Ford v. Walker ( 2007 )


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  •                          NO. 4-06-1060           Filed:   11-5-07
    IN THE APPELLATE COURT
    OF ILLINOIS
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    BOBBY FORD,                              )    Appeal from
    Plaintiff-Appellant,           )    Circuit Court of
    v.                             )    Sangamon County
    ROGER E. WALKER, JR.; Administrative     )    No. 06MR305
    Review Board Person SHERRY BENTON;       )
    Illinois Prisoner Review Board Chair-    )
    man NORMAN SUNA; Formal Head Warden      )
    GUY D. PIERCE; Formal Head Warden        )
    Designee Unknown "PP"; Adjustment Com-   )
    mittee Chairperson DAVID A. LINGLE;      )    Honorable
    and Cochairperson ANABELLE MOTTELER,     )    Patrick W. Kelley,
    Defendants-Appellees.          )    Judge Presiding.
    _________________________________________________________________
    JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
    Plaintiff, Bobby Ford, an inmate in the Illinois
    Department of Corrections (DOC), filed a complaint against
    defendants, Roger E. Walker, Jr. (DOC's Director); Administrative
    Review Board (Administrative Board) person Sherry Benton; Illi-
    nois Prisoner Review Board (Prisoner Review Board) Chairman
    Norman Suna; Formal Head Warden Designee Unknown "PP"; Adjustment
    Committee Chairperson David A. Lingle; and Cochairperson Anabelle
    Motteler, alleging his due-process rights were violated during
    four prison disciplinary proceedings.    On November 21, 2006, the
    trial court granted defendants' motions to dismiss.    Plaintiff
    appeals, arguing the court erred by dismissing his complaint.
    On June 2, 2006, plaintiff filed a pro se "petition for
    mandamus under 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983," alleging his due-
    process rights were violated during four prison disciplinary
    proceedings that resulted in revocation of good-conduct credits.
    He asserted due-process violations occurred at the adjustment-
    committee level of proceedings, including (1) insufficient
    evidence of his guilt to some of the charged offenses, (2) denial
    of his right to call witnesses, (3) denial of the opportunity to
    appear at one of his disciplinary hearings, (4) the failure of
    prison officials to timely conduct one of his disciplinary
    hearings, and (5) the failure of prison officials to conduct one
    of the disciplinary hearings at the same prison where the corre-
    sponding disciplinary report was issued.   Plaintiff also alleged
    defendants failed to correct the due-process violations on
    review, and DOC's Director, the Prisoner Review Board, and the
    Administrative Board failed to provide "factual information" for
    their decisions.
    Plaintiff requested the trial court hold the manner in
    which his good-conduct credits were revoked to be unconstitu-
    tional; compel restoration of his good-conduct credits and
    expungement of disciplinary reports; order defendants to provide
    him with a factual basis for decisions relating to the denial of
    his grievances, revocation of his good-conduct credits, and his
    prolonged placement in punitive segregation; and order defendants
    to adhere to and abide by the rules and laws governing revocation
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    of good-conduct credits.   Additionally, plaintiff asserted he was
    entitled to $100,000 in compensatory and punitive damages from
    each defendant and litigation expenses.
    Documents attached to plaintiff's complaint showed he
    received four disciplinary reports while imprisoned.   On Septem-
    ber 28, 2005, he received the first disciplinary report at issue.
    In connection with that report, the adjustment committee found
    plaintiff guilty of insolence and disobeying a direct order.   It
    recommended revocation of three months of good-conduct credits.
    Plaintiff filed a grievance, which was denied upon review by the
    Administrative Board.    The record does not contain the disciplin-
    ary report, the adjustment-committee report, or plaintiff's
    grievance; the above information is gleaned from the Administra-
    tive Board's report.
    On October 7, 2005, plaintiff received the second
    disciplinary report, citing him with disobeying a direct order,
    intimidation or threats, and insolence.   An adjustment-committee
    hearing was conducted, during which two of plaintiff's three
    witnesses were called.   The adjustment-committee report states
    the third witness was "not contacted due to being [the] reporting
    employee."   The adjustment committee found plaintiff guilty of
    disobeying a direct order and insolence and recommended revoca-
    tion of one month of plaintiff's good-conduct credits.   Plaintiff
    filed a grievance but the Administrative Board denied it.
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    On October 28, 2005, plaintiff was issued a third
    disciplinary report, citing him with assault.    The adjustment
    committee report shows a hearing was conducted and three of
    plaintiff's four witnesses were called.    The fourth witness was
    not called because his testimony was deemed to be cumulative.
    Following the hearing, the adjustment committee found plaintiff
    guilty of assault and recommended revocation of six months of his
    good-conduct credits.   Plaintiff filed a grievance, which the
    Administrative Board denied .    On January 17, 2006, the Prisoner
    Review Board adjusted the loss of good-conduct credits to three
    months.
    On January 16, 2006, plaintiff received the fourth
    disciplinary report at issue, citing him with assault, fighting,
    and threats or intimidation.    The adjustment-committee report
    shows a hearing was conducted, but plaintiff requested no wit-
    nesses and refused to appear.    The adjustment committee found
    plaintiff guilty of all three cited offenses and recommended
    revocation of one year's good-conduct credits.    The record shows
    plaintiff filed a grievance but does not contain a final decision
    by the Administrative Board.
    Defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiff's peti-
    tion pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure
    (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2004)), alleging he failed to state a
    cause of action for mandamus relief.    On November 21, 2006, the
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    trial court granted defendants' motions.
    This appeal followed.
    Initially, defendants contend plaintiff failed to
    exhaust his administrative remedies in connection with his first,
    second, and fourth disciplinary reports.   Specifically, they note
    plaintiff failed to attach the following documents to his com-
    plaint: (1) an adjustment-committee report for his first disci-
    plinary hearing, (2) grievances he filed in connection with his
    first, second, and fourth disciplinary reports, and (3) the
    Administrative Board's decision in connection with his fourth
    disciplinary report.
    A party aggrieved by an administrative decision cannot
    seek judicial review unless he has first pursued all available
    administrative remedies.   Johnson v. Department of Corrections,
    
    368 Ill. App. 3d 147
    , 150, 
    857 N.E.2d 282
    , 285 (2006).   The
    doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies to
    grievances filed by inmates.    Johnson, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 150,
    
    857 N.E.2d at 285
    .
    Contrary to defendants' contentions, the documents
    plaintiff attached to his complaint were sufficient to show he
    exhausted administrative remedies in connection with his first
    three disciplinary reports.    However, with respect to his fourth
    disciplinary report, plaintiff failed to show his grievance had
    administrative finality and, therefore, did not meet his burden
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    of showing the exhaustion of administrative remedies.    See Reyes
    v. Walker, 
    358 Ill. App. 3d 1122
    , 1125-26, 
    833 N.E.2d 379
    , 382
    (2005).    Although plaintiff attached the Administrative Board's
    final decision to his appellate brief (showing reduction of the
    amount of his good-conduct credits to zero), documents appended
    to briefs that were not included in the record on appeal will be
    ignored.    In re Parentage of Melton, 
    321 Ill. App. 3d 823
    , 826,
    
    748 N.E.2d 291
    , 294 (2001).    Thus, our review is limited to
    proceedings in connection with only the first three disciplinary
    reports.
    On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred by
    granting defendants' motions to dismiss.    A section 2-615 motion
    challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint.    Gilchrist v.
    Snyder, 
    351 Ill. App. 3d 639
    , 642, 
    814 N.E.2d 147
    , 150 (2004).
    Pursuant to that section, "[d]ismissal is appropriate only where,
    viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the
    plaintiff, it is clear that no set of facts can be proved under
    the pleadings that will entitle the plaintiff to relief."
    Gilchrist, 
    351 Ill. App. 3d at 642
    , 
    814 N.E.2d at 150
    .    A trial
    court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to section 2-615 is
    subject to de novo review.    Gilchrist, 
    351 Ill. App. 3d at 642
    ,
    
    814 N.E.2d at 150
    .
    "An allegation of a due-process-rights violation ***
    states a cause of action in mandamus."     Dye v. Pierce, 369 Ill.
    - 6 -
    App. 3d 683, 687, 
    868 N.E.2d 293
    , 296 (2006).     Mandamus is an
    extraordinary remedy that may be used to compel a public officer
    to perform his official duties that do not involve an exercise of
    discretion.   Lewis E. v. Spagnolo, 
    186 Ill. 2d 198
    , 229, 
    710 N.E.2d 798
    , 813 (1999).   "A writ of mandamus will not be granted
    unless the plaintiff can show a clear, affirmative right to
    relief, a clear duty of the defendant to act, and clear authority
    in the defendant to comply with the writ."     Spagnolo, 
    186 Ill. 2d at 229
    , 
    710 N.E.2d at 813
    .   Such relief "'is not appropriate to
    regulate a course of official conduct or to enforce the perfor-
    mance of official duties generally.'"     Cannon v. Quinley, 
    351 Ill. App. 3d 1120
    , 1127, 
    815 N.E.2d 443
    , 449 (2004), quoting
    Hatch v. Szymanski, 
    325 Ill. App. 3d 736
    , 739, 
    759 N.E.2d 585
    ,
    588 (2001).
    In his complaint, plaintiff argued he was denied due
    process during his prison disciplinary proceedings.    Principles
    of due process require an inmate receive (1) notice of disciplin-
    ary charges at least 24 hours prior to a hearing, (2) the oppor-
    tunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when
    consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, and
    (3) a written statement by the fact finder of the evidence relied
    upon to support a finding of guilt.     Cannon, 
    351 Ill. App. 3d at 1127
    , 
    815 N.E.2d at 449
    , citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    ,
    563-66, 
    41 L. Ed. 2d 935
    , 955-56, 
    94 S. Ct. 2963
    , 2978-79 (1974).
    - 7 -
    First, plaintiff contended his due-process rights were
    violated because the adjustment committee's guilty findings in
    connection with his October 7, 2005, and October 25, 2005,
    disciplinary reports were not supported by the evidence.    To find
    an inmate guilty of a charged offense, the adjustment committee
    "must be reasonably satisfied there is some evidence that the
    offender committed the offense."    20 Ill. Adm. Code §504.80(j)(1-
    ), as amended by 
    27 Ill. Reg. 6214
    , 6229 (eff. May 1, 2003).
    Plaintiff's claims are insufficient to show his due-process
    rights were violated.    The relevant adjustment-committee deci-
    sions were attached to his complaint.    Each decision shows the
    committee provided the basis for its guilty finding and included
    the facts relied upon by the committee.    A review of those
    documents shows the committee's decisions were supported by "some
    evidence" as required.
    Second, plaintiff argued he was denied his right to
    call witnesses at his October 13, 2005, disciplinary hearing.
    The adjustment committee may deny an inmate's witness request "if
    the witness's testimony would be irrelevant, cumulative, or would
    jeopardize the safety or disrupt the security of the facility,
    among other reasons."    Cannon, 
    351 Ill. App. 3d at 1131
    , 
    815 N.E.2d at 452
    .   Since it is within the committee's discretion to
    deny an inmate's witness request, such a decision may not be
    challenged in an mandamus petition.     Cannon, 
    351 Ill. App. 3d at 1131
    , 
    815 N.E.2d at 452
    .
    - 8 -
    The remainder of plaintiff's alleged due-process
    violations concern proceedings in connection with only his fourth
    disciplinary report.   Because he failed to prove exhaustion of
    administrative remedies as to that report, we do not consider
    those allegations on appeal.
    Here, plaintiff failed to allege facts that would
    entitle him to mandamus relief for due-process violations at the
    adjustment-committee level of disciplinary proceedings.   It
    follows that there were no errors to correct on review from those
    proceedings, and plaintiff's argument to that effect also fails.
    In his complaint, plaintiff further argued DOC's
    director, the Administrative Board, and the Prisoner Review Board
    were required, but failed, to provide "factual information" for
    their decisions.   To support his position, plaintiff cited
    section 3-5-1(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS
    5/3-5-1(b) (West 2004)), which provides as follows:
    "If [DOC] or the Prisoner Review Board makes
    a determination *** which affects the length
    of the period of confinement or commitment,
    the committed person and his counsel shall be
    advised of factual information relied upon
    *** to make the determination."
    Pursuant to section 3-5-1(b), "any time a decision affecting the
    length of commitment is made, the committed person is entitled to
    know the factual basis for that decision."   Hynes v. Snyder, 355
    - 9 -
    Ill. App. 3d 394, 402, 
    823 N.E.2d 231
    , 238 (2005).
    In this instance, the decisions affecting the length of
    plaintiff's commitment were the revocations of his good-conduct
    credit.   The record reflects he was advised of the factual basis
    for the revocations at the adjustment-committee level of proceed-
    ings.   Section 3-5-1(b) does not require more than this.   (Al-
    though plaintiff failed to attach one of the adjustment commit-
    tee's decisions to his complaint, we note his argument is based
    on the fact that he did not receive "factual information" from
    the director, the Administrative Board, or the Prisoner Review
    Board, not that he failed to receive the appropriate information
    from the adjustment committee.)
    In this case, plaintiff failed to allege facts suffi-
    cient to show due-process violations at the adjustment-committee
    level or that he failed to receive the "factual information"
    relied upon to revoke his good-conduct credits.    His complaint
    failed to state a cause of action for mandamus relief.
    Finally, we note, defendant filed a pro se "petition
    for mandamus under 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983."     Plaintiff's
    complaint did not distinguish between claims for mandamus relief
    and claims brought under section 1983.   Nevertheless, revocation
    of good-conduct credit may be reviewed pursuant to section 1983
    of the Civil Rights Act (
    42 U.S.C. §1983
     (2000)) where the inmate
    seeks damages or injunctive relief.    Wolff, 
    418 U.S. at 554-55
    ,
    
    41 L. Ed. 2d at 950
    , 
    94 S. Ct. at 2974
    ; see also Mason v. Snyder,
    - 10 -
    
    332 Ill. App. 3d 834
    , 844, 
    774 N.E.2d 457
    , 465 (2002) (Cook, J.,
    dissenting).    However, for the same reasons already stated,
    plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts that would entitle
    him to relief.
    Additionally, "where success in a prisoner's [section]
    1983 damages action would implicitly question the validity of
    conviction or duration of sentence, the litigant must first
    achieve favorable termination of his available state, or federal
    habeas, opportunities to challenge the underlying conviction or
    sentence."     Muhammad v. Close, 
    540 U.S. 749
    , 751, 
    158 L. Ed. 2d 32
    , 36, 
    124 S. Ct. 1303
    , 1304 (2004), citing Heck v. Humphrey,
    
    512 U.S. 477
    , 
    129 L. Ed. 2d 383
    , 
    114 S. Ct. 2364
     (1994).    Here,
    plaintiff's success in this action would implicitly question the
    validity of his disciplinary proceedings and the duration of his
    sentence.    Thus, his section 1983 claim must also fail because he
    failed to show a previous successful challenge to his disciplin-
    ary proceedings.
    Here, plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts that
    would entitle him to mandamus relief or relief under section
    1983.   The trial court did not err by granting defendants'
    motions to dismiss.
    For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
    judgment.
    Affirmed.
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    KNECHT and TURNER, JJ., concur.
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