Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas ( 2006 )

SIXTH DIVISION
June 23, 2006
No. 1-05-2320
VISION POINT OF SALE, INC., an Illinois ) Appeal from the
Corporation, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. )
)
GINGER HAAS, an Individual, and LEGACY )
INCORPORATED, an Illinois Corporation, ) Honorable
) Peter Flynn,
Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge Presiding
PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the
court:
Defendants Ginger Haas and Legacy Inc. served requests to
admit on plaintiff Vision Point of Sale (Vision). No officer of
Vision signed the response Vision served on defendants, and
Vision did not file the response in court. Defendants moved to
deem their requests admitted. The trial court granted the
motion, but at a later hearing the court sua sponte vacated the
ruling and decided to allow Vision to file late its signed
responses to the requests. The court certified for immediate
review a question concerning limits on the factors a court may
consider when deciding whether to grant an extension of time for
filing a response to a request to admit facts.
We hold that the court may consider any facts that help it
"strike a balance between diligence in litigation and the
1-05-2320
interests of justice." United States v. $30,354.00 in United
States Currency, 863 F. Supp. 442, 445 (W.D. Ky. 1994). In
particular, the court need not restrict its attention to the
causes for the delay in the response to the request to admit.
However, we find that the trial court here did not follow
procedures mandated by Supreme Court Rule 183 (134 Ill. 2d R.
183) when it decided to allow the late filing. Accordingly we
vacate the order that gave rise to the certified question and we
remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
In July 2003 Haas quit the position she held with Vision and
began working for Legacy, a direct competitor of Vision. Vision
sued Haas and Legacy in February 2004 for tortious interference
with business relationships, breach of fiduciary duties, and
violation of the Illinois Trade Secrets Act (765 ILCS 1065/1 et
seq. (West 2002)).
After an evidentiary hearing in May 2004 the trial court
granted Vision a preliminary injunction in which the court
ordered Legacy to purge from its computer system all information
it obtained from Vision through Haas. Both Vision and Legacy
advanced proposals for methods of ensuring that Legacy abided by
the order. The court mapped a separate course in an effort to
respond to both parties' legitimate concerns. The order, dated
September 27, 2004, directed Legacy to purchase new computers and
to allow Vision's experts to observe the copying and transfer of
-2-
1-05-2320
files from the old computer to the new computers. The court also
ordered Legacy to pay a large share of the fees for Vision's
experts.
On December 14, 2004, Legacy and Haas faxed to Vision a set
of requests to admit. Vision sent its responses to the requests
to Legacy and Haas on January 12, 2005. An attorney for Vision
signed the responses, and an officer of Vision signed a
verification of the responses.
On April 1, 2005, Legacy and Haas moved to deem all of their
requests admitted because Vision did not file its responses with
the court and because only an attorney, and not an officer of
Vision, signed the responses. On April 6, 2005, the clerk of the
court file stamped a copy of Vision's responses; on April 26,
2005, the clerk stamped a second copy of Vision's responses, this
one bearing a signature, as well as a verification, of one of the
officers of Vision.
At the hearing on the motion to deem facts admitted, the
court denied Vision's oral motion for leave to file its signed
responses late. Because the officer of Vision had signed only
the verification of the responses served in January, and not the
responses themselves, and because Vision failed to file those
responses with the court in January, the responses did not meet
the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 216(c) (134 Ill. 2d R.
216(c)) and Rule 3.1(c) of the rules of the circuit court of Cook
County (Cook Co. Cir. Ct. R. 3.1(c) (eff. May 1, 1996)). See Moy
-3-
1-05-2320
v. Ng, 341 Ill. App. 3d 984 (2003). The trial court granted the
motion of Legacy and Haas to deem all of the requests admitted.
Also in April 2005, Vision petitioned for a rule to show
cause, asking the court to enter sanctions against Legacy for
Legacy's failure to pay fees as directed by the court's order of
September 27, 2004. Vision supported the motion with documents
showing that Vision had requested payment from Legacy of Legacy's
share of the fees for the work of Vision's experts in supervising
the transfer of files from Legacy's old computers to its new
computers.
On May 13, 2005, at oral argument on the motion for a rule
to show cause, Legacy admitted that it had not made any payments
under the order of September 27, 2004. Legacy argued that the
court should reconsider that order. The court said:
"You didn't come in on a motion to reconsider.
You didn't come in on a motion for a protective order.
You didn't come in on a motion to clarify.
You simply didn't pay ***.
* * *
*** I am greatly troubled by the tenor of Legacy's
response to the rule to show cause which consists not
of explaining some difficulty in compliance, but rather
in asserting that *** the underlying order of September
27th, 2004, is wrong. And therefore, Legacy shouldn't
have to obey it anyway.
-4-
1-05-2320
While it is true that that order is interlocutory,
it is also true that if Legacy really thought it didn't
understand the order or wanted to take issue with the
order, Legacy could have come in on a motion.
On the other hand, I am, as I indicated, not
impressed with plaintiff's argument that the only thing
Legacy can do is pay. ***
***
I also cannot avoid, in considering the events
leading up to the rule to show cause and in listening
to the parties' arguments this afternoon, comparing
what can fairly be characterized as Legacy's conscious
stubbornness with regard to the September 27th, 2004,
order with Vision Point's inadvertent and technical
non-compliance not with a Court order, but with Supreme
Court Rule 216 ***.
It is interesting that [Legacy and Haas], in
argument, linked the continuing validity of the
September 27th order and the allocations made in it to
the discussions that we've had in the last few weeks
regarding the requests to admit.
The link is not instantly self-evident, but I
agree with defendants that the link exists.
Supreme Court Rule 219 authorizes a virtually
unlimited variety of sanctions in the event a party
-5-
1-05-2320
fails to comply with a Court order ***.
* * *
I turn, then, to Supreme Court Rule 183. ***
* * *
*** Rule 183 does not *** limit good cause to good
cause for a failure to do an act on time. ***
*** The good cause is for granting the extension
of time.
And it seems to me that if we look at good cause
*** under all of the circumstances of the case, there
is good cause for the Court to *** allow a late filing
or correction of whatever violation has occurred.
***
*** [W]e have, on the part of Vision Point, a
technical and inadvertent failure to comply with the
requirements of Moy and we have, on the part of Legacy,
what I do believe to be a settled policy of
recalcitrance with regard to the Court's Sepember 27th,
2004, order *** and if we look at all of that in the
context of the case law which says that the goal of all
discovery procedures is a trial on the merits *** and
that the purpose of sanctions should be not to punish,
but to encourage compliance, in my opinion, the fair
result here *** [is] to allow Legacy to present its
challenges to the September 27th order and to the
-6-
1-05-2320
invoices which Vision Point has submitted, but to
vacate the Court's order refusing to grant Vision Point
an extension under Rule 183 in order to clean up the
technical non-compliance in its responses to the
requests to admit."
The court entered a written order dated May 24, 2005, that
vacated the order that deemed requests admitted, and the court
expressly allowed Vision an extension of time to file its
responses to the requests for admissions. Vision responded to
the requests to admit, this time with the signature of Vision's
chief executive officer, and Vision filed its responses with the
court.
Legacy and Haas moved to reconsider the order of May 24,
2005. In the alternative they sought certification of a question
for appeal. The court denied the motion for reconsideration but
certified for appeal the following question:
"In determining whether 'good cause' exists under
Supreme Court Rule 183 for the grant of an extension of
time to remedy an unintentional noncompliance with a
procedural requirement, may the Court take into
consideration facts and circumstances of record which
go beyond the reason for the noncompliance?"
Haas and Legacy filed a timely application for leave to appeal
under Supreme Court Rule 308. 155 Ill. 2d R. 308. This court
granted the petition.
-7-
1-05-2320
ANALYSIS
The parties agree that our interpretation of Supreme Court
Rule 183 will determine our response to the certified question,
so we review the issue de novo. Atlantic Coast Airlines Holdings
v. Bloomington-Normal Airport Authority, 357 Ill. App. 3d 929,
933 (2005). The parties also ask us to "go beyond the question
of law presented and consider the propriety of the order that
gave rise to the appeal." Bright v. Dicke, 166 Ill. 2d 204, 208
(1995). We review discovery orders for abuse of discretion.
Moy, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 988.
Supreme Court Rule 183 provides simply:
"This court, for good cause shown on motion after
notice to the opposite party, may extend the time for
filing any pleading or the doing of any act which is
required by the rules to be done within a limited
period, either before or after the expiration of the
time." 134 Ill. 2d R. 183.
The rule on its face does not limit the factors the court may
consider in determining whether a party has shown good cause for
extending the time for filing.
Our supreme court interpreted the rule in Bright, 166 Ill.
2d at 208. The defendant there sought leave to file a late
response to the plaintiff's requests to admit. The trial court
denied the defendant's motion and certified for appeal a question
concerning the effect of Rule 183 on the deadline for responses
-8-
1-05-2320
to requests to admit. Our supreme court held that Rule 183 gives
the trial court discretion to allow a party to serve a response
to requests to admit after the expiration of the 28 day period
specified in Rule 216. Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 208. The court
added that the discretion to permit a late response "does not
come into play under the rule unless the responding party can
first show good cause for the extension." Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at
209. According to the court,
"mere absence of inconvenience or prejudice to the
opposing party is not sufficient to establish good
cause under Rule 183 and the companion provision of the
Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1007 (West
1992)). The moving party must assert some independent
ground for why his untimely response should be
allowed." Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 209.
The court in Bright did not purport to delineate all the
appropriate factors a trial court might take into account when
deciding whether to grant an extension of time under Rule 183.
The court held only that the lack of prejudice to a party
requesting admissions, standing alone, did not constitute good
cause for extending the time to respond to admissions. However,
the court cited with approval Sims v. City of Alton, 172 Ill.
App. 3d 694 (1988). In Sims the defendant failed to respond to
the plaintiffs' requests to admit. On the day of trial the
plaintiffs moved to deem the requests admitted. The defendant
-9-
1-05-2320
sought leave to file a late response, arguing that its attorney
had not received the requests to admit, many of the requests
improperly sought the admission of conclusions of law, the
requests concerned issues central to the case, and the plaintiffs
would suffer no prejudice from the late response. The trial
court granted the defendant leave to file the late response.
The appellate court held:
"[A] circuit court has wide discretion with regard
to the requests to admit and may allow a late filing in
order to prevent injustice. ***
*** Here plaintiffs' request to admit facts went
to the central issues of the case and the plaintiffs
failed to show that the filing of defendant's late
response prejudiced their case." Sims, 172 Ill. App.
3d at 698.
The court affirmed the decision to permit the late filing of
responses to the requests to admit.
Similarly, in Bluestein v. Upjohn Co., 102 Ill. App. 3d 672
(1981), the defendant's lawyer carelessly failed to respond to
requests to admit for nine months. The trial judge permitted the
late filing because the requests concerned the central issue in
the case. The judge said:
"'[I]f I were to find those requests have been admitted
by a lawyer's carelessness, without more, I would be
depriving a party of his right to a trial by jury on a
-10-
1-05-2320
basic issue in this case.'" Bluestein, 102 Ill. App. 3d
at 678.
The judge added that he would deem any request admitted if the
plaintiff could show prejudice due to the late response. The
appellate court affirmed, relying on the trial court's "inherent
power to prevent injustice." Bluestein, 102 Ill. App. 3d at 678.
Even when the appellate court has disallowed late responses
to requests to admit, the court has acknowledged the trial
court's discretion, and it has not purported to require strict
adherence to the 28-day limit. See Moy, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 991;
Harris Bank St. Charles v. Weber, 298 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1083
(1998); Magee v. Walbro, Inc., 171 Ill. App. 3d 774, 779-80
(1988); Johannsen v. General Foods Corp., 146 Ill. App. 3d 296,
300 (1986). We have found no court that limited the appropriate
considerations for granting an extension of time to the causes
for the delay.
Some of the factors considered in Sims and Bluestein range
well beyond the causes for the delay. The centrality of the
issues to the case, like the prejudice to the parties, does not
relate to the cause of the delay. The concerns addressed in Sims
and Bluestein relate directly to the interest in achieving
substantial justice between the parties.
Federal courts and the courts of other states have rules
that permit late filings for good cause, much like our Supreme
Court Rule 183. In addition to the factors emphasized in the
-11-
1-05-2320
Illinois cases, the foreign courts have considered the responding
party's good faith (Countee v. United States, 112 F.2d 447, 451
(7th Cir. 1940)), the conduct of the party requesting admissions,
especially in regard to other discovery (Marshall v. Sunshine &
Leisure, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 354, 356 (D. Fla. 1980)), and the
length of the delay beyond the statutory deadline (Holt v. Best,
750 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Mo. App. 1988)). We find that courts in
Illinois have authority to consider all of these factors, and any
other factors that bear on the balance the court must strike
between the need for efficient litigation and the interest of
achieving substantial justice between the parties. See generally
H. Henry, Annotation, Time for Filing Responses to Requests for
Admissions; Allowance of Additional Time, 93 A.L.R. 2d 757 (1964).
Accordingly, we answer "yes" to the certified question.
To reach its decision here the trial court considered
factors outside the cause for the delay. Insofar as the court
did so, we find no error. But the judge allowed the extension
after deciding, sua sponte, to revisit his decision to deny
Vision leave to file late its responses to the requests to admit.
The judge looked to Rule 183 as authority for permitting the
late filing. At the hearing in April 2005, Vision orally moved
for leave to file its responses late. However, neither before
that hearing nor before the hearing on May 13, 2005, did Legacy
and Haas receive any notice of a motion pursuant to Rule 183.
Rule 183 requires a motion and notice to the party opposing
-12-
1-05-2320
the party who seeks an extension of time for filing. While the
trial court retains its inherent authority to reconsider its
interlocutory rulings (People v. Jones, 219 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2006);
Geske v. Geske, 343 Ill. App. 3d 881, 885 (2003)), when the court
exercises its authority to act sua sponte, it still must follow
"otherwise applicable procedures, including notice of the
proposed judicial action and the opportunity to argue against
such action, as required in fairness to the litigants." People
v. Edwards, 355 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 1100 (2005).
Neither Vision nor the trial court followed proper
notification procedures for a Rule 183 motion. Therefore, we
vacate the order of May 24, 2005, and we remand for the filing of
a written motion pursuant to Rule 183, with notice to Legacy and
Haas, giving them an opportunity for a hearing on their
objections to the motion. The court should take into
consideration any facts bearing on the balance between the need
for efficient litigation in full compliance with court rules and
the interests of achieving substantial justice on the merits for
the parties. The court need not restrict its attention to the
causes for the delay in the responses to the requests to admit.
The parties sought to raise other issues in their briefs.
Rule 308 generally allows this court narrow jurisdiction to
decide the question the trial court certified. Reich v.
Gendreau, 308 Ill. App. 3d 825 (1999). While we may review the
trial court's orders insofar as those orders gave rise to the
-13-
1-05-2320
certified question (Bright, 166 Ill. 2d at 208), we find that the
other proposed issues fall outside the proper scope of our review
under Rule 308. See Jones v. City of Carbondale, 217 Ill. App.
3d 85, 88 (1991).
Certified question answered; order vacated and cause
remanded.
TULLY and O'MALLEY, JJ., concur.
-14-