People v. Goodwin ( 2008 )

NO. 4-06-0354 Filed 4/21/08
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court
v. ) of Macon County
STEPHEN G. GOODWIN, ) No. 05CF486
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) John K. Greanias,
) Judge Presiding
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
In February 2006, following a jury trial, the jury
convicted defendant, Stephen G. Goodwin, of escape (720 ILCS
5/31-6(c) (West 2004)), unlawful possession of a converted
vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2004)), burglary (720 ILCS
5/19-1(a) (West 2004)), aggravated kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10-
2(a)(2) (West 2004)), aggravated unlawful possession of a con-
verted vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7)(A) (West 2004)), and
aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (625
ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(4) (West 2004)). In June 2005, at a pretrial
hearing on a motion to receive a new attorney, the trial court
held defendant in direct criminal contempt for an outburst of
profanity. The court sentenced defendant to 180 days in the
Macon County jail.
In March 2006, the trial court sentenced defendant to
concurrent prison terms of 7 years for escape, 3 years for
fleeing, 15 years for possession of a converted vehicle, and 30
years for aggravated kidnaping, all running consecutive to the
sentence in another case.
Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court
erred in making his contempt sentence consecutive to any future
sentence which might be imposed; (2) his contempt sentence was
excessive; and (3) the State failed to prove him guilty of
kidnaping beyond a reasonable doubt. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In April 2005, the State charged defendant with escape
(720 ILCS 5/31-6(c) (West 2004)), unlawful possession of a stolen
vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2004)), burglary (720 ILCS
5/19-1(a) (West 2004)), aggravated kidnaping (720 ILCS 5/10-
2(a)(2) (West 2004)), aggravated unlawful failure to obey an
order to stop (625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7)(a) (West 2004)), and
aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer (625
ILCS 5/11-204.1(a)(4) (West 2004)). The unlawful-possession-of-a
stolen-vehicle charge was later amended to unlawful possession of
a converted vehicle (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 2004)), and the
aggravated-unlawful-failure-to-obey-an-order-to-stop charge was
amended to aggravated unlawful possession of a converted vehicle
(625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7)(A) (West 2004)).
As is relevant to this appeal on the aggravated kidnap-
ing charge, the information alleged that on April 3, 2005,
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defendant intentionally escaped from Decatur police officer
Christopher Copeland and entered a Dodge Caravan with the intent
to commit a theft. The information further alleged defendant
knowingly and secretly confined Carmen Howard, a child under the
age of 13 years, and refused to stop when Decatur police officer
Chad Shull signaled for him to do so.
On June 10, 2005, at a pretrial hearing, defendant
interrupted the proceedings several times complaining about his
attorney. When the trial court refused to interrupt the discus-
sion of other issues to address defendant's accusation that his
attorney was "working with" the assistant State's Attorney,
defendant said "[t]his mother-fucking court is crooked." The
court immediately found defendant in direct criminal contempt and
orally sentenced him to 180 days in the Macon County jail,
stating:
"Mr. Goodwin, I find you are in direct crimi-
nal contempt of court for swearing by audibly
saying 'mother-fucker' in open court. I
sentence you to 180 days in the Macon County
[j]ail for contempt which sentence will run
consecutive to the sentence you are currently
serving and any other sentence that is subse-
quently imposed on you in the pending cases."
On June 20, 2005, defendant handed the trial court a
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letter apologizing for his outburst. That same day, defendant
also verbally apologized to the court during a pretrial hearing
on defendant's motion to proceed pro se.
On June 24, 2005, at a hearing on defendant's motion to
dismiss count IV (aggravated kidnaping), the State asked the
trial court to enter a written finding of direct criminal con-
tempt. The court responded that it would consider defendant's
letter as an oral motion to modify the sentence and to vacate the
finding of contempt. The court stated:
"Again, Mr. Goodwin [(defendant)] *** you
have filed a written apology to the [c]ourt
which I have now received. What I am going
to do with respect to that is, I am going to
take that as an oral motion to *** modify the
sentence and to vacate the finding of con-
tempt and I'm going to take that under ad-
visement at this time until, basically, we
get done with the case. So, it will leave
that--the possibility of me vacating all or
part of the sentence and vacating the finding
of contempt open so that it again that will
be possible. If I don't do that right now,
then, once 30 days passes, I can't do that;
so, I'm leaving that possibility open right
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now *** and I will prepare a written order,
and I'll provide [a] copy of that to both
[defendant] and you, [defense counsel], once
I've prepared and filed that written order."
On June 27, 2004, the trial court entered a written
order finding defendant in direct criminal contempt and sentenc-
ing him to 180 days in the Macon County jail, to be served
"consecutive to [d]efendant's other sentence previously imposed."
Although the "Findings" section of the written order referred to
the oral sentence given on June 10 and the corresponding docket
entry where the written order recited that the court had "sen-
tenced [d]efendant to 180 days in the Macon County [j]ail to run
consecutive to the sentence previously imposed in another case
and any other sentences imposed in the future for criminal
offenses charged in this case," the sentence contained in the
decretal portion of the written order corrected what the court
said orally on June 10, in its docket entry, and in the findings
of the written order.
The "previously imposed" sentence referred to was for
theft over $300. On March 8, 2005, the Macon county circuit
court sentenced defendant to four years in the Illinois Depart-
ment of Corrections (DOC) for that charge. Defendant asked to be
released on a $100,000 recognizance bond for a week before he had
to report to serve his sentence. He was given a three-day stay
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and ordered to report for his sentence on March 11, 2005.
Defendant did not report and a warrant was issued for his arrest.
On February 6, 2006, the jury trial commenced on five
charges (the State was granted a motion just before trial to nol-
pros the burglary charge). Kevin Howard testified, as is rele-
vant to this appeal, that on April 3, 2005, he and his 11-month-
old daughter, Carmen, were sitting in a minivan belonging to
Kevin and his wife Dorian, as it was idling in the driveway at
2822 Cardinal Drive. Kevin was in the driver's seat and Carmen
was in a child's car seat, facing forward, belted to the seat
directly behind the driver's seat. The windows behind the front
doors of the van were tinted.
Kevin saw a man, whom he identified as defendant, being
chased by a police officer. Defendant ran up along side the van,
crossed in front of it, then ran around the house. Kevin got out
to see what was happening. He left his door open. He headed
back to the van, but saw defendant again. This time, defendant
jumped into the driver's seat of the minivan, shut the door, and
locked the doors. The evidence at trial conflicted on whether
the driver's window of the van was open and whether, as defendant
drove off in the van, Kevin yelled that there was a child in the
car or "stop, get out of my car."
The evidence at trial indicated that defendant drove
away, accelerating quickly, with the child still strapped in her
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car seat in the car. Kevin and Dorian chased on foot briefly,
with Dorian screaming that there was a baby in the car. Decatur
police officers Nathan Binkley and Christopher Copeland, who were
attempting to take defendant in on the outstanding warrant, ran
back to their squad car. Officer Chad Shull, who was also on the
scene, gave chase in his patrol car, and Kevin and his sister-in-
law got in another vehicle and also chased defendant. After
driving a short way, Kevin and his sister-in-law asked some
passersby whether they had seen the van. The passersby said they
had seen the van and pointed Kevin and his sister-in-law in the
direction they had seen it travel. Kevin spotted the van, which
had no police cars behind it. Kevin and his sister-in-law turned
around and followed the van, but they then lost sight of it.
Officers Nathan Binkley and Christopher Copeland also
attempted to locate the van. They did find it, following it
briefly before their commander called off the pursuit. Officers
Chad Shull and Chad Larner pursued the defendant in the minivan
for a longer time. During this time, defendant drove at speeds
of 75 to nearly 100 miles per hour, ran red lights, crossed a
median, and drove in oncoming traffic lanes to drive around
stopped traffic. The pursuit was terminated by Sargent Squires
(first name not in evidence). Officer Chad Shull and Chad Larner
slowed and lost sight of the van, but they continued driving.
Shortly after that, Officer Chad Shull saw people
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pointing toward an apartment complex at the next intersection.
Officer Chad Shull saw the van on the curb at that intersection.
Officers Chad Shull and Chad Larner arrived at the van about the
same time and found that Kevin had arrived before any police
officers. Kevin had not seen the van since the first time he
lost sight of it. Officer Chad Larner estimated that the van was
out of his sight for about two minutes. The record indicates
that Officer Chad Shull also lost sight of the van. Immediately
after he arrived, Kevin removed Carmen from the van. Carmen was
crying, and both parents noted that her face was red and
splotchy, which is how it looked when she has been crying.
At trial, defendant testified in his own defense. He
admitted that he knew there was a warrant for his arrest, and he
did not want to be taken in on it. Defendant testified he was
going to hide in the van but decided to drive away when one of
the officers tried to spray him with mace. He said the windows
were closed, and he heard a man yell at him to get out of the
van, but did not hear anything about a child in the van. He said
he did not look behind him, music was playing in the van, and he
never heard Carmen. He also said that he spent a considerable
amount of the time he was running from police talking to his
girlfriend on Kevin's cell phone.
The jury found defendant guilty on all charges. On
March 22, 2006, the trial court vacated the (nonaggravated)
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possession-of-a-converted-vehicle conviction, and sentenced
defendant to concurrent sentences of 7 years' imprisonment for
escape, 30 years' imprisonment for kidnaping, 15 years'
imprisonment for aggravated possession of a converted vehicle,
and 3 years' imprisonment for eluding, all running consecutive to
defendant's March 8, 2005, sentence for theft over $300 in Macon
County case No. 04-CF-752.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant raises three issues on appeal. Defendant
argues (1) the trial court erred in making his contempt sentence
consecutive to any future sentence the court might impose, (2)
his contempt sentence was excessive, and (3) the State failed to
prove him guilty of kidnaping beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Review the Trial Court's
Order on Timing and Duration of Defendant's Contempt Sentence
Defendant argues the trial court erred by ordering his
contempt sentence run consecutive to any future sentence the
court might impose in the pending case. The State concedes it
would have been improper for the court to order the contempt
sentence run consecutive to any future sentence but argues (1)
defendant forfeited any error regarding the finding of contempt
by failing to obtain a final ruling from the court; and (2) in
the alternative, this court lacks jurisdiction to address the
alleged errors because defendant did not appeal the order within
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30 days. This court will address the State's arguments first.
1. The June 27, 2005, Order Was Final
The State claims that the trial court never ruled on
defendant's motion to modify or vacate. The State notes that the
court did enter a written order of contempt on June 27, 2005.
The State argues, however, that the order was not a final
judgment of contempt because the court stated on June 24, 2005,
that it was taking the motion under advisement until completion
of the case. We disagree.
Although the trial court stated that it would take the
motion under advisement until completion of the case, the court
clearly reconsidered that statement when it entered the June 27,
2005, order.
At the same time the trial judge said he would decide
the motion at the end of the case, he said that he knew the
decision on the motion would have to be made quickly. The judge
said that he would have to decide within 30 days, if at all. At
the same hearing, this case was set for pretrial on September 6,
2005, and trial was set for the term beginning September 19,
2005. Because the case was clearly not going to trial within 30
days, and the judge was clearly cognizant of the limited time he
had to reconsider, the judge could not have meant after the trial
when he said at "the end of the case." The judge then said that
he would keep the issue open for the moment but would issue a
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written order. Placed in context, when the judge said "the end
of the case," he apparently meant that after the pretrial hearing
he would consider modifying or vacating the finding of contempt,
and he then would issue a written order. He issued the final
order three days later with no modification.
2. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction To Consider Defendant's
Appeal of His Contempt Sentence Because Defendant
Failed To Timely Appeal
The State also argues that this court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the issues of timing and excessiveness
of defendant's contempt sentence because defendant did not appeal
within 30 days of the entry of the final order of contempt.
"An order finding a person or entity in contempt of
court which imposes a monetary or other penalty" is final for
purposes of appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(5). An appeal must be
filed within 30 days of the entry of the order appealed. 188
Ill. 2d R. 606(b).
Because defendant did not file an appeal within 30 days
of the order entered by the trial court on June 27, 2005, this
court lacks jurisdiction to consider the issues defendant raises
with regard to timing and excessiveness his contempt sentence.
B. Defendant Was Not Awarded Sentence Credit in
Excess of What He Was Entitled
The State also argues that the trial court awarded
defendant sentence credit in excess of what he was entitled. In
their briefs, neither party discusses the appropriateness of the
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State raising the issue. The State did not cross-appeal. The
State raised this issue in its appellee brief. The State,
however, is in the position of an appellant by raising this issue
and is thus restricted by Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (188 Ill.
2d R. 604(a)(1)), which lists the few permissible grounds for an
appeal by the State. People v. Kent, 40 Ill. App. 3d 256, 265-
66, 350 N.E.2d 890, 898 (1976).
Challenging the calculation of credit for time served
is not among the list of bases for a State's appeal. 210 Ill. 2d
R. 604(a)(1). If the State had filed a cross-appeal, the cross-
appeal would fail on this basis.
The State asserts, however, that the trial court's
determination of sentencing credit is a void judgment, which may
be attacked at any time. City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d
504, 510, 705 N.E.2d 81, 85 (1998). The State argues the result
of giving what the State believes is too much credit for time
served is that the court exceeded its authority by giving a
lesser sentence than the statute imposed. Roman, 184 Ill. 2d at
510, 705 N.E.2d at 85.
However, the trial court here sentenced defendant to
six months' jail time consecutive to the four-year sentence he
was then serving for theft. Consecutive sentences are discrete
and individual; thus, the contempt sentence will begin once the
theft sentence is complete. People v. Pack, 224 Ill. 2d 144,
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148, 862 N.E.2d 938, 941 (2007). As the defendant points out,
this just means he has not yet started serving the contempt
sentence. Although defendant was sentenced to six months in the
county jail for contempt, a docket entry dated June 24, 2005,
indicated the trial court transferred defendant to DOC to serve
time on the theft charge. Defendant spent the entire time that
the State presumes he was serving his contempt sentence in the
custody of DOC with the exception of a few days in August 2005,
when he was awaiting a hearing on several motions he had filed in
this case. This corroborates defendant's contention that he has
not yet served the contempt sentence.
C. State Proved Defendant Guilty of Aggravated
Kidnaping Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Defendant last argues the State did not prove the
aggravated-kidnaping charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant
claims that the State failed to prove "secret confinement"
because everyone knew the baby was in the van and the baby could
be observed by a person looking inside the van's window.
Generally, where a defendant challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence, the test is whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d
317, 322, 830 N.E.2d 556, 559 (2005). It is not the function of
the appellate court to retry the defendant. People v. Slinkard,
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362 Ill. App. 3d 855, 857, 841 N.E.2d 1, 3 (2005).
However, when the facts are not in dispute, and the
reviewing court is interpreting whether those facts meet the
definition of a statutory term, the question is one of law.
People v. Lamborn, 185 Ill. 2d 585, 590, 708 N.E.2d 350, 354
(1999); People v. Smith, 191 Ill. 2d 408, 411, 732 N.E.2d 513,
514 (2000). Here, the issue is whether the undisputed facts of
the case constitute "secret confinement" under section 10-1(a) of
the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/10-1(a) (West 2004)). The
question is one of law and this court will review the finding of
"secret confinement" de novo. Lamborn, 185 Ill. 2d at 590, 708
N.E.2d at 354; Smith, 191 Ill. 2d at 411, 732 N.E.2d at 514
A kidnaping occurs when a person knowingly and secretly
confines another person against his will. 720 ILCS 5/10-1(a)(1)
(West 2004). Confinement of a child under the age of 13 is
considered "against his will" if done without the consent of the
parents or legal guardian, and, where the victim is under 13, the
crime also become aggravated kidnaping. 720 ILCS 5/10-1(b), 10-
2(a)(2) (West 2004).
The precedent in Illinois is clear and consistent: one
person holding another in a car on the public highways
constitutes secret confinement. People v. Bishop, 1 Ill. 2d 60,
64, 114 N.E.2d 566, 568 (1953); People v. Hamil , 20 Ill. App. 3d
901, 908, 314 N.E.2d 251, 256 (1974). In Bishop, 1 Ill. 2d at
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64, 114 N.E.2d at 568, the court rejected the argument that there
can be no secret confinement where the victim was forcibly
confined in a car that was driven around for four hours. In
Hamil, 20 Ill. App. 3d at 908, 314 N.E.2d at 256, the element of
secret confinement was established where the defendant confined
the victim in the car while driving down several alleys, then
stopped where the victim could not open the door. Defendant
argues the police and the Howards lost visual contact with the
van for only a short time. However, there is no minimum time of
confinement set forth in the kidnaping statute.
In this case, the facts demonstrated that defendant was
driving in a van at a high rate of speed and attempting to elude
capture. He had Carmen in the van and managed, for a time, to
succeed in getting away from her family and the police.
Defendant argues that Carmen was not secretly confined
under the analysis in People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 187-88,
604 N.E.2d 294, 316-17 (1992). In Pasch, the supreme court found
the defendant not proved guilty of aggravated kidnaping beyond a
reasonable doubt where the State failed to prove secret
confinement in a hostage standoff where the defendant never
attempted to keep the victim's location (in the victim's
apartment) a secret and the victim's sister was aware of the
victim's location at all times. Defendant argues that Carmen was
not secretly confined because her parents and the police knew she
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was in the minivan from the time defendant drove it away until
Kevin found the van and removed Carmen. Pasch is distinguishable
because defendant was driving a van with Carmen in it, attempting
to elude detection, not holding her in a fixed location where her
presence was widely known
Defendant also argues that the child was visible
through the window of the van, which was operated on public
roads, so Carmen was never removed from the public awareness. In
People v. Trotter, 371 Ill. App. 3d 869, 876-77, 864 N.E.2d 281,
287 (2007), overruled on other grounds by People v. Harrison, 226
Ill. 2d 427, 441, 877 N.E.2d 432, 439 (2007), the appellate court
found the defendant was not proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt where the defendant took a child without the parents'
consent, boarded a light-rail train, rode it for a while,
disembarked, spoke with a suspicious police officer, walked to a
gas station while the police officer kept her in sight, and went
to the bathroom where she was ultimately arrested. The court in
Trotter found that secret confinement was not proved because the
victim was never removed from the public awareness. Trotter, 371
Ill. App. 3d at 877, 864 N.E.2d at 287.
Again, however, Carmen was not in clear view of the
public, as she would be on a train or bus, or had she been taken
through a gas station in view of an employee and had briefly been
taken to a public restroom. She was strapped in the child seat
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of a van with tinted windows. Even if Carmen were visible in the
van, her presence there would not arouse suspicion. There would
be no indication to the public that her being in the van was
without her parents' permission.
Finally, defendant asserts that this situation is
comparable to People v. Lamkey, 240 Ill. App. 3d 435, 439, 608
N.E.2d 406, 409 (1992), because, defendant asserts, Carmen was
visible through the van window. The court found the State failed
to prove secret confinement in Lamkey, where the victim was held
and sexually assaulted behind a glass door a couple steps off of
a busy Chicago street. Lamkey, 240 Ill. App. 3d at 439, 608
N.E.2d at 409. Confinement, though, is much more "secret" when
it involves a very small child in a child seat in a moving
vehicle than it is when a sexual assault is being perpetrated
behind a glass door clearly visible from a busy street.
Clearly, defendant had Carmen secretly confined within
the meaning of the statute, and defendant was therefore correctly
found guilty of aggravated kidnaping beyond a reasonable doubt.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment. As part of our judgment, we grant the State its
statutory assessment of $50 against defendant as costs of this
appeal.
Affirmed.
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McCULLOUGH and STEIGMANN, JJ., concur.
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