K.D. v. Villa Grove Community Unit School District No. 302 Board of Education ( 2010 )

Filed 8/24/10 NO. 4-09-0913
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
K.D., by and Through His Parents, ) Appeal from
NICHELLE D. and BRADLEY D., ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiffs-Appellees, ) Douglas County
v. ) No. 09CH27
VILLA GROVE COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL )
DISTRICT NO. 302 BOARD OF EDUCATION; )
and DR. STEVEN POZNIC, in His )
Official Capacity as District No. 302 ) Honorable
Superintendent, ) Chris E. Freese,
Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:
In July 2009, plaintiff, K.D., by and through his
parents, Nichelle D. and Bradley D., filed a complaint for
injunctive relief alleging defendants, Villa Grove Community Unit
School District No. 302 and Dr. Steven Poznic, in his official
capacity as District No. 302 superintendent (referred to collec-
tively herein as the District), violated section 14-6.02 of the
School Code (105 ILCS 5/14-6.02 (West 2008)) by denying K.D., a
student with autism, use of a service animal. In November 2009,
the trial court entered an order finding K.D.'s dog to be a
service animal and ordering the District to allow K.D. to bring
the dog to school functions.
The District appeals, arguing the trial court erred in
granting plaintiffs injunctive relief because (1) plaintiffs
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and (2) K.D.'s
dog was not a "service animal" pursuant to section 14-6.02 of the
School Code. We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
When this action commenced, K.D. was six years old and
attending Villa Grove Elementary School, a school located within
the District. K.D. is autistic, which places him under the
purview of article 14 of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/14-1.01
through 14-16 (West 2008)) as a child with a disability. In May
2009, K.D. received a Labrador retriever named "Chewey" from
Autism Service Dogs of America (ASDA). Later that month, the
District sent plaintiffs a letter informing them Chewey was
prohibited from accompanying K.D. to school. Plaintiffs contin-
ued to negotiate with the District as to Chewey's entry into the
school. On June 29, 2009, the District informed K.D.'s parents
it prohibited Chewey from attending school with K.D. that summer.
K.D. was enrolled in an extended school-year program to prevent
his academic and functional skills from regressing during the
summer scheduled to begin July 1, 2009, but was unable to attend
after the District refused to allow Chewey to accompany K.D. to
class.
On July 9, 2009, K.D.'s parents filed a verified
complaint and a motion for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction on K.D.'s behalf, claiming section 14-6.02
of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/14-6.02 (West 2008)) permitted
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K.D. to bring Chewey with him to Villa Grove Elementary School.
On July 13, 2009, the District filed a motion to
dismiss plaintiffs' motion for temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, contending (1) plaintiffs failed to
exhaust their administrative remedies before commencing their
action before the trial court and (2) Chewey was not a "service
animal" for purposes of section 14-6.02 of the School Code.
After a hearing the following day, the court denied the Dis-
trict's motion and granted plaintiffs' motion for a temporary
restraining order, thereby enjoining the District from denying
Chewey from attending school with K.D. As a result, Chewey
accompanied K.D. to school during the entire 2009-2010 school
year.
In August 2009, plaintiffs amended their complaint
regarding the prayer for relief. Upon amendment, plaintiffs
sought a trial court order requiring the District to not only
permit Chewey to attend school with K.D. but also (1) train at
least one primary staff member and one backup staff member in
service-animal equipment and the necessary commands for Chewey to
accompany K.D. to all school functions; (2) designate one primary
staff member to hold Chewey's leash while K.D. is also tethered
to Chewey during student transition periods throughout the school
day; (3) designate one primary staff member to release K.D. from
his tether while he uses the restroom facilities and during
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periods with heavy physical activity, such as physical-education
classes; and (4) allow Chewey access to water and to relieve
himself when appropriate during the school day. The District
filed a motion to strike the amended prayer for relief. The
court allowed the District's motion, finding plaintiffs' re-
quested relief exceeded the scope of the School Code.
On November 10, 2009, the trial court conducted a
hearing on plaintiffs' complaint. At the hearing, plaintiffs
called two witnesses, Kati Witko and Nichelle D., and the Dis-
trict called three, Aimee Reardon, Kathy Burgess, and Beth
Wiessing.
Witko testified ASDA employs her as a program training
director. Witko holds a two-year "dog certificate" from Animal
Behavior College, and her job consists of training dogs to assist
children with autism, including Chewey.
According to Witko, ASDA dogs receive approximately 16
months of training, beginning when the dogs are between 6 and 8
months old. As part of a dog's training, ASDA employees take the
dog to schools, with both autistic and nonautistic children, so
it can learn to remain calm around children who exhibit loud
behavior. While at school with its child, a dog remains in a
"down-stay" position, which "can look like sleeping," to keep the
child calm and safe. The dog does not move from the down-stay
position unless commanded by its handler. Accordingly, the
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handler plays "a big role" by ensuring the dog does "what he's
supposed to at the right time."
Witko stated Chewey is not currently commanded by K.D.
because K.D. does not function at a level where he could provide
Chewey with a sense of leadership or control. Rather, he is
specifically trained not to respond to K.D.'s commands, and thus
someone else must command him. Although Chewey knows over 30
commands, a handler needs to know only 5 to manage Chewey in a
school environment. Chewey's main handler is K.D.'s mother,
Nichelle.
Witko further testified Nichelle received training in
Oregon with Chewey before ASDA placed Chewey with the family in
Villa Grove. After placement, Witko flew to plaintiffs' home in
May 2009 to teach Chewey how to apply his training to K.D.
Typically, such training includes school placement, but because
the District refused to allow Chewey in K.D.'s elementary school,
Witko could not perform such placement during her May 2009 visit.
However, she was able to conduct the training upon her return in
August 2009, which K.D.'s speech teacher, his one-on-one aide,
the head of special education at the school, and "some fill-in
aides" attended. Upon completion of the training, Witko provided
written information, her phone number, and her e-mail address.
No one from the school contacted Witko, and Witko's follow-up
telephone calls were never returned.
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According to Witko, Chewey's training taught him to
stand his ground when tethered to K.D., thereby preventing K.D.
from running away. Witko explained when autistic children are
outside, they need to be held onto to prevent them from running
off into dangerous situations. The tether system provides
children with a sense of interdependence and an ability to move
about how the children wish without being held onto by an adult.
Tethering also reassures family members and school staff the
child will not run, and thus it permits them to "do more things
and get [the child] more into the social realm and environment."
Witko also explained Chewey aids K.D. during transitional periods
by applying deep pressure with his head or paw upon command,
something children with autism "seek and need."
Witko emphasized the importance of K.D. and Chewey
working together at all times when outside the home. In doing
so, K.D. and Chewey form a bond, which will cause K.D. "to want
to be by his dog and to not feel the desire to run off and to
really not be able to run off because of that tether but because
he wants to be by his dog."
K.D.'s mother, Nichelle, testified K.D.'s autism causes
him to run away frequently in public into dangerous situations
from her, her husband, and K.D.'s aides at school and to leave
the house at night while the rest of the family sleeps. As K.D.
grows stronger, Nichelle has more difficulty controlling him.
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K.D. also has difficulty with transitions from the house to
public places, such as school or church. Prior to Chewey's
arrival, K.D. adapted poorly to changes in his routine and had
difficulty sleeping, averaging two to three hours per night.
Nichelle and her husband obtained Chewey to keep K.D.
safe and calm him down. Since receiving Chewey, K.D. becomes
upset for shorter periods of time, completes his homework, and
sleeps between six to eight hours per night. He has less diffi-
culty transitioning between home and other public places, includ-
ing school. As an example, Nichelle cited K.D.'s morning arrival
at school, which used to involve frequent tantrums but, after
Chewey, occurs "calmly, happily." Nichelle attributed these
changes to Chewey's ability to apply pressure upon command to
K.D., which calms K.D. and recenters him to the task at hand.
Nichelle also noted Chewey makes K.D. safer because he keeps K.D.
from running away and barks in the night if K.D. leaves his bed.
In January 2008, prior to undergoing the extensive
application process for a ASDA-trained dog, Nichelle informed
K.D.'s teacher she planned on obtaining a dog to assist K.D. In
summer 2008, Nichelle filled out an application with ASDA. After
requesting an individualized education plan meeting to discuss
the dog accompanying K.D. to school and K.D.'s diet, the District
informed Nichelle in December 2008 it denied the dog access.
At the close of plaintiffs' evidence, the District
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moved for a directed judgment, which the trial court denied. The
District then presented the following testimony.
Reardon testified the District employs her as K.D.'s
one-on-one aide. Reardon assists K.D. with "transitioning" from
place to place, his homework, and any other needs arising during
his time in the classroom. Regarding Chewey, Reardon testified
the dog does "nothing" when not commanded by her or another
adult. Reardon also testified she often repeats commands two or
three times before Chewey responds. When other dogs are near the
playground, "Chewey will bark *** and try to pull to go to the
other dogs." Occasionally, Chewey barks in school and sniffs at
other students. In the month prior to testifying, Reardon
experienced difficulty from Chewey when he tried to remove the
gentle leader located around his mouth and attached to his leash.
Approximately once a week, Reardon reported Chewey acts "con-
flicted" when K.D. issues a command differing from a command
issued by Reardon. Sometimes, Chewey moves in the classroom when
he should remain still. Reardon further stated Chewey does
nothing to benefit K.D., reasoning "[h]e has to be commanded by
me to do anything he needs to do; and generally, he's just lying
on the ground."
On cross-examination, Reardon admitted she knows the
command to correct any inappropriate behavior by Chewey and uses
it effectively. She further admitted she feels confident as
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Chewey's handler. After she experienced difficulties with
Chewey's gentle leader, she consulted K.D.'s mother, who promised
to order a new gentle leader. Reardon also contacted K.D.'s
mother about having to repeat commands to Chewey, to which K.D.'s
mother advised Reardon to be more authoritative. Reardon ac-
knowledged despite her testimony Chewey does nothing for K.D.,
she had observed him tethered to K.D. during transition periods,
commanded him to find K.D. when untethered, and observed him
apply deep pressure to K.D.
Burgess testified she works as a full-time aide for the
District. Her duties include "a lot of fill-in work for other
students [and] relieving other teachers *** for breaks." She
spends time daily with K.D. during lunch and recess. Regarding
Chewey, Burgess tethers and untethers him after transitions from
the classroom to the lunchroom to outside. On three occasions,
Chewey spotted other dogs and barked at them. Once, Burgess took
Chewey outside for a bathroom break, Chewey spotted another dog,
and "it took two of [Burgess's] hands to hold him back." Burgess
stated she often repeats commands to Chewey two or three times
before he responds. Not once has she seen Chewey respond to
commands given by K.D.
Burgess contrasted K.D.'s behavior at the beginning of
the 2009 school year with his behavior the previous year. She
noted he transitions poorly from recess to the classroom, some-
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thing he had less problems with during the 2008-2009 school year.
Burgess also noted K.D. acts up in the bathroom, an issue not
arising previously. During these times, Chewey is not tethered
to K.D.
On cross-examination, Burgess admitted she never
notified K.D.'s mother or the ASDA trainer about Chewey's barking
at other dogs because it is not a consistent problem. She
further admitted not watching Chewey closely during the lunch
hour because her eyes are on K.D., who is not tethered to Chewey
during that time.
Finally, Wiessing testified the District employs her as
a speech-language pathologist. Wiessing has training and certif-
ication in working with autistic children. Wiessing worked with
K.D. during the 2008-2009 school year, before Chewey's arrival,
and during the 2009-2010 school year, after Chewey's arrival.
During the 2009-2010 school year, Wiessing met with K.D. 4 days
per week for approximately 15 to 20 minutes. She also saw K.D.
frequently in the hallways, on the playground, and in the cafete-
ria. During "the first couple weeks of school" in 2009, Wiessing
observed K.D. in his classroom three to four days per week.
Chewey's behavior concerned Wiessing because he in-
creasingly stood up when K.D. stood up, despite not being com-
manded to do so. Once, K.D. was untethered and ran down the
hallway, followed by Chewey, who ignored the aide's command to
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stop. Wiessing stated she often repeats commands frequently,
"anywhere from two to three [times]."
Since the start of the 2009-2010 school year, Wiessing
observed (1) K.D. throwing more tantrums, of a longer duration
than the previous school year; (2) an increase in K.D.'s use of
echolalia, an involuntary echoing of things K.D. has heard; (3) a
decrease of independence; and (4) a decrease in K.D.'s use of
spontaneous language. Wiessing attributed the decrease in K.D.'s
independence to the fact K.D. used to travel by himself, followed
by his aide, to each location on his schedule but during the
current school year K.D. traveled with at least "two individuals
and a dog." However, she did not explain the reason for the
increase in individuals traveling with K.D. and admitted for part
of 2009-2010 school year, K.D. did not have a photographic map of
the locations on his schedule as he did during the previous
school year. As to K.D.'s decrease in spontaneous language,
Wiessing attributed part of the decrease to regression during the
summer but noted "[i]t was much longer than [she] expected this
year." Wiessing further opined Chewey did nothing to aid K.D.,
citing an incident where K.D. had a tantrum and Chewey placed his
paw on K.D.'s back to calm him but K.D. got up, Chewey removed
his paw, and the tantrum continued.
On cross-examination, Wiessing stated K.D. received no
speech therapy during the summer. Because Wiessing only saw K.D.
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during two school years, she experienced only one extensive
period where K.D. came back to school after a long break. The
previous school year, Wiessing experienced difficulty providing
K.D. therapy because he often slept during their sessions,
something K.D. no longer does. Wiessing also explained several
differences existed between the current school year and the
previous one, which included (1) K.D having a new teacher; (2)
K.D. having Reardon as his one-on-one aide, who was not his aide
the previous year; and (3) a new classroom for K.D.'s speech
therapy.
After hearing the above evidence, the trial court ruled
in plaintiffs' favor, finding (1) the District violated section
14-6.02 of the School Code and (2) Chewey is a service animal
within the meaning of the statute because he is individually
trained to perform tasks for K.D.'s benefit. In support of its
decision, the court reasoned as follows:
"This is not about the burden of the parents.
It's not about the difficult task of the
school. It's about one sentence in one sec-
tion of the School Code, and that sentence is
extremely simple.
***
This is not even a close case. ***
[P]laintiff[s] ha[ve] shown far beyond a
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preponderance of the evidence that the dog in
this case fits [the 'service animal' defini-
tion set forth in section 14-6.02 of the
School Code]. ***
Has this dog been individually trained[-
?] The evidence is uncontradicted that the
dog was individually trained to attempt to
benefit an autistic child. Not in dispute.
Does the child in question have a dis-
ability[?] Not in dispute. Uncontradicted.
The child has autism.
Are there tasks for the benefit of the
student that the dog has been trained to
perform[?] And the statute does not say it
has to be tasks at school. *** It says the
dog has to be, has to be trained to perform
tasks that benefit the student. Period. It
does not say that the task can only be per-
formed with the command of a handler.
Doesn't say that.
The tasks that this dog has been trained
to perform, and which, in fact, clearly bene-
fit this child are as follows--they have been
testified to very clearly in this case--we
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have a deep[-]pressure technique which gives
a calming effect for the child.
We have a tether situation which helps
the child locate a specific place and keeps
the child from running away on a whim. The
dog helps the child focus on various tasks
the child is performing; and, perhaps even
the most important one, this dog helps this
child get into school in the morning without
incident.
Now, have these tasks, every single day,
been performed without problem? Absolutely
not. Does that mean the school can keep the
dog out? Not the way the School [C]ode is
written.
*** [B]ased on th[e] statute and the
facts in this case, there can only be one
decision. And that is the school must allow
the dog admission with this student."
The court entered a written order on November 24, 2009, in which
it ordered the District to permit Chewey to accompany K.D. to all
school functions, regardless of whether the functions were inside
the classroom.
This appeal followed.
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II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, the District contends the trial court erred
in granting plaintiffs injunctive relief because (1) plaintiffs
failed to exhaust their administrative remedies and (2) K.D.'s
dog is not a service animal pursuant to section 14-6.02 of the
School Code.
A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Initially, the District argues the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over this case because plaintiffs failed to exhaust
their administrative remedies prior to filing suit. Specifi-
cally, the District alleges plaintiffs should have sought a
special-education due-process hearing under section 14-8.02a(f)
of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/14-8.02a(f) (West 2008)) and,
because plaintiffs failed to do so, the court should have granted
the District's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint.
An appellate court reviews de novo a trial court's
grant or denial of a motion to dismiss. Simmons v. Homatas, 236
Ill. 2d 459, 477, 925 N.E.2d 1089, 1100 (2010).
Generally, aggrieved parties may not file suit in
circuit court without first exhausting their administrative
remedies. Poindexter v. State of Illinois, 229 Ill. 2d 194, 206-
07, 890 N.E.2d 410, 419 (2008). "The purpose of the [exhaustion-
of-remedies] doctrine is *** to permit [administrative bodies] to
apply the special expertise that they possess." North Trust Co.
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v. County of Lake, 353 Ill. App. 3d 268, 276, 818 N.E.2d 389, 397
(2004). Accordingly, exhaustion is not required if the adminis-
trative agency's expertise is not involved. Morr-Fitz, Inc. v.
Blagojevich, 231 Ill. 2d 474, 499, 901 N.E.2d 373, 390 (2008).
Pertinent to the case at bar, section 14-8.02a(f) of
the School Code permits the State Board of Education to conduct
an impartial due-process hearing upon request by a parent. 105
ILCS 5/14-8.02a(f) (West 2008). The State Board of Education's
duty is to carry out the federal Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (20 U.S.C. §§1400 through 1482 (2006)), which
requires exhaustion of administrative remedies "to channel
disputes related to the education of disabled children into an
administrative process that could apply administrators' expertise
in the area and promptly resolve grievances." Polera v. Board of
Education of Newburgh Enlarged City School District, 288 F.3d
478, 487 (2d Cir. 2002).
The case at bar presents a single question: whether
Chewey constitutes a service animal under the Illinois School
Code, a matter irrelevant to any educational benefit he provides
K.D. The School Code's definition of "service animal" is not a
matter within school administrators' expertise. Rather, the
School Code exempts reference to any educational benefit from the
definition of "service animal" and instead merely requires an
animal be "individually trained to perform tasks for the benefit
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of a student." 105 ILCS 5/14-6.02 (West 2008); see also
Kalbfleisch v. Columbia Community Unit School District Unit No.
4, 396 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1115-16, 920 N.E.2d 651, 661 (2009)
("[t]he language of [section 14-6.02] does not include the term
'educational benefit,' and we '"should not attempt to read a
statute other than in the manner in which it was written"'
[citations]"). Thus, the educational expertise of school admin-
istrators and the State Board of Education is irrelevant. As
discussed below, despite the inevitable impact a service animal's
presence at school will have on a student's individualized
education plan, the School Code requires school districts admit
the service animal with the student as long as the animal meets
the definition set forth in section 14-6.02. The statute con-
tains no language regarding the educational impact caused by the
animal's presence. Because the definition excludes reference to
the service animal's impact on the student's education, any
hearing conducted by school administrators would simply amount to
interpretation of the statute's language--i.e., whether the
animal the disabled student seeks to bring to school is "individ-
ually trained to perform tasks for the benefit of a student."
This is a matter well within a circuit court's jurisdiction.
In rejecting the District's argument the exhaustion-of-
remedies doctrine applies in this case, we are unpersuaded by the
District's heavy reliance on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals'
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decision in Cave v. East Meadow Union Free School District, 514
F.3d 240, 245 (2d Cir. 2008). Cave's outcome depended on federal
statutes, none of which included a service-animal definition
similar to that contained in the Illinois School Code at issue in
this case. Thus, despite the factual similarities between Cave
and the case at bar, we decline to follow its logic.
In sum, the trial court properly denied the District's
motion to dismiss because plaintiffs were not required to seek a
due-process hearing under section 14-8.02a(f) of the School Code
prior to filing suit in the circuit court.
B. Section 14-6.02's "Service Animal" Definition
Next, the District argues plaintiffs failed to show
Chewey constitutes a "service animal" within the meaning of
section 14-6.02. Specifically, the District contends (1) Chewey
"provides no tangible tasks for K.D.'s benefit," (2) Chewey's
training "is not such to reflect the appropriate behaviors
expected," (3) "any act [Chewey] does do is at the command of an
adult handler--not on [his] own or at the command of K.D."--and
therefore Chewey does not "accompany" K.D. for purposes of the
statute, and (4) Chewey's behavior does not benefit K.D. but
instead "has actually caused K.D. to regress in his educational
and functional development." Because (1) the record before us on
appeal establishes Chewey provides some benefit to K.D. and (2)
the District's remaining arguments reach beyond the plain,
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unambiguous meaning of the statute, we disagree.
Interpreting a statute is a question of law, which an
appellate court reviews de novo. Ryan v. Board of Trustees of
the General Assembly Retirement System, 236 Ill. 2d 315, 319, 924
N.E.2d 970, 973 (2010). When interpreting a statute, the funda-
mental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give
effect to the legislature's intent. Ryan, 236 Ill. 2d at 319,
924 N.E.2d at 973. In that process, the language of the statute
is the best indicator of legislative intent, which courts give
its plain and ordinary meaning. Rosewood Care Center, Inc. v.
Caterpillar, Inc., 226 Ill. 2d 559, 567, 877 N.E.2d 1091, 1096
(2007). "We may not depart from the plain language of the
statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions
that conflict with the express legislative intent." Rosewood
Care Center, Inc., 226 Ill. 2d at 567, 877 N.E.2d at 1096.
At issue in the case at bar is section 14-6.02 of the
School Code, which states as follows:
"Service animals such as guide dogs,
signal dogs[,] or any other animal individu-
ally trained to perform tasks for the benefit
of a student with a disability shall be per-
mitted to accompany that student at all scho-
ol functions, whether in or outside the
classroom." 105 ILCS 5/14-6.02 (West 2008).
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The facts set forth in the record before us on appeal
establish Chewey constitutes a service animal under section 14-
6.02. The ASDA trainer and K.D.'s mother both testified Chewey
performs specific tasks to benefit K.D. by (1) preventing him
from running away through tethering and (2) applying deep pres-
sure to calm K.D. when he experiences a tantrum. K.D.'s mother
further testified since Chewey's arrival, the deep pressure
Chewey applies has caused (1) K.D.'s sleep to improve from two to
three hours per night to six to eight hours per night, (2) less
difficulty when K.D. transitions from home to school in the
mornings, and (3) K.D. to focus more easily on his homework.
According to K.D.'s mother, the tethering between Chewey and K.D.
decreases the risk of K.D. running away because he is tethered to
Chewey most of the day and Chewey alerts the family when K.D.
leaves his bed at night. Despite the District's assertion Chewey
"provides no tangible benefit to K.D.," the District's witnesses
also agreed they observed Chewey being tethered to K.D. and
applying deep pressure to K.D. during tantrums. Moreover,
Chewey's trainer testified she traveled to K.D.'s home to adapt
Chewey's autism-related training specifically to K.D. and noted
separation between K.D. and Chewey weakens the special bond
between them. Taken together, this evidence establishes Chewey
is individually trained to perform tasks for K.D.'s benefit.
The District further argues Chewey's behavior (1) fails
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to "reflect the appropriate behaviors expected" and (2) does not
benefit K.D. but instead "has actually caused K.D. to regress in
his educational and functional development." These arguments
exceed the plain meaning of the statute. Regardless of whether
Chewey's behavior varies from his training, section 14-6.02 does
not specify service animals must behave perfectly at all times.
Moreover, the statute does not require evaluating the disabled
child's educational and behavioral performances before labeling
the animal assisting the child a "service animal."
The District also contends Chewey is not a service
animal because he cannot "accompany" K.D. pursuant to section 14-
6.02 because "any act [Chewey] does do is at the command of an
adult handler--not on [his] own or at the command of K.D."
Again, no statutory language suggests affording "accompany" a
definition other than its plain, ordinary meaning. Generally,
"accompany" is defined as "to go with as an associate or compan-
ion." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary at 7 (10th ed.
2000); see also People v. Fort, 373 Ill. App. 3d 882, 885, 869
N.E.2d 950, 953 (2007) (in ascertaining the plain and ordinary
meaning of the language used in a statute, a court may "'turn to
a dictionary when determining the meaning of an otherwise unde-
fined word or phrase' [citation]"). The District's assertion
K.D.--not an adult handler--must control Chewey for the dog to
"accompany" K.D. is unpersuasive because the plain meaning of
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"accompany" does not encompass "control." To allow the Dis-
trict's interpretation to prevail would require this court to
turn to the discussion of service animals in other statutes cited
by the District, such as the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (20 U.S.C. §§1400 through 1482 (2006)), the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. §§12101 through
12213 (2006)), and the Vocational Rehabilitation Act Amendments
of 1998 (29 U.S.C. §§794 through 794(e) (2006)). However, as
noted above, section 14-6.02 is unambiguous and thus turning to
other aids of statutory construction is unnecessary.
We conclude Chewey is a service animal individually
trained to perform tasks for K.D.'s benefit. On its face,
section 14-6.02 permits Chewey to attend school with K.D. Thus,
the trial court did not err in ordering the District to permit
Chewey to accompany K.D. to all school functions.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment.
Affirmed.
STEIGMANN and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.
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