In re Robin C. ( 2008 )

Filed 9/26/08 NO. 4-07-1033
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re: ROBIN C., a Person Found ) Appeal from
Subject to Involuntary Admission, ) Circuit Court of
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Sangamon County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 07MH813
v. )
ROBIN C., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant. ) Esteban F. Sanchez,
) Judge Presiding.
________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE TURNER delivered the opinion of the court:
In November 2007, a petition was filed for the emer-
gency involuntary admission of respondent, Robin C., alleging she
was mentally ill, reasonably expected to inflict serious physical
harm upon herself or others, and unable to provide for her basic
physical needs. In December 2007, the trial court conducted a
hearing and granted the petition. The court ordered respondent
hospitalized for no more than 90 days.
On appeal, respondent argues (1) the petition for
involuntary admission was defective and (2) the State failed to
set forth clear and convincing evidence warranting involuntary
admission. We reverse.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 2007, Springfield police officer J. Waller
filed a petition for emergency involuntary admission as to
respondent pursuant to section 3-601 of the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/3-601 (West
2006)). In his factual basis, Waller stated respondent was found
at a motel after police were called because she was "throwing
rocks at the building while naked." Respondent had "written all
over herself" and had also written on her bathroom floor and
walls. Waller stated respondent "was making crazy statements,"
including that she would "blow up a school." Waller stated
respondent had no food in her apartment and, because of her state
of mind, could not care for herself. Respondent agreed to go to
the hospital but only after taking off her clothes.
The petition alleged respondent was mentally ill,
reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon herself
or another in the near future, unable to provide for her basic
physical needs so as to guard herself from serious harm without
the assistance of family or outside help, and in need of immedi-
ate hospitalization for the prevention of such harm. Two medical
certificates were also filed indicating respondent was subject to
involuntary admission and in need of immediate hospitalization.
In December 2007, the trial court conducted a hearing
on the petition. Dr. Narasimhulu Sarma testified he has worked
as a psychiatrist for 37 years. Based on his examination of
respondent, Dr. Sarma diagnosed her with chronic paranoid schizo-
phrenia with symptoms of disorganization. As to his belief that
respondent suffers from a mental illness, Dr. Sarma found respon-
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dent to be "quite psychotic" and "paranoid." Dr. Sarma stated
prior to her admission respondent was found outside of a motel
throwing rocks while naked. He indicated it was "very clear"
that respondent would be a potential threat of harm to herself
and others. Dr. Sarma also noted respondent threatened to blow
up a school in the past. He believed respondent was in need of
treatment and hospitalization. When asked if the formulated
treatment plan was the least-restrictive alternative, Dr. Sarma
stated it was "the best that we can do for her." He recommended
a period of commitment not to exceed 90 days. On cross-examina-
tion, Dr. Sarma testified respondent had exhibited psychotic
behavior following her admission but not any dangerous behaviors
such as throwing objects or threatening people.
Respondent testified she was 44 years old and denied
throwing rocks at a building while naked. She stated she would
continue to take her medicine, which she believed had helped her.
If discharged, respondent indicated she could stay at her aunt's
house although she preferred to return to the motel.
On cross-examination, respondent testified to her
actions prior to admission. She stated she was outside of a
building when two men started throwing rocks. When the police
arrived, respondent stated she took off her undergarments because
she "didn't need them." She had also "written on" herself and
described it as tracing a scar with a blue marker. She asked the
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officers if she could wash it off so as not to give the appear-
ance that she was having a "psychotic episode."
The trial court found respondent suffered from a mental
illness and as a result of that illness was reasonably expected
to inflict serious physical harm upon herself or another in the
near future. The court ordered respondent hospitalized for no
more than 90 days. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Mootness
Initially, we note this case is moot. Section 3-813(a)
of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-813(a) (West 2006)) provides that an
initial order for hospitalization shall not exceed 90 days.
Here, the trial court's order granting the petition for involun-
tary admission was entered on December 7, 2007. Since the 90
days have passed and the court's order no longer has any force or
effect, it is impossible for this court to grant any effectual
relief to any party. However, as numerous courts have found
involuntary-admission cases fall within recognized exceptions to
the mootness doctrine, we will address this appeal on the merits.
See In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 492, 702 N.E.2d 555, 559-
60 (1998) (capable-of-repetition exception); In re Alaka W., 379
Ill. App. 3d 251, 258, 884 N.E.2d 241, 246-47 (2008); In re
Dorothy J.N., 373 Ill. App. 3d 332, 334, 869 N.E.2d 413, 415
(2007) (public-interest exception); In re Elizabeth McN., 367
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Ill. App. 3d 786, 789, 855 N.E.2d 588, 590 (2006).
B. Petition for Involuntary Admission
Respondent argues the petition for involuntary admis-
sion was defective because it did not list the names and ad-
dresses of the respondent's family members or guardian or that a
diligent effort was made to determine that information.
Section 3-601(b)(2) of the Code requires a petition for
involuntary admission to include the following:
"The name and address of the spouse,
parent, guardian, substitute decision maker,
if any, and close relative, or if none, the
name and address of any known friend of the
respondent whom the petitioner has reason to
believe may know or have any of the other
names and addresses. If the petitioner is
unable to supply any such names and
addresses, the petitioner shall state that
diligent inquiry was made to learn this in-
formation and specify the steps taken." 405
ILCS 5/3-601(b)(2) (West 2006).
As important liberty interests are involved in involun-
tary-commitment proceedings, strict compliance with statutory
procedures is required. In re Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d 763,
768, 838 N.E.2d 218, 222 (2005). Our supreme court has held
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procedural deviations from the Code do not require reversal of a
commitment order if the defects could have and should have been
objected to immediately, could have been easily cured if objected
to immediately, and in the end made no difference anyway. In re
Nau, 153 Ill. 2d 406, 419, 607 N.E.2d 134, 140 (1992); see also
In re Tommy B., 372 Ill. App. 3d 677, 684, 867 N.E.2d 1212, 1219
(2007) (reversal for failure to strictly comply with section 3-
601(b)(2) is not warranted unless the respondent suffered preju-
dice). Whether a respondent's procedural rights were violated is
a question of law and our review is de novo. In re Shirley M.,
368 Ill. App. 3d 1187, 1190, 860 N.E.2d 353, 356 (2006).
In the case sub judice, the petition for involuntary
admission contains a section where the petitioner can list the
names and addresses of those people mentioned in section 3-
601(b)(2) or, if the names are not listed, space to describe the
steps taken in making the diligent inquiry to identify and locate
those individuals. The lines available for the names, addresses,
and/or steps taken were left blank here. Thus, the petition was
deficient as it failed to comply with the Code.
Although the petition was defective, we find respondent
suffered no prejudice. Dr. Sarma testified at the hearing that
he talked with respondent's mother the previous week, and she was
concerned about respondent returning to the mother's home. Dr.
Sarma stated respondent's mother wanted her to stay in a motel
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because she was afraid of respondent. When asked if he had
spoken with anyone else, Dr. Sarma stated respondent had an aunt,
but she was not available.
Respondent did not object at the hearing to the defi-
ciencies in the petition. Moreover, her testimony did not
suggest any hardship or prejudice because of the State's failure
to contact other responsible adults or otherwise comply with
section 3-601(b)(2). The only people respondent mentioned were
her mother and her aunt. While not listed in the petition, the
evidence indicates Dr. Sarma contacted respondent's mother and
attempted to contact her aunt. Respondent has not identified
anyone else that could have or should have been listed. Thus, we
find respondent suffered no prejudice.
We note this court addressed this same issue in Tommy
B., where the section 3-601(b)(2) portion of the petition was
also left blank. In pointing out the petition is reviewed by
numerous individuals, including the petitioner, the facility
director, the circuit clerk, the attorney for the State, the
respondent's attorney, and the trial judge, this court noted "not
one person noticed the petition is missing required information."
Tommy B., 372 Ill. App. 3d at 685, 867 N.E.2d at 1220. If
discovered at the hearing, we found these deficiencies could be
speedily addressed to "avoid needless appeals" and "save count-
less resources." Tommy B., 372 Ill. App. 3d at 685, 867 N.E.2d
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at 1220; see also Dorothy J.N., 373 Ill. App. 3d at 338, 869
N.E.2d at 417 (Steigmann, J., specially concurring) (noting the
recent increase in involuntary-admission cases on appeal wherein
"the same issues tend to arise in case after case"). The same
can be said here. Procedural deficiencies and mistakes in
mental-health cases "suggest a lack of attention to process" (In
re Lillie M., 375 Ill. App. 3d 852, 860, 875 N.E.2d 157, 164
(2007) (Knecht, J., dissenting)), and we reiterate the need for
greater attention to detail in complying with the statutory
requirements in these cases.
C. Involuntary Commitment
Respondent argues the State failed to present clear and
convincing evidence warranting her involuntary admission. We
agree.
A trial court's decision on involuntary admission is
accorded great deference on appeal and will not be overturned
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re
Hannah E., 376 Ill. App. 3d 648, 661, 877 N.E.2d 63, 75 (2007).
The court's judgment will be considered against the manifest
weight of evidence "'only when an opposite conclusion is apparent
or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not
based on evidence.'" Elizabeth McN., 367 Ill. App. 3d at 789,
855 N.E.2d at 590, quoting In re John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d 778,
781, 792 N.E.2d 350, 353 (2003).
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"[I]nvoluntary admission procedures implicate substan-
tial liberty interests which must be balanced against the State's
dual interests in protecting society from dangerous mentally ill
persons and protecting those who are unable to care for them-
selves." In re Rovelstad, 281 Ill. App. 3d 956, 967, 667 N.E.2d
720, 726 (1996). A person is subject to involuntary admission
under the Code if he or she has a mental illness and because of
that illness is "reasonably expected to inflict serious physical
harm upon himself or herself or another in the near future." 405
ILCS 5/1-119(1) (West 2006).
"Proof of mental illness alone is not sufficient to
support involuntary admission." In re Nancy A., 344 Ill. App. 3d
540, 555, 801 N.E.2d 565, 580 (2003). "A person may not be
confined against his will merely because he is mentally ill if he
is dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom." In re
O.C., 338 Ill. App. 3d 292, 296, 788 N.E.2d 1163, 1167 (2003).
Instead, to satisfy its burden of proof, "the State must submit
'explicit medical testimony' that the respondent is reasonably
expected to be a serious danger to himself or others as a result
of his mental illness." In re Bert W., 313 Ill. App. 3d 788,
794, 730 N.E.2d 591, 597 (2000). However, the trial court is not
required to wait until the respondent actually harms himself or
another before ordering hospitalization. Tommy B., 372 Ill. App.
3d at 687, 867 N.E.2d at 1221.
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In this case, Dr. Sarma testified respondent suffered
from chronic paranoid schizophrenia with symptoms of disorgani-
zation and paranoia. She had also been hospitalized "several
times in the past." We find the State presented clear and
convincing evidence of respondent's mental illness. We note
respondent does not contest this issue on appeal.
Despite our finding as to mental illness, we find the
State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
respondent would seriously harm herself or others. Dr. Sarma
testified respondent posed "a potential threat of harm to herself
or others." However, his opinion of the "potential threat of
harm" was based on the factual basis of the petition and the
hearsay therein, that respondent was naked while throwing stones
at a building. The State asked him if her throwing stones placed
someone in expectation of being harmed, and Dr. Sarma responded
yes. The evidence does not indicate who was placed in harm's
way. Dr. Sarma noted respondent threatened to blow up a school
"in the past I believe." He also stated respondent's mother told
him she did not want to bring respondent back home because she
was afraid of respondent. No witnesses offered direct testimony
that respondent had engaged in these or other harmful behaviors.
Dr. Sarma's firsthand knowledge of respondent's condi-
tion came by way of examination and contradicted the hearsay
allegations he relied upon. He stated she exhibited psychotic
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behaviors while she was hospitalized. However, she had not
exhibited any dangerous behaviors like throwing things, had not
run around naked, or threatened anyone. He also stated she was
taking her medications, although he believed she was not yet
responding.
Respondent denied being naked and throwing rocks. She
felt she had improved and no longer needed to remain hospital-
ized. She also believed her medications were helping and said
she would continue to take them.
The trial court agreed with respondent that it appeared
her medications were working. The court stated she appeared to
be lucid, which the court found contradicted Dr. Sarma's testi-
mony that she was "quite psychotic" based on his examination
prior to the hearing. The court also found respondent understood
her mental illness and was "able to control herself quite well."
However, because "she was outside reportedly naked in the cold
winter days of Springfield in November and because that conduct
placed her or others, at least her, in harm," the court concluded
she was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon
herself or another in the near future.
In this case, no direct or substantive evidence showed
respondent had engaged in dangerous or violent acts that would
place her or others in jeopardy of serious physical harm in the
near future. No evidence showed respondent harmed or threatened
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to harm her mother or anybody at the motel. It may be that
respondent could reasonably have been expected to inflict serious
physical harm upon herself or others, but the testimony from the
State's witness failed to establish that danger. Instead, the
expert's opinion was based on hearsay, and his belief that
respondent was a "potential" threat of harm was weakened by his
testimony that she had not shown any threatening behaviors while
she was hospitalized and on her medication. While the State
proved respondent suffered from a mental illness, the evidence
failed to show she was reasonably expected to inflict serious
physical harm upon herself or others in the near future because
of her mental illness. Thus, the trial court erred in granting
the petition for involuntary admission. Because of our resolu-
tion of this issue, we need not consider respondent's remaining
allegation of error.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's
judgment.
Reversed.
McCULLOUGH, J., concurs.
STEIGMANN, J., dissents.
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JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting:
Because I conclude that the trial court heard suffi-
cient evidence to justify its findings, I respectfully dissent.
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