People v. Davis ( 2011 )

NO. 4-10-0004 Opinion Filed 4/29/11
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Livingston County
LINDSEY B. DAVIS, ) No. 08CF313
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
) Honorable
) Robert M. Travers,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Appleton and McCullough concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
Following an August 2009 bench trial, the trial court
convicted defendant, Lindsey B. Davis, of obstructing justice
(720 ILCS 5/31-4(a) (West 2008)). Shortly thereafter, the court
sentenced defendant to 7 days in jail and 24 months of probation,
ordering defendant, in pertinent part, to pay a $200 deoxyribonu-
cleic acid (DNA) fee.
Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the State failed to
prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial
court erred by failing to award her $10 against her DNA fee for
time she spent in pretrial custody. Because we agree that the
court erred by failing to award her $10 against her DNA fee, we
affirm as modified and remand with directions that the court
amend its sentencing order to reflect a $10 credit against
defendant's DNA fee.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The State's Charges and Defendant's Trial
In December 2008, the State charged defendant with (1)
one count of obstructing justice and (2) two counts of aiding a
fugitive for her involvement in concealing the fact that the
father of her children, Jason Bates, was hiding in her house. At
an August 2009 bench trial, the parties presented the following
evidence.
1. The State's Case
The State presented testimony from police officers that
they were looking for Bates because they had a warrant for his
arrest. Officers arrived at the residence where defendant was
staying and knocked on the door. Defendant answered. When asked
whether she had seen Bates, defendant responded that she had not
and could not remember the last time she had seen him, explaining
that only her brother and her children were inside the home.
After speaking privately to her brother (who was also
present when the police arrived) a short time later, defendant
began crying and said that Bates was in the house. Defendant
also conceded that she knew Bates had warrants out for his
arrest. Officers then searched the house and found Bates.
2. Defendant's Case
Defendant testified that Bates had been at the house
earlier that day to see the children, but that she told him to
leave because she knew he was wanted by the police. Bates told
her that he was going to leave, and she assumed that he had done
- 2 -
so.
Bates testified that he had stopped at the house to see
his children and told defendant that he was leaving. However, he
decided to stay because it was snowing and cold outside. Bates
was in the kitchen for about 15 minutes when he heard knocking at
the door. He assumed it was the police. Bates said that he
walked from the kitchen, through the living room--where defendant
was sitting in a chair--up the stairs, and into the attic. He
did not think that defendant saw him.
Defendant explained that she had not seen Bates pass
through the living room on the way up the stairs. She acknowl-
edged that although she was sitting in a chair near the front
door, she was delayed in getting to the door because of her
pregnancy. Defendant explained that she gave the officers
consent to search the house for Bates only because they were
"drilling her" with questions.
B. Defendant's Conviction and Sentence
Following defendant's trial, the trial court convicted
defendant of obstructing justice and acquitted her of both counts
of aiding a fugitive. Shortly thereafter, the court sentenced
defendant to 7 days in jail and 24 months of probation, ordering
defendant, in pertinent part, to pay a $200 DNA fee.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
Defendant argues that (1) the State failed to prove her
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) the trial court erred by
- 3 -
failing to award her $10 against her DNA fee for time she spent
in pretrial custody. We address defendant's contentions in turn.
A. Defendant's Claim That the State Failed To
Prove Her Guilty Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Defendant first contends that the State failed to prove
her guilty of obstructing justice beyond a reasonable doubt. We
disagree.
1. The Crime of Obstructing Justice
and the Standard of Review
A person obstructs justice when, with intent to prevent
the apprehension of any person, she knowingly "[d]estroys,
alters, conceals or disguises physical evidence, plants false
evidence, [or] furnishes false information." 720 ILCS 5/31-4(a)
(West 2008).
In People v. Dat Tan Ngo, 388 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1052,
904 N.E.2d 98, 102 (2008), this court outlined the standard for
reviewing claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, as
follows:
"'When reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal
case, the relevant inquiry is whether, when
viewing the evidence in the light most favor-
able to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential ele-
ments of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.' People v. Singleton, 367 Ill. App.
3d 182, 187, 854 N.E.2d 326, 331 (2006). The
- 4 -
trier of fact has the responsibility to de-
termine the credibility of witnesses and the
weight given to their testimony, to resolve
conflicts in the evidence, and to draw rea-
sonable inferences from that evidence. Peo-
ple v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 225, 821 N.E.2d
307, 311 (2004). A court of review will not
overturn the verdict of the fact finder 'un-
less the evidence is so unreasonable, improb-
able[,] or unsatisfactory that it raises a
reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.'
People v. Jones, 219 Ill. 2d 1, 33, 845
N.E.2d 598, 616 (2006)."
2. The Evidence Presented in This Case
In this case, as is often the case, the trier of fact
was presented with two versions of the events that led to the
charges: (1) the State's version and (2) the defendant's version.
a. The State's Version
The officers arrived at the house. Defendant and Bates
saw the police at the door. Defendant, knowing that the police
had a warrant for Bates's arrest, stalled for time while Bates
ran to hide in the attic. Defendant answered the door and told
the officers that Bates had left. After speaking to her brother,
who apparently was unwilling to lie for Bates, defendant acknowl-
edged that Bates was there and consented to a search of the
house.
- 5 -
b. Defendant's Version
Bates stopped at the house to see his children.
Defendant, knowing the police were looking for Bates, ordered him
to leave. Unbeknownst to defendant, Bates went to the back of
the house. Shortly thereafter, the police knocked on the door.
Bates, suspecting it was the police, dashed through the living
room and up the stairs without defendant's noticing. Meanwhile,
defendant was delayed in answering the door because of her
pregnancy. When asked by the officers whether Bates was in the
house, defendant responded that Bates had been there but was
gone. The police continued "drilling her" with questions until
she finally, in an effort to get them to leave her alone, told
them to look through the house. To her surprise, the officers
found Bates hiding in the house.
3. The Evidence in the Light Most
Favorable to the Prosecution
Presented with these two contradicting versions of
events, the trial court found defendant guilty of obstructing
justice. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime of obstructing justice
beyond a reasonable doubt. As previously stated, it is the trier
of fact, in this case the trial court, who has the responsibility
to determine the credibility of witnesses and how much weight to
afford their testimony, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and
draw reasonable inferences from that evidence. Here, the court
did just that and found that the State's version of events was
- 6 -
more persuasive as to the obstructing-justice count.
As part of her argument, defendant contends that she
did not "materially impede" the police investigation and, there-
fore, did not obstruct justice because she recanted her claim
that Bates was not in the house shortly after she told the
officers that Bates was in the house. To support her position,
defendant points to this court's decision in People v. Gray, 146
Ill. App. 3d 714, 718, 496 N.E.2d 1269, 1272 (1986), in which we
noted the following:
"There may be, *** based upon the particular
facts of each case, a situation where a re-
cantation within a short period of time would
permit the trier of fact to find the defen-
dant not guilty of an obstructing-justice
charge."
Defendant, citing People v. Comage, No. 109495, slip op. at 9
(Ill. Feb. 25, 2011), claims that because a short delay does not
"materially impede" police investigations, her delay in telling
the truth cannot be used to support her conviction for obstruct-
ing justice. Defendant's interpretation of the supreme court's
holding in Comage is too expansive.
In Comage, the defendant argued that he did not "con-
ceal" contraband as that term is used in the obstructing-justice
statute. The supreme court agreed, reversing the defendant's
obstructing-justice conviction where the defendant had thrown
contraband over a fence while being pursued by police. Comage,
- 7 -
slip op. at 9. The police saw the defendant throw the items over
the fence and recovered them within 20 seconds. Comage, slip op.
at 9. The court explained that although the contraband was
briefly out of the officers' sight, the defendant had not materi-
ally impeded their investigation and therefore, the defendant had
not obstructed justice. Comage, slip op. at 9-10.
Unlike Comage, where the supreme court was addressing
what it meant to conceal evidence under the obstructing-justice
statute, this case involves knowingly furnishing false informa-
tion to the police. When the defendant places evidence momen-
tarily out of sight during arrest or pursuit, the defendant has
not "concealed" that evidence for purposes of the obstructing-
justice statute because such an act does not make recovery of the
evidence substantially more difficult or impossible. See Comage,
slip op. at 8-9 (comparing the 20-second impediment in that case
with the impediment in People v. Brake, 336 Ill. App. 3d 464, 783
N.E.2d 1084 (2003), where the defendant had swallowed evidence,
which investigators later recovered, in hopes that it would go
unrecovered); see also In re M.F., 315 Ill. App. 3d 641, 650, 734
N.E.2d 171, 178 (2000) (throwing "bags of drugs down from the
landing and onto the ground in the vicinity of and in view of the
police officer who was shining a flashlight on respondent, saw
his conduct, and recovered the drugs within seconds of the act"
was not "likely to either destroy the evidence or make recovery
less likely"). This is in large part due to the fact that the
risk that the evidence would be compromised is virtually nonexis-
- 8 -
tent. Compare People v. Sumner, 40 Ill. App. 3d 832, 354 N.E.2d
18 (1976) (affirming the defendant's conviction for obstructing
justice where the defendant destroyed physical evidence that had
been in her son's bloody clothes). However, when, as here, the
defendant furnishes false information, the potential that the
investigation will be compromised is exceedingly high, which is
why such a crime may be completed in a very short period of time-
-indeed, it may be completed at the moment such false information
is provided. See Gray, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 717, 496 N.E.2d at
1271 ("The requisite intent in an obstructing-justice charge is
established at the time the original false information is given
and not at the time of its recantation."). That is precisely
what happened in this case.
Defendant provided the officers with false information
about whether Bates was in the house, knowing that they had a
warrant for Bates's arrest, in the hopes that he would not be
apprehended. It was not until after defendant spoke to her
brother and it apparently became clear that he was going to
"spill the beans" that she decided to tell the truth. Under
these facts, we conclude that defendant's actions in that regard
impeded the officers' investigation at the time that she misled
them by lying. See Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary 581
(10th ed. 2000) (to "impede" means to "interfere with or slow the
progress of").
B. Defendant's Claim That the Trial Court Erred by
Failing To Award Her $10 Against Her DNA Fee
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by
- 9 -
failing to award her $10 against her DNA fee for time she spent
in pretrial custody. The State concedes this point, and we
accept the State's concession.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
judgment as modified and remand with directions that the court
amend its sentencing order to reflect a $10 credit against
defendant's DNA fee. As part of our judgment we award the State
its statutory assessment of $50 against defendant as costs of
this appeal.
Affirmed as modified and remanded with directions.
- 10 -