Nelson v. County of Kendall , 990 N.E.2d 1237 ( 2013 )

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
Nelson v. County of Kendall, 2013 IL App (2d) 120635Appellate Court LARRY NELSON, NELSON MULITMEDIA, INC., WSPY AM, INC.,
Caption WSPY, INC., and WSPY-TV, INC., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE
COUNTY OF KENDALL, Defendant-Appellee (Eric Weis, Kendall
County State’s Attorney, Intervenor-Appellee).–LARRY NELSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE OFFICE OF THE KENDALL COUNTY
STATE’S ATTORNEY, Defendant-Appellee.
District & No. Second District
Docket Nos. 2-12-0635, 2-12-0636 cons.
Filed May 30, 2013
Held Defendant State’s Attorney’s office is not a “public body” as defined by
(Note: This syllabus the Illinois Freedom of Information Act and could not be compelled to
constitutes no part of turn over emails generated by that office; therefore, the dismissal of
the opinion of the court plaintiffs’ actions seeking the disclosure of those emails was affirmed.
but has been prepared
by the Reporter of
Decisions for the
convenience of the
reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kendall County, Nos. 10-MR-143, 11-
Review MR-146; the Hon. Marcy Buick, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Grant S. Wegner and R. Peter Grometer, both of Mahoney, Silverman &
Appeal Cross, LLC, of Joliet, for appellants.
Charles M. Colburn, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office,
of Springfield, and Lawrence M. Bauer and Scott Jacobson, both of
State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of Elgin, for appellee
County of Kendall.
Eric C. Weis, State’s Attorney, of Yorkville (Leslie J. Johnson, Assistant
State’s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee Office of Kendall County
State’s Attorney.
Donald M. Craven and Esther J. Seitz, both of Donald M. Craven, P.C.,
of Springfield, for amicus curiae Illinois Broadcasters Association.
Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro,
Solicitor General, and Jane Elinor Notz, Deputy Solicitor General, of
counsel), for amicus curiae Attorney General of Illinois.
Panel JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices McLaren and Hutchinson concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff, Larry Nelson, filed separate actions in the circuit court of Kendall County
against Kendall County (county) (No. 10-MR-143) and the office of the Kendall County
State’s Attorney (State’s Attorney) (No. 11-MR-146).1 Pursuant to section 11(a) of the
Illinois Freedom of Information Act (Act) (5 ILCS 140/11(a) (West 2010)), Nelson sought
injunctions requiring the county and the State’s Attorney to turn over emails that Nelson
contended were responsive to records requests that Nelson had submitted to the two entities.
The trial court dismissed Nelson’s actions with prejudice, finding that the county could not
be compelled to turn over emails generated by the State’s Attorney’s office and that the
1
Nelson Multimedia, Inc., WSPY AM, Inc., WSPY, Inc., and WSPY-TV, Inc., each of which
is a corporation of which Nelson is the president, also were named plaintiffs in the action against the
county. We refer to these entities collectively as “Nelson.” The Kendall County State’s Attorney is
Eric Weis.
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State’s Attorney, as a member of the judicial branch of state government, was not a “public
body” as defined in section 2(a) of the Act (5 ILCS 140/2(a) (West 2010) (defining “[p]ublic
body,” in pertinent part, as “all legislative, executive, administrative, or advisory bodies of
the State”)). For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶2 BACKGROUND
¶3 The Act requires every public body in Illinois to make available to any person for
inspection or copying all public records, subject to a long list of exceptions. 5 ILCS 140/3(a),
7 (West 2010). Pertinent to our case, the Act’s definition of “public records” includes “all
*** electronic communications *** pertaining to the transaction of public business ***
having been prepared by or for, or having been used by, received by, in the possession of, or
under the control of any public body.” 5 ILCS 140/2(c) (West 2010). If a public body denies
a request for public records, it must notify the requestor in writing and explain in detail the
reasons for the denial. 5 ILCS 140/9(a) (West 2010). An individual whose request for public
records is denied may either (1) file within 60 days a request for review with the public
access counselor in the Attorney General’s office (5 ILCS 140/9.5(a) (West 2010)), or (2)
file an action in the circuit court for injunctive or declaratory relief (5 ILCS 140/11(a) (West
2010)). In the former situation, the Attorney General may issue a binding opinion (5 ILCS
140/9.5(f) (West 2010)), which will be considered a final decision of an administrative
agency subject to administrative review (5 ILCS 140/11.5 (West 2010)). In the latter
situation, the circuit court considers the matter de novo and has the power to enjoin a public
body from withholding public records. 5 ILCS 140/11(d), (f) (West 2010).
¶4 Nelson filed two actions in the circuit court, seeking injunctive relief under section 11(a)
of the Act. In the first action (No. 10-MR-143), filed against the county, Nelson alleged that
the county had improperly denied a September 28, 2010, request for emails sent or received
during January 2010 by two assistant State’s Attorneys. After the State’s Attorney intervened
in the action, both the county and the State’s Attorney filed motions to dismiss pursuant to
section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West
2010)). The county argued that it could not be compelled to turn over emails that were
generated by the State’s Attorney’s office. The State’s Attorney argued that his office was
not a “public body” but was part of the judicial branch of state government, which is not
subject to the Act.
¶5 In the second action (No. 11-MR-146), filed against the State’s Attorney, Nelson alleged
that the State’s Attorney had improperly denied a November 17, 2011, request for all emails
sent or received during January 2010 by the State’s Attorney and by three assistant State’s
Attorneys. As in case No. 10-MR-143, the State’s Attorney filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code, arguing that his office was not a “public body”
subject to the Act.
¶6 On May 11, 2012, the trial court granted the county’s and the State’s Attorney’s motions
and dismissed both of Nelson’s actions with prejudice. The court concluded that the county
could not be compelled to disclose emails generated by the State’s Attorney’s office. The
court further concluded that the State’s Attorney is a member of the judicial branch of state
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government and is not a “public body” subject to the Act. Nelson timely appealed.
¶7 ANALYSIS
¶8 On appeal, Nelson does not challenge the trial court’s determination that the county
cannot be compelled to turn over emails generated by the State’s Attorney’s office. Nelson’s
only contention is that the trial court erred when it determined that the State’s Attorney is a
member of the judicial branch of state government and, thus, is not a “public body” subject
to the Act. Whether a State’s Attorney is a “public body” subject to the Act is an issue of first
impression.
¶9 As an initial matter, we address Nelson’s argument that the State’s Attorney effectively
admitted to being a “public body” under the Act when he partially approved a prior records
request from Nelson in April 2010 that sought the same emails as Nelson’s September 28,
2010, request that was the subject of case No.10-MR-143. Nelson cites no authority to
support his position, so his argument is forfeited. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. July 1,
2008) (requiring the argument section of an appellant’s brief to “contain the contentions of
the appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of the authorities and the pages of the
record relied on”). Even if the argument were not forfeited, however, the issue before us
involves a question of law, and we fail to see how the State’s Attorney’s response to an
earlier records request bears upon that question.
¶ 10 Our primary objective in interpreting the Act is to ascertain and give effect to the intent
of the legislature. Southern Illinoisan v. Illinois Department of Public Health, 218 Ill. 2d
390, 415 (2006). The Act’s plain language is the most reliable indicator of the legislature’s
intent. Southern Illinoisan, 218 Ill. 2d at 415. In determining the legislature’s intent, we must
construe words and phrases not in isolation but in light of the statute’s other provisions.
Southern Illinoisan, 218 Ill. 2d at 415. Because the issue before us involves a matter of
statutory interpretation, and because Nelson appeals from section 2-619(a)(9) dismissals, our
review is de novo. Lacey v. Village of Palatine, 232 Ill. 2d 349, 359 (2009) (de novo review
of a section 2-619(a)(9) dismissal); Southern Illinoisan, 218 Ill. 2d at 421 (de novo review
of an issue of statutory construction).
¶ 11 The Act defines “public body,” in pertinent part, as “all legislative, executive,
administrative, or advisory bodies of the State, *** counties, *** [and] any subsidiary bodies
of any of the foregoing.” 5 ILCS 140/2(a) (West 2010). Notably absent from the definition
is the word “judicial” or the phrase “judicial bodies.” In Copley Press, Inc. v. Administrative
Office of the Courts, 271 Ill. App. 3d 548 (1995), which involved a records request submitted
to the Lake County pretrial services agency, the court addressed the absence of the word
“judicial” from the Act’s definition of public body. Copley Press, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 554.
The court determined as a matter of first impression that, because the legislature specifically
referenced the legislative and executive branches of government, without referencing the
judicial branch, it must have intended to exclude the judiciary from the Act. Copley Press,
271 Ill. App. 3d at 554. The court went on to conclude that, because the Lake County pretrial
services agency performed a clearly judicial function and was an arm of the court
accountable to the chief judge, the agency belonged to the judicial branch and was not
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subject to the Act. Copley Press, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 549, 554. In support of its holding, the
court explained that the Act does not narrowly define (or define at all) the judiciary. Copley
Press, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 554.
¶ 12 Both Nelson and the amici curiae2 argue that, under the functional approach used in
Copley Press (i.e., the approach of looking to a governmental entity’s functions to determine
to which branch of government the entity belongs), the State’s Attorney is not a member of
the judicial branch of government. According to Nelson and the amici curiae, the relevant
considerations under Copley Press are that (1) the State’s Attorney is not an arm of the court
accountable to the chief judge, and (2) the State’s Attorney does not perform a clearly
judicial function. Nelson and the amici curiae further argue that in several cases not
involving the Act our supreme court has used a functional approach to determine that State’s
Attorneys are executive branch officials for separation-of-powers purposes. For example, in
People ex rel. Daley v. Suria, 112 Ill. 2d 26 (1986), and in People ex rel. Daley v. Moran,
94 Ill. 2d 41 (1983), the court held that a judge violated the separation-of-powers provision
of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, § 1) when the judge encroached upon a
State’s Attorney’s charging and prosecutorial decisions. Suria, 112 Ill. 2d at 36; Moran, 94
Ill. 2d at 46. In both cases, the court described State’s Attorneys as executive branch officials
who perform the discretionary executive function of initiating and managing criminal
prosecutions. Suria, 112 Ill. 2d at 37; Moran, 94 Ill. 2d at 45.
¶ 13 The State’s Attorney responds that Newman, Raiz & Shelmadine, LLC v. Brown, 394 Ill.
App. 3d 602 (2009), which was decided more recently than Copley Press, did not use a
functional approach when it determined that the clerk of the circuit court of Cook County
belonged to the judicial branch of state government and was not subject to the disclosure
requirements of the Act. Newman, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 606. Rather, the State’s Attorney points
out, the court in Newman relied on the supreme court’s holding in Drury v. County of
McLean, 89 Ill. 2d 417 (1982), that clerks of the circuit courts “ ‘are nonjudicial members
of the judicial branch of State government.’ ” Newman, 394 Ill. App. 3d at 605 (quoting
Drury, 89 Ill. 2d at 420). Drury, in turn, relied on section 18(b) of the judicial article of the
Illinois Constitution, which establishes clerks of the circuit courts and refers to them as
“ ‘non-judicial officers of the Circuit Courts.’ ” Drury, 89 Ill. 2d at 422 (quoting Ill. Const.
1970, art. VI, § 18(b)). According to the State’s Attorney, because the judicial article of the
Illinois Constitution likewise establishes his office (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 19), he also
should be treated as a member of the judicial branch of state government.
¶ 14 In response to Suria, Moran, and similar cases cited by Nelson and the amici curiae, the
State’s Attorney relies on Ingemunson v. Hedges, 133 Ill. 2d 364 (1990), which he contends
“specifically rejected” a functional approach. In Ingemunson, the supreme court addressed
the issue of whether the Illinois Constitution’s prohibition against mid-term salary increases,
which appears in the executive article, applied to State’s Attorneys. Ingemunson, 133 Ill. 2d
at 365-66 (citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. V, § 21). The court noted that the office of State’s
2
We allowed the Illinois Attorney General and the Illinois Broadcasters Association to file
briefs as amici curiae in support of Nelson.
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Attorney “is neither specifically named in the executive article nor one which is filled by
executive appointment.” Ingemunson, 133 Ill. 2d at 367. Rather, the court noted, the office
“is established by section 19 of article VI, the judicial article.” Ingemunson, 133 Ill. 2d at
367. The court concluded that, because the drafters of the constitution established the office
of State’s Attorney in the judicial article and specifically provided that State’s Attorneys’
salaries “shall be provided by law,” the drafters “could not have intended that State’s
Attorneys be subject to the executive article’s salary-raise prohibition.” Ingemunson, 133 Ill.
2d at 367.
¶ 15 We disagree with the State’s Attorney that either Newman or Ingemunson is apposite
here. In Newman, the court relied on Drury, which in turn relied on section 18(b) of article
VI of the constitution, in rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the circuit clerk qualified as
a “public body” by virtue of being answerable to the county. Newman, 394 Ill. App. 3d at
605-06. Thus, the issue in Newman was not whether the circuit clerk was a judicial or an
executive body, but whether the circuit clerk was a state- or a county-level official. The
Newman court’s resolution of that issue is not helpful to determining whether State’s
Attorneys are subject to the Act, which turns on whether the office of State’s Attorney
qualifies as a judicial or an executive body.
¶ 16 Ingemunson is even farther afield. That case involved the very narrow issue of whether
mid-term salary increases for State’s Attorneys were constitutional, and the key consideration
in resolving that issue was the specific salary provision contained in section 19 of article VI
of the constitution. Ingemunson, 133 Ill. 2d at 367. Contrary to the State’s Attorney’s
argument, the court in Ingemunson did not reject a functional approach; it simply explained
that a functional approach was unnecessary to resolve the issue before it. See Ingemunson,
133 Ill. 2d at 370.
¶ 17 Yet, we agree with the State’s Attorney that the establishment of the office of State’s
Attorney in the judicial article of the Illinois Constitution is determinative of the issue before
us. In reaching this conclusion, we emphasize that our task is not to answer the question of
why the office of State’s Attorney is established in the constitution’s judicial article. Nor is
it to decide whether State’s Attorneys belong to the judicial or the executive branch of
government. Rather, our task is to resolve the narrow issue of whether the legislature
intended for the office of State’s Attorney to qualify as a “public body” subject to the Act.
As we will explain, in light of the placement of that office in the constitution’s judicial
article, we decline to infer a legislative intent to subject State’s Attorneys to the Act in the
absence of a clear expression to that effect in the statute.
¶ 18 Central to our decision is the consideration that the drafters of every Illinois Constitution
that has provided for the office of State’s Attorney, including the drafters of the current
constitution, have placed that office in the judicial article. Ill. Const. 1848, art. V, § 28; Ill.
Const. 1870, art. VI, § 22; Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 19. The state’s first constitution, ratified
the year that Illinois became the twenty-first state, did not provide for the election or
appointment of State’s Attorneys. See Ill. Const. 1818. At that time, State’s Attorneys were
provided for by statute, and there was one appointed for each of the state’s four judicial
circuits. 1819 Ill. Laws 204 (§§ 1, 2). The state’s second constitution, adopted in 1848,
established State’s Attorneys in the judicial article and provided for the general election of
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one State’s Attorney per judicial circuit, of which there were then nine. Ill. Const. 1848, art.
V, § 28. Illinois’s third constitution, ratified in 1870, again placed the office of State’s
Attorney in the judicial article and provided for the general election of one State’s Attorney
per county, as opposed to per circuit. Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI, § 22. Currently, the Illinois
Constitution of 1970, in section 19 of the judicial article, provides for the general election
of one State’s Attorney per county, or of one State’s Attorney serving two or more counties
under certain circumstances. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 19.
¶ 19 The constitutional treatment of State’s Attorneys is critical to our resolution of the issue
before us, because the Act does not apply to judicial bodies, and because the legislature’s use
of the term “judicial,” in another context, reveals that the term is broad enough to include an
entity created under the constitution’s judicial article. As we discussed above, while the Act
applies to legislative, executive, administrative, and advisory bodies, it does not apply to
judicial bodies. See 5 ILCS 140/2(a) (West 2010) (defining “public body,” in pertinent part,
as “all legislative, executive, administrative, or advisory bodies of the State”); Copley Press,
271 Ill. App. 3d at 554 (interpreting the Act’s definition of “public body” as excluding the
“judiciary”). Furthermore, the Act does not define the term “judicial.” See Copley Press, 271
Ill. App. 3d at 554 (explaining that the Act does not narrowly define (or define at all) the
“judiciary”). In another context, however, the legislature has designated the office of the
State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor to be “a judicial agency of state government.” 725
ILCS 210/3 (West 2010). The office of the State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor prosecutes
appeals with the consent and at the direction of the State’s Attorneys otherwise responsible
for prosecuting the appeals. 725 ILCS 210/4.01 (West 2010). At the very least, this means
that the legislature’s use of the term “judicial” is broader than the term “judicial power,”
which our supreme court has defined as “ ‘the power which adjudicates upon the rights of
citizens and to that end construes and applies the law.’ ” People v. Joseph, 113 Ill. 2d 36, 41
(1986) (quoting People v. Hawkinson, 324 Ill. 285, 287 (1927)). Given that the legislature’s
use of the term “judicial” includes the statutorily created appellate arm of the office of State’s
Attorney, in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary we conclude
that the term is broad enough also to include the office of State’s Attorney, established in the
constitution’s judicial article.
¶ 20 The constitutional treatment of State’s Attorneys in Illinois also renders the functional
approach used in Copley Press not useful in the case before us. Although Nelson and the
amici curiae urge us to follow this aspect of Copley Press, the pretrial services agency that
was the recipient of the records request in that case was not a constitutionally created body.
In the absence of a relevant constitutional provision, the court in Copley Press relied on the
considerations that the pretrial services agency was an arm of the court accountable to the
chief judge and performed a clearly judicial function. We need not interpret Copley Press as
endorsing a functional approach for all cases involving an issue of whether a governmental
entity meets the Act’s definition of “public body.”
¶ 21 Likewise, Nelson’s and the amici curiae’s reliance on Suria, Moran, and similar
separation-of-powers cases is misplaced. Suria and Moran were cases in which the trial
judges encroached upon the State’s Attorneys’ prosecutorial and charging functions. As the
court in Ingemunson later explained, it was necessary in Suria and Moran to look to “history
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and tradition” to determine whether any violation of the constitution’s separation-of-powers
provision had occurred, because “[n]othing in the constitution explicitly addresses the
question of who may or may not institute criminal proceedings or whether such a decision
is an executive or judicial function.” Ingemunson, 133 Ill. 2d at 370. Here, by contrast, the
focal point of our inquiry is not the history and tradition of State’s Attorneys’ powers and
functions. Nor is our focus on determining the branch of government to which State’s
Attorneys belong. Rather, our narrow objective is to determine only whether the legislature
intended to include State’s Attorneys within the Act’s definition of “public body.” Again,
given that (1) the Act’s definition of “public body” does not include judicial bodies, (2) the
legislature’s use of the term “judicial” in another context reveals that the term is broad
enough to include an entity created under the constitution’s judicial article, and (3) the office
of State’s Attorney is established in the constitution’s judicial article, we decline to infer a
legislative intent to include State’s Attorneys within the Act’s definition of “public body”
absent a clear expression to that effect. We believe that we would risk usurping the
legislative role were we to ignore these considerations and conclude that State’s Attorneys
are subject to the Act merely because they have powers and perform functions that in certain
other contexts have been characterized as executive. See, e.g., Suria, 112 Ill. 2d at 37;
Moran, 94 Ill. 2d at 45.
¶ 22 Although Nelson and the amici curiae caution that a decision affirming the trial court
would conflict with the holdings of separation-of-powers cases such as Suria and Moran and,
ultimately, would violate the separation-of-powers provision of the Illinois Constitution, their
concern is unfounded. As we explained above, our resolution of the narrow issue before us
does not require us to categorize the State’s Attorney as either a judicial or an executive
branch official. Nor do we need to define or characterize State’s Attorneys’ powers and
functions as either judicial or executive. We simply decline to infer a legislative intent to
include State’s Attorneys within the Act’s definition of “public body.” Nothing in our
resolution of this issue affects the precedential value of any case, not involving the Act, that
has defined or characterized the office of State’s Attorney.
¶ 23 CONCLUSION
¶ 24 Based on the foregoing, we hold that the State’s Attorney is not a “public body” subject
to the Act. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the circuit court of Kendall County.
¶ 25 Affirmed.
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