Detrana v. Such ( 2006 )

Filed November 20, 2006
No. 1-05-1263
FRANCESCA DETRANA, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County.
)
v. )
)
JERRY SUCH and SERIFA SUCH, )
)
Defendants-Appellees )
)
(Berton N. Ring, ) Honorable
) Joyce Marie Murphy Gorman,
Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:
In this landlord-tenant dispute, plaintiff Francesca Detrana
appeals from an order of the circuit court entering partial summary
judgment in defendants' favor on the issue of "ownership," and an
order (following a bench trial) imposing Supreme Court Rule 137
sanctions (155 Ill. 2d R. 137) against plaintiff's attorney. At
trial, the trial court ruled that, pursuant to section 5-12-020(a)
of the City of Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance
(RLTO) (Chicago Municipal Code §5-12-020(a) (2004)), the subject
building coowned by defendants Jerry and Serifa Such and Serifa's
father, Nasrulla Murtus,1 was exempted from the operation of the
1
Murtus, who died prior to trial, was not named as a defendant in this case.
1-05-1263
RLTO because it was "owner-occupied." The court further denied
plaintiff’s request for sanctions against defendants and their
counsel. There was no report of proceedings or bystanders report
filed in this matter. However, in reading the record in this case
together with the briefs of both parties, this court concludes that
it can determine the issues in this appeal. We find that the
record is sufficiently complete to allow us to consider the merits
of the arguments raised. Robles v. Chicago Transit Authority, 235
Ill. App. 3d 121, 601 N.E.2d 869 (1992).
On appeal, plaintiff contends: (1) the term "owner-occupied,"
as used in the RLTO, should apply only to titleholders who maintain
a measure of control over the premises; (2) even if this court
finds that bare legal title constitutes ownership within the
meaning of the RLTO, summary judgment in favor of defendants was
improper because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding
whether defendants waived the RLTO exemption and whether Murtus'
occupancy was designed to avoid application of the RLTO; and (3)
plaintiff presented an objectively reasonable argument regarding
the definition of "ownership" as incorporating an element of
control, thereby precluding imposition of Supreme Court Rule 137
sanctions (155 Ill. 2d R. 137) against his attorney, Berton Ring.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
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Plaintiff entered into a lease on June 5, 1999, "for apartment
unit #3" located at 1246 West Altgeld in Chicago. The monthly rent
was $1,525 and the security deposit was $2,287.50. Serifa Such
was listed as the lessor. The expiration date of the lease was
June 30, 2000. Plaintiff renewed the lease on June 30, 2000, with
the rent listed as $1,600 and the security deposit $2,362.50.
Plaintiff moved out of the premises prior to June 27, 2001, having
"paid all the rents to Serifa through June 30, 2001." On August
15, 2001, Serifa sent plaintiff a list of deductions against
plaintiff’s security deposit plus the balance of the deposit
($1,077.54), "together with the receipts," explaining the deduction
of $116.25 for two late charges, and giving credit for two years of
interest on the deposit.
On October 22, 2001, plaintiff filed a four-count complaint
against defendants. Counts I, II and IV were based on claims
under the RLTO. Count III was based on breach of contract for
mishandling her security deposit. Plaintiff further alleged in her
complaint that the "subject *** building contains two units, is not
owner occupied and is subject to the [RLTO]."
On January 8, 2003, defendants filed a motion for partial
summary judgment on counts I, II and IV of plaintiff's complaint,
arguing that the RLTO was inapplicable to the property because
Murtus, one of the titleholders, resided in the basement apartment,
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thereby excluding the building from operation of the RLTO pursuant
to section 5-12-020 of the RLTO. Defendants attached, in support
of their motion, the quitclaim deed by which Murtus conveyed title
to the building to himself, Serifa, and Jerry; Serifa's
supplemental and second supplemental affidavits; and a portion of
Serifa’s deposition. In her affidavits, Serifa averred that:
Murtus had resided in and occupied the premises for approximately
37 years; during plaintiff’s tenancy, the basement apartment was
occupied by Murtus and, at times, by his grandson, Adam; and Murtus
was 78 years old in 1999 and was absent from his basement apartment
approximately two or three weeks out of the entire year due to
medical treatments. In her deposition, Serifa testified that: at
times from 1999 to 2001, when Murtus was ill, he would stay with
defendants for short periods of time, but then would return to his
home at the 1246 West Altgeld building; and Murtus’ furniture,
furnishings and clothing were at the Altgeld building. Defendants
further argued that plaintiff's affidavit, which they attached,
"does not state that Nasrulla Murtus did not occupy the subject
property *** from 1999-2001," and that plaintiff admitted in the
affidavit that Murtus received his mail at the property.
Defendants further argued that plaintiff's affidavit simply stated
that plaintiff never saw, communicated with or met Murtus.
Defendants explained this fact throughout Serifa's deposition, in
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which Serifa testified that Murtus was very ill and a private
person. Defendants further explained, pursuant to Serifa's
supplemental and second supplemental affidavits, that the reason
plaintiff never saw Murtus, but did see Adam, was that Adam went to
work every day, while Murtus was retired and stayed at home.
Lastly, defendants maintained that because plaintiff was working
nights and sleeping during the day, she could not have personal
knowledge of Murtus' whereabouts and activities.
Plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to
defendants' motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff argued
that a question of fact existed as to whether Murtus occupied the
basement apartment. Plaintiff maintained that Serifa was lying
about Murtus' occupancy, based on the fact that the basement
apartment did not have electric service or direct heat, and Murtus
lived there without a telephone. Plaintiff further argued that a
"letter" from defendants to plaintiff, showing a deduction for
interest on plaintiff's security deposit for her two-year tenancy
pursuant to the RLTO, was evidence that Serifa "treated the RLTO as
applying" to the property, and "the purported applicability of the
'owner-occupied' exemption [was] a convenient fabrication concocted
after suit was commenced." (Emphases in original.)
Plaintiff also argued that, although Murtus was a titleholder,
he could not be deemed an owner for purposes of the owner-occupied
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exemption because he did nothing concerning the management of the
building and kept his "ownership" secret. Plaintiff maintained
that the thrust of the RLTO is to ensure the proper treatment of
tenants by landlords and that this purpose is not applicable where
the party has no control over the status of the tenants' rights.
In opposition, plaintiff presented her affidavit, which
included her averment that she never saw Murtus in the building and
that the basement apartment was unoccupied (except by Adam for two
or three months) during her tenancy. Plaintiff also relied on
Serifa's deposition testimony regarding the facts that the basement
unit did not have its own direct heating, electricity or telephone
service to the apartment.
The trial court granted partial summary judgment on the issue
of ownership, finding that Murtus was a titleholder, but denied the
motion on the issue of occupancy, finding that competing deposition
testimony sufficiently created a factual dispute.
A trial was conducted on plaintiff’s complaint and, on
November 3, 2002, the trial court entered judgment in favor of
defendants and against plaintiff on the RLTO counts, finding that
the RLTO did not apply because the building was "owner-occupied" by
Murtus. The trial court also entered judgment in favor of
plaintiff on her breach of contract claim regarding her security
deposit. Defendants tendered payment of the judgment against them
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to plaintiff, but plaintiff’s counsel refused to accept it.
Defendants then filed a petition for Supreme Court Rule 137
sanctions against Berton N. Ring, plaintiff356 Ill. App. 3d 405, 411,
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826 N.E.2d 1064 (2005). In interpreting a statute, "'the primary
rule, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and
give effect to the true intent of the legislature.’" Meyer v.
Cohen, 260 Ill. App. 3d 351, 356 (1993), quoting Kraft, Inc. v.
Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990).
"Our inquiry begins with the language of the
statute, but it also entails consideration of
'the reason and the necessity for the law, the
evils to be remedied, and the objects and
purposes to be obtained.' [Citation.] The
intent of the legislature is best evidenced by
the language of the statute, and where the
enactment is clear and unambiguous, we are not
at liberty to depart from its plain meaning.
[Citation.] However, statutes are also to be
construed in a manner which avoids absurd or
unjust results ***." Meyer, 260 Ill. App. 3d
at 356.
The language of a statute must be given its plain and ordinary
meaning and "[t]he dictionary can be used to ascertain the ordinary
and popular meaning of words." Stein v. Chicago Park District, 323
Ill. App. 3d 574, 577 (2001).
The stated purpose of the RLTO is "to establish the rights and
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obligations of the landlord and the tenant in the rental of
dwelling units, and to encourage the landlord and the tenant to
maintain and improve the quality of housing" in the City of
Chicago. Chicago Municipal Code §5-12-010 (2004). Section 5-
12-020 of the RLTO provides: "Dwelling units in owner-occupied
buildings containing six units or less" shall be excepted from
application of the RLTO. Chicago Municipal Code §5-12-020(2004).
Section 5-12-030(c)) defines "owner" as a person
"in whom is vested all or part of the legal
title to property, or all or part of the
beneficial ownership and a right to present
use and enjoyment of the premises." Chicago
Municipal Code §5-12-030(c)) (2004.)
Black's Law Dictionary defines "owner" as "[o]ne who has the right
to possess, use, and convey something." Black's Law Dictionary
1130 (7th ed. 1999). "Ownership" is defined as "[t]he collection
of rights allowing one to use and enjoy property, including the
right to convey it to others. Ownership implies the right to
possess a thing, regardless of any actual or constructive control."
(Emphasis added.) Black's Law Dictionary 1131 (7th ed. 1999).
Plaintiff here essentially interprets "owner-occupied" as
"owner-occupier-controlled." Plaintiff claims that Murtus, at
best, was only a "fractional 'titleholder' " of the property, since
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he did not manage or collect any income from it. However, the
RLTO's definition allows for such an owner’s "fractional" interest
by providing that an owner is a person with "all or part of the
legal title to property, or all or part of the beneficial ownership
and a right to present use and enjoyment of the premises."
(Emphases added.) Chicago Municipal Code §5-12-030(c)) (2004).
Even with a "fractional interest," as plaintiff argues, Murtus
clearly had a right to possession of the property: he was a
titleholder and, as the trial court determined, therefore an owner.
He had use of the property: he rented out two units and occupied
the third. He had the right to convey the property and, in
accordance with this right, he quit-claimed the property to himself
and his daughter and her husband. That Murtus chose to exercise
all these rights in a manner apparently inconsistent with other
owners is of no consequence. The fact is that Murtus, as a
titleholder/owner, possessed all the rights of an owner and had the
legal right to exercise his rights as he saw fit, whether through
his personal control or through delegation of that control, as
here, by instructions to defendants pursuant to a power of
attorney.
We also find, with respect to plaintiff's claim that present
use and enjoyment implies requiring, and exercising, control over
the property, that this was not the intention of the city council.
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In Meyer v. Cohen, 260 Ill. App. 3d 351, 632 N.E.2d 22 (1993), a
case analogous to the case at bar, the defendant owned an eight-
unit building at the time the plaintiff signed a lease for one of
the units. Three other units (including the apartment where the
defendant lived) were occupied. Upon later terminating her lease,
the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, claiming
that the defendant failed to comply with the RLTO in returning her
security deposit. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff,
and the defendant appealed.
On appeal, the defendant in Meyer argued that the RLTO was
inapplicable to her building because it was owner-occupied and
contained six or less units. The defendant further argued that in
order for the RLTO to apply, a "dwelling unit" must "actually, not
possibly" be occupied at the time a lease is signed, and only four
of the seven available units were occupied at the time the
plaintiff signed her lease. In rejecting the defendant’s argument,
the Meyer court stated that her
"'actual occupancy’ interpretation clearly
contradicts one of the city council’s express
purposes for enacting the ordinance: 'to
establish the rights and obligations of the
landlord and the tenant in the rental of
dwelling units.’ *** [Citation.] Were we to
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adopt [the defendant’s] construction of the
ordinance, landlords would be unsure whether
they are subject to the provisions of the
ordinance, as its applicability would depend
on how many units were being occupied or how
many leases were in effect at the time a lease
was signed, thus controverting the express
purpose of the statute, i.e., to fix more
clearly the rights and obligations which
landlords and tenants have vis-a-vis each
other." Meyer, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 356.
The Meyer court further stated that the defendant’s construction
would lead to the result that a landlord would be subject to the
RLTO regarding some tenants, but not others, depending upon the
number of units occupied when a lease was signed. Similarly,
tenants in the same building would be afforded different rights and
responsibilities under the law based on the time they signed their
leases, which the city council could not have intended. The Meyer
court therefore held that the defendant was subject to the RLTO,
and it was of no import that four of the seven inhabitable units
were occupied when the plaintiff signed her lease.
In the case at bar, a construction of the definition of
"owner" to include the element of control could lead to a result
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that was not intended by the city council. For example, landlords’
and tenants’ rights and obligations could be subject to continual
changes, contrary to the purpose of the RLTO to make them more
clearly fixed. Specifically, those rights and obligations would be
subject to a determination of what constitutes a sufficient degree
of control, the time during which the control must be exercised or
not exercised, and whether partial or continuous exercise of the
control was required during a lease. Further, all of these
considerations would depend upon whether the owner remained the
same or, if the property were sold to another, whether the new
property owner exercised control of the property in the same manner
as the previous owner during his tenants' leases. Clearly, the
obligations and rights of landlords and tenants could never be
clearly fixed, since a particular owner’s control would be at issue
each time a tenant signed a lease, a fact of which an ultimate
tenant may not have notice.
Moreover, the fact that Murtus, pursuant to a power of
attorney to defendants, allowed defendants to manage and receive
income from the property does not conflict with the purpose of the
RLTO, which allows for the owner-occupied exclusion from
application of the RLTO. The fact that Murtus did not claim the
income from the property, and defendants did, has no relevance to
the issue of whether Murtus was an owner, since, like the term
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"control," which is not a term in the RLTO definition of "owner,"
there simply is no requirement in the definition that an owner
exercise his right to receive all or part or any of the income from
the property.
We find that the RLTO definition of "owner" is clear and
unambiguous. Thus, there is no need to consider how that term has
been interpreted in the cases relied upon by plaintiff. We note
only that those cases, both from Illinois and other jurisdictions,
are distinguishable or did not involve the RLTO but, rather, the
Animal Control Act, the Liquor Control Act, the Structural Work
Act, and the Property Tax Code where the term "owner" had no fixed
meaning.
II. Partial Summary Judgment Order
Plaintiff argues that even if this court finds that bare legal
title constitutes ownership within the meaning of the RLTO, summary
judgment in favor of defendants was improper because genuine issues
of material fact existed regarding whether defendant waived the
RLTO exemption and whether Murtus’ claimed occupancy of the
premises was designed to avoid application of the RLTO.
Plaintiff’s arguments are misplaced. The trial court granted
partial summary judgment by ruling on ownership only. The issues
of waiver and whether the property was owner-occupied as intended
by the ordinance were questions of fact that should have been part
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of the evidence at trial. The trial court did not grant summary
judgment on those issues. As previously indicated, no report of
proceedings or bystanders report at trial was part of the record in
this case. The burden is on the appellant to present a record of
sufficient completeness in order to question the evidence on issues
raised at trial (Robles, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 126), and appellants
in the case at bar failed to do so on the issues of waiver and
whether Murtus’ claimed occupancy of the premises was designed to
avoid application of the RLTO.
We also note that, in addition to failing to provide a report
of proceedings at trial, plaintiff did not include the transcript
of proceedings on defendants’ motion for summary judgment.2
Since we do not know what occurred at trial, we cannot make
any determination as to any of the court’s findings at trial. We
therefore must presume that the court properly decided the issues.
See Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432, 749 N.E.2d 958 (2001)
("the appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete
record" and, "absent a record, 'it [is] presumed that the order
2
Plaintiff argues that this court can determine all issues on appeal from the trial
courtWebster, 195 Ill. 2d
at 432. In addition, appellant does not claim any trial errors in
this appeal concerning waiver or the avoidance of application of
the RTLO.
III. Sanctions
A. Defendants’ Motion for Rule 137 Sanctions
Ring contends that he presented an objectively reasonable
argument as to why the definition of ownership incorporates an
element of control and, therefore, the trial court abused its
discretion in sanctioning him pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137.
(155 Ill. 2d R. 137).
Supreme Court Rule 137 provides in relevant part:
"The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has
read the pleading, motion or other paper;
that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in
fact and is warranted by existing law or a
good-faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law,
and that it is not interposed for any
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improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation." 155 Ill. 2d R.
137.
"A determination of whether to grant a party’s motion for
sanctions is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. [Citation.] The trial court’s decision will not be
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Peterson
v. Randhava, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1, 14, 729 N.E.2d 75 (2000). We
consider the following factors on review: "(1) whether the trial
court made an informed ruling; (2) whether the court based its
ruling on valid reasons that fit the case; and (3) whether the
trial court’s ruling followed logically from the application of
the reasons stated to the particular circumstances of the case."
Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 14.
While the trial court determined that a titleholder was an
owner for purposes of the RLTO, the court further stated that
Ring had the right to pursue the occupancy issue. However, the
trial court nonetheless found sanctionable Ring’s repeated
allegations that Murtus, although a titleholder, was not an
"owner" for purposes of the RLTO. We disagree with the court’s
finding. The issue of ownership, according to Ring, included a
determination of whether Murtus occupied the premises, along with
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being a titleholder. Ring’s argument, therefore, was a legal
one, even if the trial court was disposed to reject it because of
the court’s prior ruling that Murtus was a titleholder and
therefore an owner of the property. In light of the trial
court’s holding, Ring’s repeated arguments to the contrary were
merely his disagreement with the court’s decision throughout the
proceedings, which went to the ultimate decision to be made by
the trial court, which itself was subject to a determination by
reviewing courts.
We further observe that plaintiff did not dispute that
Murtus was a titleholder or owner, but rather whether Murtus was
an "owner" for purposes of the RLTO’s "owner-occupied" provision.
Additionally, no case law existed regarding the interpretation of
"owner-occupied" under the RLTO, which plaintiff maintained
included an element of control. We do not find plaintiff’s
argument without merit, particularly in light of the fact that,
prior to the trial court’s ruling, another term of the RLTO had
been challenged, requiring a reviewing court to interpret that
term. Meyer, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 356-58 (on appeal, the
defendant’s interpretation of the meaning of the term "dwelling
unit" under the RLTO was rejected).
Here, the trial court found that Ring’s repeated arguments,
challenging Murtus’ ownership based on the fact that he was a
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titleholder, were sanctionable. The trial court chose not to
accept plaintiff’s argument that Murtus could be an owner within
the meaning of "owner-occupied" in the RLTO only if he also
exercised control over the property. Nevertheless, as stated
above, Ring’s contentions on this issue were proper legal
arguments, in light of the fact that no case law existed on this
issue. Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its
discretion in sanctioning Ring on this issue.
In light of our disposition above, we also find that the
trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning Ring, pursuant
to defendants' allegations 8 and 9, for pursuing this argument in
plaintiff’s memorandum in opposition to defendants’ motion for
summary judgment and plaintiff’s trial memorandum on owner
occupancy.
B. Sanctions Against Ring
We also find that the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing, on its own initiative, Rule 137 sanctions against Ring
for filing his petition for attorney fees, which included
allegations pertaining to the security deposit with respect to
the RLTO provisions. The focus for the trial court’s imposition
of sanctions was plaintiff’s allegation that defendants falsely
answered (in the negative) the question of whether they
commingled the security deposit in violation of the RLTO. The
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court reasoned that there was no need for defendants to admit
that they commingled the security deposit when they believed the
RLTO did not apply. Ring, in his brief before this court,
contends that instead of denying this allegation, defendants
could have properly admitted to commingling and to not paying
interest on a timely basis and still could have raised the owner-
occupied exemption as a defense. In any event, the court stated
that the allegations as a whole were not well-grounded in
supportive facts and were not warranted by existing law, and the
petition was filed for an improper purpose: harassment and to
increase the cost of litigation. We observe, however, that,
again, Ring’s allegations turned on his understanding of the RLTO
and what constituted an "owner-occupied" exemption. We therefore
find that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
impose sanctions for the filing of plaintiff’s petition for
attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court’s
judgment in part, finding that the RLTO did not apply to
defendants’ property because the owner-occupied exemption in
section 5-12-020 was applicable, and we reverse the judgment of
sanctions against plaintiff