United Farm Family Mutual Insurance v. Frye ( 2008 )

NO. 4-07-0495 Filed 4/21/08
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE UNITED FARM FAMILY MUTUAL INSURANCE ) Appeal from
COMPANY, an Indiana Corporation, ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Pike County
v. ) No. 06MR4
JOSEPH A. FRYE, as Personal )
Representative of the Estate of JOSEPH )
FRYE, Deceased; and JAMIE THOMPSON, as )
Special Representative of the Estate of ) Honorable
WILMA F. FRYE, Deceased, ) Richard D. Greenlief,
Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:
In July 2003, husband Joseph Frye (Joseph-deceased) and
wife Wilma F. Frye, both residents of Indiana, died as a result
of injuries sustained in an automobile collision on an Illinois
roadway. The accident occurred while the parties were in an
automobile insured under a policy issued in Indiana by plaintiff,
United Farm Family Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau), an
Indiana corporation.
In July 2005, defendant, Joseph A. Frye (Joseph-es-
tate), personal representative of the estate of Joseph-deceased,
filed a wrongful-death action against Jamie Thompson, special
representative of Wilma's estate, in the Pike County circuit
court. Farm Bureau hired counsel, Larry Kuster, to represent
Wilma's estate in the wrongful-death action.
In February 2006, Farm Bureau filed its complaint for
declaratory judgment. In its complaint, Farm Bureau asserted it
had no duty to defend or indemnify Wilma's estate in the
wrongful-death action. Farm Bureau also asserted the estate of
Joseph-deceased could not recover as an uninsured motorist (UIM).
In March 2007, the Pike County circuit court granted
Farm Bureau's motion. Defendant Joseph-estate appealed. On
appeal, Joseph-estate argues (1) the policy issued to Joseph-
deceased and Wilma is internally inconsistent and inherently
ambiguous; (2) the estate of Joseph-deceased is entitled to UIM
coverage under Illinois public policy; and (3) Farm Bureau should
be estopped from raising coverage defenses for its delay in
filing the declaratory-judgment action. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Wilma and Joseph-deceased, wife and husband, resided
together in Munster, Indiana. They secured an automobile insur-
ance policy from Farm Bureau to cover the period of June 16,
2003, through December 16, 2003 (Policy). The 2001 Saturn
insured by the Policy was licensed and registered in Indiana, and
it was principally located in Indiana but occasionally driven
outside that state. Joseph-deceased and Wilma purchased the
Policy in Indiana.
On July 3, 2003, Wilma and Joseph-deceased were in-
volved in an automobile accident, which resulted in their deaths.
The accident occurred in Pike County, Illinois. The Policy
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provided coverage to Joseph-deceased and Wilma under the medical-
expense-and-physical-damage coverages. Payments pursuant to the
Policy coverages totaled over $62,000, for medical expenses,
death benefits, and property damage.
In June 2005, Joseph-estate demanded the policy limits
from Farm Bureau under the liability and UIM coverages in the
Policy. In July 2005, Joseph-estate filed a wrongful-death
complaint on behalf of the estate of his father, Joseph-deceased,
against Wilma's estate in Pike County, in an effort to secure for
the estate the $100,000 policy limit for liability. In the
complaint, Joseph-estate alleged Wilma caused the collision when
attempting a U-turn.
Farm Bureau provided Wilma's defense in the pending
wrongful-death action. In August 2005, Larry Kuster entered an
appearance on behalf of Wilma's estate. Farm Bureau, in provid-
ing the defense, did not make a reservation of rights. Also, in
August 2005, Wilma's estate moved to dismiss the wrongful-death
case. This motion was denied in December 2005. Wilma's estate
petitioned this court for interlocutory appeal; we denied the
request. Frye v. Thompson, No. 4-06-0090 (February 23, 2006)
(leave to appeal denied).
In February 2006, Farm Bureau filed its complaint for
declaratory judgment. Farm Bureau set forth two claims. In the
first claim, Farm Bureau maintained it had no duty to defend or
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indemnify Wilma's estate because the Policy excludes liability
coverage for claims between insured spouses. Farm Bureau relied
upon the household exclusion in the Policy:
"EXCLUSIONS--What we will not cover.
This insurance does not apply to:
* * *
15. bodily injury to the insured or to
any person related to the insured by blood,
marriage[,] or adoption and who is a resident
of the same household as the insured."
In the second claim of its complaint, Farm Bureau
asserted it had no duty to defend or indemnify Wilma's estate
under the UIM coverage, because the Policy excludes coverage for
vehicles that are insured under the Policy (owned-vehicle exclu-
sion).
"INSURING AGREEMENT - What we will pay
under Coverage K.
We will pay damages for bodily injury an
insured is legally entitled to collect from
the owner or driver of an uninsured or
underinsured motor vehicle. The bodily
injury must be caused by an accident arising
out of the ownership, maintenance[,] or use
of an uninsured or underinsured motor
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vehicle."
The Policy defines "uninsured motor vehicle" as, in part, "a land
motor vehicle licensed for highway use" but excludes a land motor
vehicle "insured under the liability coverage of this policy."
Upon Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment, the
circuit court entered declaratory judgment in Farm Bureau's
favor. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Joseph-estate sets forth three main arguments on
appeal: (1) the Policy is internally inconsistent and inherently
ambiguous; (2) Illinois public policy requires the estate of
Joseph-deceased be compensated under the UIM coverage; and (3)
Farm Bureau should be estopped from raising coverage defenses
because it delayed filing the declaratory-judgment action. We
begin with the second argument.
A. Indiana Law Applies
Joseph-estate's second argument turns on whether
Illinois or Indiana law applies. To answer this question, we
begin by ascertaining whether a conflict between the laws of
these states exists. See McGrew v. Pearlman, 304 Ill. App. 3d
697, 701, 710 N.E.2d 125, 128 (1999). One does.
Illinois and Indiana have considered the legality of
using the owned-vehicle exclusion to deny UIM coverage and
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reached different conclusions. In Illinois, courts have refused
to enforce the owned-vehicle exclusion. For example, in Squire
v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 69 Ill. 2d 167, 179, 370 N.E.2d
1044, 1049 (1977), the court concluded the Illinois Insurance
Code "requires coverage of insured persons regardless of the
motor vehicle the uninsured motorist is driving, and regardless
of the vehicle in which the insured person is located when
injured." The Squire court based its holding on section 143a of
the Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/143a (West 2002)), which requires
liability insurance policies to cover insureds "who are legally
entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured
motor vehicles." See also Squire, 69 Ill. 2d at 179, 370 N.E.2d
at 1049.
Indiana courts, however, have concluded owned-vehicle
exclusions do not violate Indiana law. In United Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hanley, 172 Ind. App. 329, 360 N.E.2d 247
(1977), the court was faced with an argument similar to the one
Joseph-estate makes here. Two sons of the insured were, with
permission, in the vehicle of another. One son was driving; the
other was a passenger. Both sons were insureds under the policy.
They were in an accident that left the driving son dead and the
other injured. See Hanley, 172 Ind. App. at 330, 360 N.E.2d at
248. The injured son sought compensation for his injuries under
the liability coverage and the UIM coverage of the policy.
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Because the household exclusion applied, the injured son was
barred from recovering under the liability portion of the policy.
The injured son then argued the UIM provisions were triggered.
Hanley, 172 Ind. App. at 333, 360 N.E.2d at 248. The Hanley
court found recovery barred, upon concluding the combination of
the exclusions did not violate Indiana law. The Hanley court
noted decisions in Illinois "awarded [UIM] coverage to insureds
who were otherwise excluded from liability coverage by operation
of the household exclusion," but it called this the minority view
and refused to follow it. Hanley, 172 Ind. App. at 335, 360
N.E.2d at 250.
Joseph-estate concedes under normal conflict-of-law
analysis, Indiana law would apply. We agree. Absent a choice-
of-law provision, we look to Illinois choice-of-law rules to
ascertain the applicable law. See Westchester Fire Insurance Co.
v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d 622, 628, 747 N.E.2d
955, 961 (2000). Under Illinois choice-of-law rules for
insurance contracts, Illinois courts use the "most significant
contacts" test. Westchester Fire Insurance, 321 Ill. App. 3d at
628, 747 N.E.2d at 961. Insurance policies "are '"governed by
the location of the subject matter, the place of delivery of the
contract, the domicile of the insured or of the insurer, the
place of the last act to give rise to a valid contract, the place
of performance, or other place bearing a rational relationship to
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the general contract."'" Westchester Fire Insurance, 321 Ill.
App. 3d at 629, 747 N.E.2d at 961, quoting Lapham-Hickey Steel
Corp. v. Protection Mutual Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 520, 526-
27, 655 N.E.2d 842, 845 (1995), quoting Hofeld v. Nationwide Life
Insurance Co., 59 Ill. 2d 522, 528, 322 N.E.2d 454, 457-58
(1975). All of these considerations lean toward applying Indiana
law.
Joseph-estate argues, however, Illinois public policy
requires the application of Illinois law here. He contends
Illinois courts have called the owned-vehicle exclusion "illegal
and unenforceable" and the enforcement of an "illegal" exclusion
would violate Illinois public policy. Joseph-estate further
maintains Illinois has an interest in protecting the individuals
who are injured on its roadways.
To determine Illinois public policy, we look to our
constitution, the legislative enactments, and decisions of the
courts. See Morris B. Chapman & Associates, Ltd. v. Kitzman, 193
Ill. 2d 560, 569, 739 N.E.2d 1263, 1270 (2000). As shown above,
the decisions of Illinois courts have interpreted section 143a as
rendering owned-vehicle exclusions "illegal and unenforceable."
See Squire, 69 Ill. 2d at 179, 370 N.E.2d at 1049.
We conclude Joseph-estate is not asking the correct
question of what Illinois public policy would allow. The
question is not simply whether Illinois public policy would want
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to prevent harm to individuals on its roadways. While we agree
Illinois would want to protect these individuals from harm while
in Illinois, we do not agree this shows Illinois public policy
requires Illinois law to govern how out-of-state residents can
contract with their insurance companies to be fiscally protected
or compensated for injuries sustained in another state.
Rather, the true question is whether Illinois public
policy mandates Illinois law governs a purely Indiana insurance
contract: one between two individual residents and a corporate
resident, involving a vehicle licensed in Indiana, which happens
to be involved in an accident in Illinois. Joseph-estate has not
shown Illinois public policy requires this court to interject
Illinois law here. No Illinois resident claims he was denied
coverage under the suit. The liability coverage would have
applied to any Illinois resident injured as a result of Wilma's
negligence. Moreover, section 143a, upon which Illinois courts
rely to find such exclusions "illegal and unenforceable,"
explicitly applies only to vehicles registered or garaged in
Illinois. See 215 ILCS 5/143a (West 2002). Section 143a thus
cannot serve as the basis for concluding a vehicle registered in
Indiana by Indiana residents must provide the UIM coverage to
cover injuries to other Indiana-resident members of their
household simply because the vehicle is driven in Illinois.
Indiana has ascertained its residents can bargain away such
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coverage, which likely results in lower premiums. The holding
Joseph-estate seeks would require this Illinois court to
interfere with Indiana's ability to determine whether lower
premiums or greater coverage is better for Indiana citizens when
Illinois residents are not affected.
Indiana law applies to this contract. Under Indiana
law, the owned-vehicle exclusion prevents Joseph-estate's
recovery of damages under the UIM coverage of the Policy.
B. The Policy Is Not Internally Inconsistent or Ambiguous
Joseph-estate argues he is nevertheless entitled to the
UIM coverage because the Policy is internally inconsistent and
inherently ambiguous. Joseph-estate maintains the Policy's
household exclusion renders Wilma an UIM, while the owned-vehicle
exclusion renders her an insured motorist, creating an absurd
result. Joseph-estate contends the two exclusions combined
provide "the legal protection equivalent to wet tissue paper."
Farm Bureau responds by asserting the Policy contains
provisions interpreted and enforced by courts in Indiana. We
agree with Farm Bureau.
Having determined Indiana law permits the two clauses,
we cannot find an inherent inconsistency between the household
exclusion and the owned-vehicle exclusion. As shown above, these
clauses have been enforced in Indiana. See Hanley, 172 Ind. App.
at 336, 360 N.E.2d at 251.
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In addition, contrary to the sweeping assertions of
Joseph-estate, the application of these two clauses does not
create a worthless Policy. Farm Bureau paid claims from this
collision under other coverages. Moreover, the liability
coverage and the UIM coverage, although they provided no coverage
to Joseph-deceased in this collision, had purpose. They provided
protection from collisions of vehicles not covered under the
Policy or vehicles not driven by members of the household.
In addition, we find Joseph-estate has not proved the
terms of the Policy to be ambiguous. We recognize the difficulty
of following insurance contracts, but Joseph-estate has not shown
any ambiguity to render the contract unenforceable.
C. Farm Bureau Is Not Estopped From Denying Coverage
Joseph-estate last argues Farm Bureau should be
estopped from raising coverage defenses under the "mend-the-hold"
and equitable-estoppel doctrines. Joseph-estate emphasizes the
following facts: Farm Bureau did not file the declaratory
judgment action until more than 31 months after the accident, 8
months after he made the policy limits demand, and 6 months after
the lawsuit was filed; Farm Bureau defended Wilma's estate
without making a reservation of rights; and Farm Bureau admitted
through Kuster's answers to interrogatories there was coverage of
the claim. Joseph-estate contends Farm Bureau, through its
actions, conceded coverage and cannot now maintain there is none.
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We first find Kuster's answer to interrogatories in the
underlying wrongful-death action cannot be held against Farm
Bureau. Kuster is the attorney for Wilma's estate. Although
Kuster was paid by Farm Bureau, Joseph-estate has not identified
anything in the record to indicate he represented Farm Bureau.
We also find it irrelevant that over 31 months had
passed since the accident before Farm Bureau filed the
declaratory-judgment action. A duty to defend does not arise
until after the underlying lawsuit is filed. See Grinnell Mutual
Reinsurance Co. v. LaForge, 369 Ill. App. 3d 688, 698, 863 N.E.2d
1132, 1140 (2006).
1. The "Mend-the-Hold" Doctrine
We turn to Joseph-estate's first argument: the "mend-
the-hold" doctrine prohibits Farm Bureau from relying on the
coverage defenses raised in the declaratory-judgment action.
Under the mend-the-hold doctrine, in the insurance context,
insurers may not deny a claim for one reason and then change "the
reason for its denial in the midst of litigation." LaForge, 369
Ill. App. 3d at 699, 863 N.E.2d at 1140. "'"[It] is not
permitted thus to amend [its] hold."'" LaForge, 369 Ill. App. 2d
at 699, 863 N.E.2d at 1140, quoting Gibson v. Brown, 214 Ill.
330, 341, 73 N.E. 578, 582 (1905), quoting Ohio & Mississippi Ry.
Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U.S. 258, 267-68, 24 L. Ed. 693, 696 (1877).
Other than relying on Kuster's interrogatory answer,
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Joseph-estate has not identified any place in the record showing
Farm Bureau denied his claim for coverage for one reason and
changed the reason after litigation began. In fact, the record
shows Farm Bureau had not denied Joseph-estate's claims before
Joseph-estate filed the wrongful-death action. Joseph-estate
made its claim under the liability coverage portion of the Policy
on June 6, 2005. While making its claim, Joseph-estate
maintained he needed a prompt response because the statute of
limitations was about to expire. On June 15, 2005, Farm Bureau
informed Joseph-estate it did not yet have an authorized response
to his claim and it would take some time to get one. On July 1,
2005, the wrongful-death suit was filed.
Even if Joseph-estate could rely on Farm Bureau's
provision of a defense for Wilma's estate as admitting coverage
and then Farm Bureau's declaratory-judgment action as a change of
position, the mend-the-hold doctrine does not apply. This court
will not apply the doctrine "in the absence of detriment to the
party seeking its application, unfair surprise, or
arbitrariness." LaForge, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 699, 863 N.E.2d at
1141. Joseph-estate has not established, much less argued, he
suffered detriment or unfair surprise at the alleged change in
position. Nor has he shown any arbitrariness to justify
application of the doctrine here. Further, Joseph-estate cannot
claim he incurred costs of litigation as a result of the alleged
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change of position, because he made his demand shortly before he
filed suit and before he received word on Farm Bureau's position.
2. Equitable Estoppel
Joseph-estate argues the doctrine of equitable estoppel
prohibits Farm Bureau from denying coverage. Joseph-estate
maintains because Farm Bureau undertook defending Wilma's estate
without a reservation of rights and did not seek a declaratory
judgment until after the motion to dismiss in the underlying suit
was denied, the doctrine prohibits Farm Bureau from denying
coverage.
Farm Bureau maintains, in part, the equitable estoppel
doctrine does not apply because Joseph-estate has not shown
prejudice. We agree.
Joseph-estate's position focuses on an insurer's
responsibilities when faced with a claim it believes is not
covered by a duty to defend. In that situation, "the insurer may
not simply refuse to defend the insured." Johnson v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., 346 Ill. App. 3d 790, 794, 806 N.E.2d 223,
226 (2004). The insurer must, instead, "either (1) defend the
lawsuit under a reservation of rights or (2) seek a declaratory
judgment that no coverage exists." Johnson, 346 Ill. App. 3d at
794, 806 N.E.2d at 226. We will find an insurer "estopped from
raising a policy defense to coverage only if it fails to take
either of these two actions" (Johnson, 346 Ill. App. 3d at 794,
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806 N.E.2d at 226) and it "is later found to have wrongfully
denied coverage" (Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Ehlco
Liquidating Trust, 186 Ill. 2d 127, 150, 708 N.E.2d 1122, 1134-35
(1999)). Proof of prejudice, in these circumstances, is not
required. See Wausau, 186 Ill. 2d at 157-58, 708 N.E.2d at 1138.
A different equitable estoppel applies, however, if the
insurer initially undertakes the duty to defend without reserving
its rights, but later reserves rights or files a declaratory-
judgment action. See Wausau, 186 Ill. 2d at 158, 708 N.E.2d at
1138. In the cases where the duty to defend was undertaken but
then disputed, an insurer will not be equitably estopped from
denying coverage unless prejudice exists. See Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 195-96, 355 N.E.2d 24, 28-29
(1976); American States Insurance Co. v. National Cycle, Inc.,
260 Ill. App. 3d 299, 302-03, 307-08, 631 N.E.2d 1292, 1295,
1298-99 (1994); Mid-State Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Illinois
Insurance Exchange, Inc., 175 Ill. App. 3d 265, 268-70, 529
N.E.2d 696, 698-99 (1988).
In this case, Joseph-estate has not shown prejudice.
The duty to defend was not owed to Joseph-estate. Joseph-estate
has not shown how he was prejudiced by Farm Bureau's conduct, and
he has not provided any basis for the conclusion barring Farm
Bureau from a valid defense would be equitable.
The only argument Joseph-estate makes for prejudice is
that Wilma's estate was prejudiced because she was not allowed to
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control her defense. Notwithstanding the problems that arise on
using an adversary's alleged prejudice to trigger estoppel, case
law shows courts should not conclusively presume prejudice "from
the mere entry of appearance and assumption of the defense."
Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d at 196, 355 N.E.2d at 29; see also Royal
Globe Insurance Co. v. Tutt, 108 Ill. App. 3d 69, 71, 438 N.E.2d
943, 945 (1982). Prejudice will be found if "by the insurer's
assumption of the defense the insured has been induced to
surrender his right to control his own defense." Peppers, 64
Ill. 2d at 196, 355 N.E.2d at 29. Prejudice must be proved "'by
clear, concise, and unequivocal evidence.'" National Cycle, 260
Ill. App. 3d at 308, 631 N.E.2d at 1299, quoting Old Mutual
Casualty Co. v. Clark, 53 Ill. App. 3d 274, 279, 368 N.E.2d 702,
705 (1977). Joseph-estate argues nothing more than Wilma's
estate was denied the opportunity to hire counsel. This argument
is insufficient.
Joseph-estate's case law on this point is
distinguishable. Joseph-estate relies on Apex Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Christner, 99 Ill. App. 2d 153, 240 N.E.2d 742 (1968). In
Christner, however, the insured, rather than a third-party
plaintiff in an underlying action, sought equitable estoppel. In
addition, a motion for summary judgment against the insured was
pending in the underlying lawsuit before the insurer sought a
declaratory judgment and summary judgment was entered before the
declaratory-judgment case was decided. See Christner, 99 Ill.
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App. 2d at 158-59, 240 N.E.2d at 745-46.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
STEIGMANN, J., concurs.
MYERSCOUGH, J., specially concurs.
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JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH, specially concurring:
I specially concur. I agree with the majority that
Indiana law applies. The Illinois Insurance Code permits out-of-
state insurance companies to issue policies in conformance with
the laws of their respective states:
"The policies of a company, not
organized under the laws of this State, may
contain any provision which the law of the
state or country under which the company is
organized prescribes shall be in such
policies when issued in this State, and the
policies of such insurance company organized
under the laws of this State may, when issued
or delivered in any other state or country,
contain any provisions required by the laws
of the state or country in which the same are
issued, anything in this Code to the contrary
notwithstanding." 215 ILCS 5/443 (West
2006).
However, I write separately to note the contradiction
within the Insurance Code. All drivers of vehicles in Illinois
must possess mandatory minimum UIM and underinsured (UDIM)
insurance but vehicles registered in another state need only
possess insurance in conformance with the other state's laws.
Illinois public policy mandates $20,000/$40,000 limits on UIM and
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UDIM coverage. Simply put, drivers in Illinois, whether
residents or not, are required to possess those insurance limits
to drive upon the roads in Illinois. Absolute liability lies for
failure to possess those insurance limits:
"Section 3-707 is the penalty provision
for violation of the mandatory insurance
provisions of the Code. See 625 ILCS 5/7-
601, 7-602 (West 2000). The purpose to be
achieved, then, is enforcement of the
mandatory insurance requirement, which was
instituted for the protection of the public
(see State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 285 Ill.
App. 3d 115, 120-21[, 674 N.E.2d 52, 55-56]
(1996)), and to promote public safety and
financial responsibility (see 625 ILCS 5/7-
100 through 7-708 (West 2000) ('Illinois
Safety and Family Financial Responsibility
Law')). In the legislature's words, 'the
State has a compelling interest in ensuring
that drivers *** demonstrate financial
responsibility, including family financial
responsibility, *** in order to safely own
and operate a motor vehicle.' See 625 ILCS
5/7-701 (West 2000). Thus, the legislature,
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in its wisdom, has determined that important
public interests are served by eliminating
uninsured vehicles from the roads of this
state. It makes sense, then, that they
should place an absolute obligation on the
operators, who are directly responsible for
placing a motor vehicle on the road, to
ascertain the insured status of the motor
vehicle or suffer the consequences. Thus,
section 3-707, which defines the penalty for
a violation of the mandatory insurance
requirements set forth in sections 7-601 of
the Code, is appropriately read as imposing
absolute liability and expressing the public
policy of Illinois." People v. O'Brien, 197
Ill. 2d 88, 99-100, 754 N.E.2d 327, 334
(2001).
Further, Illinois law, contrary to Indiana law,
mandates those minimum limits on the vehicle regardless of the
operator. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Illinois
Farmers Insurance Co., 226 Ill. 2d 395, 411, 875 N.E.2d 1096,
1105 (2007). See also this recently enacted provision of the
Insurance Code:
"Any policy of private passenger
automobile insurance must provide the same
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limits of bodily injury liability, property
damage liability, [UIM] and [UDIM] bodily
injury, and medical payments coverage to all
persons insured under that policy, whether or
not an insured person is a named insured or
permissive user under the policy. If the
policy insures more than one private
passenger automobile, the limits available to
the permissive user shall be the limits
associated with the vehicle used by the
permissive user when the loss occurs." Pub.
Act 95-395, §5, eff. January 1, 2008 (adding
215 ILCS 5/143.13a) (2007 Ill. Legis. Serv.
4757 (West)).
Clearly, Wilma Frye, the deceased, should have been
insured here in compliance with the mandatory insurance public-
policy requirement of Illinois. But, in effect, the majority
permits an uninsured vehicle to be driven upon the roads of this
State, contrary to the public policy of our State. Both Wilma
Frye and her husband, Joseph Frye, were in violation of that
public policy and the statutory mandate of such sections as
section 7-601, for example, when driving and permitting the
operation of their vehicle in Illinois. Both could have been
prosecuted for that violation under our absolute-liability
statute governing drivers, even though their Indiana insurance
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company bore no responsibility to comply with the mandatory
insurance laws of Illinois.
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