People v. Hill , 2012 IL App (5th) 100536 ( 2012 )

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
People v. Hill, 2012 IL App (5th) 100536
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption ROSS ADAM HILL, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Fifth District
Docket No. 5-10-0536
Rule 23 Order filed April 11, 2012
Motion to publish
granted May 2, 2012
Held Defendant’s four-year sentence for aggravated driving under the influence
(Note: This syllabus that resulted in the death of a passenger in defendant’s vehicle was
constitutes no part of affirmed over defendant’s contentions that the provision of the statute
the opinion of the court allowing probation for such a conviction only when “extraordinary
but has been prepared circumstances” are found is unconstitutionally vague and that the trial
by the Reporter of court abused its discretion in finding no “extraordinary circumstances” in
Decisions for the his case, since defendant failed to rebut the presumption that the statute
convenience of the was constitutional and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
reader.)
assessing the circumstances.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Williamson County, No. 07-CF-332;
Review the Hon. John Speroni, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Johannah B. Weber, and Lawrence J. O’Neill, all of
Appeal State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.
Charles Garnati, State’s Attorney, of Marion (Patrick Delfino, Stephen E.
Norris, and Sharon Shanahan, all of State’s Attorneys Appellate
Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE CHAPMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Donovan and Justice Spomer concurred in the judgment
and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant appeals from the four-year sentence on his conviction for aggravated driving
under the influence. Probation for a conviction is only allowable when extraordinary
circumstances are found. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(2)(G) (West 2008). On appeal, defendant
contends that the term “extraordinary circumstances” is unconstitutionally vague. Defendant
alternatively argues that the trial court’s application of the statute was improper, because the
evidence he presented at his sentencing hearing warranted probation.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 On July 16, 2007, defendant and two of his friends, Broady Harding and Greg Wyatt,
were drinking beer at Greg Wyatt’s home. Between 11 p.m. and midnight, after he finished
his work shift, Justin Dodd went to Wyatt’s home. According to defendant, Justin Dodd
advised the men that he had argued with his father, and he wanted to start drinking. However,
Justin did not want to stay at Greg’s home. He allegedly suggested that the men go for a ride,
buy beer, and drink while driving around. Both Broady Harding and Greg Wyatt confirmed
in testimony at the sentencing hearing that Justin Dodd wanted to drink alcohol and that he
offered to pay for gas and to buy the beer. The record on appeal is unclear about how many
people were with defendant in the vehicle that night. Defendant, Justin Dodd, and Greg
Wyatt were in the vehicle. Whether Broady Harding and an individual simply identified as
Carly were present in the vehicle is not clear from the record. Defendant was driving the
vehicle. That night, while drinking and driving, defendant lost control of the vehicle and the
vehicle rolled over. Defendant claims that he swerved to avoid a deer and went off the road.
At the hospital that night, defendant was told that the accident resulted in the loss of Justin
Dodd’s life.
¶4 On August 10, 2007, the State filed its information charging defendant with the offense
of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of section 11-501(d)(1)(F)
of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(F) (West 2006)).
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¶5 Defendant entered into an open guilty plea on September 22, 2008.
¶6 The presentence investigation revealed no past criminal history, but a fairly large number
of traffic violations.
¶7 At sentencing on January 23, 2009, defendant advanced his argument in mitigation that
the victim, Justin Dodd, induced or facilitated defendant’s conduct–in that Justin Dodd asked
to drive around while drinking and went so far as to pay for the gasoline and the beer in order
to accomplish that goal. At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the court took the
matter under advisement. On January 30, 2009, the trial court sentenced defendant to four
years after concluding that no extraordinary circumstances existed that would require or
support a sentence of probation. Defendant’s motion to reconsider this sentence was denied
by the trial court on April 1, 2009.
¶8 On appeal to this court, we vacated the denial of defendant’s motion to reconsider his
sentence because the court did not comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July
1, 2006). People v. Hill, No. 5-09-0189 (2010) (unpublished summary order under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(2) (eff. May 30, 2008)).
¶9 On remand to the trial court, defendant filed a new motion to reconsider sentence on
September 13, 2010. The motion was argued on October 26, 2010, and the court took the
motion under advisement. On October 29, 2010, the trial court denied the motion.
¶ 10 Defendant appeals.
¶ 11 LAW AND ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Statute Is Unconstitutionally Vague
¶ 13 Defendant argues that the term “extraordinary circumstances” is impermissibly and
unconstitutionally vague.
¶ 14 Statutory language is presumptively constitutional. People v. Waid, 221 Ill. 2d 464, 480,
851 N.E.2d 1210, 1219 (2006). The burden to rebut this presumption of constitutionality lies
with the party challenging the validity of the statute. People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d 400, 406,
790 N.E.2d 846, 851 (2003). We review the constitutionality of a statute on a de novo basis.
People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 448, 705 N.E.2d 67, 71-72 (1998).
¶ 15 Due process mandates that criminal statutes have clear definitions. People v. Maness, 191
Ill. 2d 478, 483, 732 N.E.2d 545, 549 (2000). Ambiguity in a criminal statute must be
resolved in a manner favoring the accused. People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 581, 861 N.E.2d
967, 975 (2006). If a sentencing provision fails to sufficiently clarify the consequences of
violating a criminal statute, the sentencing provision can be found to be void for vagueness.
See People v. Taher, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1015-16, 769 N.E.2d 1021, 1027-28 (2002). In
order to pass a test for vagueness, it is important for guidelines to be set that govern the
statute’s enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
¶ 16 The precise language of section 11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code states:
“(d) Aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, other drug or drugs, or
intoxicating compound or compounds, or any combination thereof.
***
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(2) ***
***
(G) A violation *** of this subsection (d) is a Class 2 felony, for which the
defendant, unless the court determines that extraordinary circumstances exist and
require probation, shall be sentenced to: (i) a term of imprisonment of not less than
3 years and not more than 14 years if the violation resulted in the death of one
person[.]” 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(2)(G) (West 2008).
¶ 17 Defendant contends that the term “extraordinary circumstances” is unconstitutionally
vague, but the Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Winningham, 391 Ill. App. 3d 476, 909
N.E.2d 363 (2009), has ruled on the constitutionality of the term and held that the term is not
vague. We turn to this case.
¶ 18 The factual background and application of the sentencing statute in People v.
Winningham are strikingly similar to this case. Derek Winningham was involved in a motor
vehicle accident that resulted in the death of one person. Id. at 477, 909 N.E.2d at 365. As
a result of the accident, Winningham was charged with aggravated driving under the
influence. Id. In an open plea, Winningham pled guilty. Id. at 478, 909 N.E.2d at 365. At
sentencing, the court learned that Winningham had no criminal history, was employed as a
firefighter and had saved numerous lives while working in that capacity, had completed
alcohol counseling, and had expressed extreme remorse and regret that his actions led to the
death of the victim. Id., 909 N.E.2d at 366. Evidence was also introduced that Winningham
was assisting the victim’s family in the dramshop civil action against the tavern where he had
been drinking. Id. Additionally, his attorney introduced between 80 and 90 letters at
sentencing from family, friends, and fellow firefighters describing Winningham’s positive
impact on their lives. Id. at 479, 909 N.E.2d at 366. Winningham asked the court to find that
his assistance with the dramshop suit amounted to extraordinary circumstances warranting
a sentence of probation. Id. The trial court found that while Winningham had been assisting
the victim’s family, this assistance did not rise to an extraordinary level. Id. Winningham was
sentenced to a three-year term of imprisonment. Id.
¶ 19 Winningham did not argue that the statute impacted his first amendment rights.
Accordingly, the court explained that when a statute does not impact first amendment
freedoms, the statute will not be held to be unconstitutionally vague on its face unless the
statute is incapable of any valid application–“unless under no set of circumstances would the
statute be valid.” Id. at 481, 909 N.E.2d at 368 (citing People v. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 109, 112,
745 N.E.2d 548, 551 (2001)).
¶ 20 The court explained that by arguing that the term “extraordinary circumstances” is
undefined and subject to arbitrary application, Winningham was unavoidably conceding that
the statute could be validly applied in some situations–even if on occasion the statute’s
application was arbitrary. Id. An uncertain application of the sentencing statute was not the
definitive test for vagueness. Id. Therefore, the court rejected Winningham’s argument that
the use of the “extraordinary circumstances” term rendered the sentencing statute
unconstitutionally vague on its face.
¶ 21 Winningham next argued that the sentencing statute was unconstitutionally vague
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because it is subject to arbitrary and discriminatory application. Id. The appellate court stated
as follows:
“A statute satisfies due process if ‘(1) the statute’s prohibitions are sufficiently definite,
when measured by common understanding and practices, to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair warning as to what conduct is prohibited; and (2) the statute marks
boundaries sufficiently distinct for judges and juries to administer the law fairly in
accordance with the intent of the legislature.’ ” Id. at 482, 909 N.E.2d at 368 (quoting
People v. Ramos, 316 Ill. App. 3d 18, 26, 735 N.E.2d 1094, 1100-01 (2000)).
Contrary to Winningham’s argument that the term was vague because the legislature
neglected to define the term, the court explained that the Illinois Vehicle Code provided
clear, definite standards for a trial court to fairly administer the law. Id. at 483, 909 N.E.2d
at 369. The legislature recognized the fact that there would be certain factual scenarios where
the sentence range of 3 to 14 years would not be appropriate–that in those circumstances,
probation would be more appropriate. Id.
“Thus, as a matter of legislative grace and lenity, the General Assembly determined that
it would not entirely eliminate the trial court’s discretion to impose a sentence of
probation. However, the General Assembly also determined that a court may do so only
under extraordinary circumstances, which is entirely consistent with the great danger that
drunk drivers impose upon our society, as shown by the tragic circumstances of this very
case. Thus, the challenged provision’s clear purpose was to substantially limit the
discretion that a trial court possesses to impose a sentence of probation when a
defendant’s DUI offense proximately caused the death of another person.” Id. (citing
People v. Maldonado, 386 Ill. App. 3d 964, 973, 897 N.E.2d 854, 863 (2008)).
The fact that the legislature empowered sentencing courts with discretion in determining
what circumstances could be considered extraordinary did not render the statute
unconstitutionally vague. Id.
¶ 22 As pointed out by the appellate court in People v. Winningham, similar phrases in
sentencing statutes have been upheld by our supreme court. See People v. Davis, 205 Ill. 2d
349, 379, 793 N.E.2d 552, 570 (2002) (consideration of “ ‘any other reason’ ” in aggravation
does not render the death-penalty statute unconstitutionally vague); People v. Williams, 192
Ill. 2d 548, 590, 736 N.E.2d 1001, 1024 (2000) (consideration of aggravating factor of
“ ‘cold, calculated[,] and premeditated manner’ ” does not render the death-penalty statute
unconstitutionally vague); People v. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364, 407, 651 N.E.2d 133, 153
(1995) (jury’s consideration of nonstatutory aggravating factors does not result in an arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty); People v. Lucas, 132 Ill. 2d 399, 444, 548 N.E.2d 1003,
1022 (1989) (consideration of aggravating factor of “ ‘exceptionally brutal or heinous
behavior’ ” does not render the death-penalty statute unconstitutionally vague); People v.
McCreadie, 223 Ill. App. 3d 316, 319-20, 584 N.E.2d 839, 841 (1991) (the phrase
“ ‘exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty’ ” does not render
the natural-life-sentencing provision unconstitutionally vague).
¶ 23 The arguments advanced by defendant in this case virtually mirror those of defendant
Winningham. We agree with the analysis and holding of the Fourth District Appellate Court.
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Defendant’s citation to various dictionary definitions and equating those definition
differences with vagueness misses the mark. While the term is not specifically defined, the
intent of the legislature was to grant deference to the trial court. We hold that defendant has
failed to overcome his burden to rebut the presumption that the sentencing statute challenged
is constitutionally sound.
¶ 24 Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Sentencing
¶ 25 Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in not construing the facts
of this case as presenting extraordinary circumstances warranting probation rather than a
term of imprisonment.
¶ 26 The trial court has very broad discretion when imposing sentence. People v. Stacey, 193
Ill. 2d 203, 209, 737 N.E.2d 626, 629 (2000). That discretion is not without limits. Id. The
punishment ordered by the trial court must be just and equitable. People v. Blumstengel, 61
Ill. App. 3d 1016, 1021, 378 N.E.2d 401, 404 (1978). However, if the sentence imposed is
within the statutory limits, there is a rebuttable presumption that the sentence is appropriate,
and that presumption can only be overturned if the sentence imposed varies greatly from the
purpose and spirit of the law. People v. Chambers, 258 Ill. App. 3d 73, 92, 629 N.E.2d 606,
620 (1994). On appeal, the court will not interfere with the sentence imposed, unless the
record reflects that the sentence is excessive and not justified under any reasonable review.
People v. Smith, 214 Ill. App. 3d 327, 338, 574 N.E.2d 784, 791-92 (1991).
¶ 27 In this case, the trial court found no extraordinary circumstances warranting probation.
The trial court found that defendant’s lack of a criminal history was a mitigating factor. The
trial court found no merit to defendant’s proposed factor in mitigation–that he was induced
to drink alcohol and drive while intoxicated by the victim’s suggestion. The trial court noted
that a sentence of imprisonment was necessary for deterrence purposes.
¶ 28 The extraordinary circumstances required for probation are matters for the trial court’s
discretion. Winningham, 391 Ill. App. 3d at 483, 909 N.E.2d at 369. Upon careful review of
this record, we concur with the trial court’s assessment that extraordinary circumstances were
lacking. Defendant’s attempt to blame the victim for his own choices on that night is without
merit and is not worthy as a mitigating factor. Defendant’s behavioral choices that evening
in July 2007 led to Justin Dodd’s death. Justin Dodd did not mandate the actions taken by
defendant. With probation not being appropriate, the minimum sentence is three years. We
conclude that the trial court’s sentence of four years does not amount to an abuse of
discretion and is in keeping with the purpose and spirit of the law.
¶ 29 CONCLUSION
¶ 30 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Williamson County is
hereby affirmed.
¶ 31 Affirmed.
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