IL Department of Central Management Services v. IL Labor Relations Board ( 2007 )


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  •                            NO. 4-06-0083      Filed 5/2/07
    IN THE APPELLATE COURT
    OF ILLINOIS
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, DEPARTMENT OF    )    Direct Appeal from
    CENTRAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES (DEPARTMENT )    Illinois Labor
    OF CORRECTIONS),                        )    Relations Board,
    Petitioner-Appellant,         )    State Panel
    v.                            )
    THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, LABOR RELATIONS )
    BOARD, STATE PANEL; JACKIE GALLAGHER,   )    No. S-CA-03-002
    MICHAEL HADE, CHARLES HERNANDEZ, REX    )        S-CA-03-052
    PIPER, and LETITIA TAYLOR, the Members )         S-CA-03-054
    of Said Board and Panel in Their        )        S-CA-03-056
    Official Capacity Only; and THE         )        S-CA-03-064
    AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY    )        S-CA-03-068
    AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, COUNCIL 31,    )        S-CA-03-090
    Respondents-Appellees.        )        S-CA-03-092
    ______________________________________________________________
    JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:
    This case arises out of an impasse in negotiations
    between petitioner, the State of Illinois Department of Central
    Management Services (Department of Corrections) (hereinafter
    CMS), and respondent American Federation of State, County, and
    Municipal Employees, Council 31 (hereinafter AFSCME).   The
    negotiations involved the impact on security employees of CMS's
    closure of several correctional facilities.   AFSCME was the
    exclusive representative of the employees at issue.   Both parties
    agree that the employees in question are "security employees" as
    defined by the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Act) (5 ILCS
    315/3(p) (West 2002)).   Because security employees are afforded
    access to certain dispute-resolution procedures under section 14
    of the Act, both parties often refer to the security employees as
    section 14 employees (5 ILCS 315/14 (West 2002)).   This case
    centers around the scope of section 14 dispute-resolution proce-
    dures afforded to section 14 employees, specifically whether
    section 14 authorizes "midterm interest arbitration," i.e.,
    arbitration in the middle of a contract as opposed to its begin-
    ning or end.
    On December 21, 2005, respondent Illinois Labor Rela-
    tions Board (Board) issued a decision and order finding that (1)
    section 14 authorizes "interest arbitration" for disputes involv-
    ing section 14 employees in "midterm" disputes and not merely in
    "initial" or "successor" disputes; and (2) the collective-bar-
    gaining agreement relevant to this case did not contain a waiver
    of the statutory right to midterm interest arbitration for
    security employees.   In keeping with these findings, the Board
    held that CMS violated sections 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(4) of the Act
    when it refused to proceed to impasse resolution pursuant to
    section 14 of the Act (5 ILCS 315/10(a)(1), (a)(4) (West 2002)).
    The Board ordered CMS to cease and desist from refusing to
    proceed to impasse resolution pursuant to section 14.   The Board
    did not allow immediate access to interest arbitration but
    instead ordered the parties to design a process for the resolu-
    tion of the dispute under section 14(p), with any disagreements
    subject to the Board's compliance (5 ILCS 315/14(p) (West 2002)).
    - 2 -
    CMS appeals the Board's findings.       American Federation of State,
    County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 22 Pub. Employee
    Rep. (Ill.) par. 10, Nos. S-CA-03-002, S-CA-03-048, S-CA-03-052,
    S-CA-03-054, S-CA-03-056, S-CA-03-064, S-CA-03-068, S-CA-03-090,
    S-CA-03-092 (Illinois Labor Relations Board, State Panel, Decem-
    ber 21, 2005) (hereinafter 22 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 10).
    We affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    At all times relevant, a bargaining agreement between
    CMS and AFSCME was in effect.   The bargaining agreement was
    extensive in nature and was part of a long-standing relationship
    of bargaining agreements between the parties. The bargaining
    agreement contained a general no-strike provision, which applied
    to all employees, both section 14 security employees and nonsec-
    tion 14 employees.   In contrast, by statute, section 14 employees
    are generally prohibited from striking and nonsection 14 employ-
    ees generally have the right to strike.      5 ILCS 315/17 (West
    2002) (general right-to-strike provision).      As is required when a
    bargaining agreement contains a no-strike clause, the bargaining
    agreement also contained a grievance-arbitration provision, which
    applied to all employees in the bargaining unit and provided for
    final and binding arbitration of disputes concerning the adminis-
    tration or interpretation of the bargaining agreement.      See 5
    ILCS 315/8 (West 2002) (bargaining agreements that contain no-
    - 3 -
    strike clauses must also contain grievance-arbitration provi-
    sions).   The bargaining agreement also contained a memorandum of
    understanding in its appendix, which provided that, within 60
    days of the employer's announcement of a correctional-facility
    closure, the parties "agree to negotiate over such matters that
    may impact upon employees *** on questions of wages, hours[,] and
    other conditions of employment."   Accordingly, in 2002, CMS and
    AFSCME entered into negotiations concerning the impact that the
    closure of nine correctional facilities would have on security
    employees.
    The parties were unable to reach full agreement on
    several points concerning the closure of the facilities.   The
    subjects on which the parties reached impasse included issues
    relating to the filling of vacancies and transfer, recall, and
    seniority rights of the affected employees.   It appears that
    these issues were not specifically covered by the bargaining
    agreement.   AFSCME requested that the parties enter into "inter-
    est arbitration" to resolve the remaining issues.   AFSCME thought
    that it had a statutory right to interest arbitration under
    section 14 of the Act, entitled "Security Employee, Peace Offi-
    cer[,] and Fire Fighter Disputes," which delineates interest-
    arbitration procedures of security employees (5 ILCS 315/14 (West
    2002)).   CMS refused to enter into interest arbitration, and
    implemented its "final offer" as determined by the 2002 negotia-
    - 4 -
    tions, including all the terms upon which the parties were unable
    to agree.
    In the July through October 2002 period, AFSCME filed
    nine unfair-labor-practice charges against CMS, each alleging
    that CMS violated sections 10(a)(1) and 10(a)(4) of the Act
    because CMS refused to proceed to interest arbitration (5 ILCS
    315/10(a)(1), (a)(4) (West 2002)).      These sections state that an
    employer commits unfair labor practice under the Act when it
    restrains an employee's ability to exercise the rights guaranteed
    by the Act (5 ILCS 315/10(a)(1) (West 2002)) and when it
    "refuse[s] to bargain collectively in good faith with a labor
    organization which is the exclusive representative of public
    employees in an appropriate unit, including, but not limited to,
    the discussing of grievances with the exclusive representative"
    (5 ILCS 315/10(a)(4) (West 2002)).      AFSCME's nine complaints were
    ultimately consolidated into one.    AFSCME withdrew No. 5-CA-03-
    048.   In June 2004, the case went before an administrative law
    judge (ALJ), who found in favor of AFSCME.     The ALJ ordered the
    parties to proceed to "interest arbitration" under section 14.
    American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees,
    Council 31, 22 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 10, Nos. S-CA-03-
    002, S-CA-03-052, S-CA-03-054, S-CA-03-056, S-CA-03-064, S-CA-03-
    068, S-CA-03-090, S-CA-03-092 (Illinois Labor Relations Board,
    State Panel, ALJ recommended decision and order, April 25, 2005).
    - 5 -
    CMS filed exceptions, and the case then went before the
    Board.   Both parties stipulated that there was "no issue" as to
    whether this dispute should be "deferred" to the grievance-
    arbitration procedures contained in the bargaining agreement.    By
    this, we presume the parties meant that the existence of the
    grievance-arbitration provision contained within the bargaining
    agreement did not (1) require a finding that the current dispute
    should be resolved through the contractual grievance-arbitration
    procedures rather than the statutory procedures, or (2) preclude
    the Board from addressing whether the Act also authorized midterm
    interest arbitration.   AFSCME stated in closing that the issue of
    whether good-faith bargaining had occurred was a statutory issue
    and was not to be determined by the contractual grievance-arbi-
    tration procedures.   CMS argued that AFSCME did not have a
    statutory right to midterm interest arbitration because, accord-
    ing to CMS's interpretation of the statute, section 14 gave
    security employees the right to interest arbitration only for
    disputes arising during the formation of "initial" or "successor"
    contracts (i.e., comprehensive bargaining agreements), not for
    "midterm" disputes (i.e., an ancillary dispute arising while the
    bargaining agreement is still in effect) that were not the
    subject of contract "reopeners" (i.e., where the parties agree to
    "reopen" the agreement or designated part of the agreement).    In
    the alternative, CMS argued that AFSCME contractually waived any
    - 6 -
    statutory right to midterm interest arbitration.
    The Board found that the Act allowed for midterm
    interest arbitration and declined to follow CMS's narrow inter-
    pretation of section 14.    Instead, the Board relied largely on
    the general policy language in section 2 of the Act, which states
    that all collective-bargaining disputes involving security
    employees shall be submitted to impartial arbitrators (5 ILCS
    315/2 (West 2002)).   The Board also held that AFSCME did not
    contractually waive its statutory right to access midterm inter-
    est arbitration in this matter.    The Board ordered CMS to desist
    from "[r]efusing to proceed to impasse resolution, pursuant to
    [s]ection 14 of the Act."    22 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 10,
    at 28.   The Board's decision differs slightly from that of the
    ALJ because the ALJ ordered the parties to proceed to interest
    arbitration.   However, the Board stated that "[s]ection 14 of the
    Act does not contemplate immediate access to interest arbitra-
    tion, without some sort of mediation attempt, unless the parties
    agree to such a process."    22 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par. 10,
    at 29.   Therefore, pursuant to section 14(p), the Board ordered
    the parties to design a process for the resolution of this
    dispute, with any disagreements subject to the Board's compliance
    (5 ILCS 315/14(p) (West 2002)).    Section 14(p) states that
    "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of [section 14] the employer
    and exclusive representative may agree to submit unresolved
    - 7 -
    disputes concerning wages, hours, terms[,] and conditions of
    employment to an alternative form of impasse resolution."      5 ILCS
    315/14(p) (West 2002).
    CMS filed a petition for judicial review of the Board's
    decision, and a question exists as to whether said petition was
    timely filed.   The Board and AFSCME each filed separate appellate
    briefs in support of the Board's decision.    Additionally, the
    American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organiza-
    tions (AFL-CIO) and the Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor
    Council (IFO-PLC) each filed separate amicus curiae briefs in
    support of the Board's decision.
    II. ANALYSIS
    A. Timing
    The Board argues that, as a threshold issue, this
    appeal should be dismissed because CMS's petition for direct
    review was not timely filed.    Parties proceeding before an
    administrative agency shall be barred from obtaining judicial
    review of the agency's decision if review is not sought within
    the time and in the manner provided by the statute.    735 ILCS
    5/3-102 (West 2004); Rodriguez v. Sheriff's Merit Comm'n of Kane
    County, 
    218 Ill. 2d 342
    , 349-50, 
    843 N.E.2d 379
    , 382-83 (2006).
    Section 11(e) of the Act states that any direct appeal should be
    filed within 35 days from the date that a copy of the decision
    sought to be reviewed was served upon the parties.    5 ILCS
    - 8 -
    315/11(e) (West 2002).    Because the term "service" is not defined
    by the Act, we must defer to section 3-113 of the Administrative
    Review Law, which provides in relevant part:
    "The method of service of the decision shall
    be as provided in the Act governing the pro-
    cedure before the administrative agency, but
    if no method is provided, a decision shall be
    deemed to have been served either when a copy
    of the decision is personally delivered or
    when a copy of the decision is deposited in
    the United States mail ***."   (Emphasis
    added.)   735 ILCS 5/3-113 (West 2002).
    Illinois precedent is clear that date of "service" means the date
    that the decision was mailed, not the date it was received.
    
    Rodriguez, 218 Ill. 2d at 351
    , 843 N.E.2d at 383.
    Here, the Board issued its decision on December 21,
    2005, and asserts that it mailed out its decision on the same
    day.   CMS received the decision on December 23, 2005.    CMS filed
    its petition on Friday, January 27, 2006, 37 days after the
    decision was mailed, but only 35 days after the date the decision
    was received.
    CMS requests, however, that we find exception to the
    definition of service contained in section 3-113 because the
    Board's own regulations concerning the time limits set forth in
    - 9 -
    the Act deem that "[s]ervice of a document upon a party by mail
    shall be presumed complete three days after mailing, if proof of
    service shows the document was properly addressed."      80 Ill. Adm.
    Code §1200.30(c) (Conway Green CD-ROM June 2003); see also 145
    Ill. 2d R. 12 (also declining to label date of service as the
    date the document was mailed, stating that service by mail is
    complete four days after mailing).      Case law supports CMS's
    request, and we agree.
    Section 1200.30 was explicit in providing that its
    provisions applied "in computing any period of time prescribed by
    the Act."   80 Ill. Adm. Code §1200.30(a) (Conway Green CD-ROM
    June 2003).    The Board concedes that case law has found that an
    administrative agency may, under its general authority to inter-
    pret its governing statutes, define "service" as occurring
    sometime after mailing, and that section 1200.30 was intended to
    change the statutory service provisions of section 3-113 of the
    Administrative Review Law.    Moren v. Department of Human Rights,
    
    338 Ill. App. 3d 906
    , 909, 
    790 N.E.2d 86
    , 88-89 (2003); Board of
    Education of Plainfield Community Consolidated School District
    No. 202 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 143 Ill.
    App. 3d 898, 903, 
    493 N.E.2d 1130
    , 1133-34 (1986) (Fourth Dis-
    trict); Water Pipe Extension, Bureau of Engineering, Laborers
    Local 1092 v. City of Chicago, 
    195 Ill. App. 3d 50
    , 56, 
    551 N.E.2d 1324
    , 1326 (1990).
    - 10 -
    However, the Board contends that section 1200.30
    applies only to in-Board proceedings, not to petitions for
    judicial review, and therefore is not applicable to the instant
    case.   The Board argues that its 2004 amendment to the regula-
    tions, which added section 1200.3 (80 Ill. Adm. Code §1200.3
    (added by emergency rulemaking at 28 Ill. Reg. 7529, eff. May 12,
    2004)), now prohibits section 1200.30's application to external
    procedures, such as a petition for judicial review and that
    Moren, School District 202, and Local 1092 no longer apply.        We
    disagree.
    The amendment inserted a general policy statement,
    section 1200.3, preceding section 1200.30.     80 Ill. Adm. Code
    §1200.3 (added at 28 Ill. Reg. 15154, eff. November 1, 2004)).
    The general policy statement provided:
    "The regulations contained in this Part
    detail the procedures that employers, employ-
    ees[,] and labor organizations should use
    when filing petitions pursuant to parts 1210
    [representation proceedings], 1220 [unfair
    labor charges,] and 1230 [impasse resolu-
    tion], which implement the provisions of the
    Illinois Public Labor Relations Act ***."
    (Emphases added.)   80 Ill. Adm. Code §1200.3
    (added at 28 Ill. Reg. 15154, 15160 (eff.
    - 11 -
    November 1, 2004)).
    The Board asserts that the regulations contained in this part
    only apply to internal procedures following the amendment because
    section 1200.3 refers only to petitions filed under sections
    1210, 1220, and 1230, which are all, according to the Board,
    internal procedures.
    However, section 1200.30 is also contained in the
    "Part" to which section 1200.3 refers.    Moreover, section
    1200.30, the specific regulation concerning timing of service,
    remains unchanged and still explicitly states that the timing
    provision applies "any period of time prescribed by the Act or
    this Part."   (Emphases added.)   80 Ill. Adm. Code §1200.30
    (Conway Green CD-Rom June 2003).    The timing of a petition for
    judicial review is a "period of time prescribed by the Act."    As
    such, section 1200.30 should continue to apply to external
    procedures as dictated by case-law precedent.    As stated in
    Moren, it would be "fundamentally unfair to penalize [the]
    petitioner for relying on procedural rules promulgated by the
    very agency from which [it] seeks judicial review."     
    Moren, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 910
    , 790 N.E.2d at 89.
    B. Standard of Review
    The Board concedes that this court should apply a de
    novo standard of review in evaluating the Board's determination
    that the Act authorized midterm interest arbitration.    See Wilson
    - 12 -
    v. Department of Professional Regulation, 
    344 Ill. App. 3d 897
    ,
    907, 
    801 N.E.2d 36
    , 44 (2003) (de novo review of an administra-
    tive agency's decision is limited to matters involving statutory
    interpretation).   However, the Board argues, and we agree, that,
    to the extent that there are any ambiguities, this court should
    give deference to the administrative agency's interpretation of
    the Act it was created to enforce.       County of Will v. Illinois
    State Labor Relations Board, 
    219 Ill. App. 3d 183
    , 185, 
    580 N.E.2d 884
    , 885 (1991), citing City of Decatur v. American
    Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees Local 268, 
    122 Ill. 2d 353
    , 361, 
    522 N.E.2d 1219
    , 1222 (1988).      It is reasonable
    to defer to an agency's interpretation of its enabling statute
    because the agency presumably makes informed decisions based on
    its experience and expertise.    County of 
    Will, 219 Ill. App. 3d at 185
    , 580 N.E.2d at 885.   Other courts have characterized this
    form of deference to the agency's interpretation as "relevant but
    not binding," stressing that de novo review still applies.
    Branson v. Department of Revenue, 
    168 Ill. 2d 247
    , 254, 
    659 N.E.2d 961
    , 965 (1995).
    The issue of waiver turns on an application of the
    relevant law to the particular facts of the case.      Specifically,
    we must ask whether the language in the bargaining agreement
    meets the "clear and unmistakable" standard for a party to a
    labor agreement's waiver of a statutory right.      See American
    - 13 -
    Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Illinois
    State Labor Relations Board, 
    274 Ill. App. 3d 327
    , 334, 
    653 N.E.2d 1357
    , 1362 (1995) (regarding "clear and unmistakable"
    standard).   Where the Board's determination is best considered a
    mixed question of law and fact, the "clearly erroneous" standard
    of review is appropriate.   City of Belvidere v. Illinois State
    Labor Relations Board, 
    181 Ill. 2d 191
    , 205, 
    692 N.E.2d 295
    , 302
    (1998).
    C. Statutory Right to Interest Arbitration
    The crux of CMS's argument on appeal is that the plain
    language of section 14, entitled "Security Employee, Peace
    Officer[,] and Fire Fighter Disputes," simply does not grant
    security employees the statutory right to the interest arbitra-
    tion in order to resolve midterm interest disputes.    Before we go
    any further in discussing CMS's argument, we clarify that the
    Board did not hold that section 14 guaranteed security employees
    a right to immediate access to interest arbitration.      Rather, the
    Board held that section 14 authorizes midterm interest arbitra-
    tion for security employees.
    In applying provisions of a statute, our primary goal
    is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature,
    and the language of the statute itself is the best indicator of
    the legislature's intent.   See Price v. Philip Morris, Inc., 
    219 Ill. 2d 182
    , 242, 
    848 N.E.2d 1
    , 37 (2005).   CMS contends that
    - 14 -
    section 14's specific reference to initial and successor con-
    tracts without referencing midterm disputes means that section 14
    does not cover midterm disputes.   The portions of section 14 to
    which CMS points in support of its argument state:
    "(a) In the case of collective[-]bargaining
    agreements involving units of security em-
    ployees of a public employer, *** and in the
    case of disputes under [s]ection 18, unless
    the parties mutually agree to some other time
    limit, mediation shall commence 30 days prior
    to the expiration date of such agreement ***.
    In the case of negotiations for an initial
    collective[-]bargaining agreement, mediation
    shall commence upon 15 days notice from
    either party ***.   If any dispute has not
    been resolved within 15 days after the first
    meeting of the parties and the mediator, or
    within some other time limit as may be
    mutually agreed upon by the parties, either
    [party] may request *** arbitration, and shall
    submit a copy of the request to the Board."
    (Emphases added.)   5 ILCS 315/14(a) (West
    2002).
    And:
    - 15 -
    "(h) Where there is no agreement between
    the parties, or where there is an agreement
    but the parties have begun negotiations ***
    looking into a new agreement or amendment
    of the existing agreement, and the wage rates
    or other conditions of employment under the
    proposed new or amended agreement are in dis-
    pute, the arbitration panel shall base its
    findings, opinions and order upon the follow-
    ing factors, as applicable: ***."   (Emphasis
    added.)   5 ILCS 315/14(h) (West 2002)
    ("agreement" means a collective-bargaining
    agreement, not a settlement of terms).
    (Also, it appears to be CMS's position that the term "amended
    agreement" refers to a "reopened" contract term, and not a
    midterm dispute.)     Contrary to CMS's assertion, the plain lan-
    guage of section 14 does not omit all references to midterm
    disputes.    Though section 14's references to midterm disputes are
    not as obvious as its references to initial and successor con-
    tracts or even to contract "reopeners," they are subtly present.
    For example, subsection 14(a) specifies that the dispute-resolu-
    tion procedures delineated in section 14 (i.e., including inter-
    est arbitration) are available to section 18 disputes.      5 ILCS
    315/14(a) (West 2002) ("In the case of collective[-]bargaining
    - 16 -
    [disputes] involving *** security employees *** and in the case
    of disputes under [s]ection 18").    Section 18 authorizes the
    courts to relegate employees who have the right to strike to
    resolve their disputes under section 14 procedure when the act of
    striking might present a clear and present danger to the public.
    5 ILCS 315/18 (West 2002).    Because there is no statutory dis-
    tinction between an employee's right to strike midterm and an
    employee's right to strike in support of its position regarding
    an initial or successor contract, section 14 authorizes the use
    of its procedures to employees who are potentially involved in a
    midterm dispute.
    CMS supplements its "plain-language" argument with the
    contention that the interest-arbitration timetables set forth in
    section 14 are unworkable for resolution of midterm disputes.
    CMS notes that it could take over 170 days to resolve an ancil-
    lary issue, during which time the employer would be prohibited
    from changing any existing wages, hours, or other conditions of
    employment during the pendency of the arbitration proceeding.      5
    ILCS 315/14(l) (West 2002).    This argument is ultimately uncon-
    vincing.   The timetable set forth in section 14 is directory, not
    mandatory.   See City of Seattle, Wash. Public Employment Rela-
    tions Comm'n Decision, No. 1667-A (February 28, 1984) (recogniz-
    ing the directory/mandatory distinction), available at
    http://www.perc.wa.gov/databases/ulp/1677-a.htm (last visited
    - 17 -
    April 13, 2007).   In fact, the Act specifically states that the
    parties may mutually agree to "some other time limit."   5 ILCS
    315/14(a) (West 2002).   Also, it is important to remember that
    the Board's actual order in this case required the parties to
    design their own process for the resolution of the dispute, with
    any disagreements subject to the Board's compliance process.     5
    ILCS 315/14(p) (West 2002).   Hence, the parties here were not
    bound by particular statutory time constraints.
    State of Connecticut Office of Labor Relations v.
    Connecticut State Employees Ass'n, Connecticut State Board of
    Labor Relations Decision No. 2860 (October 30, 1990), which CMS
    cites, most plainly illustrates CMS's argument that the specific
    provisions of section 14 preclude midterm interest arbitration.
    The Connecticut labor board held that because the arbitration
    provision at issue specifically referenced initial and successor
    contracts, as well as contract "reopeners," but did not reference
    midterm disputes, the arbitration provision could not be inter-
    preted to cover midterm disputes.   Connecticut, slip order at 6.
    Interestingly, shortly after the board came out with its decision
    in Connecticut, the Connecticut legislature added a clause to the
    arbitration provision that expressly provided for midterm inter-
    est arbitration.   See Conn. Pub. Act 91-290, eff. October 1, 1991
    (adding section 5-276a(c) to the statute (see Conn. Gen. Stat.
    §5-276a(c) (1998)); State of Connecticut v. Connecticut Employees
    - 18 -
    Union Independent, Inc., No. CV93-0704068 (October 22, 1993)
    (unreported decision by Connecticut Superior Court judge implic-
    itly affirming the board's determination that section 5-276a(c)
    applied to certain midterm bargaining negotiations) (1993 Conn.
    Super. LEXIS 2726).    Additionally, we note that the labor board
    in Connecticut failed to consider policy arguments that the
    instant Act, as will be discussed below, requires us to consider.
    Most basically, the Connecticut board did not consider the
    specific arbitration provision in conjunction with a more general
    policy clause.
    Looking to the language of section 14 is not enough;
    this court must evaluate the statute as a whole and, if possible,
    construe it so that no term is rendered superfluous or meaning-
    less.   Texaco-Cities Service Pipeline Co. v. McGaw, 
    182 Ill. 2d 262
    , 270, 
    695 N.E.2d 481
    , 485 (1998).    Section 2 of the Act,
    entitled "Policy," also makes specific reference as to how
    disputes involving security employees are to be resolved:
    "[A]ll collective[-]bargaining disputes in-
    volving persons *** defined herein as secu-
    rity employees shall be submitted to impar-
    tial arbitrators, who shall be authorized to
    issue awards in order to resolve such dis-
    putes.   It is the public policy of the State
    of Illinois that where the right of employees
    - 19 -
    to strike is prohibited by law, it is neces-
    sary to afford an alternate, expeditious,
    equitable[,] and effective procedure for the
    resolution of labor disputes subject to ap-
    proval procedures mandated by this Act.    To
    that end, the provisions for such awards
    shall be liberally construed."    (Emphases
    added.)   5 ILCS 315/2 (West 2002).
    CMS argues that the general policy provisions of
    section 2, indicating that "all" collective-bargaining disputes
    should be resolved through arbitration, is in conflict with the
    more specific provisions of section 14.    When interpreting
    legislative intent, specific provisions control over the more
    general provisions.   Knolls Condominium Ass'n v. Harms, 
    202 Ill. 2d
    450, 459, 
    781 N.E.2d 261
    , 267 (2002).    However, the statutes
    should be construed in harmony with each other if at all possible
    so that no provisions are rendered inoperative.     Knolls, 
    202 Ill. 2d
    at 
    458-59, 781 N.E.2d at 267
    .
    The key to harmonizing the two sections is that section
    2 mandates "alternate, expeditious, equitable[,] and effective
    procedure" for labor disputes where the employees who are prohib-
    ited from striking "by law."   (Emphasis added.)    5 ILCS 315/2
    (West 2002).   The phrase "alternate, expeditious, equitable[,]
    and effective" is a statutorily mandated right. Section 2 makes
    - 20 -
    clear the legislature's intent that the statutory dispute-resolu-
    tion rights of employees who do not have the statutory right to
    strike be commensurate with the right to strike.
    In reaching impasse in a typical negotiation, an
    employer has the right to unilaterally implement its final offer
    and an employee has the right to strike in support of its bar-
    gaining demands.   Local Union No. 47 v. National Labor Relations
    Board, 
    927 F.2d 635
    , 640 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Hydrologics, Inc., 
    293 N.L.R.B. 1060
    , 1062 n.13, 
    131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1350
    , 1353 n.10, citing
    Speedrack, Inc., 
    293 N.L.R.B. 1054
    , 1055-56, 
    131 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1347
    (1989).   Providing each party with an economic weapon puts the
    parties on more equal footing.   Local Union No. 
    47, 927 F.2d at 643
    , citing National Labor Relations Board v. Lion Oil Co., 
    352 U.S. 282
    , 290-91, 
    1 L. Ed. 2d 331
    , 338-39, 
    77 S. Ct. 330
    , 335
    (1957).   However, employees who do not have the statutory right
    to strike, such as the security employees in the instant case,
    would not be on equal footing with the employer were the employer
    to implement its final offer upon reaching impasse.     Such a
    result is not in line with the plain language of section 2, which
    states that it is necessary to provide employees who are statuto-
    rily prohibited from striking with an alternate and equitable
    means of resolving their disputes.     The Act itself grants a
    general right to strike to non-section 14 employees and makes no
    distinction as to whether that right applies only to initial-
    - 21 -
    successor disputes or whether that right applies to midterm
    disputes.   See 5 ILCS 315/17 (West 2002) (granting nonsection 14
    employees a general right to strike).    As such, the statutory
    dispute-resolution procedures of section 14, the only section
    detailing dispute-resolution procedures for section 14 employees,
    must cover midterm disputes as well as initial-successor disputes
    if said dispute-resolution procedures are to be alternate and
    equitable to the right to strike.    See Seattle, Wash. Public
    Employment Relations Comm'n Decision No. 1667-A (using similar
    reasoning to determine that despite the statute's specific
    reference to initial and successor contracts only, the union was
    entitled to interest arbitration under the statute, if necessary,
    to resolve a midterm dispute upon reaching impasse in bargain-
    ing).   As stated by the commission in Seattle, "[t]he balance of
    power would be tipped in favor of the employer by the [statutory
    provisions prohibiting striking], which clearly preclude the
    alternative of economic action [that] would have been available
    to [those employees with the right to strike]."    Seattle, Wash.
    Public Employment Relations Comm'n Decision No. 1667-A (1984),
    slip order at 4.    We will hereinafter call the argument that
    section 2 favors a statutory right to midterm interest arbitra-
    tion in exchange for a statutory right to strike as the "right to
    strike" argument.
    The only other case to consider the "right to strike"
    - 22 -
    argument, Dane County, Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n Decision
    No. 17400 (November 2, 1979), affm'd sub nom. Dane County Special
    Education Ass'n v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, No. 80-
    CV-0097 (Wis. Cir. Ct. of Dane County, June 9, 1980), is distin-
    guishable.    The Dane County labor board found the "right to
    strike" policy argument (slip order at 9) "compelling," (slip
    order at 11) but stated that it would not even consider the
    policy argument where it found the statutory language to be clear
    (slip order at 11-12).   The interest-arbitration provision in
    Dane County, as in the instant case, made express reference to
    initial and successor contracts only (slip order at 11).
    However, the statutory language in Dane County more
    specifically excluded midterm interest arbitration.   The Dane
    County statute contained parallel provisions, one concerning
    fact-finding procedures and one concerning interest-arbitration
    procedures.   The fact-finding language encompassed midterm
    disputes and the interest-arbitration procedure did not mention
    midterm disputes.   The Wisconsin labor board reasoned that where
    a section of a statute contains a particular provision, omission
    of the same provision in a similar section is significant to show
    different legislative intent for the two sections.    Dane County,
    slip order at 11-12; see also for example, Hamilton v. Conley,
    
    356 Ill. App. 3d 1048
    , 1056, 
    827 N.E.2d 949
    , 957 (2005).   The
    instant statute contains no such parallel provisions.
    - 23 -
    Even more important, Dane County is not persuasive
    because, unlike the general policy statement in Dane County,
    which also promoted the peaceful resolution of labor disputes,
    the policy statement in the present case makes express reference
    to the potential imbalance between employees who do not have the
    right to strike and the employers with whom they are negotiating,
    stating that it is "necessary" to afford security employees
    access to an economic bargaining weapon that is qualitatively
    similar to the right to strike.   See 5 ILCS 315/2 (West 2002).
    This express language is indication enough that we, unlike the
    Board in Dane County, must consider the "compelling" "right to
    strike" policy argument.
    CMS argues that the "right-to-strike" argument must
    fail here because finding that section 14 employees have a
    statutory right to midterm interest arbitration would afford
    section 14 employees greater rights than their nonsection 14
    counterparts in this case.   This is a result that CMS deems
    contrary to the policy statement contained within section 2,
    mandating that section 14 employees receive alternate and equita-
    ble procedure for dispute resolution.   A careful reading of
    section 2, however, shows that section 2 states that the statu-
    tory dispute-resolution rights to be granted to security employ-
    ees are to be alternate to the right to strike itself, not
    necessarily alternate to the rights afforded to other employees.
    - 24 -
    See 5 ILCS 315/2 (West 2002).    As discussed in Local Union No.
    47, the rationale behind the right to strike is to put employees
    on equal footing with employers, and it is therefore logical to
    infer that any statutory alternative to the right to strike is
    also meant to facilitate good-faith negotiations between employ-
    ers and employees.   Local Union No. 47, 
    927 F.2d 635
    , 642-43.
    We nevertheless address CMS's argument that allowing
    security employees midterm interest arbitration under the Act
    would improperly give security employees greater rights than non-
    section 14 employees.   CMS notes that the bargaining agreement
    relevant here contains a general no-strike provision that is
    applicable to all employees, both security employees that are
    statutorily prohibited from striking and nonsection 14 employees.
    CMS seems to imply that, in this case, nonsection 14 employees
    are also statutorily prohibited from striking.    See 5 ILCS 315/17
    (West 2002).   Section 17, entitled "Right to Strike," states that
    nonsection 14 employees generally have a statutory right to
    strike so long as the existing bargaining agreement does not
    prohibit the strike and so long as the existing bargaining
    agreement does not contain a final and binding arbitration
    provision.   5 ILCS 315/17 (West 2002).   Admittedly, the bargain-
    ing agreement here contains both a no-strike clause and a
    grievance-arbitration provision.    As such, CMS argues that
    finding security employees have the right to midterm interest
    - 25 -
    arbitration in certain situations, while simultaneously finding
    that nonsection 14 employees do not have the right to strike,
    affords security employees greater rights than nonsection 14
    employees.
    However, whether the nonsection 14 employees covered by
    the bargaining agreement may be statutorily prohibited from
    striking in this case is of no import.   As will be discussed
    further in the waiver section of this analysis, the no-strike
    contractual clause was not statutorily mandated.   See 5 ILCS
    315/8 (West 2002) (stating the parties have an option, upon
    mutual agreement, to forgo a no-strike clause in the bargaining
    agreement).   The fact that security employees maintain a statu-
    tory right to access midterm interest arbitration while nonsec-
    tion 14 employees lose the statutory right to strike that
    prompted the legislature to give security employees the right to
    interest arbitration in the first place results from the inter-
    play between section 17 of the statute and the unique terms of
    the particular contract at issue here.   This interplay between
    statute and a specific contract should not negate a general
    statutory right; rather, said interplay between contract and
    statute is a question more appropriate for a waiver analysis.
    D. Waiver of Statutory Right to Interest Arbitration
    CMS next contends that even if section 14 security
    employees have the statutory right to demand midterm interest
    - 26 -
    arbitration, then the security employees have waived those rights
    in the bargaining agreement.   The contractual waiver of a statu-
    tory right in a labor agreement must be "clear and unmistakable."
    
    American, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 334
    , 653 N.E.2d at 1362.    The
    language of the contract must evince an "unequivocal intent" to
    relinquish the relevant statutory right; waiver is never presumed
    and the language sustaining the waiver must be specific.     Ameri-
    can, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 
    334, 653 N.E.2d at 1362
    .    In support of
    its waiver argument, CMS points to the bargaining agreement's no-
    strike clause and its facilities-closure clause.
    As stated above, the bargaining agreement contained a
    no-strike clause, which prohibited all employees, both section 14
    and nonsection 14, from striking.   As a statutorily mandated
    tradeoff to the no-strike clause, the bargaining agreement also
    contained a grievance-arbitration provision.   See 5 ILCS 315/8
    (West 2002).   Section 8 of the Act states that, unless mutually
    agreed otherwise, the bargaining agreement shall contain a
    grievance resolution procedure that shall apply to all employees
    in the bargaining unit and shall provide for final and binding
    arbitration of disputes concerning the administration or inter-
    pretation of the bargaining agreement.   Section 8 also provides
    that whenever a bargaining agreement contains a final and binding
    arbitration provision, it shall also contain a provision prohib-
    iting strikes for the duration of the agreement.    5 ILCS 315/8
    - 27 -
    (West 2002); City of Decatur, 5 Pub. Employee Rep. (Ill.) par
    2008, No. S-CA-88-92, at X-87 (Illinois State Labor Relations
    Board 1989).   The rationale behind this tradeoff is to ensure
    that negotiations proceed in good faith by keeping the parties on
    even footing in the face of impasse.    In other words, where the
    contract takes away a party's right to strike in support of its
    bargaining position, the contract also provides that party with
    an alternative means of resolution, preventing the employer from
    unilaterally implementing its final offer before utilizing
    mediation and arbitration procedures.
    Contrary to CMS's assertion, the coterminous no-strike
    clause and grievance-arbitration clause do not require this court
    to find that the security employees have waived their statutory
    right to interest arbitration, nor do they require that this
    issue be resolved through contractually authorized grievance-
    arbitration procedures.   Such a result would only be tenable if a
    security employee's statutory right to interest arbitration was
    somehow inversely dependent upon a nonsection 14 employee's
    contractual waiver of the statutory right to strike.    We have
    already held this is not the case.     The mere fact that there was
    a relationship between the legislature's intent in enacting two
    different statutory rights (here the right to interest arbitra-
    tion and the right to strike), for two different groups of
    employees (here security employees and nonsection 14 employees),
    - 28 -
    does not mean that one group's contractual waiver of its respec-
    tive statutory right results in the other group's contractual
    waiver of its statutory right.   The fact that nonsection 14
    employees have given up their right to strike in exchange for
    grievance-arbitration procedures does not mean that security
    employees have waived their statutory right to interest arbitra-
    tion.
    The bargaining agreement also contained a facilities-
    closure clause, contained in a memorandum of understanding in the
    bargaining agreement's appendix, which stated as follows:
    "It is understood by the parties that within
    sixty (60) days of the [e]mployer's announce-
    ment of the closure or conversion of a facil-
    ity ***, the parties agree to negotiate over
    such matters that may impact upon employees
    covered by this agreement on questions of
    wages, hours[,] and other conditions of em-
    ployment."   (Emphasis added.)
    According to CMS, the significance of this clause is that it
    gives the state a right to close a facility and obligates CMS to
    bargain over the impact of such closures but is silent as to how
    the parties would resolve impact bargaining if a voluntary
    agreement was not reached.   CMS notes that, as evidenced by
    article XXXIV, section 4, in the bargaining agreement, entitled
    - 29 -
    "Waiver," AFSCME had unlimited right and opportunity to make
    demands and proposals on any subject of collective bargaining.
    One of those demands and proposals was the memorandum of under-
    standing concerning facility closures quoted above.    CMS notes
    that AFSCME had the opportunity to reference statutory interest
    arbitration in that memorandum and it did not.    CMS argues that
    by agreeing to impact bargaining on facility closures, without
    more, the parties have agreed to apply the normal procedures with
    respect to impact bargaining--that when the parties reach im-
    passe, the employer may unilaterally implement its final offer.
    CMS argues that because the collective-bargaining agreement did
    not specifically include a clause stating that the parties had a
    right to go to interest arbitration under the statute, the
    dispute could only be covered under the jurisdiction of the
    contract's grievance-arbitration procedure.
    There are three problems with this argument.   First,
    there is no rule that a party has to affirmatively name a statu-
    tory right in a contract in order to preserve that statutory
    right.    See 
    American, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 334
    , 653 N.E.2d at
    1362.    Second, CMS's two conclusions, that CMS has a right to
    implement its final offer upon reaching impasse and that the
    dispute at issue here could only be covered under the contract's
    grievance-arbitration procedure, are inconsistent with one
    another.    The contractual grievance-arbitration procedure does
    - 30 -
    not provide for implementation of a final offer upon impasse.
    Rather the grievance-arbitration procedure dictates that parties
    resolve disputes through the lowest level of grievance procedure
    possible, advancing up "steps" of grievance procedure upon
    failing to come to a resolution, ultimately allowing for binding
    arbitration procedures if the parties complete the requisite
    steps.   Third, while the dispute at issue may very well have been
    resolved under the contractual grievance-arbitration procedures,
    the parties in this case have stipulated that there was no issue
    of deferral to the grievance-arbitration procedures.    In Spokane
    County, No. 12105-U-95-2853 Wash. Public Employment Relations
    Comm'n Decision No. 5698 (October 9, 1996) (deferral does not
    mean loss or surrender of jurisdiction) (
    1996 WL 686780
    , at *5),
    the Commission stated that even where a dispute involving unilat-
    eral change is arguably covered by the grievance-arbitration
    procedure in the existing bargaining agreement, and therefore may
    be most rightfully be deferred to the grievance-arbitration
    procedures, a commission still has jurisdiction over such mat-
    ters.
    Even if CMS's argument were meritorious as to an
    implicit waiver of the statutory right to interest arbitration,
    CMS is still unable to meet the applicable waiver standard in
    Illinois.    The employees at issue here have not "clearly and
    unmistakably" waived their right to interest arbitration.      As
    - 31 -
    stated by the Board, the no-strike clause does not even reference
    interest arbitration, let alone a waiver of interest arbitration.
    Nothing in the bargaining agreement explicitly states that
    section 14 employees, or any employees for that matter, waive
    their statutory right to interest arbitration.
    Accordingly, the security employees have not contractu-
    ally waived their statutory right to access midterm interest-
    arbitration procedures authorized by the Act.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the Board's
    decision and order.
    Affirmed.
    KNECHT and TURNER, JJ., concur.
    - 32 -