People v. Eastin ( 2009 )

NO. 4-09-0302 Filed 12/23/09
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Edgar County
CLINTON T. EASTIN, ) No. 08TR866
Defendant-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) Steven L. Garst,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE McCULLOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
In March 2009, defendant, Clinton T. Eastin, entered a
guilty plea to one count each of driving with a suspended license
and driving under the influence (DUI). In April 2009, the trial
court vacated defendant’s conviction for driving with a suspended
license on the grounds it was an included offense of aggravated
DUI. The State appeals, arguing (1) driving with a suspended
license is not an included offense of aggravated DUI and (2)
defendant has forfeited his right to challenge his driving-while-
suspended conviction because he received the benefit of a
negotiated guilty plea. We reverse and remand with directions.
In May 2008, defendant was arrested for DUI (625 ILCS
5/11-501(a)(2) (West Supp. 2007)) and driving with a suspended
license (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West Supp. 2007)). In July 2008,
the State charged defendant by information with DUI while driving
with a suspended license, a Class 4 felony (625 ILCS 5/11-
501(a)(2), (c-1)(1) (West Supp. 2007) (count I). For simplicity,
we refer to count I as aggravated DUI.
On May 18, 2009, defendant filed a motion for an
advisory opinion from the trial court, arguing driving with a
suspended license was an included offense of aggravated DUI. The
court recharacterized defendant’s motion as a motion to dismiss.
On May 27, 2009, after hearing and argument, the court denied
defendant’s motion.
On May 30, 2009, defendant pleaded guilty to aggravated
DUI and driving with a suspended license. The trial court
sentenced defendant to two years’ conditional discharge and 30
days in the Edgar County jail, subject to work release. The
court also ordered defendant to complete 75 hours of counseling
and to pay costs, a $500 fine, and the $1,000 DUI-equipment-fund
assessment. The court’s docket entry states the sentence was
"pursuant to agreement." The court then continued sentencing on
the driving-while-suspended conviction.
In April 2009, the trial court granted defendant’s
motion to vacate his guilty plea on the charge of driving with a
suspended license and dismiss the complaint. The court
apparently held that driving with a suspended license is an
included offense of aggravated DUI.
This appeal followed.
Defendant has not filed an appellee’s brief with this
court. Nonetheless, we elect to decide the appeal on the merits
pursuant to the principles set forth in First Capitol Mortgage
Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345
N.E.2d 493, 495 (1976) (reviewing court may exercise discretion
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to decide appeal on the merits where appellee has not filed a
brief).
Turning to the merits, we agree with the State that
driving with a suspended license is not an included offense of
aggravated DUI. The supreme court has explained as follows:
"Under the plain language of [section
11-501 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS
5/11-501 (West Supp. 2007))], there is only
one offense of driving under the influence.
[Citation.] Subsection (a) sets forth the
elements for the offense and classifies the
offense as a Class A misdemeanor. The
enhancing factors in subsection (c) do not
create a new offense, but rather serve only
to enhance the punishment." People v. Van
Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d 330, 337, 904 N.E.2d 29,
32-33 (2009).
In Van Schoyck, the supreme court also stated that
section 111-3(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725
ILCS 5/111-3(c) (West 2008)) applies to prosecutions in which the
State seeks to enhance the applicable sentencing range with proof
of a prior conviction of a different criminal statute. Van
Schoyck, 232 Ill. 2d at 337-39, 904 N.E.2d at 33-34 (discussing
the effect of driving-with-a-revoked-license conviction on DUI
sentencing). The court further stated that "[u]nder section 111-
3(c), a prior conviction such as the revoked license in this case
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is not an element of the underlying offense." Van Schoyck, 232
Ill. 2d at 339, 904 N.E.2d at 34.
The holding in Van Schoyck controls the outcome of this
case. Defendant’s conviction for driving with a suspended
license is not an element of the offense of aggravated DUI.
Instead, the driving-while-suspended conviction constitutes an
aggravating factor that the State must prove at sentencing to
enhance defendant’s sentence from a Class A misdemeanor to a
Class 4 felony. Therefore, driving with a suspended license
cannot, as a matter of law, constitute an included offense of
aggravated DUI.
Defendant cites People v. Miller, 339 Ill. App. 3d 990,
992, 791 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (2003) (Third District), for the
proposition that driving with a suspended license is an included
offense of aggravated DUI. We note the State conceded the error
in Miller, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 992, 791 N.E.2d at 1147. However,
to the extent Miller conflicts with Van Schoyck, we find the
supreme court implicitly overruled Miller’s holding.
Because we have determined the trial court erred when
it vacated defendant’s conviction for driving with a suspended
license, we do not reach the State’s argument that defendant is
estopped from repudiating the terms of his negotiated guilty plea
with the State.
For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s
judgment and remand with directions to reinstate defendant’s
conviction for driving with a suspended license and proceed to
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sentencing.
Reversed and remanded.
KNECHT and TURNER, JJ., concur.
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