People v. Mullins ( 2010 )

Filed 10/6/10 NO. 4-10-0016
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Vermilion County
RICKY A. MULLINS, ) No. 08CF638
Defendant-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) Craig H. DeArmond,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:
In October 2008, the State charged defendant, Ricky A.
Mullins, in case No. 08-CF-638 with possession of a controlled
substance (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(A) (West 2008)) and possession
of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS
570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2008)). In December 2009, the trial court
granted his motion to dismiss because the State violated his
right to a speedy trial under section 103-5(b) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Speedy-Trial Act) (725 ILCS 5/103-
5(b) (West 2008)) and section 3-8-10 of the Unified Code of
Corrections (Intrastate Detainers statute) (730 ILCS 5/3-8-10
(West 2008)). The State appeals, arguing defendant (1) failed to
notify the State about his demand for trial and (2) did not
comply with the requirements of the Intrastate Detainers statute.
We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On October 24, 2008, the Vemilion County State’s
Attorney’s office filed an information in case No. 08-CF-638
charging defendant with one count of possession of a controlled
substance and one count of possession of a controlled substance
with intent to deliver. On October 27, 2008, the trial court
issued an arrest warrant for defendant in case No. 08-CF-638. At
some point prior to March 4, 2009, defendant was incarcerated in
Graham Correctional Center on an unrelated offense.
On March 4, 2009, defendant filed a handwritten "Motion
for Speedy Trial" on the Vermilion County charges with the
circuit clerk of Vermilion County. On March 9, 2009, defendant
pro se filed two additional documents containing boilerplate
language with the circuit clerk. The first document was titled
"Demand for Speedy Trial and/or to Quash Warrant." This document
referenced defendant’s right to a speedy trial under the
Intrastate Detainers statute (730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 (West 2008)), the
Speedy-Trial Act (725 ILCS 5/103-5 (West 2008)), and article I,
section 8, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §8). The document also contained blank spaces where defendant
entered the following information by hand: his name, his inmate
number, the name of the warden at his correctional facility, the
length of his current sentence, his release date, and his date of
birth. Defendant also wrote he was demanding speedy trial for
charges against him in Vermilion County. However, defendant
- 2 -
incorrectly entered his case number as "08-CF 634." Finally, at
the bottom of the document, defendant described the charges
against him as "Possession With Intent To Deliver possession."
The second document was titled "Notice of Filing" and
it contained information describing where defendant sent his
demand for speedy trial. Here, defendant correctly entered his
name and the Vermilion County case number in the header of the
form. In the body of the document, defendant wrote he mailed the
original and one copy of his demand for speedy trial to the
Vermilion County circuit clerk. However, defendant did not
include an address for the circuit clerk. Defendant also wrote
he sent one copy of the demand for speedy trial to the Vermilion
County State’s Attorney and the warden of the Graham Correctional
Center. Again, defendant did not write an address for the
State’s Attorney’s office. An address for the warden was in-
cluded in this section, but it was a typed address that appeared
to be a part of the form. The final section of the document was
labeled "Affidavit of Service," and it contained a pledge stating
the demand for speedy trial had been mailed to the parties named
in the body of the document. Defendant entered the correct
information in this section and signed and dated the form.
On March 9, 2009, the circuit clerk forwarded defen-
dant’s demand for speedy trial to the trial court. On March 12,
2009, the court directed the circuit clerk to send a copy of
- 3 -
defendant’s demand to the State’s Attorney’s office, which the
circuit clerk forwarded on March 13, 2009. The record does not
show if the State ever received any copies of defendant’s demand
for speedy trial.
In June 2009, defendant filed a petition for status
report. In August 2009, the trial judge set the case for a
status hearing with instructions to the State to writ the defen-
dant back to the court. In September 2009, the court held the
status hearing. Randall Brinegar, the State's Attorney for
Vermilion County, appeared for the State. Defendant was ar-
raigned, the public defender was appointed, and the case was set
for preliminary hearing. Defendant then had the following
conversation with the court,
"DEFENDANT: Can I ask a question,
though?
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
DEFENDANT: By me filing a motion for
speedy trial it’s been over 200 days.
THE COURT: You know what. I don’t doubt
for one minute that [the public defender] is
going to be raising that between now and the
time of the preliminary hearing. That’s
something that’s going to have to be
addressed."
- 4 -
Defendant was taken into custody.
On October 1, 2009, the trial court called the case for
preliminary hearing. Assistant State's Attorney Kavita Uppal
appeared for the State and made a motion to continue the case.
After a brief conversation, the court stated, "[Defendant] has a
speedy[-]trial demand on file back in March. So the State's
motion to continue this, so there's no confusion on the record,
will be allowed over [defendant's] strenuous objection." The
court granted the State's motion and reset the preliminary
hearing date. On October 5, 2009, defendant pro se filed a
handwritten motion to dismiss based on the violation of his right
to a speedy trial.
On October 8, 2009, the trial court held the
preliminary hearing and found probable cause. On the same day,
the public defender filed a "Motion for Discharge." This motion
requested the court dismiss the charges against defendant because
defendant had not been brought to trial within the statutory time
period.
On October 19, 2008, the trial court held a hearing on
the motion for discharge. At the hearing, the State argued it
never received defendant’s demand for speedy trial. The trial
court noted the docket stated the circuit clerk had forwarded the
State a copy of defendant’s demand for speedy trial in March. A
brief conversation ensued and the trial court granted the State
- 5 -
additional time to brief issues related to the motion for
discharge.
On December 29, 2009, the trial court filed an order
granting defendant’s motion. The order stated, in part:
"Here, the [d]efendant properly complied with
the requirements of [s]ection 3-8-10. Al-
though the State contends [it] did not
initially receive the [d]emand when it was
filed on March 12, it is clear [it] received
one the following day, according to the
docket. The demand was directed to the
State’s Attorney’s [o]ffice as required, and
contained all necessary information. Even
though they maintain they received no copies
before August 28, the docket is the official
record upon which this [c]ourt is to rely.
In addition, the [d]efendant’s pleadings
included a Notice of Filing which stated,
under oath, that the [d]efendant mailed cop-
ies to both the [c]lerk’s [o]ffice and the
State’s Attorney’s [o]ffice on March 4, 2009.
The [d]efendant’s 160 days therefore
began to run on March 13, 2009. He was not
brought to court until September 21, 2009,
- 6 -
192 days after his demand. *** More than 160
days have passed since his demand, the
[d]efendant is entitled to discharge and the
case is hereby dismissed."
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
The State argues it did not violate defendant’s right
to a speedy trial because defendant (1) failed to notify the
State about his demand for trial and (2) did not comply with the
requirements of the Intrastate Detainers statute. We address
each of these contentions in turn.
A. Standard of Review
When the facts of a case are not in dispute, the issue
is a question of law and review is de novo. People v. Bannister,
232 Ill. 2d 52, 66, 902 N.E.2d 571, 581 (2008).
B. Sufficient Notice
The State first argues defendant did not assert his
right to a speedy trial because the State never received his
demand. The office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD)
counters defendant invoked his right to a speedy trial when he
complied with the requirements of the Intrastate Detainers
statute. We agree with OSAD.
A defendant in custody on unrelated charges can only
assert his right to a speedy trial if he files his demand accord-
- 7 -
ing to the requirements found in the Intrastate Detainers stat-
ute. People v. Wooddell, 219 Ill. 2d 166, 175, 847 N.E.2d 117,
122 (2006). According to the Intrastate Detainers statute, a
demand for speedy trial requires:
"a statement of the place of present
commitment, the term, and length of the re-
maining term, the charges pending against him
or her to be tried and the county of the
charges, and the demand shall be addressed to
the [S]tate's [A]ttorney of the county where
he or she is charged with a copy to the clerk
of that court and a copy to the chief admin-
istrative officer of the Department of Cor-
rections institution or facility to which he
or she is committed." 730 ILCS 5/3-8-10
(West 2008).
As a threshold matter, we examine whether defendant
complied with the requirements of the Intrastate Detainers
statute. In March 2009, defendant forwarded two documents to the
circuit clerk of Vermilion County. The first document was titled
"Demand for Speedy Trial and/or to Quash Warrant." This document
contained boilerplate language designed to meet the requirements
of the Intrastate Detainers statute. On this document, defendant
wrote that his demand for speedy trial was based on charges in
- 8 -
Vermilion County. He also indicated he was serving a 2 1/2-year
sentence at Graham Correctional Center. He noted that he was
scheduled for release on September 9, 2009. Finally, he de-
scribed the charges against him as "Possession with intent to
deliver possession." This information, by itself, was sufficient
to satisfy the requirements of the Intrastate Detainers statute.
The second document was titled "Notice of Filing" and
it was designed to prove defendant had complied with the service-
by-mail requirements found in the Illinois Supreme Court rules.
According to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 12(b)(3) (145 Ill. 2d R.
12(b)(3)), service by mail is proved when the person who mailed
the document signs an "affidavit *** stating the time and place
of mailing, the complete address which appeared on the envelope,
and the fact that proper postage was prepaid." Here, the "Notice
of Filing" document stated defendant mailed the original and one
copy of his demand for speedy trial to the Vermilion County
circuit clerk. The document also stated defendant mailed one
copy to the Vermilion County State’s Attorney and the warden at
Graham Correctional Center. At the bottom of the document, in
the section labeled "Affidavit of Service," defendant, being duly
sworn, stated he placed each demand for speedy trial into a
sealed envelope and placed the envelope in the outgoing mail at
Graham Correctional Center. Based on these facts, we find
defendant complied with the requirements for service by mail.
- 9 -
In support of this finding, we also note the trial
court’s docket entry showed the circuit clerk forwarded a copy of
defendant’s demand to the State. Under Illinois law, the court
docket entries are presumed to be correct. People v. Brooks, 158
Ill. 2d 260, 274, 633 N.E.2d 692, 698 (1994). Therefore, assum-
ing arguendo defendant did not technically satisfy his obligation
to notify the State, the circuit clerk’s action would have
compensated for any theoretical shortcoming. We conclude the
court’s docket entry adds support to our finding defendant
satisfied the notice requirements of the Intrastate Detainers
statute.
1. Lack of Mailing Address on Form
The State argues defendant’s attempt at notice was
ineffective because he did not provide a proper mailing address
for the State’s Attorney on his "Notice of Filing." We are not
persuaded. Defendant’s "Notice of Filing" showed he addressed
his demand for speedy trial to the "State’s Attorney [of] Vermil-
ion County" and the "Circuit Clerk [of] Vermilion County." On
this form, defendant did not include any city, road, or building
number under the Vermilion County State’s Attorney or the Vermil-
ion County circuit clerk. Despite this lack of information,
defendant’s demand for speedy trial and his "Notice of Filing"
arrived at the circuit clerk’s office in a timely fashion.
Therefore, defendant addressed the envelope sufficiently to allow
- 10 -
delivery to the circuit clerk. We conclude the trial court could
reasonably infer defendant’s addressing an envelope to the
State’s Attorney in a similar fashion would be sufficient to
ensure delivery. Further, as we previously stated, the circuit
clerk’s action of forwarding defendant’s demand for speedy trial
cured any theoretical errors by defendant on this issue.
2. Receipt of Demand by State
The State next argues defendant’s right to a speedy
trial was not violated because the State never received defen-
dant’s demand. We are not persuaded. The clear purpose of the
Intrastate Detainers statute was to allow for service by mail.
This court has previously stated service by mail cannot be
"'frustrated by the mere allegation of the [appellant] that he
did not receive it.'" In re Marriage of Betts, 159 Ill. App. 3d
327, 332, 511 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1987), quoting Bernier v.
Schaefer, 11 Ill. 2d 525, 529, 144 N.E.2d 577, 579 (1957).
Assuming arguendo defendant was untruthful when he claimed that
he forwarded his demand for speedy trial to the State’s Attorney,
the trial court’s docket entry showing the circuit clerk for-
warded defendant’s demand for speedy trial reinforces our belief
proper steps were taken to notify the State.
We also note in passing, the State relied on two cases,
People v. Jones, 84 Ill. 2d 162, 417 N.E.2d 1301 (1981), and
People v. Dotson, 136 Ill. App. 3d 356, 483 N.E.2d 577 (1985), to
- 11 -
support its claim that a demand for speedy trial was not effec-
tive until the State received notice. The State argues both
cases support its position because the State did not receive
notification about the initial demand for speedy trial in either
case. We disagree with the State’s interpretation of those
cases. In both of those cases, the defendant gave the initial
demand for speedy trial to the circuit clerk, without attempting
to notify the prosecutor. See Jones, 84 Ill. 2d at 165-66, 417
N.E.2d at 1303-04; see also Dotson, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 357, 483
N.E.2d at 578. Further, in both cases, the State did not become
aware of defendant’s demand for speedy trial for several months
after the circuit clerk received defendant’s initial demand. See
Jones, 84 Ill. 2d at 166, 417 N.E.2d at 1303-04; see also Dotson,
136 Ill. App. 3d at 357, 483 N.E.2d at 578. The reviewing courts
in both Jones and Dotson based their decisions, in part, on their
concern defendants could exploit a loophole if they were allowed
to invoke their right to a speedy trial without attempting to
notify the State. See Jones, 84 Ill. 2d at 168-69, 417 N.E.2d at
1304-05; see also Dotson, 136 Ill. App. 3d at 360, 483 N.E.2d at
579-80.
In contrast, here, both defendant and the circuit clerk
made affirmative actions to notify the State. Defendant signed
an affidavit stating he mailed a copy of the demand to the
State’s Attorney. Similarly, the circuit clerk forwarded a copy
- 12 -
of defendant’s demand to the State within four days of its
receipt. These actions were affirmative steps intended to notify
the State. The Jones and Dotson courts never required proof the
State receive the demand for speedy trial. Therefore, our ruling
here is consistent with the reasoning from Jones and Dotson.
We find the State’s receipt of defendant’s demand does
not control here. The Intrastate Detainers statute does not
require proof of receipt by the State. Both defendant and the
circuit clerk took appropriate action to notify the State. These
actions were sufficient to meet the requirements of the
Intrastate Detainers statute. Therefore, defendant properly
asserted his right to a speedy trial.
C. Compliance with Statutory Requirements
The State next argues defendant did not assert his
right to a speedy trial because his demand included the wrong
case number and he did not sufficiently describe the charges.
OSAD counters by stating defendant complied with the requirements
of the Intrastate Detainers statute. We agree with OSAD.
1. Incorrect Case Number
Here, the State relies on People v. Sandoval, 236 Ill.
2d 57, 923 N.E.2d 292 (2010). There, the court stated the
following:
"This court has repeatedly recognized
that '"defendants *** serving prison terms
- 13 -
for existing convictions at the time they
face trial on additional charges *** do not
suffer a loss of liberty while awaiting trial
on the pending charges."' Wooddell, 219 Ill.
2d at 175[, 847 N.E.2d at 122], quoting [Peo-
ple v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419, 428, 639
N.E.2d 550, 555 (1994)]. The legislature has
chosen to impose additional demand require-
ments on those individuals not applicable to
others. In Staten, this court rejected the
notion that the additional conditions imposed
by the legislature in section 3-8-10 are
'meaningless' or mere technicalities, finding
that the information required was properly
mandated 'for the administrative convenience
of the State' and that the legislature in-
tended to place the burden of compliance on
the demanding defendant who, as noted, is
already incarcerated and thus suffers no
additional loss of liberty. Staten, 159 Ill.
2d at 428[, 639 N.E.2d at 555]. In Staten,
this court insisted that a demand under sec-
tion 3-8-10 be unambiguous. Staten, 159 Ill.
2d at 428-29[, 639 N.E.2d at 555-56] (citing,
- 14 -
approvingly, appellate court cases that put
the demand burden upon the defendant and
require a 'clear and unequivocal' demand).
* * *
The balancing inherent in our speedy-trial
statute is the prerogative of the legislature.
Taking into account the pertinent stat-
utes, authorities, and principles, it is our
opinion, given the facts of this case, that
the circuit court has reversed the burden of
compliance with statutory conditions the
legislature intended for the 'administrative
convenience of the State,' placing the burden
instead on the very party for whose benefit
those conditions were enacted. We see the
result here as inconsistent with the rights
of public justice.
It is not unreasonable to require that
defendants demanding a speedy trial under the
provisions of section 3-8-10 specify the
charges to which their demands pertain. That
is not to say that case numbers are necessar-
ily required in the demand; however, if they
are not included, other adequate indicia of
- 15 -
identification must be provided, such as the
name of the charge and the date upon which
the offense was allegedly committed. It is
not enough to say 'Du Page County DUI' if a
defendant has 10 such charges pending--or
even three in two different cases. The defi-
ciency here is compounded by defendant's
provision of a case number ('WO5A48844') that
had nothing to do with either case, and ap-
pears to have initially led the circuit clerk
to believe the demand might relate to a mu-
nicipal prosecution. In any event, such
laxity is inconsistent with the additional
burden the legislature has seen fit to place
upon those already incarcerated for other
offenses, those who suffer no additional loss
of liberty because of the pending charges.
It is also inconsistent with the implementa-
tion of statutory conditions enacted for the
administrative benefit of the State to re-
quire the State to track down defendant's
pending cases or writ him into court to fig-
ure out what he means." (Emphasis added.)
Sandoval, 236 Ill. 2d at 66-68, 923 N.E.2d at
- 16 -
297-98.
In Sandoval, 236 Ill. 2d at 59, 923 N.E.2d at 293, the
State charged the defendant with three different counts of
driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) in two different
cases. The defendant, while incarcerated in prison on unrelated
Cook County charges, mailed a document labeled "Demand for Speedy
Trial and/or Quash Warrant" to the DuPage County State’s Attorney
and the DuPage County circuit clerk. Sandoval, 236 Ill. 2d at
61, 923 N.E.2d at 294. The document included a blank for the
defendant’s case number, where the defendant entered a number
that could not be used to correctly identify either of his cases.
Sandoval, 236 Ill. 2d at 61, 923 N.E.2d at 294. Additionally,
the defendant only described the charges against him as "DuPage
County D.U.I." Sandoval, 236 Ill. 2d at 62, 923 N.E.2d at 295.
The Illinois Supreme Court found that the defendant had not
asserted his right to a speedy trial because his inclusion of an
apparently meaningless case number and his description of the
charges as "DuPage County D.U.I." were not sufficient to inform
the State to which case or to which DUI count the defendant
intended the demand to apply. Sandoval, 236 Ill. 2d at 67-68,
923 N.E.2d at 298.
In this case, the State argues defendant’s demand was
not effective because, like Sandoval, defendant’s entry of the
incorrect case number on his demand for speedy trial was mislead-
- 17 -
ing to the State. We disagree and find that Sandoval is distin-
guishable from this case. In Sandoval, 236 Ill. 2d at 59, 923
N.E.2d at 293, the defendant faced three different DUI charges in
two different cases. In contrast, here, the record contains no
information defendant had another case in Vermilion County.
Therefore, the State could not confuse defendant’s demand with
charges in another case. Further, in this case, defendant
provided his name, date of birth, and, as we will discuss later,
an adequate description of the charges on this form. The State
could have used this information to identify defendant’s case
with minimal effort, despite the incorrect case number. More-
over, defendant did not violate any statutory requirements
because the Intrastate Detainers statute does not require the
case number. Therefore, we find the entry of the incorrect case
number, by itself, does not justify the denial of defendant’s
right to a speedy trial.
2. Description of Charges
The State next argues defendant’s demand was not
effective because he did not clearly describe the charges. We
disagree. According to the Illinois Supreme Court, "speedy-trial
statutes implement constitutional rights and are to be liberally
construed." Staten, 159 Ill. 2d at 427, 639 N.E.2d at 555.
Further, the text of the Intrastate Detainers statute does not
require a specific legal description of the charges against
- 18 -
defendant. Based on this reasoning, we conclude the Intrastate
Detainers statute only requires a defendant describe the charges
sufficiently to provide notice to the State.
Here, the State claims defendant’s description of the
charges was inadequate because he did not include the words "of a
controlled substance." We find this argument unpersuasive.
Defendant described the charges as "Possession With Intent To
Deliver possession." The actual charges against defendant listed
in the October 2008 information were count I, possession of a
controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(A) (West 2008)), and
count II, possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2008)). The record
shows the trial court had no difficulty understanding defendant’s
description of the charges. Obviously defendant intended this
language to describe the charges against him. Based on these
facts, we find defendant’s description was sufficient to provide
the State with notice defendant was demanding a speedy trial on
the two counts listed in the October 2008 information.
D. Epilogue
In sum, we agree with the trial court: defendant’s
right to a speedy trial was violated. Defendant had a statutory
right to a speedy trial within 160 days of his demand, provided
he complied with the requirements found in the Intrastate
Detainers statute and the Speedy-Trial Act. See Wooddell, 219
- 19 -
Ill. 2d at 174-75, 847 N.E.2d at 122. Here, defendant made his
demand for speedy trial according to the statutory requirements.
The circuit clerk forwarded his demand to the State on March 13,
2009. According to our analysis, the speedy-trial clock started,
at the very latest, when the circuit clerk forwarded the demand.
The Intrastate Detainers statute requires dismissal of the
charges when a defendant properly makes a demand and the State
does not commence his trial within the statutory time period.
730 ILCS 5/3-8-10 (West 2008). Defendant invoked the speedy-
trial right. The State failed to bring defendant to trial within
the statutorily required time period. Therefore, the court is
required by law to dismiss the charges against defendant.
Finally, we note the content of the notice-by-mail
requirements of the Intrastate Detainers statute (730 ILCS 5/3-8-
10 (West 2008)) is a matter within the legislature's prerogative.
The purpose of the Intrastate Detainers statute is to require a
defendant notify the State he is invoking his right to a speedy
trial. However, the statute currently contains no safeguards
requiring the State actually receive the notice.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's order
granting defendant's motion to dismiss.
Affirmed.
TURNER and APPLETON, JJ., concur.
- 20 -
- 21 -