People v. Clausell ( 2008 )

NO. 4-07-0997 Filed 10/31/08
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Adams County
DONTE M. CLAUSELL, ) No. 07CF395
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Scott H. Walden,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
In September 2007, a jury acquitted defendant, Donte M.
Clausell, of aggravated battery (720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(8) (West
2006)) and convicted him of robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-1 (West 2006))
and burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West 2006)). In October 2006,
the trial court sentenced defendant to 36 months' probation and
ordered him to pay restitution. Defendant appeals, arguing the
imposition of restitution was improperly based on the acquitted
aggravated-battery charge. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Justin Davis testified he was standing by his vehicle
when a white four-door vehicle approached. Davis explained three
black males dressed in baggy pants and long white shirts got out
and asked him "where the green was." Davis testified he assumed
they wanted money or drugs. Davis turned to leave but was struck
in the neck from behind and fell to the ground unconscious.
Davis woke lying on his back with one of the men
standing on his face. A second man was searching through his
pockets. A third man was searching his vehicle. Davis testified
the man standing on his face told Davis he would "stomp [his]
face in" if he moved. The men took Davis's cellular phone,
wallet, and keys. The men unlocked the vehicle's trunk and
removed four speakers. The men placed the speakers in their
vehicle and left.
Davis called the police and provided a description of
the men, a description of the vehicle, and the vehicle's license-
plate number.
According to City of Quincy, Illinois, police officer
Chad Liesen's testimony, police found the vehicle approximately
an hour later. Defendant and two other men were inside the
vehicle. All three men were dressed in baggy shorts and long
white shirts. Liesen testified Davis's speakers were located in
the backseat and trunk.
The jury found defendant guilty of robbery and burglary
but not guilty of aggravated battery.
At sentencing, the State requested restitution for
Davis's medical bills. Defense counsel argued against such
restitution because the injuries were caused by the aggravated
battery and defendant was found not guilty of the aggravated-
battery charge. The State argued that the use of force for the
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robbery was sufficient to justify restitution. Davis reported
suffering a concussion. The trial court acknowledged defendant
was acquitted of aggravated battery but found the record afforded
a sufficient basis to order restitution for Davis's medical bills
based on the force used in the robbery. The court ordered
defendant to pay restitution of $2,541.06 for Davis's medical
expenses.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court improperly
ordered him to pay restitution for medical expenses because
Davis's medical bills resulted from the acquitted aggravated-
battery charge. The State argues the restitution order was based
on defendant's robbery conviction. We agree with the State.
A. Standard of Review
"A restitution order will not be reversed absent a
showing of an abuse of discretion." In re M.Z., 296 Ill. App. 3d
669, 673, 695 N.E.2d 587, 589 (1998).
B. The Restitution Order Was Proper
"It is well established that a court may not impose
restitution for charges upon which a defendant is acquitted."
People v. Owens, 323 Ill. App. 3d 222, 234, 753 N.E.2d 513, 523
(2001). In addition, the trial court may not "order restitution
of sums extraneous to the charges before it." People v. Thomp-
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son, 200 Ill. App. 3d 23, 26, 557 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (1990).
However, a defendant may be ordered to make restitution for
injuries proximately caused by the same criminal conduct of
defendant as that of which he was convicted (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(b)
(West 2006)).
Section 5-5-6 of the Unified Code of Corrections
(Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-5-6 (West 2006)) requires the trial
court to order restitution in accordance with that section for
all convictions resulting from offenses in violation of the
Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/1-1 through 47-25 (West 2006))
in which a person received an injury to their person as a result
of the defendant's criminal act. Under subsection (a) of that
section, the court shall determine at the sentencing hearing
"whether the defendant should be required to make restitution in
cash, for out-of-pocket expenses, damages, losses, or injuries
found to have been proximately caused by the conduct of the
defendant." 730 ILCS 5/5-5-6(a) (West 2006).
The trial court calculated the $2,541.06 restitution
order for Davis's medical expenses as follows: $290.50 for
Clinical Radiology; $10 for a prescription; and $2,240.56 to
Blessing Hospital, $1,833.39 of which was covered by insurance.
See Wills v. Foster, 229 Ill. 2d 393, 412-14, 892 N.E.2d 1018,
1030-31 (2008) (finding that where the plaintiff was entitled to
seek and recover the reasonable value of her medical expenses,
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her recovery was not limited by the amount paid by insurance).
The aggravated-battery charge alleged defendant "or one
for whose conduct he is legally responsible, struck *** Davis in
the head with his fist." The robbery charge alleged defendant
"or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible, took prop-
erty, being keys and a cell phone, from the person of *** Davis,
by the use of force." Defendant argues that because the blow to
the head was the basis for the aggravated-battery charge, of
which defendant was acquitted, any restitution based on that
charge is void.
In support of that position, defendant cites People v.
Chapin, 233 Ill. App. 3d 28, 597 N.E.2d 1250 (1992). However,
Chapin is distinguishable. In Chapin, the jury acquitted defen-
dant of theft by deception of $6,000 and found him guilty of
theft by deception of $4,600. Chapin, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 32,
597 N.E.2d at 1253. On appeal, defendant argued the trial court
erred when it ordered him to pay $10,600 in restitution. Chapin,
233 Ill. App. 3d at 34, 597 N.E.2d at 1255. The Third District
found the $6,000 restitution order was void as defendant was only
convicted of theft by deception of $4,600. Chapin, 233 Ill. App.
3d at 34, 597 N.E.2d at 1255. The court found the trial court
was not permitted to order restitution of sums extraneous to the
charges before it. Chapin, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 34, 597 N.E.2d at
1255.
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In contrast here, the trial court did not order resti-
tution for sums extraneous to the charges. The injuries Davis
incurred were based on the robbery charge of which defendant was
convicted. Defendant was charged with robbery for taking Davis's
keys and cellular phone by force. The court acknowledged defen-
dant was acquitted of aggravated battery but still found restitu-
tion was justified based on the force used for the robbery.
According to Davis's testimony, one of the men struck him in the
head causing him to fall to the ground. One of the men then held
Davis on the ground by placing his foot on Davis's head, covering
his nose and cheek. Davis also testified the pressure exerted on
his head was hurtful and made him feel his head could have been
stomped into the ground.
Defendant contends the medical expenses relate solely
to the initial blow to Davis's head, which formed the basis for
the aggravated-battery charge. Defendant argues while the
aggravated battery caused Davis' concussion, the force used in
the robbery "did not even cause a bloody nose." In addition,
defendant contends "the only injury Davis reported and police
observed was redness and swelling behind [his] right ear from the
initial blow to the head." However, defendant presented no
evidence Davis' injuries were exclusively caused by the initial
blow recited in the aggravated-battery charge.
Even assuming arguendo that Davis's injuries resulted
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exclusively from the initial blow, the fact defendant was acquit-
ted of the aggravated-battery charge is not determinative as
"[r]estitution may properly be ordered for all losses proximately
caused by the same criminal acts of the defendant." People v.
Gallinger, 252 Ill. App. 3d 816, 819, 624 N.E.2d 399, 401 (1993),
citing People v. Hernandez, 236 Ill. App. 3d 983, 985, 600 N.E.2d
1234, 1235 (1992).
In this case, the initial strike is proximately related
to the robbery. Here, defendant was engaged in a single course
of conduct. The blow to Davis's head reasonably could be seen to
have been used to disable Davis and allow the robbery to com-
mence. As a result, Davis's injuries were proximately caused by
defendant's criminal conduct for which he was convicted.
Accordingly, the trial court's restitution order can
stand solely on defendant's robbery conviction. As a result, we
find the court did not err in ordering restitution for Davis's
medical costs.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment. As part of our judgment, we grant the State its $50
statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.
Affirmed.
KNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.
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