In re Atul R. ( 2008 )

No. 4-07-0703 Filed 6/13/08
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re: Atul R., a Person Found Subject ) Appeal from
to Involuntary Treatment, ) Circuit Court of
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Sangamon County
Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. O7MH501
v. )
ATUL R., ) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant. ) George H. Ray,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a July 2007 hearing, the trial court found
respondent, Atul R., subject to involuntary treatment (405 ILCS
5/2-107.1 (West 2006)).
Respondent appeals, arguing that (1) the State failed
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he was subject to
involuntary treatment, and (2) the trial court's order authoriz-
ing involuntary treatment failed to comply with the Mental Health
and Developmental Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-
5)(1) (West 2006)) because his criminal defense attorney was not
notified of the petition. Because we agree with respondent's
second argument, we reverse.
Respondent was found unfit to stand trial on a charge
not specified in the record. He was admitted to the McFarland
Mental Health Center (MMHC). In July 2007, Sreehari Patibandla,
respondent's psychiatrist at MMHC, filed a petition seeking to
involuntarily administer treatment to respondent. The petition
alleged that (1) respondent (a) had a mental illness, (b) refused
to receive psychotropic medication, and (c) exhibited (i) deteri-
oration of his ability to function, (ii) suffering, or (iii)
threatening behavior; (2) respondent's mental illness had existed
for a period of time marked by the continuing presence of symp-
toms or the repeated episodic occurrence of symptoms; (3) respon-
dent lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the
psychotropic medication; (4) the benefits of the psychotropic
medication clearly outweighed the harm; and (5) other less-
restrictive services were explored and found inappropriate. The
petition requested the following medications: (1) Geodon (80 to
240 milligrams per day), (2) lithium (600 to 2,100 milligrams per
day), and (3) lorazepam (2 to 8 milligrams per day). The peti-
tion also requested the use of certain blood tests necessary for
the safe and effective administration of the requested medica-
tions.
At the hearing on the petition, which was held later in
July 2007, Patibandla testified that respondent had been diag-
nosed with bipolar disorder. As a result of that mental illness,
respondent developed delusional thoughts and threatening behav-
ior. Patibandla explained that during the previous seven days,
respondent had been involuntarily medicated. Respondent had made
statements that he would "mess up" staff members and "statements
of killing." Respondent told Patibandla that he felt the pres-
ence of "the evil angels" in the hospital and was going to kill
them. Following the medication, respondent experienced improved
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sleep and less "pressured" speech patterns. Patibandla opined
that respondent lacked the capacity to give informed consent as
to his treatment because he did not think he was mentally ill or
needed medication.
Patibandla then testified that in the
involuntary-treatment petition, he had requested (1) Geodon,
lithium, and lorazepam as the first-choice medications and (2)
Zyprexa, Abilify, Seroquel, valproic acid, and Trileptal as
alternative medications. Patibandla opined that the medications
would allow respondent to sleep better and "[h]is energy level
would be more in tune with everyone else." Further, the medica-
tions would "help with the delusional thinking" and allow respon-
dent to "rationally converse."
Patibandla acknowledged that the suggested "mood
stabilizers" had possible side effects. He explained that
respondent previously had received multiple doses of Geodon
without any side effects. Patibandla also stated that respondent
would be monitored for possible side effects through certain
testing and procedures. Patibandla opined that the potential
benefits of the proposed medications clearly outweighed the
potential harm if respondent did not receive them. Patibandla
further stated that other less-invasive treatment was inappropri-
ate for respondent.
The trial court admitted in evidence the State's
exhibit No. 1, which was a list of medical and nursing staff who
were authorized to administer the requested medications to
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respondent.
Respondent interjected during counsel's cross-examina-
tion of Patibandla that his former guru was "the Devil himself."
Respondent stated that he was "the second coming of Jesus
Christ," a messenger of Christ, and "Nicodemus in my past life."
Respondent was dismissed from medical school "because of Luci-
fer's direct involvement with my life." He believed "Lucifer"
wanted to destroy him because he represented "the truth of the
second coming of Jesus Christ." Further, respondent stated he
did not have a "violent intention" when he committed armed
robbery, explaining that he "deliberately used a BB gun."
On direct examination, respondent testified that the
medications sought to be administered were very dangerous and
"extremely sedative." They caused respondent to function as a
"zombie." He did not believe he was mentally ill. Respondent
would "relish the opportunity of psychotherapy." Respondent
testified that he was not violent and did not threaten anyone.
Based on the evidence, the trial court found "the
treatment requested is needed and would be beneficial to the
patient."
This appeal followed.
As an initial matter, on March 20, 2008, the State
filed a motion to cite supplemental authority, In re Alfred H.H.,
379 Ill. App. 3d 1026 (2008). On March 28, 2008, respondent
responded to the State's motion requesting this court deny the
motion. We ordered respondent's response to the State's motion
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taken with the case and now deny it.
Respondent argues that the trial court's order autho-
rizing involuntary treatment failed to comply with the Code
because his criminal defense attorney was not notified of the
petition. Before considering the merits of this issue, we
address two preliminary matters. Specifically, we consider
whether the issue is moot and whether the respondent waived
review of the issue (more specifically referred to as forfeiture
and procedural default (People v. Corrie, 294 Ill. App. 3d 496,
506, 690 N.E.2d 128, 135 (1998))).
First, the issue is moot. The underlying judgment,
entered by the trial court on July 27, 2007, was limited to 90
days, which have passed.
An issue raised in an otherwise moot appeal may be
addressed when (1) the immediacy or magnitude of the interests
involved in the case warrants the reviewing court's action or (2)
"'the issue is "'likely to recur but unlikely to last long enough
to allow appellate review to take place because of the intrinsi-
cally short-lived nature of the controversies.'"' [Citations.]"
Felzak v. Hruby, 226 Ill. 2d 382, 392, 876 N.E.2d 650, 657-58
(2007).
The first exception to the mootness doctrine, known as
the public-interest exception, applies only if a clear showing
exists that (1) the question at issue is of "a substantial public
nature," (2) an authoritative determination is needed to guide
public officers in the performance of their duties, and (3) the
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circumstances are likely to recur in other cases. Felzak, 226
Ill. 2d at 393, 876 N.E.2d at 658; In re J.T., 221 Ill. 2d 338,
350, 851 N.E.2d 1, 8 (2006). The public-interest exception must
be "narrowly construed and requires a clear showing of each
criterion." Felzak, 226 Ill.2d at 393, 876 N.E.2d at 658.
The second exception to the mootness doctrine, the
capable-of-repetition exception, applies only if (1) the chal-
lenged action is of such short duration that it cannot be fully
litigated prior to its cessation and (2) the same complaining
party may reasonably be expected to be subject to the same action
again. Like the public-interest exception, the
capable-of-repetition exception must be narrowly construed and
requires a clear showing of each criterion. J.T., 221 Ill. 2d at
350, 851 N.E.2d at 8.
In In re Alfred H.H., 379 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1028, ___
N.E.2d ___, ___ (2008), this court recently discussed the
mootness doctrine in mental-health cases, as follows:
"For the last several years, this court
has rather routinely recognized an exception
to the mootness doctrine in cases involving
involuntary mental-health admission and in-
voluntary mental-health treatment. However,
given the supreme court's clear, consistent,
and recent adherence to the established ex-
ceptions to the mootness doctrine without
regard to the type of cases before it, we
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conclude that Supreme Court of Illinois doc-
trine requires us to determine whether an
otherwise moot appeal comes within an estab-
lished exception to the mootness doctrine."
In this case, respondent argues that the trial court's
involuntary-treatment order failed to comply with the Code (405
ILCS 5/2-107.1(a-5)(1) (West 2006)) because his criminal defense
attorney was not notified of the petition. Given that (1) strict
compliance with statutory procedures is required based on the
important liberty interests involved in involuntary-treatment
cases (In re Lisa G.C., 373 Ill. App. 3d 586, 590, 871 N.E.2d
794, 799 (2007)) and (2) our supreme court has stated that "the
procedures courts must follow to authorize the involuntary
medication of mental[-]health patients involve matters of 'sub-
stantial public concern'" (In re Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d 30, 46,
820 N.E.2d 424, 434 (2004), quoting In re Mary Ann P., 202 Ill.
2d 393, 402, 781 N.E.2d 237, 243 (2002)), respondent's arguments
regarding the involuntary-treatment order's compliance with the
Code constitute questions of public importance. In addition,
answers to respondent's arguments will provide an authoritative
determination to guide public officers in the performance of
their duties in mental-health cases. Finally, the circumstances
in this case are likely to recur in other involuntary-treatment
cases. Accordingly, we conclude that respondent clearly estab-
lished the criteria necessary to satisfy the public-interest
exception to the mootness doctrine. Because we so conclude, we
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need not address whether respondent also established the criteria
necessary to satisfy the capable-of-repetition exception to the
mootness doctrine.
Second, we consider whether the issue is waived.
Citing In re Splett, 143 Ill. 2d 225, 572 N.E.2d 883 (1991), the
State contends that the respondent waived review of whether
notice of the petition should have been served on his criminal
defense attorney because he did not raise that issue in the trial
court. In Splett, our supreme court held that proof of formal
notice of the proceeding may be excused when circumstances
demonstrate that actual notice is sufficient. Splett, 143 Ill.
2d at 231-32, 572 N.E.2d at 886. In finding that formal notice
is not necessary if the respondent receives actual notice of the
petition, our supreme court noted that reversal of an order
granting a petition for involuntary commitment is not required if
(1) the respondent and his attorney took part in the proceedings
on the merits and never challenged a procedural defect to which
an objection could and should have been immediately made; (2) the
procedural defect could have been cured easily if a timely
objection had been made; and (3) the procedural defect made no
difference in the end result. Splett, 143 Ill. 2d at 230-31, 572
N.E.2d at 886.
In this case, the result of the proceedings could
indeed affect the respondent's criminal case. See Robert S., 213
Ill. 2d at 57, 820 N.E.2d at 440. Moreover, waiver is a limita-
tion on the parties and not the courts. "[A] reviewing court may
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ignore waiver in order to achieve a just result." In re Janet
S., 305 Ill. App. 3d 318, 320, 712 N.E.2d 422, 423-24 (1999).
Thus, we choose to address the merits of this issue.
Section 2-107.1(a-5)(1) of the Code (405 ILCS
5/2-107.1(a-5)(1) (West 2006)) provides in part:
"The petitioner shall deliver a copy of the
petition[] and notice of the time and place
of the hearing[] to the respondent, his or
her attorney, any known agent or
attorney-in-fact, if any, and the guardian,
if any, no later than [three] days prior to
the date of the hearing."
In Robert S., the respondent was found unfit to stand
trial on unknown charges. Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 32, 820
N.E.2d at 426. He was subsequently admitted to a mental-health
facility and during his stay there, his treating psychiatrist
petitioned to involuntarily administer psychotropic medication.
Notice of the petition was never served on the respondent's
criminal defense attorney. Following a hearing, the trial court
granted the petition to involuntarily administer psychotropic
medication.
On appeal, our supreme court considered whether pursu-
ant to section 2-107.1(a-5)(1) of the Code, the respondent's
criminal defense attorney was entitled to notice of the petition
to administer psychotropic medication. The court determined that
the respondent's criminal defense attorney was due such notice
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because, at the very least, that attorney was the respondent's
agent, and as such, the plain language of section 2-107.1(a-5)(1)
required that notice be served on him or her. Robert S., 213
Ill. 2d at 57, 820 N.E.2d at 440. In reaching that conclusion,
the court noted:
"Respondent came to be in a mental[-]
health facility because he was found unfit to
stand trial in a criminal proceeding. In
that proceeding, he was represented by an
attorney. All of the parties to this action
were aware of that proceeding. Although the
purpose of the instant proceeding was to
determine whether psychotropic medication
should be forced upon respondent for his own
benefit and/or the safety of those around
him, ultimately, there may be consequences
pertinent to the pending criminal matter.
We note that the language concerning
notification in section 2-107.1(a-5)(1) of
the Code is very broad and general. It re-
fers to notification of, inter alios, a re-
spondent's 'attorney' and 'any known agent,'
without qualification or limitation. We have
previously construed this section to require
notification of 'any other interested parties
to the proceeding.' See In re C.E., 161 Ill.
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2d [200, 226, 641 N.E.2d 345, 357 (1994)].
In the absence of any restrictive language in
the statute, we believe respondent's criminal
defense attorney qualifies as a party to whom
notice is due. In the very least, criminal
counsel was a 'known agent,' and thus should
have been given notice of this proceeding."
Robert S., 213 Ill. 2d at 56-57, 820 N.E.2d
at 440.
Here, respondent came to be in a mental-health facility
because he was found unfit to stand trial in a criminal proceed-
ing. In that proceeding, he was represented by an attorney. All
of the parties to this action were aware of that proceeding.
Section 2-107.1(a-5)(1) of the Code mandates that an agent for
the respondent must be given notice of a petition seeking to
involuntarily administer psychotropic medication, and our supreme
court has determined that a respondent's criminal defense attor-
ney falls into this category. Thus, the respondent's criminal
defense attorney was entitled to notice of the petition.
Because we reverse the trial court's involuntary-
treatment order, we do not address respondent's remaining argu-
ment.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court's
judgment.
Reversed.
KNECHT and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.
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