People v. Croom ( 2008 )

NO. 4-06-0927 Filed 2/15/08
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Champaign County
DWAYNE T. CROOM, ) No. 05CF1023
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Thomas J. Difanis,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
A jury found defendant, Dwayne T. Croom, guilty of
first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West 2004)) and the
trial court sentenced him to 50 years in prison. Defendant
appeals, arguing the court erred by denying his motion to sup-
press statements he made to law-enforcement officers that he
alleges were made during a custodial interrogation and without
the benefit of Miranda warnings (see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966)). We affirm.
The record reflects defendant lived with his girl-
friend, Rochelle Bolden, and her two children, three-year-old
Altravius and two-year-old Amya. (Alternate spellings of
Altravius's name appear in the record but, for purposes of
consistency, the above spelling will be used herein.) On May 31,
2005, the State charged defendant with the first degree murder of
Altravius. It alleged, on June 26, 2004, he struck Altravius in
the abdomen and caused Altravius's death. On the date of the
alleged offense, defendant was 16 years old.
On July 19, 2005, defendant filed a motion to suppress
oral statements he made to police officer Robert Rea. Defendant
alleged the statements were made during a custodial interrogation
but that he was not afforded the opportunity to knowingly waive
his constitutional rights to remain silent, to consult a lawyer,
to have a lawyer present, or to terminate the interrogation at
any time, nor was he told that anything he said could be use
against him in court. Defendant also raised questions concerning
the voluntariness of his statements.
On July 29, 2005, the trial court conducted a hearing
on defendant's motion to suppress. Rea testified he was a
detective with the Champaign, Illinois, police department and was
assigned to investigate Altravius's death. In connection with
that investigation, he interviewed both defendant and Rochelle.
Rea's first interview with defendant took place at the police
department shortly following Altravius's death.
On July 7, 2004, Rea discussed the case with Dr. Bryan
Mitchell, the doctor who performed the autopsy on Altravius's
body. Dr. Mitchell stated the cause of Altravius's death was
blunt-force trauma to the abdomen. Additionally, Rea learned
information that was inconsistent with the version of events
defendant provided. During the course of his investigation, Rea
further learned defendant had a criminal history that included
convictions for retail theft and burglary to a motor vehicle.
On July 21, 2004, Rea attempted to locate defendant.
He was accompanied by Sergeant Jim Rein and the two rode in
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Rein's work van. The van was unmarked and did not have a cage or
police radio. It did have a small, narrow, light bar located in
front of the rearview mirror. Rea testified he was dressed in a
collared shirt and dress slacks.
The officers located defendant at approximately 3 p.m.,
exiting an apartment. Rea called to defendant and defendant
approached the officers. After conversing about a newspaper
article that defendant felt portrayed him in a bad light, Rea
asked to speak with defendant about statements Rochelle made to
police. In response, defendant entered the van. Rea stated he
did not ask defendant to get in the van and defendant was not
searched prior to entering. Rea also testified the van was
parked in the driveway of an apartment building. Once defendant
was in the van, Rein asked defendant if the officers could move
the van somewhere else. Defendant agreed and the officers drove
the van approximately three blocks away and parked it on the
street. Rea testified that he did not lock the van doors after
defendant entered the van; however, the doors may have locked
automatically as the van was being driven.
Once the van was moved, Rea asked defendant to tell him
what happened the night Altravius died. Rea stated defendant
repeated essentially the same story he had given during their
first interview but added a few more details. Some of the
details defendant provided were inconsistent with information
obtained from Altravius's autopsy. Rea confronted defendant with
the inconsistencies in his story. Defendant maintained that he
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was being truthful but became fidgety, nervous, and upset.
According to Rea, defendant never asked to leave the van.
Rea testified he continued to converse with defendant
and question defendant's story. Defendant became increasingly
upset as Rea discounted his version of events. Ultimately,
defendant started crying and stated as follows: "I did it. I
can't do this. I want to talk to my mom. I want to go home."
Rein asked defendant if he wanted to go home, and defendant
replied that he did. The officers began driving toward defen-
dant's residence and Rea showed defendant a photograph of
Altravius's body prior to the autopsy. The photograph showed
bruising and injuries to Altravius's side. Defendant became
extremely upset and was yelling and crying.
Upon arriving at defendant's residence, Rea asked if he
could ask defendant one more question and defendant replied that
Rea could. Rea then inquired as to whether defendant could think
of anything that happened on the day Altravius died that could
have caused his injuries. Defendant responded that Altravius
fell on some playground equipment. Rea asked defendant to show
him the playground equipment and defendant said that he would.
Defendant did not ask to have his mother accompany them.
Defendant directed the officers to a playground. Along
the way, defendant indicated he wanted a cigarette and Rein
stopped at a convenience store where a pack of cigarettes and a
bottle of water were obtained for defendant. At the playground,
defendant directed the officers to a specific piece of playground
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equipment and described the incident. The officers and defendant
then returned to the van and drove to a convenience store so that
Rea could use the restroom. Rea stated he got out of the van at
the convenience store. The doors to the van were open and other
people were around. At that time, defendant did not state that
he wanted to leave.
When Rea returned from the restroom, he heard Rein ask
defendant to go to the police department and provide a taped
statement. Defendant said that he would provide a taped state-
ment and the officers traveled with defendant to the police
department. At the police department the officers took defendant
to an interview room and read him the Miranda warnings. Defen-
dant indicated he understood his rights and was willing to speak
with the officers.
At the beginning of the interview Rea asked whether he
made defendant go to the police department and defendant stated
"no." Rea also asked whether he made defendant tell him anything
that day and, again, defendant responded "no." Additionally, Rea
asked whether everything they talked about and everything defen-
dant told Rea was because defendant wanted to and defendant
responded "yes." Rea and defendant then discussed the circum-
stances of Altravius's death. That portion of the interview was
videotaped and audiotaped. Defendant was not arrested after the
interview.
Rea testified that he never made any promises to
defendant nor did he threaten defendant in any way. Also, he
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never told defendant that he could not leave. Defendant asked to
go home once and the officers took him home. Further, other than
that one time, defendant never asked to leave.
On cross-examination, Rea stated he was aware defendant
was 16 years old when the interview occurred. He also knew
defendant had been in high school and defendant told Rea that he
was getting a GED (general equivalency diploma). Rea did not
know what level of schooling defendant completed or his reading
level. More specifically, he was not aware that defendant was at
a seventh-grade reading level. Rea did, however, know defendant
could read and write because he followed along with Rea on the
Miranda form during their first interview. Regarding defendant's
comprehension level, Rea was only aware that defendant stated he
understood his Miranda rights.
The day Rea interviewed defendant in the van, they were
together for 3 1/2 or 4 hours. He did not read defendant his
Miranda rights nor did he call defendant's mother or any adult
with an interest in defendant's welfare. Rea further testified
that both he and Rein were juvenile officers and that his goal
during the van interview was to get defendant to confess to
murder. Rea denied getting agitated during the interview or
swearing. Further, he testified that, after defendant asked to
go home, the officers drove defendant home. It was defendant's
choice not to get out of the vehicle at that point.
On redirect, Rea testified that he felt defendant was
more mature than most 16 year olds because of his lifestyle and
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that factored into the way the officers spoke with him during the
interview. Specifically, they considered that defendant had been
living in an adult relationship and caring for children and that
his own mother lived an hour and a half away. The manner in
which they approached defendant on the day in question was also
affected by (1) the fact that defendant had prior police contacts
and was on probation and (2) their previous contacts with him and
knowledge of his level of understanding. Additionally, during
Rea's first interview with defendant, Rea asked defendant if he
knew how to read and write and defendant responded that he did.
Regarding the van locks, Rea stated there was nothing
special about the van that made it impossible to unlock the van
from the inside. There was also nothing obstructing defendant's
access to the van door. At no time did defendant attempt to
unlock the door, nor was he told that he could not unlock the
door. Rea testified, when they stopped at the park, defendant
would have had to open the van door and let himself out because
Rea could not open the door from the outside when it was locked.
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He stated, on
July 21, 2004, at approximately 3:30 p.m. he saw Rea as he was
leaving his mother's apartment building. Rea was in a van with
another officer and asked defendant to "come over here." Defen-
dant stated he walked over to Rea because he believed he would
have been arrested if he failed to listen. Rea asked defendant
if he would get in the van but defendant refused. Rea then told
defendant to get in the van and defendant complied. Defendant
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stated he finally entered the van because Rea was a police
officer and defendant thought he would be arrested for failing to
comply. At that time defendant was 16 years old.
After entering the van, defendant felt like he was
under arrest. He stated he was in the backseat of the van and
the doors were locked. Defendant did not feel like he could exit
the van at his own discretion. He thought that if he tried to
leave he would be charged with trying to get away. Further,
defendant testified he was not read his Miranda rights.
After he entered the van, defendant and Rea initially
talked about newspaper articles that mentioned the case. Defen-
dant stated he was upset because an article made it sound like he
whipped Altravius on the night he died. Rea responded by telling
defendant he was "a fucking liar" and that Rea believed defendant
"did it." Defendant stated Rea called him a liar three or four
times.
Defendant stated he was in the van for 2 or 2 1/2
hours. At first, the van was parked in a driveway and remained
there for 10 to 15 minutes. The officers then stated they wanted
to move somewhere else and "take a ride." Defendant testified
they drove the van to a park. He stated he had no choice in
where the van was driven and he was not asked where he wanted to
go. Further, the officers did not tell him he was free to leave
or that he could go home at any time. At one point, the officers
stopped the van at a gas station and asked defendant if he wanted
water and offered him a pack of cigarettes. He did not know why
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he did not go home when they stopped at the gas station. How-
ever, defendant also stated that the van doors were locked and he
could not have left the van.
While at the park, defendant told the officers that he
wanted to go home and specifically stated that he wanted his
mother. At that point, he had been with the officers for approx-
imately an hour and a half. Defendant testified the officers
ignored his requests and continued to question him. Also, he
reached for the van door but it was locked.
Defendant further testified the officers showed him a
photograph of Altravius's body. Defendant became upset and
stated he wanted to go home and get out of the van. He testified
he reached for the door but it was locked and he started to cry.
Defendant stated that, during their conversation, Rea told him
everything would be okay and nothing would happen to defendant.
However, Rea also stated that he would do everything in his power
to see that defendant rotted in jail. Defendant felt manipulated
into saying something that he otherwise would not have said and
believed Rea confused him. He denied ever stating "I did it."
At some point the officers took defendant to the
driveway of his residence but did not let him out. Instead, Rea
stated he wanted to ask defendant another question. Defendant
reached for the door but it was still locked. Defendant contin-
ued to answer questions because he could not get out of the van.
Defendant additionally testified that he attended an
alternative school and the tenth grade was as far as he went in
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school. He stated that he read at a seventh-grade level.
Further, defendant acknowledged previous contacts with law
enforcement.
On cross-examination, defendant testified that he was
living away from his own mother in Champaign with Rochelle and
her children. Defendant's mother lived in Kankakee, Illinois.
He further acknowledged that, following the van interview, he
made a taped statement at the police department. Prior to making
his statement, police read him the Miranda warnings. Defendant
acknowledged that he stated he willingly went to the police
department and was not forced to go there by Rea. He also stated
he was not forced to make any statements that day and he will-
ingly made statements to Rea. On redirect, defendant testified
he made those statements about his willingness to speak with Rea
because he was afraid.
After hearing the evidence and listening to the par-
ties' arguments, the trial court denied defendant's motion to
suppress. It found his statements were voluntarily made and that,
while in the van, he was not in custody for Miranda purposes.
The court emphasized its finding that the van the officers drove
was not a police vehicle and was, instead, "the type of modern
vehicle that when one puts it in gear and starts driving, it
automatically locks the doors." It noted the evidence failed to
indicate the van was the type of vehicle that could secure
someone on the inside without that person being able to get out.
For further support that the van was not a police vehicle, it
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pointed to Rea's testimony that he could not open the van door
from the outside when it was locked and that, at the park,
defendant most likely opened the van door and exited the vehicle
on his own.
The trial court found that defendant entered the van of
his own will. Also, it was of the opinion that, after defendant
became upset and the officers drove him home, defendant could
have exited the van if he wanted; however, upon inquiry by Rea,
defendant agreed to answer another question. The court rejected
the idea that defendant's will was overborne by the officers or
that he was so distraught, confused, or frightened that he did
not know what he was doing. It stated "except for that period of
time when he got emotional, the rest of the time [defendant] was
coming up with answers to questions that were being asked,
answers that were not going to incriminate him."
The trial court also considered defendant's age,
education, intellectual level, prior experiences, and lifestyle.
It stated defendant looked and sounded more mature than a typical
17 year old, his age at the date of the suppression hearing. It
commented on defendant's prior experiences with law enforcement,
noting he was on probation in a juvenile case. It found defen-
dant was familiar with not only police officers but the court
system itself. The court further pointed out that, although
defendant was 16 years old at the time of the offense, he was
living independently with his girlfriend. It also determined
that he could read, noting the evidence showed he read a newspa-
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per article about the case and became upset with its contents.
Additionally, the court found defendant was "an intelligent young
man" and "somewhat articulate."
Following the suppression hearing, defendant's case
proceeded to a jury trial. On September 8, 2006, the jury found
him guilty of first degree murder. On October 18, 2006, defen-
dant filed a motion for a new trial, alleging, in part, that the
trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. On October
19, 2006, the court denied defendant's posttrial motion. The
same date, the court sentenced defendant to 50 years in prison.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by
denying his motion to suppress statements he made in the van to
Officer Rea. He contends the statements at issue were made
during the course of a custodial interrogation and are inadmissi-
ble because he was not read his Miranda rights. Defendant does
not dispute the voluntariness of his statements.
Mixed questions of law and fact are presented by a
challenge to a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress.
People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 512, 813 N.E.2d 93, 100
(2004). The court's factual findings will be upheld unless they
are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Pitman, 211
Ill. 2d at 512, 813 N.E.2d at 100. "This deferential standard of
review is grounded in the reality that the [trial] court is in a
superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the
witnesses, observe the witnesses' demeanor, and resolve conflicts
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in their testimony." Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d at 512, 813 N.E.2d at
100-01. "[T]he ultimate question of whether the evidence should
be suppressed" is subject to de novo review. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d
at 512, 813 N.E.2d at 101.
In Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 706-07, 86
S. Ct. at 1612, the Supreme Court held that a suspect's state-
ments are inadmissible when they are made during a custodial
interrogation and without the suspect being informed of certain
constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent and
the right to counsel. A custodial interrogation means "question-
ing initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d
at 706, 86 S. Ct. at 1612. "[I]n determining whether a person is
'in custody' for purposes of Miranda, a court should first
ascertain and examine the circumstances surrounding the interro-
gation, and then ask if, given those circumstances, a reasonable
person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate
the interrogation and leave." People v. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492,
506, 810 N.E.2d 472, 481 (2003).
Relevant factors to consider when determining whether
an individual was in custody include "(1) the time and place of
the confrontation; (2) the number of police officers present; (3)
the presence or absence of family or friends; (4) any indicia of
a formal arrest procedure, such as physical restraint, the show
of weapons or force, booking[,] or fingerprinting; and (5) the
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manner by which the individual arrived at the place of the
interrogation." People v. Melock, 149 Ill. 2d 423, 440, 599
N.E.2d 941, 948 (1992). Regarding the reasonable-person portion
of the custody inquiry, "the accepted test is what a reasonable
person, innocent of any crime, would have thought had he or she
been in the defendant's shoes." Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 506, 810
N.E.2d at 482. Additionally, although a police officer's intent
is relevant to determine wither the officer created a coercive
atmosphere requiring the Miranda warnings, the focus of the
custody inquiry is always on what the defendant thought and
believed. People v. Gorman, 207 Ill. App. 3d 461, 472-73, 565
N.E.2d 1349, 1356 (1991).
Initially, the parties disagree on the extent to which
defendant's age should be considered when determining whether he
was in custody for purposes of Miranda. Defendant cites Braggs,
209 Ill. 2d 492, 810 N.E.2d 472, for the proposition that the
reasonable-person standard should be modified to take into
account the general characteristics of juveniles. He maintains
the proper consideration for a court when making a custody
determination is whether a reasonable 16-year-old would have felt
at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.
The State argues the principle for which defendant
cited Braggs is not good law because Alvarado v. Hickman, 316
F.3d 841 (9th cir. 2002), a case our supreme court relied heavily
upon in Braggs, was reversed by the United States Supreme Court
in Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 655, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938,
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946, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2144 (2004). In Yarborough, 541 U.S. at
655, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 946, 124 S. Ct. at 2144, the Supreme Court
found the Alvarado state court's failure to consider the defen-
dant's age did not provide a proper basis for finding that the
court's decision was an unreasonable application of clearly
established law. In reaching that decision, the Supreme Court
noted it never stated a suspect's age or experience was relevant
to the Miranda custody analysis, finding its "opinions applying
the Miranda custody test have not mentioned the suspect's age,
much less mandated its consideration." Yarborough, 541 U.S. at
666, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 952-53, 124 S. Ct. at 2150-51. Addition-
ally, the Court stated as follows:
"There is an important conceptual dif-
ference between the Miranda custody test and
the line of cases from other contexts consid-
ering age and experience. The Miranda custody
inquiry is an objective test. *** The objec-
tive test furthers 'the clarity of
[Miranda's] rule,' [citation], ensuring that
the police do not need 'to make guesses as to
[the circumstances] at issue before deciding
how they may interrogate the suspect,' [cita-
tion]. ***
At the same time, the objective Miranda
custody inquiry could reasonably be viewed as
different from doctrinal tests that depend on
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the actual mindset of a particular suspect,
where we do consider a suspect's age and
experience. For example, the voluntariness of
a statement is often said to depend on
whether 'the defendant's will was overborne,'
[citation], a question that logically can
depend on 'the characteristics of the ac-
cused,' [citation]. The characteristics of
the accused can include the suspect's age,
education, and intelligence, [citation], as
well as a suspect's prior experience with law
enforcement, [citation]. In concluding that
there was 'no principled reason' why such
factors should not also apply to the Miranda
custody inquiry, [citation], the [Alvarado
court] ignored the argument that the custody
inquiry states an objective rule designed to
give clear guidance to the police, while
consideration of a suspect's individual
characteristics--including his age--could be
viewed as creating a subjective inquiry."
Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 667-68, 158 L. Ed. 2d
at 953-54, 124 S. Ct. at 2151-52.
In Braggs, our supreme court discussed modification of
the reasonable-person standard to take into account an individ-
ual's status as a juvenile. Such modification was not the
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subject of the court's holding; however, the court used that
discussion to support its determination that modification of the
reasonable-person standard was appropriate to account for the
defendant's mental retardation. Alvarado, the case at the heart
of Braggs's discussion, was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court in Yarborough. There, although the Supreme Court did not
hold consideration of a defendant's age during a Miranda custody
inquiry was prohibited, it strongly emphasized the objective
nature of such an inquiry.
Applying the modified standard defendant suggests,
i.e., what a reasonable 16-year-old in defendant's position would
have perceived, incorporates a subjective factor into an objec-
tive test. Given the Supreme Court's emphasis on objectiveness,
we decline to consider defendant's age when determining whether
he was in custody for Miranda purposes.
However, we note the trial court did consider defen-
dant's age and other subjective factors at the suppression
hearing. At the conclusion of the evidence, the court stated, in
part, as follows:
"[W]e have a young man who is on proba-
tion, juvenile case. *** So he has had some
*** familiarity with not only the police
officers but with the court system itself.
***
The defendant's testimony is such that
the [c]ourt is of the opinion that *** he
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looks and sounds more mature and older than a
[17] year old. ***
***[T]he [c]ourt has to consider his
age, his education, his intellectual level,
prior experiences, [and] his lifestyle. The
good news is the defendant is[,] *** in this
[c]ourt's opinion[,] an intelligent young
man, somewhat articulate. ***."
Here, considerations of the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation and what a reasonable person in defendant's
position would have perceived do not result in a finding that
defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes during the van
interview. The record shows the interrogation at issue occurred
over the course of a few hours in the afternoon. Defendant and
two police officers, Rea and Rein, were present for the inter-
view, which was conducted, for the most part, inside a van that
was parked on a city street. The evidence showed, while the van
was Rein's work vehicle, it was not a typical police vehicle.
The van was unmarked with no radio. Further, although the
testimony revealed the van doors locked automatically as the
vehicle was driven, the van had no means by which to secure an
individual inside. More specifically, it did not have a cage or
lack door handles.
Rea's and defendant's testimonies differed on the
circumstances surrounding defendant's entry into the van. The
trial court found defendant entered the van of his own accord.
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That finding was supported by Rea's testimony and is not against
the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, defendant was not
handcuffed or searched prior to entering the van and the record
fails to reflect any other indicia of formal arrest procedure.
After defendant entered the van, he and Rea began
discussing Altravius's death. Rea was dressed in plain clothes
and was the officer who primarily questioned defendant. Although
Rea admitted his intention was to get defendant to confess to
murder, the record does not reflect that the mood of the interro-
gation was such that reversal of the trial court's decision is
warranted. Moreover, the court found the officers drove defen-
dant home at defendant's request and that defendant could have
exited the vehicle but, instead, chose to remain and answer more
questions. Its finding is supported by Rea's testimony and,
while defendant's testimony contradicted Rea's, the court found
Rea more credible.
Ultimately, defendant agreed to go to the police
department and provide a taped statement. At the end of the
interview, defendant was permitted to leave and was not arrested.
Based upon these circumstances, we find that a reason-
able person in defendant's position would not have felt he was in
police custody during the van interrogation. The trial court did
not err by denying defendant's motion to suppress.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment. As part of our judgment, we grant the State's request
that defendant be assessed $50 as costs for this appeal.
Affirmed.
MYERSCOUGH and TURNER, JJ., concur.
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