Mabie v. Village of Schaumburg ( 2006 )

SECOND DIVISION
March 31, 2006
No. 1-05-2457
DANIEL MABIE, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. )
)
VILLAGE OF SCHAUMBURG, )
) Honorable
Defendant-Appellant. ) Mary Anne Mason,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:
Daniel Mabie, a fireman, sues the Village of Schaumburg for sick leave and
vacation benefits he did not receive while recovering from injuries incurred at the fire
station. He says he is entitled to those benefits under the Public Employee Disability
Act (PEDA) (5 ILCS 345/0.01 et seq. (West 2000)).
The Village claims it does not have to pay the benefits because the plaintiff=s
injury did not occur "in the line of duty" under PEDA.
This case requires us to construe and apply PEDA=s use of the words "line of
duty." The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff. We affirm the trial
court.
FACTS
Plaintiff was employed by the defendant as a full-time
firefighter when he was injured on April 12, 1999. He fell down
fire station stairs on his way to roll call. He was unable to
1-05-2457
perform his duties as a firefighter from April 13, 1999, to
August 5, 1999. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the plaintiff
on his workers= compensation claim, finding the plaintiff
suffered "a compensable injury arising out of and in the course
of his employment." The Illinois Industrial Commission and the
trial court confirmed the arbitrator=s decision. The Village
appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court, Industrial Commission
Division. While the Village=s appeal was pending, the parties
agreed to settle the workers= compensation claim. The settlement
awarded the plaintiff $32,500 for medical expenses, permanent
disability, and interest. The parties agreed to dismiss the
Village=s appeal.
Following the settlement, the plaintiff filed a complaint
for injunctive relief pursuant to PEDA seeking an order directing
the Village to reinstate his sick leave and vacation benefits.
Under PEDA, a firefighter who suffers an injury "in the line of
duty" shall continue to be paid by his employer on the same basis
as before his injury, with no deduction from sick leave credits,
overtime accumulation, or vacation. 5 ILCS 345/1 (West 2000).
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging the plaintiff
waived his right to ask for additional benefits outside the
settlement agreement. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff=s
complaint.
2
1-05-2457
On appeal, this court reversed, finding the language of the
settlement agreement was limited to those claims that could be
enforced by the Industrial Commission. Mabie v. Village of
Schaumburg, 1-04-1709 (2004) (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23). The plaintiff could not have waived his right to
bring his PEDA claim, and the agreement did not have any res
judicata effect as to plaintiff=s claim. Mabie, 1-04-1709, slip
op. at 6.
On remand to the trial court, the plaintiff moved for
summary judgment on two alternative theories: (1) he suffered an
injury in the line of duty that was compensable under PEDA; and
(2) the Village was barred from challenging the cause of
plaintiff=s disability and its legal effect based on the res
judicata or judicial estoppel effect of the settlement agreement
and prior Industrial Commission decisions.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff,
based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
DECISION
Summary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings,
depositions, affidavits, admissions, and exhibits on file, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, show there
is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West
3
1-05-2457
2000); Illinois Farmers Insurance Co. v. Marchwiany, 361 Ill.
App. 3d 916, 919, 838 N.E.2d 172 (2005). Our review is de novo.
Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 361 Ill. App. 3d at 919.
Collateral estoppel, a branch of res judicata, prohibits the
relitigation of an issue actually decided in an earlier
proceeding between the same parties. McCulla v. Industrial
Commission, 232 Ill. App. 3d 517, 520, 597 N.E.2d 875 (1992). In
order to apply collateral estoppel, (1) the issue decided in the
prior adjudication must be identical to the issue in the current
action; (2) the party against whom estoppel is asserted must have
been a party or in privity with a party in the prior action; and
(3) the prior adjudication must have resulted in a final judgment
on the merits. Dowrick v. Village of Downers Grove, 362 Ill.
App. 3d 512, 516, 840 N.E.2d 785 (2005).
The question is whether the prior decision in the workers=
compensation case that the injury "arose out of and in the course
of employment" collaterally estopped the defendant from
relitigating the issue of causality in the PEDA case. PEDA
provides compensation for a firefighter who "suffers any injury
in the line of duty which causes him to be unable to perform his
duties." 5 ILCS 345/1(b) (West 2000).
Because there is no definition of "line of duty" in PEDA,
and no cases directly on point, the parties rely on cases
4
1-05-2457
comparing workers= compensation claims with line-of-duty
disability pension claims.
The Workers= Compensation Act (WCA) provides for
compensation for accidental injuries "arising out of and in the
course of the employment" of the injured employee. 820 ILCS
305/2 (West 2000). The applicable section of the Illinois
Pension Code (Pension Code) allows a pension board to grant a
line-of-duty disability pension for "sickness, accident, or
injury incurred in or resulting from the performance of an act of
duty or from the cumulative effects of acts of duty." 40 ILCS
5/4-110 (West 2000).
There is no definition of "act of duty" in the section of
the Pension Code applying to firefighters in municipalities with
populations of 500,000 and under. However, this court has held
the definition in the Pension Code for cities with populations
over 500,000 applies equally to all firefighters. See Jensen v.
East Dundee Fire Protection District Firefighters= Pension Fund
Board of Trustees, 362 Ill. App. 3d 197, 204, 839 N.E.2d 670(2005). That section defines an "act of duty" as:
"[a]ny act imposed on an active fireman by
the ordinances of a city, or by the rules or
regulations of its fire department, or any
act performed by an active fireman while on
5
1-05-2457
duty, having for its direct purpose the
saving of the life or property of another
person." 40 ILCS 5/6-110 (West 2000).
If a firefighter is injured while performing an act imposed
on him by the ordinances of a city or the rules and regulations
of the fire department, he is not required to prove the act had
for its direct purpose the saving of the life or property of
another person. O=Callaghan v. Retirement Board of Firemen=s
Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 302 Ill. App. 3d 579, 583, 706
N.E.2d 979 (1998) (Firefighter who injured his knee during a
training course was entitled to benefits under the Pension Code).
The defendant contends the court in Demski v. Mundelein
Police Pension Board, 358 Ill. App. 3d 499, 831 N.E.2d 704(2005), made clear that whether an accident arose "out of and in
the course of employment" for purposes of workers= compensation
is a different issue than whether an accident occurred during an
"act of duty" under the Pension Code. There, the plaintiff, a
police officer, injured her back during a routine physical
fitness agility examination. Demski, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 500.
The Illinois Industrial Commission determined her injury arose
out of the course of her employment. The pension board denied
her application for a line-of-duty pension, finding her
disability was not caused by the performance of an act of duty.
6
1-05-2457
Demski, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 502. The court held collateral
estoppel did not apply. The pension board was not bound by the
Industrial Commission=s determination because the issue in the
two cases was not identical. Demski, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 502-
503.
The issue before the pension board was whether the accident
occurred during an "act of duty," as defined by section 5-113 of
the Pension Code. Demski, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 503. Section 5-
113, applicable to police officers in cities with populations
over 500,000, defines an "act of duty" as:
"Any act of police duty inherently involving
special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a
citizen in the ordinary walks of life,
imposed on a policeman by the statutes of
this State or by the ordinances or police
regulations of the city in which this Article
is in effect or by a special assignment; or
any act of heroism performed in the city
having for its direct purpose the saving of
the life or property of a person other than
the policeman." 40 ILCS 5/5-113 (West 2000).
The court held the issue of whether Demski was injured while
performing an act of duty never had been litigated. Demski, 358
8
1-05-2457
Ill. App. 3d at 503. That is, the workers= compensation case did
not decide whether Demski was performing an act involving a
special risk not ordinarily shared by a citizen. Demski, 358
Ill. App. 3d at 503-504. The issues were "substantially
different." Demski, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 504.
The specialized definition of "act of duty" in Demski does
not apply here. In Jensen, the court found the language in
section 5-113 of the Pension Code defining an act of duty for
police officers is different than the language defining the term
"act of duty" as it relates to firefighters. Jensen, 362 Ill.
App. 3d at 203. Because the pension board improperly applied the
definition of the term >act of duty= in section 5-113, the court
held the board never addressed the issue of whether the
plaintiff=s injury was incurred in or resulted from "acts of
duty" within the meaning of section 4-110 of the Pension Code.
Jensen, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 204-205.
When we look at cases not involving the "special risk"
definition in Demski, it is clear the courts treat the causal
test under the Pension Code as equivalent to the test under the
WCA. In Wilfert v. Retirement Board of Firemen=s Annuity &
Benefit Fund of Chicago, 263 Ill. App. 3d 539, 543, 640 N.E.2d
1246 (1994), the court held the Pension Code "serves an
equivalent purpose to the objectives of workers= compensation"
9
1-05-2457
and is to be liberally construed in favor of the applicant to
achieve its beneficent purpose. Moreover, the "line of duty"
test in pension cases is the same as the general test of "arising
out of and in the course of the employment" applied in workers=
compensation cases. Wilfert, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 544, citing
Unger v. Continental Assurance Co., 107 Ill. 2d 79, 85, 481
N.E.2d 684 (1985). See also Luchesi v. Retirement Board of the
Firemen=s Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago, 333 Ill. App. 3d
543, 551, 776 N.E.2d 703 (2002) (courts interpret the causal test
under the Code as similar to the test under the WCA);
O=Callaghan, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 583 (tests should be interpreted
similarly).
In McCulla, a firefighter appealed the denial of workers=
compensation benefits. Previously, the pension board had awarded
him a "not in duty" pension, meaning he was disabled " >as a
result of any cause other than an act of duty.= " McCulla, 232
Ill. App. 3d at 521, citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 108 1/2,
par. 4-111. The court held that under collateral estoppel, the
pension board=s decision barred the firefighter from relitigating
the issue of whether his injuries were causally connected to his
employment. McCulla, 232 Ill. App. 3d at 521. The court said,
"[w]e find no difference between the issue
adjudicated before the pension board and the
10
1-05-2457
issue of causation subsequently before the
Commission. The claimant had a full
opportunity to adjudicate the issue of the
work-related nature of his disability before
the pension board. The pension board found
his disability did not arise out of his
duties as a fire fighter. He did not appeal
this determination. Therefore, he is
collaterally estopped from relitigating that
issue before the Commission." McCulla, 232
Ill. App. 3d at 521.
Similarly, in Dempsey v. City of Harrisburg, 3 Ill. App. 3d
696, 698, 279 N.E.2d 55 (1971), the court held the issues in
proceedings under the WCA and the Policemen=s Pension Fund were
"sufficiently alike that it would be a pointless quibble to deny
that they are identical." The statute governing the pension fund
in Dempsey provided benefits in the event " >a policeman loses
his life in the performance of duty.= " Dempsey, 3 Ill. App. 3d
at 698, citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1967, ch. 108 1/2, par. 3-118.
The court held the Industrial Commission=s decision was res
judicata and binding on the defendants in the pension action.
Dempsey, 3 Ill. App. 3d at 698.
We see no meaningful difference between the "line of duty"
11
1-05-2457
standard in PEDA and the causation test in workers= compensation
claims--that the injury "arose out of and in the course of
employment." There is no reason to require a firefighter to
provide different proof that he was injured in the line of duty
under PEDA than he would in a "line-of-duty" pension case.
Accordingly, we find the defendant is collaterally estopped from
relitigating the issue of causation, based on the finding in the
workers= compensation claim that plaintiff=s injury arose out of
the course of his employment.
The defendant contends a material issue of fact remains as
to whether plaintiff tripped on an aerosol can or whether he
slipped for some other reason. In an affidavit attached to his
motion for summary judgment, plaintiff said he stepped on an
aerosol can and fell down the fire station stairs. The defendant
refers to statements made by the plaintiff, his captain, and his
doctor that indicate plaintiff fell down the stairs but do not
mention an aerosol can. Can or no can, the plaintiff was on his
employer's premises and proceeding to work at the direction of
his employer when the accident occurred. Precisely how the
plaintiff slipped or tripped does not matter. See Unger, 107
Ill. 2d at 85-86, quoting Chmelik v. Vana, 31 Ill. 2d 272, 278,
201 N.E.2d 434 (1964) (injury must occur " >within the period of
employment at a place where the employee may reasonably be in the
12
1-05-2457
performance of his duties, and while he is fulfilling those
duties= "). No issue of material fact remains.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court=s grant of summary judgment for
the plaintiff.
Affirmed.
GARCIA, P.J., and SOUTH, J., concur.
13