People v. Johnson ( 2008 )

Filed 7/16/08
NO. 4-07-0820
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
DANIEL ROY JOHNSON, ) No. 07CM383
Defendant-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) Holly F. Clemons,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:
In April 2007, the State charged defendant, Daniel Roy
Johnson, with unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(a)
(West 2006)). In May 2007, defendant filed a motion to suppress
evidence obtained during a traffic stop. In June 2007, the trial
court granted defendant's motion. The State filed this interloc-
utory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill.
2d R. 604(a)(1)). On appeal, the State argues the trial court
erred by granting defendant's motion to suppress the evidence.
We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
At the May 2007 hearing on defendant's motion to
suppress, defendant testified he worked the 11 p.m. to 3:15 a.m.
shift for FedEx as a package handler. On April 7, 2007, he got
off work at 3:15 a.m. and took two coworkers as passengers in his
car. As he was driving on Anthony Drive, he noticed flashing
lights in his rearview mirror. He immediately pulled over.
Defendant said he had been driving within the speed limit,
maintaining his vehicle in the lane of travel, and driving with
his headlights on, and as far as he knew, he was not in violation
of any traffic laws. Defendant did have an air freshener hanging
from his rearview mirror. The air freshener is a life-size pair
of plastic cherries, red and green in color. Defendant did not
think the cherries materially obstructed his clear view out of
the car.
Defendant testified as he was stopped, a police officer
walked up to the car and stated, "that's why I stopped you, right
there." The police officer said defendant should not have the
cherries hanging from the rearview mirror and it was a violation.
Defendant replied, "[T]hat's ridiculous." According to defen-
dant, the officer told defendant it was illegal to have anything
hanging on the rearview mirror.
Officer Andrew Good testified he had been employed
since 2004 with the Champaign County sheriff's department. Good
made the stop on the basis of the cherries obstructing the
windshield. When he first observed defendant's car, Good was
approximately two car lengths behind defendant's vehicle. Good
followed defendant less than a quarter mile before making the
stop.
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On cross-examination, Good said as part of his patrol
duties he frequently makes traffic stops. When he first observed
the vehicle, defendant was approaching Anthony Drive with his
turn signal on, but the car was not in the turn lane. Defendant
turned off the turn signal and continued straight. Defendant
then turned into a parking lot, drove through it, and then turned
onto Anthony Drive. Good observed the vehicle from the rear and
the side and saw the cherries hanging from the rearview mirror.
Good observed the cherries were hanging at eye level, and from
Good's perspective the air freshener created a material obstruc-
tion of defendant's view of the roadway.
On redirect, Good said he had not been formally trained
as to what constitutes a "material obstruction" of a driver's
view. Good had read about "material obstructions" in law and
traffic books. Good estimated the cherries were about two inches
across. The air freshener could block the driver's view if a
vehicle or pedestrian emerged. Good then looked at the photo-
graphs defendant had previously entered into evidence. Looking
at the photographs of defendant's car with the cherries hanging
from the rearview mirror, Good said the view was not obstructed.
In the photographs, the lighting is daylight and sunny, but
during the stop it was dark outside.
Officer Good was recalled by the State. Good testified
after the stop had been made, defendant said he was on his way
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home from work and he and his passengers had been smoking canna-
bis. Good noticed a green leafy substance on and around defen-
dant's mouth, and he smelled the odor of burnt cannabis.
In argument, defense counsel maintained People v. Cole,
369 Ill. App. 3d 960, 874 N.E.2d 81 (2007), controlled, and
provided a copy to the court. Defense counsel emphasized the
strand of beads in Cole was larger than an air freshener and yet
the court held there was no probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion to make the stop. Further emphasizing that a subjective
belief that a law has been broken, when no violation actually
occurred, is not objectively reasonable. Upon conclusion of
arguments of counsel, the trial court granted the motion to
suppress evidence, reasoning as follows:
"The issue before the [c]ourt is whether
Officer Good had a reasonable suspicion that
the [d]efendant had committed or was about to
commit a crime. *** The [c]ourt noted and
finds extremely persuasive, *** the
[d]efendant's testimony that Officer Good
told him *** he was not supposed to have
anything hanging from his rearview mirror[,
which] was uncontroverted. ***
The [c]ourt certainly does believe that
this officer was acting in good faith, but
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the [c]ourt does not believe that the cherry
air freshener constituted a violation of the
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/12-503(c) (West
2006)); and thus, a reasonable officer would
not have reasonable suspicion to make the
stop. The cherry air freshener in question
was certainly smaller than the 'fuzzy dice'
that constituted a violation of People v.
Mendoza[, 234 Ill. App. 3d 826, 599 N.E.2d
1375 (1992)]. *** The cherries were also
smaller than the two tree-shaped air freshen-
ers in People v. Jackson[, 335 Ill. App. 3d
313, 780 N.E.2d 826 (2002)]. Moreover, the
cherries were mounted on a piece of wire and
did not move or swing. Even assuming the
cherries were hanging at the [d]efendant's
eye level, they still would not constitute a
material obstruction ***."
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
The State challenges the trial court's granting of
defendant's motion to suppress. This court will reverse a trial
court's ruling on a motion to suppress where it involves credi-
bility assessments or factual determinations only if it is
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manifestly erroneous or against the manifest weight of the
evidence. People v. Driggers, 222 Ill. 2d 65, 70, 853 N.E.2d
414, 417 (2006); People v. Moss, 217 Ill. 2d 511, 517-18, 842
N.E.2d 699, 704 (2005). We review de novo the ultimate ruling of
whether the evidence must be suppressed, assessing the facts in
relation to the issues presented. Moss, 217 Ill. 2d at 518, 842
N.E.2d at 704.
The State argues the key issue is whether Officer Good
had probable cause to justify the traffic stop of defendant's
vehicle based on a violation of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehi-
cle Code) (625 ILCS 5/12-503(c) (West 2006), not whether the
cherry air freshener constituted a material obstruction. The
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
U.S. Const., amend. IV. An automobile stop is subject to the
constitutional imperative that it be reasonable under the circum-
stances. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 135 L. Ed.
2d 89, 95, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996). "As a general matter,
the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police
have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has
occurred." Whren, 517 U.S. at 810, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 95, 116 S.
Ct. at 1772. The Vehicle Code states:
"No person shall drive a motor vehicle
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with any objects placed or suspended between
the driver and the front windshield, rear
window, side wings or side windows immedi-
ately adjacent to each side of the driver
which materially obstructs the driver's
view." (Emphases added.) 625 ILCS 5/12-
503(c) (West 2006).
To prove probable cause, the State need only show that it was
"reasonable" for Officer Good to conclude that the cherry air
freshener materially obstructed defendant's view. United States
v. Dowthard, 500 F.3d 567, 569 (7th Cir. 2007). Even if his
belief was incorrect, "[w]hen an officer makes a stop based on a
mistake of fact, we ask only whether the mistake was reasonable."
(Emphasis in original.) United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958,
962 (7th Cir. 2006). Therefore, the only argument available to
defendant is the factual question of whether it was reasonable
for Officer Good to believe he observed defendant driving with a
"material obstruction" of defendant's view. Dowthard, 500 F.3d
at 569. Officer Good testified that he did.
We give deference to the trial court's findings of
fact. The court evaluated Officer Good's testimony, stating:
"Officer Good did not tell the
[d]efendant that only material[] obstructions
were prohibited. The [c]ourt realizes cer-
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tainly that Officer Good did testify to that
when he was in court, however it remains
uncontroverted and uncontradicted[,] that he
did not do so at the time of the stop."
Defendant argued, and the trial court agreed, that the
facts in this case were substantially the same as in Cole, 369
Ill. App. 3d 960, 874 N.E.2d 81, where this court found the
officer made a mistake of law and therefore lacked probable cause
to make a traffic stop. In Cole, the officer making the stop was
operating under a misunderstanding of the law that anything
suspended between the driver and the front windshield violated
the Vehicle Code. The officer testified:
"'Q. [By DEFENSE COUNSEL:] So, do you
stop every vehicle that has something hanging
between the driver and the windshield?
A. [OFFICER:] Yes, sir. If I can get a
vehicle stopped, I do stop every vehicle.
* * *
Q. Okay. That's your opinion of the
statute, is that the statute does not allow
anything hanging in between the window, wind-
shield and the driver?
A. Yes.'" Cole, 369 Ill. App. 3d at
962, 874 N.E.2d at 83-84.
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In this case, Officer Good testified he believed the object
created a material obstruction. Defendant's testimony showed
Officer Good did not say the words "material obstruction" during
the stop.
Defendant argues the trial court correctly found that a
reasonable officer would not have reasonable suspicion to stop
defendant's car based on the cherry air freshener attached to the
rearview mirror. Defendant's exhibits show the cherry air
freshener in relation to the driver and the windshield, and the
trial court found "a reasonable officer would not have reasonable
suspicion to make the stop." When Good was asked to look at
defendant's exhibit photographs, Good said, "from the picture,
there is nothing actually obstructed in that picture, no." We
note the photographs entered into evidence were taken in bright
daylight from the view at each end of the car. Good also testi-
fied he observed defendant's car in the dark from the rear and
side from about two car lengths' distance. The trial court
differentiated the facts in cases finding larger air fresheners
or fuzzy dice to be violations of the Vehicle Code. In Jackson,
335 Ill. App. 3d 313, 780 N.E.2d 826, the officer's testimony was
uncontroverted that the air freshener constituted a legal basis
for reasonable suspicion. In Mendoza, 234 Ill. App. 3d 826, 599
N.E.2d 1375, the driver's view was obstructed by a fuzzy dice and
other items hanging from the rearview mirror.
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In Cole, the defendant was stopped because the officer
saw a single strand of opaque beads that were one-fourth of an
inch in diameter hanging four inches in length from the rearview
window at eye level. Cole, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 963, 874 N.E.2d at
84-85. This court found a traffic stop based on a mistake of law
to be unconstitutional. An officer "who mistakenly believes a
violation occurred when the acts in question are not prohibited
by law is not acting reasonably." Cole, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 968,
874 N.E.2d at 88.
We find the trial court's opinion that the officer did
not tell defendant the air freshener was a material obstruction
is entitled to deference and not against the manifest weight of
the evidence. The photographs show the officer's belief, after a
fleeting view in the dark, that the cherries were a material
obstruction was not justifiable. Further, the officer's lack of
understanding as to what constitutes a material obstruction was
no different from the situation in Cole. The motion to suppress
is affirmed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
APPLETON, P.J., and COOK, J., concur.
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