People v. Gaytan , 992 N.E.2d 17 ( 2013 )

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
People v. Gaytan, 2013 IL App (4th) 120217
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption JOSE GAYTAN, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. Fourth District
Docket No. 4-12-0217
Rule 23 Order filed May 21, 2013
Rule 23 Order
withdrawn June 11, 2013
Opinion filed May 21, 2013
Held In a prosecution for unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver
(Note: This syllabus and unlawful possession of cannabis arising from a traffic stop for having
constitutes no part of a license plate obstructed by a trailer hitch, the trial court erred in denying
the opinion of the court defendant’s motion to suppress, since section 3-413(b) of the Illinois
but has been prepared Vehicle Code prohibits obstructing materials attached to the plate itself,
by the Reporter of not objects such as the trailer hitch here, which was not connected to the
Decisions for the plate and only partially obstructed the plate; therefore, section 3-413(b)
convenience of the did not provide a basis for stopping defendant.
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of McLean County, No. 10-CF-864; the
Review Hon. Robert L. Freitag, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Karen Munoz, and Colleen Morgan, all of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.
Ronald C. Dozier, State’s Attorney, of Bloomington (Patrick Delfino,
Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Dodegge, all of State’s Attorneys
Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Pope and Holder White concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In September 2010, a McLean County grand jury indicted defendant, Jose Gaytan, for
unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2010)) and
unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2010)). Defendant filed a motion
to suppress evidence, arguing the police officers did not have articulable suspicion a crime
had been committed or was being committed when they stopped defendant for an obstructed
license plate. In October 2011, the trial court held a stipulated bench trial and found
defendant guilty. The court sentenced defendant to 30 months’ probation, including a
condition that he serve 120 days in the county jail.
¶2 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court improperly denied the motion to suppress
evidence. Defendant asserts section 3-413(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code)
(625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2010)) only prohibits materials physically attached to the
registration plate itself and not obstructions, such as a trailer hitch, not attached to the
registration plate. We agree and reverse.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In September 2010, a McLean County grand jury indicted defendant for unlawful
possession of cannabis with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 550/5(d) (West 2010)) and unlawful
possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(d) (West 2010)). These charges resulted from a
traffic stop and a search of the vehicle in which defendant was a passenger.
¶5 In November 2010, defendant filed a motion “to quash arrest and suppress evidence”
arguing the traffic stop resulting in his arrest was improper. (We note the proper title for such
a motion is “motion to suppress evidence.” See People v. Hansen, 2012 IL App (4th)
110603, ¶¶ 61-63, 968 N.E.2d 164.) In January 2011, the trial court held a hearing on the
motion. Officers Karl Ladtkow and Dan Crowley of the Chenoa police department were
running stationary radar detection on Interstate 55. Ladtkow’s attention was drawn to a
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purple Lincoln Mark V because of “the color of the vehicle and the big tires on the vehicle.”
As the vehicle passed, Ladtkow observed “the vehicle had a trailer hitch on the back and
there was a ball on the back that obscured the license plate” and the trailer hitch “was
covering up the bottom of the plate.” Ladtkow testified the hitch was covering some of the
numbers on the plate and the plate was obstructed when he was following behind the vehicle.
On cross-examination, Ladtkow explained he was not able to see all of the numbers on the
plate “unless I got right up on to the bumper of the vehicle and be able to look over that and
see, you know, what number that was.” Ladtkow admitted once he stopped the vehicle and
walked up to it, he was able to clearly see the license plate despite the trailer hitch.
¶6 Defendant submitted into evidence a photograph of the Lincoln taken from an angle
directly behind the vehicle and from a height approximately above the rear bumper. The trial
court observed “the ball hitch in the photograph is not obstructing any of the numbers” but
“the photo is also obviously taken by someone who is standing right at the rear of the vehicle,
and certainly the officer testified that he was further back and that the angle, therefore, was
different and the ball was obstructing one of the numbers.” The court denied defendant’s
motion to suppress because the hitch obstructed the license plate.
¶7 In April 2011, defendant filed a motion to reopen evidence to permit introduction of a
video recording of the traffic stop. By written order, the trial court granted defendant’s
motion to reopen evidence and permitted introduction of the video recording.
¶8 In July 2011, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion to reconsider.
Defendant argued the statute “impl[ies] a cover, something attached to the plate.” A tow
hitch “is something that’s not on the plate. It’s in front of it as you’re going down the road,”
but if the plate is covered by that particular angle, “all you had to do is just move over a little
bit to the left or the right and the letter is clearly discernible.” In making its ruling, the trial
court explained the videotape “really doesn’t clear up for me one way or the other whether
this thing blocked part of the letters or not. It does appear that maybe it blocks a little piece
of one of them on the video, but I can’t tell if it really does or it’s just grainy from the video
itself.” The court denied the motion to reconsider.
¶9 In October 2011, the trial court held a stipulated bench trial and found defendant guilty
of unlawful possession of cannabis with intent to deliver. The court sentenced defendant as
stated.
¶ 10 This appeal followed.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 Defendant argues the trial court improperly denied the motion to suppress evidence.
Defendant asserts (1) based on its statutory language and the doctrine of ejusdem generis,
section 3-413(b) of the Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2010)) only “prohibits
materials which physically obscure the registration plate itself and is not so expansive as to
include legal use of trailer hitches and other similar vehicle accessories”; (2) the statute does
not extend the requirement that the registration plate be “clearly visible” to momentary
obstructions, such as properly installed trailer hitches; and (3) the police officers had no
reason to believe a crime had been committed “by having a standard-issue trailer hitch which
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made it difficult to view the registration plate from certain positions.” Defendant asserts no
Illinois case has directly construed the statutory language of section 3-314(b) and cites
several out-of-state cases in support of his argument.
¶ 13 The State concedes the issue presented in this case is not controlled by Illinois precedent
and argues (1) section 3-413(b)’s use of the terms “clearly visible” and “clearly legible”
require “that a registration plate must not be obstructed and must be fully readable,” and (2)
“a registration plate that is fastened in a place that results in it being partially obscured by a
trailer hitch” violates section 3-413(b), because the plate is not “clearly visible.” The State
cites People v. White, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 584 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), and Parks v. State, 2011
WY 19, 247 P.3d 857 (Wyo. 2011), for the proposition “a majority of jurisdictions that have
considered this issue have concluded that a trailer ball so positioned so as to partially obstruct
a license plate constitutes a traffic violation.”
¶ 14 A. Standard of Review
¶ 15 In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, this court applies a
two-part standard of review: we will reverse factual findings only if they are against the
manifest weight of the evidence; however, de novo review applies to the trial court’s ultimate
ruling of whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause exists and whether suppression is
warranted. People v. Grant, 2013 IL 112734, ¶ 12, 983 N.E.2d 1009; People v. Mott, 389 Ill.
App. 3d 539, 542, 906 N.E.2d 159, 163 (2009).
¶ 16 B. Fourth Amendment Traffic Stops
¶ 17 Generally, under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amend. IV), a police officer may lawfully stop a person when the officer has reasonable,
articulable suspicion that the person has committed, or is about to commit, a crime. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). See also 725 ILCS 5/107-14 (West 2010) (statutory
codification of Terry standard).
¶ 18 “Vehicle stops are subject to the fourth amendment’s reasonableness requirement.”
People v. Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20, 971 N.E.2d 1058. An investigatory stop must be
justified at its inception. People v. Close, 238 Ill. 2d 497, 505, 939 N.E.2d 463, 467 (2010).
“A police officer may conduct a brief, investigatory stop of a person where the officer can
point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion.” Hackett, 2012 IL 111781, ¶ 20, 971 N.E.2d
1058. A police officer may stop a vehicle where he or she has reasonable suspicion to believe
the driver is violating the Vehicle Code. Mott, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 544, 906 N.E.2d at 164. “In
judging the police officer’s conduct, we apply an objective standard: ‘would the facts
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure *** “warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief” that the action taken was appropriate?’ ” Close, 238 Ill. 2d at 505, 939
N.E.2d at 467 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). A police officer conducting a traffic stop
need not always be correct but must be reasonable, and an officer’s objectively reasonable
mistake of fact rarely violates the fourth amendment. People v. Cole, 369 Ill. App. 3d 960,
967-68, 874 N.E.2d 81, 88 (2007). “However, a police officer who mistakenly believes a
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violation occurred when the acts in question are not prohibited by law is not acting
reasonably.” Cole, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 968, 874 N.E.2d at 88. See also Mott, 389 Ill. App. 3d
at 543, 906 N.E.2d at 164 (“Where a traffic stop is based upon a mistake of law, it is
unconstitutional.”).
¶ 19 C. Section 3-413 of the Vehicle Code
¶ 20 Section 3-413(a) of the Vehicle Code provides registration plates for an automobile must
be attached to the vehicle, “one in the front and one in the rear.” 625 ILCS 5/3-413(a) (West
2010). Section 3-413(b) provides:
“Every registration plate shall at all times be securely fastened in a horizontal position
to the vehicle for which it is issued so as to prevent the plate from swinging and at a
height of not less than 5 inches from the ground, measuring from the bottom of such
plate, in a place and position to be clearly visible and shall be maintained in a condition
to be clearly legible, free from any materials that would obstruct the visibility of the
plate, including, but not limited to, glass covers and plastic covers. Registration stickers
issued as evidence of renewed annual registration shall be attached to registration plates
as required by the Secretary of State, and be clearly visible at all times.” (Emphasis
added.) 625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2010).
¶ 21 We note Public Act 97-743 (Pub. Act 97-743, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013)) amended section
3-413 and removed the language “including, but not limited to, glass covers and plastic
covers” from section 3-413(b) and added sections 3-413(g) to (j). The new section 3-413(g)
provides, “A person may not operate any motor vehicle that is equipped with registration
plate covers.” Pub. Act 97-743, § 5 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013) (adding 625 ILCS 5/3-413(g)).
¶ 22 D. Comparative Illinois Cases
¶ 23 As defendant points out, the supreme court has not determined whether section 3-413(b)
prohibits any object from partially covering or obstructing the registration plate or only
prohibits covering or obstructing objects physically attached or adhered to the plate. Our
research confirms the appellate court has not directly addressed this issue by published
opinion. See People v. Cosby, 231 Ill. 2d 262, 286, 898 N.E.2d 603, 618 (2008) (tinted rear
license plate cover was traffic violation supporting officer’s traffic stop); People v. Bradi,
107 Ill. App. 3d 594, 599, 437 N.E.2d 1285, 1288 (1982) (“it is a violation to have a license
plate so dirty that it is illegible” (emphasis in original)); Mott, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 547, 906
N.E.2d at 166 (This court addressed the material-obstruction statute, which prohibits objects
placed or suspended between the driver and front windshield, as applied to an air freshener
and concluded “the mere fact defendant had an air freshener hanging from her rearview
mirror did not give rise to reasonable suspicion of a violation of section 12-503(c) [of the
Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/12-503(c) (West 2004))].”).
¶ 24 Defendant notes two appellate cases where the defendant’s license plate was obstructed
by a trailer hitch. In People v. Miller, 242 Ill. App. 3d 423, 424, 611 N.E.2d 11, 13 (1993),
the police officer indicated he stopped the defendant’s vehicle for three Vehicle Code
violations, including a loud muffler, an expired license plate, and a trailer ball hitch, which
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“somewhat obstructed the numbers on the license plate.” This court noted “[e]ither violation
could have provided ample reason” for the officer to stop the vehicle and issue a ticket.
Miller, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 435, 611 N.E.2d at 20. However, the appellate court held the trial
court could have concluded the officer was not credible when he testified about the expired
license plate and obstruction and the officer made these observations after the defendant was
impermissibly stopped for the loud muffler. Miller, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 436, 611 N.E.2d at
20. In People v. Perez, 258 Ill. App. 3d 465, 466, 631 N.E.2d 240, 241 (1994), the Fifth
District considered whether the trial court properly found the deputy director of the Illinois
State Police in indirect civil contempt for failing to produce documents the three defendants
contended were necessary to show their traffic stops were pretextual. One of the defendants
was stopped “because two balls of a trailer hitch obscured one of the numbers of the pickup
truck’s license plate and because the truck was observed to travel 1 1/2 feet over the white
line on the edge of the road.” Perez, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 467, 631 N.E.2d at 242. The appellate
court rejected the defendant’s claims and found the documents sought were “immaterial” and
noted “[t]he alleged traffic violations in these cases, if established at the appropriate hearing,
provide a reasonable basis for stopping a motor vehicle.” Perez, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 472, 631
N.E.2d at 245.
¶ 25 These cases are of limited value as they were decided before the statutory amendment,
as discussed below, that added the applicable language, and did not directly address whether
a trailer hitch is a violation of section 3-413(b).
¶ 26 E. The Parties’ Out-of-State Cases
¶ 27 The parties’ briefs include lengthy discussions of out-of-state cases considering whether
a trailer hitch obstructing the defendant’s license plate violated the relevant state statute.
¶ 28 Defendant relies on a Florida case. In Harris v. State, 11 So. 3d 462 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2009), the Florida appellate court considered a Florida statute stating: “ ‘[A]ll letters,
numerals, printing, writing, and other identification marks upon the plates *** shall be clear
and distinct and free from defacement, mutilation, grease, and other obscuring matter, so that
they will be plainly visible and legible at all times 100 feet from the rear or front.’ ”
(Emphasis in original.) Harris, 11 So. 3d at 463 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 316.605(1) (2006)). The
appellate court concluded the statutory language “ ‘other obscuring matter’ ” related to
“material placed over the plate” and “would not include a trailer hitch that is properly
attached to the truck’s bumper.” Harris, 11 So. 3d at 463. Using the doctrine of ejusdem
generis, the court found the obstructions must be on the plate and “[m]atters external to the
tag, such as trailer hitches, bicycle racks, handicap chairs, u-hauls, and the like are not
covered by the statute.” Harris, 11 So. 3d at 463-64. We note the Florida statute in Harris
included a requirement that “[n]othing shall be placed upon the face of a Florida plate except
as permitted by law or by rule or regulation of a governmental agency.” Fla. Stat.
§ 316.605(1) (2006).
¶ 29 The State primarily relies on two cases from California and Wyoming. In White, the
California appellate court found the statute imposed two obligations “that the plate be clearly
visible when mounted on the vehicle and that it also be clearly legible.” White, 113 Cal. Rptr.
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2d at 586. The appellate court concluded “[a] license plate mounted in a place that results in
it being partially obstructed from view by a trailer hitch ball violates [the California Vehicle
Code] and, thus, provides a law enforcement officer with a lawful basis upon which to detain
the vehicle and hence its driver.” White, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 586. The California statute did
not include qualifying language about the types of materials obstructing the plate or plate
covers.
¶ 30 In Parks, 2011 WY 19, ¶ 3, 247 P.3d 857, the police officer could not read the
defendant’s license plate because a trailer hitch ball, mounted on the defendant’s pickup
truck’s bumper, partially obstructed the plate. The Wyoming statute required the license plate
to be “ ‘plainly visible’ ” and “ ‘[m]aintained free from foreign materials and in a condition
to be clearly legible.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Parks, 2011 WY 19, ¶ 8, 247 P.3d 857 (quoting
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-2-205(a)(iv) (LexisNexis 2009)). The Wyoming Supreme Court held
“[t]he requirements that a license plate be ‘plainly visible’ and ‘clearly legible’ indicate that
a license plate must not be obstructed in any manner.” Parks, 2011 WY 19, ¶ 12, 247 P.3d
857. The court noted the Florida statute in Harris was “significantly different” as the
Wyoming statute’s “plainly visible” requirement was not connected to any class of
“obscuring matter.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Parks, 2011 WY 19, ¶ 15, 247 P.3d
857.
¶ 31 F. Defendant’s Statutory Interpretation Claim
¶ 32 The parties disagree on whether section 3-413(b) prohibits materials attached to the plate
or encompasses materials external to the plate obstructing visibility. Defendant asserts the
doctrine of ejusdem generis supports the conclusion the language “glass covers and plastic
covers” limits the “materials that would obstruct the visibility” language to materials
physically covering the registration plate, and not any object, such as a trailer hitch, that may
come between the plate and the viewer. The State asserts the “clearly visible” requirement
applies to the “free from any materials that would obstruct the visibility of the plate” clause,
and a registration plate must not be obstructed by any material, including objects not
physically connected to the registration plate.
¶ 33 1. Statutory Interpretation in General
¶ 34 The interpretation of a statute presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. People
v. Chapman, 2012 IL 111896, ¶ 23, 965 N.E.2d 1119. The primary objective in construing
a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent, and the most reliable indicator
of that intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language itself. Id. Courts of
review determine legislative intent by reading the statute as a whole and considering all
relevant parts and not by considering words or phrases in isolation. People v. Villa, 2011 IL
110777, ¶ 35, 959 N.E.2d 634. This court will “not depart from the plain language of the
statute by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the
expressed intent.” People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 323-24, 864 N.E.2d 196, 204 (2007).
When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it should be applied without
interpretative aids. Poris v. Lake Holiday Property Owners Ass’n, 2013 IL 113907, ¶ 47, 983
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N.E.2d 993. If the statute is ambiguous, courts turn to extrinsic aids of statutory construction,
including rules of construction and legislative history. Id. Where a statutory term is not
otherwise defined it is appropriate to use a dictionary to ascertain its meaning. Id. ¶ 48, 983
N.E.2d 993.
¶ 35 “The doctrine of ejusdem generis provides that when a statutory clause specifically
describes several classes of persons or things and then includes ‘other persons or things,’ the
word ‘other’ is interpreted as meaning ‘other such like.’ ” People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130,
138, 766 N.E.2d 641, 645 (2002). “The interpretation is justified on the ground that, if the
general words were given their full and ordinary meaning, the specific words would be
superfluous as encompassed by the general terms. If the legislature had meant the general
words to have their unrestricted sense, it would not have used the specific words.” Pooh-Bah
Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill. 2d 463, 492, 905 N.E.2d 781, 799 (2009).
¶ 36 2. Plain Language of Section 3-413(b)
¶ 37 Before using rules of statutory construction, we look to the plain language of the statute.
Section 3-413(b) of the Vehicle Code provides the “registration plate shall at all times be ***
free from any materials that would obstruct the visibility of the plate, including, but not
limited to, glass covers and plastic covers.” 625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2010). The Vehicle
Code does not define the word “material” and “obstruct.” “Material” is defined as “of,
relating to, or consisting of matter.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1392
(1976). See also People ex rel. State Board of Health v. Jones, 92 Ill. App. 447, 449 (1900)
(defining “material” as “[r]elating to, or consisting of matter; corporeal; not spiritual;
physical” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “Matter” is defined as “the substance of which
a physical object is composed.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1394 (1976).
The relevant definition of “obstruct” is “to cut off from sight.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate
Dictionary 801 (10th ed. 2000).
¶ 38 Obviously, a trailer hitch is a physical object capable of obstructing a viewer’s visibility.
Read in isolation, the phrase “any materials that would obstruct the visibility of the plate”
appears to support the State’s interpretation any physical object obstructing the visibility of
the plate is a violation of section 3-413(b). However, the subject matter of this statute is
registration plates and not vehicle accessories or attachments. The statute pertains to the
requirements on a registration plate and that the “registration plate must at all times be ***
free from” obstructing materials. An alternative definition of “free” is “clear.” Merriam-
Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 463 (10th ed. 2000). “From” is defined as “a function word
to indicate a starting point of a physical movement or a starting point in measuring or
reckoning or in a statement of limits” and is “used as a function word to indicate physical
separation or an act or condition of removal, abstention, exclusion, release, subtraction, or
differentiation.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 467-68 (10th ed. 2000). Read in
totality and applying the definition of “from” to the statute, a plain reading supports
defendant’s interpretation the registration plate must be physically separated from any
material obstructing visibility of the plate. In other words, section 3-413(b) prohibits objects
obstructing the registration plate’s visibility that are connected or attached to the plate itself.
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¶ 39 The State’s interpretation is premised on the “clearly visible” and “clearly legible”
language contained in the clause addressing the plate’s visibility, legibility, “place and
position,” and “condition.” This interpretation appears to reword the statute by applying
requirements from other clauses of the statute to the relevant clause for the conclusion any
object partially obstructing a police officer’s visibility of the plate causes the plate to not be
“clearly visible” and is a violation of section 3-413(b). This appears unworkable as, taken
to its logical conclusion, it would prohibit any object such as a traffic sign, post, tree, or even
another vehicle from obstructing a police officer’s “clear visibility” of the plate. See People
v. Isaacson, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1079, 1082, 950 N.E.2d 1183, 1187 (2011) (“[W]e presume the
legislature did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice.”). The second sentence of
section 3-413(b) requires annual registration stickers attached to the registration plate must
be “clearly visible at all times.” This “at all times” language is noticeably absent from the
first sentence of section 3-413(b), and its absence implies the legislature does not require the
visibility of a registration plate to be unobstructed “at all times” from all angles. See People
v. Edwards, 2012 IL 111711, ¶ 27, 969 N.E.2d 829 (“Where language is included in one
section of a statute but omitted in another section of the same statute, we presume the
legislature acted intentionally and purposely in the inclusion or exclusion.”). Section 3-
413(b) differs significantly from the California and Wyoming statutes discussed, because it
has an additional obstruction requirement, similar to the Florida statute, and the clause
“including, but not limited to, glass covers and plastic covers.” Section 3-413(b)’s
obstruction requirement differs in construction from the Florida statute, which includes the
phrase “ ‘other obscuring matter.’ ” Harris, 11 So. 3d at 463.
¶ 40 Defendant, relying on the doctrine of ejusdem generis, asserts the language “including,
but not limited to, glass covers and plastic covers” qualifies the term “material” in the clause
to limit the obstructing material to an object like a glass or plastic cover. Unlike the Florida
statute, the general words in the section 3-413(b) do not follow the enumeration of particular
classes of things, i.e., the statute does not read “free from glass covers, plastic covers, or any
other materials that would obstruct the visibility of the plate.” We note, the legislature often
uses the phrase “ ‘including, but not limited to’ ” to indicate the list following is illustrative
rather than exhaustive. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 330, 864 N.E.2d 196, 208 (2007).
If “materials” is restricted to those materials attached to or affixed to the registration plate,
as the plain language implies, then a glass or plastic cover is an illustrative example of
impermissible materials. This interpretation comports with our review of the legislative
history.
¶ 41 3. Legislative History of Section 3-413
¶ 42 Public Act 95-29, § 5 (eff. June 1, 2008) made substantive changes to the statutory
language in section 3-413(b) (625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2006)). It removed language
stating “Clear plastic covers are permissible as long as they remain clear and do not obstruct
the visibility of the plates.” Compare 625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2006), with 625 ILCS 5/3-
413(b) (West 2008). In the Senate, Senator Munoz testified this change was to make it
“abundantly clear that clear license plate covers are illegal.” 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate
Proceedings, Mar. 30, 2007, at 155 (statements of Senator Munoz). In the House,
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Representative Hoffman testified this change was in response to license plate covers
distorting the image and obstructing the visibility of license plates to evade photo radar and
red light cameras. 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 7, 2007, at 16 (statements
of Representative Hoffman). Public Act 95-331, § 1005 (eff. Aug. 21, 2007) made technical
changes to section 3-413.
¶ 43 Public Act 89-375, § 3 (eff. Aug. 18, 1995) added the statutory language “in a condition
to be clearly legible” and replaced the language “foreign materials, including tinted glass or
tinted plastic covers, and in a condition to be clearly legible” with “any materials that would
obstruct the visibility of the plate, including, but not limited to, glass covers and tinted plastic
covers” to section 3-413(b). Compare 625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 1994), with 625 ILCS 5/3-
413(b) (West 1996). In the House, Representative Biggert explained this change addressed
registration plate covers and would permit clear plastic covers, so long as they are visible.
89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 25, 1995, at 144 (statements of
Representative Biggert). Representative Dart asked whether this language would affect
individuals whose registration plates have deteriorated. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House
Proceedings, May 25, 1995, at 146 (statements of Representative Dart). Representative
Biggert explained, “Well, the legislation does state that they shall be maintained in a
condition to be clearly legible and then with a comma, ‘free from any materials that would
obstruct the visibility of the plate.’ ” 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 25,
1995, at 146 (statements of Representative Biggert). Representative Dart responded, “Well,
Representative, yeah that comma is very important because it sort of ends it there. It says that
these license plates should be in a place in position to be clearly visible and shall be
maintained, and this is your new language, ‘shall be maintained in a condition to be clearly
legible, free from materials that will obstruct visibility of the plate,’ another comma and so
on and so forth. Does this mean that individuals now, because of this, are going to be
required to wash their license plates? Are they going to be required to repaint them
themselves?” 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 25, 1995, at 146 (statements
of Representative Dart). Representative Biggert explained, “It’s the intent of this legislation
to deal with the covers and the fact that by putting on covers, that you are not changing the
visibility of the plates.” 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, May 25, 1995, at 146-47
(statements of Representative Biggert).
¶ 44 The legislative history shows Public Act 89-375, § 3 (eff. Aug. 18, 1995), which added
the relevant statutory language, legalized clear license plate covers not obstructing visibility
of the license plate. See 625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 1996). Then, Public Act 95-29, § 5 (eff.
Jun. 1, 2008), prohibited clear license plate covers. See 625 ILCS 5/3-413(b) (West 2008).
As plate covers were being used to evade detection by photo radar and red light cameras, the
legislature decided to prohibit their use. See 95th Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June
7, 2007, at 16 (statements of Representative Hoffman). The legislative history shows the
legislature sought to restrict the use of materials such as license plate covers used to obstruct
or distort the visibility of the registration plate and not merely any object coming between
the viewer and the plate. The statutory language and history supports defendant’s
interpretation of section 3-413(b) and the conclusion the legislature sought to prohibit
obstructing materials attached to the plate itself–such as covers–and not objects partially
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obstructing the plate’s visibility that are not connected to the registration plate. A trailer ball
hitch, such as the one in this case, differs from a license plate cover in three ways: it has a
legitimate purpose independent from the license plate (i.e., to be used for towing), it is not
affixed or connected to the plate itself, and it only partially obstructs the plate from certain
angles.
¶ 45 We conclude section 3-413 does not provide a basis for justifying defendant’s traffic stop
at its inception. We express no opinion whether a trailer ball hitch obstructing visibility of
the registration sticker would be a violation of section 3-413(b).
¶ 46 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 47 For the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 48 Reversed.
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