People v. Holt ( 2007 )

NO. 4-06-0422 Filed 4/13/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
WILLIAM O. HOLT, ) No. 03CF25
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Thomas J. Difanis,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE COOK delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, William O. Holt, pleaded guilty to burglary,
and the trial court sentenced him as a Class X offender due to
his prior record. The court sentenced Holt to 13 years' impris-
onment and 3 years' mandatory supervised release (MSR). Holt did
not file a direct appeal. In a petition for postconviction
relief, Holt alleged that he only agreed to the 13-year sentence
in the plea agreement and that the addition of the MSR term
constituted an unfair breach of the plea agreement and violated
his due-process rights. The trial court dismissed the
postconviction petition at the first stage as frivolous and
patently without merit. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In compliance with Supreme Court Rule 402(a)(2) (177
Ill. 2d R. 402(a)), which requires the court to inform a defen-
dant of the maximum and minimum sentences proscribed by law for
the crime charged, the following exchange took place at the
guilty-plea proceedings:
"THE COURT: Now this is a Class 2 fel-
ony. The normal penalty range is not less
than three, nor more than seven years in
prison.
If you have two Class 2 or greater con-
victions since the amended criminal code went
into effect in 1977, then this becomes a
Class X offense, which calls for a mandatory
minimum sentence of 6 years, with a maximum
sentence fixed at 30 years. If you are sent
to prison, there [is] a period of mandatory
supervised release of one-three years. And
the maximum fine could be up to $25,000.
Do you understand those would be the
maximum penalties for this offense?
HOLT: Yes, sir." (Emphasis added.)
The trial court proceeded to admonish Holt that by pleading
guilty he would waive certain constitutional rights. Then, as
required by Rule 402(b) (177 Ill. 2d R. 402(b)), the court asked
the State to explain the terms of the plea agreement in open
court:
"THE STATE: Your Honor, in exchange for
- 2 -
the [d]efendant's offer to plead guilty to
the charge of burglary, the Class 2 felony,
as set forth in count I, the State has agreed
to recommend a commitment to the Illinois
Department of Corrections for a period of 13
years, with the [d]efendant receiving credit
for 247 days.
Additionally, the State will dismiss
2003-CF-1068 and 2003-CF-1942. ***
THE COURT: Mr. Holt, you heard what
[the State's Attorney] said. Is that your
agreement?
HOLT: Yes sir." (Emphasis added.)
The State's recitation of the plea agreement did not mention the
MSR term. The trial court sentenced Holt to 13 years but the
sentencing order made no reference to the 3-year MSR term. Holt
did not file a direct appeal.
Holt filed a petition for postconviction relief,
alleging that the State violated the terms of the plea agreement
by adding a three-year MSR term to his sentence and requested the
trial court to reduce his prison sentence by the length of his
MSR term. Defendant categorized his plea agreement as fully
negotiated. The trial court dismissed the petition, noting that
Holt had been clearly admonished at hearing that there would be a
- 3 -
three-year MSR attached to any prison term under the Class X
sentencing scheme. Accordingly, the trial court found Holt's
postconviction petition to be "intentionally deceptive" as well
as frivolous and without merit. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
We review first-stage postconviction dismissals by
determining whether the allegations contained in the petition are
frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1 (West
2004). A petition is frivolous or patently without merit if the
allegations contained therein, taken as true and liberally
construed in favor of the petitioner, fail to present the "gist"
of a constitutional claim. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239,
244, 757 N.E.2d 442, 445 (2001). The "gist" standard is a low
threshold; the petitioner need only set forth a limited amount of
detail, need not set forth the claim in its entirety, and need
not include citation to legal authority. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at
244, 757 N.E.2d at 445. The standard of review for the first-
stage dismissal of a postconviction petition is de novo. People
v. Collins, 202 Ill. 2d 59, 66, 782 N.E.2d 195, 198 (2002).
Holt cites People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177, 840
N.E.2d 658 (2005), as the sole authority in support of his
argument that his due-process rights were violated. Holt argues
that because he pleaded guilty for a specific sentence (i.e., 13
years), the addition of the MSR term resulted in a sentence "more
- 4 -
onerous than the one defendant agreed to at the time of the
hearing." Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 195, 840 N.E.2d at 669.
A defendant's due-process rights may be violated where
the defendant did not receive the "benefit of the bargain" of his
plea agreement with the State. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 186,
840 N.E.2d at 664. The defendant in Whitfield argued that the
trial court was required under Rule 402 to admonish him on the
record of the statutorily required MSR term. Whitfield, 217 Ill.
2d at 186, 840 N.E.2d at 664-65. The defendant argued that
because the court failed to admonish the defendant of the statu-
torily required MSR term, the defendant's plea agreement included
only the stated prison sentence and not the additional MSR term.
Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 186, 840 N.E.2d at 665. The court held
that the defendant did not receive the benefit of the bargain
because the addition of the MSR term resulted in a more onerous
sentence than the one agreed to at the hearing. Whitfield, 217
Ill. 2d at 195, 840 N.E.2d at 669.
Whitfield is distinguishable from the instant case. In
Whitfield, there was no mention of the MSR term during the
entirety of the plea proceedings. The defendant was not aware of
the consequences of his plea. See Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 200-
01, 840 N.E.2d at 672-73. Implicit in the Whitfield court's
reasoning is that had the defendant been aware of the MSR term
that the court was statutorily required to attach to his prison
- 5 -
sentence, then the defendant's due-process rights would not have
been violated. See Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 200-01, 840 N.E.2d
at 672-73. Here, the trial court admonished Holt of the follow-
ing: "if you are sent to prison, there [is] a period of mandatory
supervised release of one-three years." Holt stated that he
understood this. Accordingly, Holt was aware that any prison
sentence would carry with it a three-year MSR term. Holt re-
ceived the benefit of his bargain with the State.
Holt argues that it was not enough for the trial court
to admonish him of the statutorily required MSR term and that the
State should have explicitly mentioned the MSR term when it
recited the plea agreement in open court. Holt cites Justice
Thomas's specially concurring opinion, which states that the
purpose of the open-court statement and personal confirmation of
the terms of the plea agreement is to reduce what is typically an
oral understanding to a matter of record. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d
at 209, 840 N.E.2d at 677 (Thomas, C.J., specially concurring).
Justice Thomas states that "[t]his is analogous to a contract
setting where the parties' oral negotiations are reduced to a
written contract, with all previous understandings merging into
the written contract." Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 209, 840 N.E.2d
at 677 (Thomas, C.J., specially concurring).
We first note that concurring opinions, while persua-
sive, are not binding authority. People v. Patterson, 276 Ill.
- 6 -
App. 3d 107, 108, 658 N.E.2d 505, 506 (1995). More important, we
do not read Justice Thomas's statements to mean that Rule 402(b),
which states that plea agreements must be read in open court, now
requires strict compliance. Other courts have held that only
substantial compliance with Rule 402(b) is required. People v.
Mehmedoski, 207 Ill. App. 3d 275, 280, 565 N.E.2d 735, 739
(1990). Here, the record indicates that Holt was aware that the
three-year MSR term would be attached to any prison sentence.
The State's failure to restate this requirement during its
recitation of the plea agreement did not violate Holt's due-
process rights.
We note that Whitfield may also be distinguishable on
another ground. Whitfield specifically distinguished itself from
situations where, as here, the State agrees to recommend a
certain sentence. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 191, 840 N.E.2d at
667, citing People v. McCoy, 74 Ill. 2d 398, 403, 385 N.E.2d 696,
699 (1979). Where the State only promises to recommend a sen-
tence and the total sentence imposed, including subsequent parole
periods, is substantially less than the maximum sentence autho-
rized by law, the court's failure to admonish defendant of the
subsequent parole period is not of a "constitutional dimension."
Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 191, 840 N.E.2d at 667. Also, where
the State only promises to recommend a certain sentence, the
defendant does receive the benefit of the bargain he made with
- 7 -
the State. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d at 191, 840 N.E.2d at 667.
Here, though defendant categorized his plea agreement as "fully
negotiated" and ratified by the trial court, we note that the
State categorized Holt's plea as "open." Indeed, the State did
only agree to "recommend" a sentence of 13 years' imprisonment.
Moreover, applying the McCoy factors, Holt's 13-year sentence
plus 3-year MSR term was substantially less than the 30-year
maximum sentence authorized by law, and, unlike both McCoy and
Whitfield, the trial court did in fact admonish Holt as to the
MSR.
We find Holt's petition to be frivolous and patently
without merit.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's
judgment. As part of our judgment, we grant the State its
statutory assessment of $50 against Holt as costs of this appeal.
Affirmed.
McCULLOUGH and KNECHT, JJ., concur.
- 8 -