People v. Cervantes ( 2011 )

No. 2—09—0900
Opinion filed March 16, 2011
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Lake County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 08—CF—580
)
ILDIFONSO CERVANTES, ) Honorable
) Charles D. Johnson,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BOWMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Schostok and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
Following a bench trial, defendant, Ildifonso Cervantes, was convicted of resisting a peace
officer (720 ILCS 5/31—1(a—7) (West 2008)). The offense was a Class 4 felony because
defendant’s conduct proximately caused injuries to an officer. Defendant appeals, contending that
his act of running from the police was not the proximate cause of the officer’s injuries. We affirm.
Defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated driving under the influence (625 ILCS
5/11—501(d) (West 2008)), driving with a revoked license (625 ILCS 5/6—303(d) (West 2008)),
resisting a peace officer (720 ILCS 5/31—1(a—7) (West 2008)), and aggravated fleeing and eluding
(625 ILCS 5/11—204.1(a)(4) (West 2008)). The trial court conducted a bench trial. We set out only
the evidence relating to the charge of resisting a peace officer.
No. 2—09—0900
Round Lake Beach police officer Kenneth Lupi testified that, on February 10, 2008, he
received a report of a hit-and-run accident. He arrived at the address reported and saw a car that
appeared to have been struck by another car. He noticed a blue Cadillac leaving the area. He
activated his overhead lights and followed the Cadillac onto Lake Shore Drive. When the Cadillac
did not stop, Lupi activated his siren; however, the Cadillac continued north on Lake Shore Drive.
Lupi saw the Cadillac drive through two stop signs without stopping. Eventually, he turned
off his lights and siren because the Cadillac began to skid on ice and snow covering the road. After
that, the Cadillac began to obey all traffic laws before stopping at a stop sign at 1500 Hainesville
Road. The Cadillac soon pulled over in the vicinity of Williams Avenue and the driver got out. The
driver, whom Lupi identified as defendant, began running through woods and backyards. Lupi chased
defendant with the help of Sergeant Wayne Wilde, who had also arrived on the scene.
The weather was snowy, with temperatures below zero. Both Lupi and Wilde fell several
times while chasing defendant. The pair chased defendant for about one minute before defendant fell
and Wilde was able to catch up to him and keep him on the ground while a third officer handcuffed
him.
Lupi testified that Wilde sustained abrasions to his shin, his little finger, and the side of his
head. Lupi stated that Wilde injured his head when he slipped on an icy driveway on Williams
Avenue. He injured his shin climbing a fence, and he injured his little finger falling on ice.
Wilde testified that he was behind Lupi’s car as Lupi followed the Cadillac. Wilde saw the
Cadillac pull off the road. The driver, whom he identified as defendant, fled through a backyard.
Wilde exited his squad car and ordered defendant to stop. However, defendant continued running.
Wilde chased him for about a minute. During the chase, Wilde sprained the little finger on his left
hand and suffered abrasions on the left side of his forehead and his right shin from “hopping a fence.”
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On cross-examination, Wilde acknowledged that defendant did not push or shove him. Rather, he
slipped and fell on an icy driveway.
The court found defendant guilty of felony resisting a peace officer, noting that defendant
should have foreseen that, upon running from the police, the officers would follow him. The court
sentenced defendant to 18 months’ probation including 90 days in the county jail. Defendant timely
appeals.
Defendant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s
conduct proximately caused Wilde’s injuries. He maintains that he did not punch or kick the officer
and that the weather conditions on the date in question were such an extraordinary circumstance that
defendant’s conduct cannot be deemed the proximate cause of the officer’s injuries.
One is guilty of resisting or obstructing a peace officer when he or she “knowingly resists or
obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer *** of any authorized
act within his official capacity.” 720 ILCS 5/31—1(a) (West 2008). Moreover, a “person convicted
for a violation of this Section whose violation was the proximate cause of an injury to a peace officer
*** is guilty of a Class 4 felony.” 720 ILCS 5/31—1(a—7) (West 2008). Thus, to convict defendant
of a felony, the State had to prove that defendant’s conduct proximately caused injury to a peace
officer.
We note that subsection (a—7) is written as if proximate cause is in the nature of a sentencing
enhancement. Subsection (a—7) provides that a “person convicted for a violation of this Section
whose violation was the proximate cause of an injury to a peace officer *** is guilty of a Class 4
felony.” 720 ILCS 5/31—1(a—7) (West 2008). Thus, read literally, the statutory enhancement does
not apply until after an offender has been “convicted,” in other words, at sentencing. Nevertheless,
because proximate cause elevates the sentencing range, it is actually in the nature of an element of
the felony offense, and the State had to prove it beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi v. New Jersey,
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530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. When a defendant makes such a
challenge, the question is whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
State, any rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the fact in question.
People v. Lee, 213 Ill. 2d 218, 225 (2004).
Defendant argues that his conduct did not proximately cause Wilde’s injuries, because they
resulted not from any act of defendant but from the severe weather conditions. Defendant posits that
the weather was an extraordinary circumstance for which he cannot be held liable. We disagree.
Our research has not disclosed any case specifically interpreting subsection (a—7). However,
both parties rely on People v. Hudson, 222 Ill. 2d 392 (2006). There, the defendant was convicted
of felony murder after an off-duty police officer shot and killed a codefendant while resisting a
robbery attempt. The defendant contended that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that the
defendant’s actions had to cause the victim’s death but omitting an element of causation,
foreseeability. The supreme court noted that Illinois law provides that a defendant may be charged
with felony murder under the “ ‘proximate cause’ ” theory, i.e., that his acts were a proximate cause
of the victim’s death. Id. at 401. Although the supreme court found the instructions at issue
adequate, it emphasized that foreseeability was indeed an element of proximate causation for
purposes of the felony-murder statute, stating:
“In general, Illinois law provides that a defendant may be charged with murder
pursuant to the ‘proximate cause’ theory of felony murder. People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462(1997). The term ‘proximate cause’ describes two distinct requirements: cause in fact and
legal cause. First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 188 Ill. 2d 252, 257-58 (1999). We
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have stated, ‘We believe that the analogies between civil and criminal cases in which
individuals are injured or killed are so close that the principle of proximate cause applies to
both classes of cases. Causal relation is the universal factor common to all legal liability.’
Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d at 466. Legal cause ‘is essentially a question of foreseeability’; the
relevant inquiry is ‘whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a
likely result of his or her conduct.’ Galman, 188 Ill. 2d at 258. Foreseeability is added to the
cause-in-fact requirement because ‘even when cause in fact is established, it must be
determined that any variation between the result intended *** and the result actually achieved
is not so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the defendant responsible for the actual
result.’ 1 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law §6.4, at 464 (2d ed. 2003).” Id.
Here, the trial court reasonably found that defendant’s conduct of leading the officers on a
chase through ice- and snow-covered yards and driveways proximately caused Wilde’s injuries.
Contrary to defendant’s argument, the wintery conditions were not the type of “extraordinary
circumstance” that would break the causal connection. Defendant was presumably aware of the
weather conditions. When he chose to run from the pursuing police, it was reasonably foreseeable
that the officers would continue the chase on foot and, in doing so, might be injured by falling on the
snow or ice. It is simply not extraordinary to slip on ice in February. Moreover, Wilde testified that
he suffered additional injuries by climbing a fence, which was apparently not related to the weather
conditions at all. Again, defendant should reasonably have foreseen that a pursuing officer might be
injured by a fall.
Defendant, citing a comment to the Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction defining proximate cause,
contends that a defendant’s actions must be the sole proximate cause of an officer’s injury. The
comment refers to a case from this court “discuss[ing] a principle of statutory construction when ‘the’
is used instead of ‘a.’ ” Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 4.24 (West, Westlaw through
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2008 update), Committee Note (citing Sibenaller v. Milschewski, 379 Ill. App. 3d 717, 721-22
(2008)). Sibenaller observed that using the article “the” usually refers to a specific thing, usually one
that has already been mentioned, as opposed to “a” or “an,” which can refer to a number of things.
Sibenaller, 379 Ill. App. 3d 722.
While we do not dispute this principle, the statute at issue does not refer to “the proximate
cause,” but refers only to an injury “proximately caused” by a defendant’s conduct. 720 ILCS
5/31—1(a—7) (West 2008). In the analogous context of felony murder, courts have routinely held
that the State need not prove that a defendant’s acts were the sole and immediate cause of death but,
rather, must show that the defendant’s acts were a contributing cause of death, such that death did
not result from a source unconnected with or independent of those acts. See People v. Jones, 376
Ill. App. 3d 372, 387 (2007); People v. Martin, 112 Ill. App. 3d 486, 499 (1983). Here, it is clear
that defendant’s act of running from the officers was a contributing cause of Wilde’s injuries,
although it was not the only cause.
The judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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