People v. Hires ( 2009 )

NO. 4-08-0838 Filed 12/8/09
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Clark County
BILLY L. HIRES, ) No. 07CF106
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Tracy W. Resch,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In October 2007, the State charged defendant, Billy L.
Hires, with one count of aggravated driving under the influence
of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2006), as amended
by Pub. Act 95-149, §5, eff. August 14, 2007 (2007 Ill. Legis.
Serv. 1529, 1529-60 (West))) and one count of driving while
license is revoked (DWR) (625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2006)). A
jury found him guilty, and the trial court later sentenced
defendant to 24 years in prison.
Defendant appeals, arguing that the State failed to
prove him guilty of DUI beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree
and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In October 2007, Westfield police chief Michael Duvall
observed a maroon Ford minivan--which he later determined was
driven by defendant--swerving from the southbound lane of Route
49 into the northbound lane. Duvall followed the van. While
doing so, Duvall checked the van's license plate, which came back
expired. Duvall then executed a traffic stop. After Duvall
asked defendant for his driver's license, defendant stated his
license was revoked.
Duvall was the sole witness at defendant's June 2008
trial. Duvall testified that defendant produced an identifica-
tion card in lieu of a driver's license. As defendant retrieved
the card from his wallet, Duvall noticed that (1) defendant (a)
"fumbled" for his paperwork and (b) had slurred speech and (2)
"the odor of an alcoholic beverage" emanated from the van.
Duvall asked defendant if he had been drinking, and defendant
admitted consuming "four or five beers." Duvall asked defendant
to exit the van to perform field-sobriety tests. As he rose from
the driver's seat, defendant stumbled and nearly fell to the
ground.
Once defendant moved to the back of his van, Duvall
administered two field-sobriety tests. First, Duvall instructed
defendant to perform the one-legged stand. After reading in-
structions to defendant, Duvall asked defendant if any disabili-
ties would impair defendant's performance of the test. Defendant
informed Duvall he had a "bad hip" but that his condition would
not prevent him from performing either test. Bad hip notwith-
standing, defendant attempted the test. However, defendant was
unable to perform the one-legged stand, losing his balance as
soon as he lifted his foot. Duvall terminated the test, read
defendant instructions on how to perform the next test--the "walk
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and turn"--and then demonstrated the test. Although Duvall
allowed defendant two opportunities to complete the walk and
turn, defendant was unable to complete it. Duvall terminated the
test and arrested defendant for DUI and DWR. After Duvall
handcuffed defendant and placed him in the back of the squad car,
defendant became "belligerent," refused to cooperate, and swore
repeatedly. (We note that defendant refused to submit to a
Breathalyzer at the police station.)
Based on the above evidence, the jury found defendant
guilty of one count of DUI (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2006),
as amended by Pub. Act 95-149, §5, eff. August 14, 2007 (2007
Ill. Legis. Serv. 1529, 1529-60 (West))) and one count of DWR
(625 ILCS 5/6-303(a) (West 2006)). Due to defendant's eight
prior DUI convictions and seven prior DWR convictions, the trial
court determined defendant was eligible for Class X sentencing on
the DUI count (see 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(2)(E) (West 2008), as
amended by Pub. Act 95-149, §5, eff. August 14, 2007 (2007 Ill.
Legis. Serv. 1529, 1529-60 (West))) and Class 4 sentencing on the
DWR count (see 625 ILCS 5/6-303(d-3) (West 2006)). Therefore,
the court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of 24 years in
prison on the DUI count and 3 years in prison on the DWR count.
This appeal followed.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to
prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of DUI. Specifically,
defendant contends that (1) Officer Duvall's observations of
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defendant's behavior the night of the arrest do not show defen-
dant was intoxicated and (2) the field-sobriety tests Duvall
administered are unreliable. We address defendant's contentions
in turn.
A. Standard of Review
The standard of review for a challenge to the suffi-
ciency of the evidence is "'"whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt."' (Emphasis omitted.) [Citations.]"
People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 217, 824 N.E.2d 262, 267
(2005). A reviewing court will not retry a defendant and "will
not reverse a conviction unless the evidence is so improbable,
unsatisfactory, or inconclusive that it creates a reasonable
doubt of [the] defendant's guilt." Collins, 214 Ill. 2d at 217,
824 N.E.2d at 267-68.
B. The Crime of DUI
Section 11-501(a)(2) of the Illinois Vehicle Code
prohibits individuals from "driv[ing] or be[ing] in actual
physical control of any vehicle *** while *** under the influence
of alcohol." 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2006), as amended by
Pub. Act 95-149, §5, eff. August 14, 2007 (2007 Ill. Legis. Serv.
1529, 1529-60 (West)). A defendant is under the influence when,
as a result of consuming alcohol or any other intoxicating
substance, "'his mental or physical faculties are so impaired as
to reduce his ability to think and act with ordinary care.'"
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People v. Gordon, 378 Ill. App. 3d 626, 631, 881 N.E.2d 563, 567
(2007), quoting Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No.
23.29 at 203 (4th ed. 2000). Intoxication is a question of fact,
which is the trier of fact's responsibility to resolve, as well
as assessing the credibility of the witnesses and determining the
sufficiency of the evidence. People v. Janik, 127 Ill. 2d 390,
401, 537 N.E.2d 756, 761 (1989).
To prove that a defendant committed the crime of DUI,
the State may rely on circumstantial evidence. People v. Diaz,
377 Ill. App. 3d 339, 345, 878 N.E.2d 1211, 1216 (2007). The
testimony of the arresting officer by itself may be sufficient to
sustain a DUI conviction. People v. Hostetter, 384 Ill. App. 3d
700, 712, 893 N.E.2d 313, 323 (2008). Moreover, "a defendant's
refusal to submit to *** testing has 'some tendency to indicate a
consciousness of guilt' and is thus relevant and admissible in a
DUI prosecution." People v. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 201-02, 824
N.E.2d 239, 247 (2005), quoting People v. Edwards, 241 Ill. App.
3d 839, 843, 609 N.E.2d 962, 966 (1993).
C. Defendant's Challenge to the Sufficiency
of the Evidence in This Case
1. Defendant's Claim That Duvall's Observations Do
Not Show That Defendant Was Intoxicated
In this case, defendant first contends that Duvall's
testimony does not support the conclusion that defendant was
intoxicated. Instead, defendant asserts that Duvall's testimony
merely supports the conclusion that defendant consumed "some
alcohol." The State responds that Duvall's testimony "overwhelm-
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ingly supported the jury's verdict." We agree with the State.
Here, Duvall's observations--which he related to the
jury--demonstrated that defendant was intoxicated. Duvall
observed defendant repeatedly swerving his van over the center-
line of the highway. Once he initiated a traffic stop, Duvall
said he smelled alcohol and noticed that defendant was slurring
his speech and had difficulty pulling his identification card out
of his wallet. Duvall also watched as defendant stumbled out of
the driver's seat, nearly falling to the ground. Duvall ex-
plained that once out of the vehicle, defendant was incapable of
performing two separate field-sobriety tests. Though defendant
claimed to have a bad hip, he told Duvall that his condition
would not prevent him from performing either test. Further,
defendant refused to submit to Breathalyzer testing. Based on
this evidence, a rational jury could reasonably have inferred
that defendant's erratic driving, slurred speech, and poor
coordination stemmed from intoxication.
2. Defendant's Claim That the Field-Sobriety
Tests Were Unreliable
Defendant also contends the field-sobriety tests admin-
istered by Duvall "cannot be considered to have proved intoxica-
tion." Defendant cites the National Highway and Traffic Safety
Administration DWI Detection and Standardized Field Sobriety
Testing Manual for the proposition that field-sobriety tests must
be performed under standardized conditions. Because the State
presented no evidence as to the conditions under which Duvall
performed the one-legged-stand and walk-and-turn tests, defendant
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contends his "performance is not probative evidence of impair-
ment." Defendant additionally cites numerous scientific studies
in support of his claim that field-sobriety tests are unreliable.
Implicit in defendant's contentions are the following: (1) when
--as in this case--field-sobriety tests are not performed under
standardized conditions (whatever they might be), the results of
such tests should be deemed inadmissible; and (2) even if such
tests are admissible, they are insufficient, standing alone, to
justify an intoxication finding. What defendant is really saying
is that as laypersons, jurors are ill-equipped to evaluate this
type of evidence. We reject all of defendant's contentions in
this regard.
In People v. Sides, 199 Ill. App. 3d 203, 206-07, 556
N.E.2d 778, 779-80 (1990), this court held that "[n]o expert
testimony is needed nor is a showing of scientific principles
required before a jury can be permitted to conclude that a person
who performs badly on the field-sobriety tests may have his
mental or physical faculties 'so impaired as to reduce his abil-
ity to think and act with ordinary care.'" Instead, when deter-
mining whether a defendant committed the crime of DUI, jurors may
use their "common observations and experiences in life[, which]
would include not only the driving of an automobile[] but [also]
a familiarity with the degree of physical and mental acuity
required to do so." Sides, 199 Ill. App. 3d at 206, 556 N.E.2d
at 779. We reaffirm our holding in Sides.
Here, Duvall testified that defendant's poor balance
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rendered him unable to complete either field-sobriety test.
Thus, the jury's inference is entirely justified that defendant's
difficulty in performing some of the tasks necessary for the
tests revealed a similarly impaired ability to think and act with
ordinary care when operating his vehicle.
We also note that defendant appears to be suggesting
that expert testimony is required (1) to gauge the reliability of
field-sobriety tests and (2) to confirm that such tests were
administered properly. We emphatically disagree. Based upon our
analysis in Sides (which we now reaffirm), we reiterate that the
trier of fact needs no expert assistance to explain the signifi-
cance of behavior like defendant's when deciding whether a
driver's "'mental or physical faculties are so impaired as to
reduce his ability to think and act with ordinary care.'"
Gordon, 378 Ill. App. 3d at 631, 881 N.E.2d at 567, quoting
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 23.29 (4th ed.
2000).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment. As part of our judgment, we grant the State its $50
statutory assessment against defendant as costs of this appeal.
Affirmed.
MYERSCOUGH, P.J., and APPLETON, J., concur.
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