In re Samuel E. ( 2010 )


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  •                                                                    FIFTH DIVISION
    March 31, 2010
    1-09-2473
    In re ADOPTION OF SAMUEL E.                         )
    )       Appeal from the
    (SHARON S.,                                  )      Circuit Court of
    )       Cook County,
    Petitioner-Appellee,                         )       County Division.
    )
    v.                                           )
    )       09 CoAD 555 and 09 D 230086,
    SAMUEL E., a minor,                                 )       Consolidated
    )
    Respondent-Appellee, and                     )
    )       The Honorable
    ANN H.,                                             )       Susan Fox Gillis,
    )       Judge Presiding.
    Intervenor-Appellant).                       )
    )
    JUSTICE TOOMIN delivered the opinion of the court:
    In this case, we review the circuit court’s denial of intervenor-appellant Ann H.’s motion
    under section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2008))
    to dismiss petitioner Sharon S.’s petition to adopt the minor, Samuel E. Dismissal was grounded
    on the circuit court’s determination that Ann’s general consent to allow Samuel’s adoption by
    another couple was a surrender of parental rights and that the consent was not timely revoked by
    Ann under section 11 of the Adoption Act (Act) (750 ILCS 50/11 (West 2006)). The significant
    1-09-2473
    issue we address is whether the Act requires revocation of consent to a failed adoption within 12
    months. Given our determination that the limitation period is absolute, we affirm the judgment
    of the circuit court.
    BACKGROUND
    Samuel E. was adopted in August 2006 from an Ethiopian orphanage by the intervenor-
    appellant, Ann. H. Consistent with the international adoption process, the proceeding was
    assisted by a local agency, Adoption-Link. Samuel, then age 10, lived with Ann for several
    months, after which Ann sought assistance from the agency because of the child’s behavioral
    issues. Sharon S., who was a supervisor at the agency, took Samuel in temporarily for a few days
    to provide Ann some respite. However, several days later, Sharon informed Ann that Samuel did
    not want to return to Ann’s home. Accordingly, at Sharon’s request, Ann provided Sharon with
    temporary authority over Samuel. Eventually, Sharon persuaded Ann that it would be best for
    her to allow Samuel to be adopted by another family. In the meantime, Samuel continued to live
    with Sharon.
    In March 2007, Ann signed a consent for adoption by a Chicago-area family, but this
    adoption was not completed. The following month, Sharon located Kevin and Stacy G., who
    lived in Tennessee, and Samuel went to live with them. In turn, the G’s filed a petition to adopt
    Samuel in the circuit court of Cook County. Ann signed a consent to this adoption on June 11,
    2007. However, the G’s changed their minds about adopting Samuel and returned him to
    Sharon. On October 24, 2007, the county division entered an order providing that legal custody
    remained with the potential adoptive parents, the G’s, but that it was in the best interests of
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    1-09-2473
    Samuel that temporary physical custody be awarded to the adoption agency, with the instruction
    to place him in an appropriate home, including but not limited to, that of Sharon. The order
    further required supportive services to expedite an investigation as to a potential adoptive parent
    to expedite a new placement for Samuel. On July 14, 2008, the G’s adoption case was
    dismissed, and all orders previously entered were vacated.
    On July 21, 2008, Ann received a letter from the Department of Children and Family
    Services (DCFS) indicating that because of the failure of the G’s adoption Ann should contact
    DCFS to discuss her care plan for Samuel. In turn, Ann called Sharon and informed her that she
    intended to reclaim custody of Samuel. Accordingly, on February 20, 2009, Ann filed a petition
    for a writ of habeas corpus in the domestic relations division of the circuit court, seeking a court
    order directing that Sharon return Samuel to her.
    In April 2009, the Cook County State’s Attorney filed a petition for adjudication of
    wardship in juvenile court, asking that Samuel be declared a ward of the court. The petition
    alleged that Ann had neglected Samuel by refusing to allow him to return home. The State’s
    Attorney also sought a temporary custody hearing. On April 17, 2009, Ann appeared and filed a
    motion to dismiss the State’s wardship petition. Although a temporary custody hearing was not
    held on that date, the court entered an agreed order whereby Ann agreed not to remove Samuel
    pending resolution of the motion to dismiss.
    Thereafter, without notice to Ann, Sharon filed a petition to adopt Samuel in the
    proceedings below. On April 28, 2009, Sharon filed a document denominated “Consent,”
    together with the consent that Ann had signed in June 2007. In turn, the adoption court entered
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    an interim order which terminated Ann’s parental rights. Thereafter, Ann filed a motion to
    consolidate all the cases, which was granted as to the habeas and the adoption proceedings, but
    denied as to the petition for adjudication of wardship, which the State subsequently voluntarily
    dismissed.
    On June 2, 2009, the court allowed Ann’s motion to intervene and leave to file a motion
    to dismiss the petition to adopt, vacate the interim order, and declare the prior consent invalid or,
    in the alternative, to revoke the prior consent, pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Illinois Code
    of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2008)). Both Sharon and the office of the
    Public Guardian, as representative for Samuel, opposed Ann’s motion. In turn, the court entered
    an order denying Ann’s motion to dismiss the adoption petition, finding that the consent
    executed by Ann was not a specific consent, but rather was a general consent. The court also
    found that Ann had failed to file a motion to revoke consent within 12 month of execution of the
    consent as required by section 11 of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/11 (West 2006)). Further,
    the court rejected Ann’s alternative argument that Sharon should be estopped from arguing Ann’s
    failure to revoke her consent due to Sharon’s constructive fraud, reasoning that it was
    disingenuous, and denied Ann’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus for mootness. The court
    entered a Supreme Court Rule 304 (210 Ill. 2d R. 304) finding that there was no just reason to
    delay appeal of its order.
    ANALYSIS
    As a threshold matter, we address Ann’s argument that the circuit court erred in finding
    that her consent was general, rather than specific. She maintains there is no such distinction in
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    the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2008)) between a “specific” and “general”
    consent. Ann asserts that to the extent the court was referring to a surrender of parental rights,
    the document she signed was a consent to Kevin and Stacy G. to adopt Samuel, not a surrender
    of her parental rights. According to Ann, when Kevin and Stacy G. did not adopt Samuel, that
    consent became a nullity and she was not required to take any measures to revoke it.
    Alternatively, Ann argues the case should be remanded for a hearing on her motion to revoke
    consent based on her allegations of constructive fraud. Conversely, Sharon maintains that Ann
    was required under the Adoption Act to file a motion to revoke her prior consent within 12
    months, and since she failed to meet that requirement, her parental rights were properly
    terminated by the court.
    We recognize that section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure permits involuntary
    dismissal where “the claim asserted against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter
    avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2008). When
    a court rules on a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, it “must interpret all pleadings and supporting
    documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” In re Chicago Flood Litigation,
    
    176 Ill. 2d 179
    , 189, 
    680 N.E.2d 265
    , 270 (1997). Our review of a dismissal under section 2-619
    of the Code is de novo. Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 
    207 Ill. 2d 359
    , 368, 
    799 N.E.2d 273
    ,
    278 (2003).
    We discern that the policy underlying the Adoption Act directs that parents may be
    divested of parental rights either through their voluntary consent or involuntarily upon a finding
    of abuse, abandonment, neglect or unfitness. See 750 ILCS 50/8, 11 (West 2006). The Adoption
    5
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    Act provides the method by which a party may consent to relinquish parental rights to allow
    another party to adopt a child. In re A.S.B., 
    381 Ill. App. 3d 220
    , 223, 
    887 N.E.2d 445
    , 448
    (2008). Under section 8, consents or surrenders shall be required in all cases, with certain
    exceptions such as a finding of unfitness. 750 ILCS 50/8(a) (West 2006).
    It is well settled that section 10 of the Adoption Act sets forth the form for a consent (750
    ILCS 50/10(A) (West 2006)), and the form for a surrender (750 ILCS 50/10(C) (West 2006)).
    The relevant portion of the consent form delineated in section 10(A) is as follows:
    “That I do hereby consent and agree to the adoption of such child.
    That I wish to and understand that by signing this consent I do irrevocably and
    permanently give up all custody and other parental rights I have to such child.
    That I understand such child will be placed for adoption and that I cannot under
    any circumstances, after signing this document, change my mind and revoke or cancel
    this consent or obtain or recover custody or any other rights over such child. That I have
    read and understand the above and I am signing it as my free and voluntary act.” 750
    ILCS 50/10(A) (West 2006).
    Section 10(C) provides:
    “The form of surrender to any agency given by a parent of a born child who is to
    be subsequently placed for adoption shall be substantially as follows * * *:
    ***
    That I do hereby surrender and entrust the entire custody and control of such child
    to the ....... (the Agency), a (public) (licensed) child welfare agency with its principal
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    1-09-2473
    office in the City of ........, County of ....... and State of ........, for the purpose of enabling it
    to care for and supervise the care of such child, to place such child for adoption and to
    consent to the legal adoption of such child.
    That I hereby grant to the Agency full power and authority to place such child
    with any person or persons it may in its sole discretion select to become the adopting
    parent or parents and to consent to the legal adoption of such child by such person or
    persons; and to take any and all measures which, in the judgment of the Agency, may be
    for the best interests of such child, including authorizing medical, surgical and dental care
    and treatment including inoculation and anaesthesia for such child.
    That I wish to and understand that by signing this surrender I do irrevocably and
    permanently give up all custody and other parental rights I have to such child.
    That I understand I cannot under any circumstances, after signing this surrender,
    change my mind and revoke or cancel this surrender or obtain or recover custody or any
    other rights over such child.
    That I have read and understand the above and I am signing it as my free and
    voluntary act.” 750 ILCS 50/10(C) (West 2006).
    In In re Custody of Mitchell, 
    115 Ill. App. 3d 169
    , 
    450 N.E.2d 368
    (1983), the court held,
    “[w]e do not think that the legislature, by providing different forms for different routes to
    adoption, intended that no distinction be drawn between the different forms and that a consent to
    adoption be interchangeable with a surrender to an agency.” In re Custody of Mitchell, 115 Ill.
    App. 3d at 
    172-73, 450 N.E.2d at 370
    . Implicit in this recognition is the fact that subsection (C)
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    1-09-2473
    contains language indicating the child is surrendered to an agency for adoption at the agency’s
    discretion, whereas subsection (A) indicates the parent is giving consent to a specific adoption.
    Nees v. Doan, 
    185 Ill. App. 3d 122
    , 128, 
    540 N.E.2d 1046
    , 1050 (1989). Although the Adoption
    Act does not provide for consents favoring specific individuals, we previously have determined
    that where a proceeding contemplates adoption by specific parties the consent may be revoked if
    that adoption fails to materialize, and that under section 10(C), a consent to adoption must be
    distinguished from a surrender to an agency where there is no limitation as to who may adopt. In
    re Adoption of L.R.B., 
    278 Ill. App. 3d 1091
    , 1094-95, 
    664 N.E.2d 347
    , 349 (1996), citing In re
    Joseph B., 
    258 Ill. App. 3d 954
    , 963-68, 
    630 N.E.2d 1180
    , 1187-90 (1994), Nees, 
    185 Ill. App. 3d
    at 
    128-29, 540 N.E.2d at 1049-50
    (1989), and In re Custody of Mitchell, 115 Ill. App. 3d at
    
    172-73, 450 N.E.2d at 370
    . Moreover, the naming of the prospective adoptive parents in the
    caption of the consent to adoption form is not a necessary prerequisite to a finding that the
    parent's consent was so limited. In re Joseph 
    B., 258 Ill. App. 3d at 967
    , 630 N.E.2d at 1189.
    Thus, “[t]he rule is clear that a consent to adoption form is not interchangeable with a
    surrender of parental rights.” In re Joseph 
    B., 258 Ill. App. 3d at 964
    , 630 N.E.2d at 1187, citing
    In re Custody of Mitchell, 
    115 Ill. App. 3d 169
    , 
    450 N.E.2d 368
    (1983). “In order for the
    statutory structure of section 10 to have any meaning, section 10(A) must be read to provide for
    irrevocable consent to a specific adoption only.” Nees, 
    185 Ill. App. 3d
    at 
    128, 540 N.E.2d at 1050
    . “Any other construction of section 10(A) would render it superfluous.” Nees, 185 Ill.
    App. 3d at 
    128, 540 N.E.2d at 1050
    . Further, the Adoption Act itself provides that it “shall be
    liberally construed.” 750 ILCS 50/20 (West 2006); see also In re Custody of Mitchell, 
    115 Ill. 8
    1-09-2473
    App. 3d at 
    171, 450 N.E.2d at 370
    .
    Nonetheless, Ann maintains that the circuit court erred because her consent was in the
    form provided by section 10(A), rather than the format specified under section 10(C) for
    surrenders, and that, because the consent is therefore void, there was no requirement that she
    move to revoke it. We find instructive In re Custody of 
    Mitchell, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 172
    , 450
    N.E.2d at 370, where the respondent consented to the adoption of his son by specified known
    parties, and there was no language from section 10(C) providing for surrender to an agency.
    There the court determined the consent was “considerably different” from a surrender to an
    agency with consent to placement by the agency with unknown parties in section 10(C). In re
    Custody of 
    Mitchell, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 172
    , 450 N.E.2d at 370. Moreover, the language of the
    section 10(A) consent form regarding giving up custody and other parental rights was necessary
    to effect a transfer of parental rights in an adoption by those specific parties. Notably, the court
    held, “[w]e do not read this so broadly that it becomes an unconditional relinquishment of
    parental rights.” In re Custody of 
    Mitchell, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 173
    , 450 N.E.2d at 371.
    Therefore, the father could contest the use of his consent in a subsequent adoption proceeding by
    other parties.
    In Johnson v. Burnett, 
    182 Ill. App. 3d 574
    , 
    538 N.E.2d 892
    (1989), the petitioners
    seeking adoption also argued that a consent to adopt, which was signed by the parents in another
    adoption case, should be treated as a general surrender for adoption. The consents had the
    caption of the Johnsons’ case and were filed in the that case. The Johnson court construed
    Mitchell as holding that a consent is “specific to the case it was prepared for, and did not act as a
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    general surrender.” 
    Johnson, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 579
    , 538 N.E.2d at 896. The court further held,
    “[i]t is evident section 10(A) does contemplate the existence of a pending petition seeking
    adoption.” 
    Johnson, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 580
    , 538 N.E.2d at 896, citing 
    Mitchell, 115 Ill. App. 3d at 172
    , 450 N.E.2d at 370, and In re Kerwood, 
    44 Ill. App. 3d 1040
    , 1044, 
    359 N.E.2d 183
    , 186
    (1976). Thus, the court held the consents were “limited in applicability to the Johnson case ***
    and may not be considered as general surrenders.” 
    Johnson, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 580
    , 538 N.E.2d
    at 896.
    The decision in Nees was in harmony with Mitchell, as there the consent was for a
    specific adoption pursuant to section 10(A). Nees, 
    185 Ill. App. 3d
    at 
    128, 540 N.E.2d at 1049-50
    . In Nees, both parents signed a consent for the Neeses to adopt their child and the
    Neeses, in turn, filed their petition to adopt. Nees, 
    185 Ill. App. 3d
    at 
    123, 540 N.E.2d at 1047
    .
    Several months later, the court denied the Neeses’ petition, made the child a ward of the court,
    and ordered her placement in foster care. Nees, 
    185 Ill. App. 3d
    at 
    125, 540 N.E.2d at 1048
    . The
    natural mother filed timely a petition to revoke her consent.
    The Nees court held that, if there was to be any sense to the statutory distinction between
    consents and surrenders, section 10(A) “must be read to provide for irrevocable consent for a
    specific adoption only. Any other construction of section 10A would render it superfluous.”
    Nees, 
    185 Ill. App. 3d
    at 
    128, 540 N.E.2d at 1050
    . The reviewing court reasoned that when the
    circuit court denied the Neeses’ petition for adoption, the natural mother’s consent to an
    irrevocable termination of her parental rights became voidable. Nees, 
    185 Ill. App. 3d
    at 
    128-29, 540 N.E.2d at 1050
    . Relying on Mitchell, the court further held that although the section 10(A)
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    1-09-2473
    consent form includes language giving up all parental rights, that language “cannot be read so
    broadly that it encompasses a complete termination of parental rights where a proposed adoption
    by a specified known party is not consummated.” Nees, 
    185 Ill. App. 3d
    at 
    128, 540 N.E.2d at 1050
    . Thus, within the rubric of the court’s determination, when the petition to adopt was
    denied, the child should have been returned to her mother, absent a finding of unfitness or
    execution of another consent form. Nees, 
    185 Ill. App. 3d
    at 
    128, 540 N.E.2d at 1050
    .
    In the case at bar, however, the circuit court determined that Ann’s consent was not a
    “specific” consent. The court relied heavily on Joseph B. and stated the following:
    “[T]his distinction between a surrender and a consent is exactly what the courts in
    Mitchell, Johnson, N[ees] * * *, and even Joseph B. meant when they all held that a
    consent, as distinct from a surrender, is specific to the adoption petitioner and that when
    the adoption petition fails, the parent’s rights are not thereby terminated.”
    Here, Ann’s consent had the caption of the G’s case on it, similar to Mitchell and Nees,
    and was in the form under section 10(A). Thus, we agree with Ann that her consent to the G’s
    adoption was not a surrender under section 10(C) and that denial of Ann’s motion to revoke her
    consent on this basis was erroneous.
    Ann also maintains that the court erred in determining that her motion to revoke was
    time-barred. Ann contends that, since the G’s adoption was never consummated, her agreement
    to that adoption became void, and thus she was not required to seek to revoke that consent within
    the limitations period under section 11. Rejecting that contention, the circuit court found that
    Ann did not timely revoke her consent under section 11 of the Adoption Act, which provides the
    11
    1-09-2473
    following limitations period:
    “No action to void or revoke a consent to or surrender for adoption, including an action
    based on fraud or duress, may be commenced after 12 months from the date the consent
    or surrender was executed.” 750 ILCS 50/11(a) (West 2006).
    Addressing this issue, we note that the question left unresolved by Nees was the
    consequences inuring when a natural parent does not timely seek to revoke a section 10(A)
    consent:
    “As the mother here seeks the return of her child and did so in a timely fashion,
    we need not address the difficult problems that may arise where the natural parents do not
    wish the return of the child or where a considerable amount of time may pass between the
    consent and the denial of the petition for adoption.” Nees, 
    185 Ill. App. 3d
    at 129, 
    540 N.E.2d 1046
    at 1050.
    Notably, Mitchell and Johnson likewise did not address any issue as to the timeliness of an action
    to revoke a consent under section 11.
    Ann maintains that the purpose of promoting finality found section 11's statute of
    limitations was intended to apply only to cases where an adoption has been consummated, not
    where an adoption fell through. She cites to the language of Street v. Hubert, 
    141 Ill. App. 3d 871
    , 
    491 N.E.2d 29
    (1986), that the purpose of the amendment is to “cut[] off the prolonged
    ability of the natural parents to set aside an adoption decree.” 
    Street, 141 Ill. App. 3d at 874
    , 491
    N.E.2d at 31. Ann also asserts that requiring a parent to revoke a consent under section 11 in the
    context of a failed adoption reveals a conflict in the statutory scheme with section 10, which
    12
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    distinguishes between consents and surrenders. She contends that the application of section 11 to
    consents in failed adoptions would result in an absurd “legal limbo” where the natural parent’s
    rights are forfeited but the potential adoptive parents do not have parental rights. According to
    Ann, the correct result is that if an adoption falls through, the parent retains all her legal rights as
    if she had never consented.
    Ann’s proposition is devoid of any authority providing support. Moreover, well reasoned
    precedent dictates to the contrary. As this court has previously noted, “[t]he one-year statute of
    limitations contained in section 11 has consistently been interpreted by courts as being absolute.”
    In re Joseph 
    B., 258 Ill. App. 3d at 970
    , 630 N.E.2d at 1191. The specific 12-month limitation of
    section 11 of the Adoption Act is controlling in an action challenging the validity of the consent
    to adoption. In re Adoption of Baby Girls Mandell, 
    213 Ill. App. 3d 670
    , 673, 
    572 N.E.2d 359
    ,
    361 (1991). Notably, a final adoption is not a prerequisite to the application of the statute of
    limitations contained in section 11. In re Joseph 
    B., 258 Ill. App. 3d at 972
    , 
    630 N.E.2d 1180
    at
    1993.
    We find the facts at bar remarkably similar to In re Joseph B. In In re Joseph B., the
    mother, similar to Ann here, executed a document entitled “Final and Irrevocable Consent to
    Adoption” on July 12, 1991, and pursuant to court order, her son was placed with his godmother,
    who initially agreed to adopt him. In re Joseph 
    B., 258 Ill. App. 3d at 956
    , 630 N.E.2d at 1182.
    In April 1992, however, the godmother changed her mind and the adoption did not proceed.
    DCFS took the boy from the godmother’s home and placed him in a foster home. On August 13,
    1992, approximately 13 months after Angela signed the original consent and without any further
    13
    1-09-2473
    notice to the mother, DCFS sought and obtained an order terminating her parental rights and
    authorizing it to consent to the boy’s adoption. In re Joseph 
    B., 258 Ill. App. 3d at 956
    -57, 630
    N.E.2d at 1182. On November 16, 1992, the mother filed a motion to void her consent of July
    12, 1991, and vacate the August 13, 1992, order terminating her parental rights. In re Joseph 
    B., 258 Ill. App. 3d at 956
    -57, 630 N.E.2d at 1182.
    As in the case at bar, the mother in In re Joseph B. argued that the court was without
    authority to enter the order terminating her rights because the consent became void when the
    godmother decided not to adopt her son. In re Joseph 
    B., 258 Ill. App. 3d at 970
    , 630 N.E.2d at
    1191. However, the court held that even assuming arguendo that was the case, she could not
    challenge the consent or the order terminating her rights, because she failed to bring her attack
    within one year of the signing of the consent. In re Joseph 
    B., 258 Ill. App. 3d at 970
    , 630
    N.E.2d at 1191. The court stated: “The one-year statute of limitations contained in section 11 has
    consistently been interpreted by courts as being absolute.” In re Joseph 
    B., 258 Ill. App. 3d at 970
    , 630 N.E.2d at 1191. There the court relied on In re Adoption of Baby Girls Mandell, for the
    proposition that an adoption could not be challenged by an allegedly void consent. Noting the
    "clear and unequivocal language" of section 11, the court determined that section 11 barred
    actions to revoke consents filed more than one year after the signing of the consent, even where
    such consent is alleged to have been void ab initio. In re Adoption of Baby Girls 
    Mandell, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 674
    , 572 N.E.2d at 361. Thus, the mother was barred from attempting to establish
    that the consent to adoption was void, and all of her contentions which were based on this
    premise, including her jurisdictional argument, were rejected. In re Adoption of Baby Girls
    14
    1-09-2473
    
    Mandell, 213 Ill. App. 3d at 674
    , 572 N.E.2d at 362.
    The court in In re Joseph B. also rejected a similar argument that section 11 is limited
    only to circumstances where an adoption decree has been entered. In re Joseph B., 
    258 Ill. App. 3d
    at 
    972, 630 N.E.2d at 1193
    . In that matter, the court discussed In re D.B., 
    246 Ill. App. 3d 484
    , 
    615 N.E.2d 1336
    (1993), where a mother attempted to challenge the surrender she executed
    more than one year after she signed it, and, like Ann in the instant case, argued that section 11
    did not apply because there was no final order of adoption. The court in In re D.B. rejected this
    argument, stating the following:
    “There is a factual distinction between challenging the validity of the surrender for
    adoption and challenging a final order of adoption. [Citation.] However, [section 11] is
    addressed to the subject of challenges to the validity of the surrender for adoption,
    without any reference to whether an order of adoption has been entered. The statute
    specifically bars a challenge to the validity of the surrender made later than 12 months
    after the date on which the document was signed.” In re 
    D.B., 246 Ill. App. 3d at 490
    ,
    615 N.E.2d at 1340.
    Nevertheless, Ann maintains that the law under the Adoption Act was unclear and that
    even the State’s Attorney’s office and DCFS treated Ann as though she was still Samuel’s legal
    parent after the G’s adoption petition was dismissed. However, we find no ambiguity in the
    statutory language, nor in subsequent application of the statute by Illinois courts. Therefore, we
    conclude section 11 clearly bars any action challenging a consent or surrender after 12 months.
    In the case sub judice, Ann’s failure to take timely action clearly resonates. Ann signed
    15
    1-09-2473
    the consent for the G’s adoption on June 11, 2007. The G’s adoption case was not dismissed
    until July 14, 2008, and during that time the G’s still had legal custody of Samuel. Thus, 12
    months had already elapsed by the time the G’s adoption petition was dismissed. During the
    entire time the G’s adoption case was pending, Ann did not seek to revoke her consent.
    Moreover, she did not file her motion to revoke consent until June 2, 2009, nearly two years
    later. Clearly, she is foreclosed by section 11 from raising a challenge to her consent.
    We also reject Ann’s contention that the application of section 11 works an absurd result
    and leaves a child in a “legal limbo” where the parent is barred from revoking a consent even
    where an adoption fails. Section 20, enacted several months after the In re Joseph B. decision,
    provides the following:
    “In the event a judgment order for adoption is vacated or a petition for adoption is
    denied, the court shall promptly conduct a hearing as to the temporary and permanent
    custody of the minor child ***. The parties to said proceedings shall be the petitioners to
    the adoption proceedings, the minor child, any biological parents whose parental rights
    have not been terminated, and other parties who have been granted leave to intervene in
    the proceedings.” 750 ILCS 50/20 (West 2006).
    Further, section 13 of the Adoption Act dictates that the court enter an interim order and
    hold a hearing to determine the validity of a consent when an adoption petition is filed, as was
    the case here. 750 ILCS 50/13 (West 2006). The circuit court here held such a hearing, and
    determined that Ann’s belated attempt to revoke her consent was barred by section 11, and thus
    properly terminated her parental rights.
    16
    1-09-2473
    These same principles guide our determination that, regardless of whether Ann signed a
    consent under section 10(A), or a surrender under section 10(C), section 11 bars actions to
    revoke both a “a consent to or surrender for adoption.” 750 ILCS 50/11(a) (West 2006). Thus,
    notwithstanding the circuit court’s determination that Ann had executed a “general” consent, i.e.,
    a surrender, that determination does not affect the result in this case. The only difference the
    form of consent would have made is if Ann had timely brought an action to revoke, given that
    her consent to the G’s adoption may then have been voidable. See Nees, 
    185 Ill. App. 3d
    at 128-
    
    29, 540 N.E.2d at 1050
    . However, here any action to revoke is barred as untimely by section 11.
    750 ILCS 50/11(a) (West 2006). We therefore determine that the circuit court properly denied
    Ann’s motion to revoke her consent on the grounds that it was a specific consent and untimely.
    Analytical hindsight further demonstrates that Ann’s motion to challenge the consent
    based on fraud and duress and her habeas corpus petition also are foreclosed, as section 11 bars
    all actions beyond 12 months of execution of the consent. The provision specifically includes
    actions to revoke based on fraud and duress. We discern the language of the statute to be
    unmistakably clear: “No action to void or revoke a consent to or surrender for adoption,
    including an action based on fraud or duress, may be commenced after 12 months from the date
    the consent or surrender was executed.” 750 ILCS 50/11(a) (West 2006).
    Even assuming arguendo we were to address the merits of Ann’s fraud and duress
    argument, it is doubtful a different result would obtain. The burden of proving fraud or duress
    rests upon the party challenging the validity of the consent, and the findings of a trial court as to
    this issue may not be set aside on appeal unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.
    17
    1-09-2473
    Hale v. Hale, 
    57 Ill. App. 3d 730
    , 736, 
    373 N.E.2d 431
    , 435 (1978). Here, the circuit court’s
    ruling denying Ann’s motion to revoke consent based on fraud and duress as “disingenuous” was
    not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Again, we find In re Joseph B. instructive,
    where we rejected an action to revoke consent based on fraud and duress under similar
    circumstances, reasoning:
    “In this case, there were apparent alternative methods of ascertaining the truth.
    Angela could have easily sought the advise of an attorney for a determination as to
    whether she could redeem her rights. She could have called the public defender and
    learned that the adoption was not proceeding.” In re Joseph B., 
    258 Ill. App. 3d
    at 975-
    
    76, 630 N.E.2d at 11
    .
    In the case sub judice, similar to the holding in In re Joseph B., Ann could have readily
    consulted with an attorney and discovered that any action to revoke her consent was governed by
    the 12-month limitation period. Ann argues that Sharon breached her fiduciary duty as a social
    worker and committed fraud by taking Samuel in, persuading Ann to allow Samuel to be adopted
    by another family, and persuading her not to take steps to regain custody. Yet, in rejecting that
    argument, the court aptly stated: “I can’t imagine that Ann [H.] reasonably relied on what
    Sharon told her. There was no reason she couldn’t get an attorney.” Further, the person who
    obtained Ann’s consent was not Sharon but another person at the agency. To set aside a consent
    to adoption, the fraud and duress must have been accomplished by the person before whom the
    consent or surrender is acknowledged. Kathy O. v. Counseling & Family Services, 
    107 Ill. App. 3d
    920, 926-27, 
    438 N.E.2d 695
    , 701 (1982). Fraud or duress by some third party does not affect
    18
    1-09-2473
    the validity of the consent. Kathy O., 
    107 Ill. App. 3d
    at 
    927, 438 N.E.2d at 701
    . Therefore, we
    concur in the circuit court’s determination that there was no showing of constructive fraud.
    We further find that Ann did not make a proper showing to sustain her habeas corpus
    petition. The critical issue in a habeas proceeding is whether the petitioner can show a prima
    facie legal right to custody. Stines v. Vaughn, 
    23 Ill. App. 3d 511
    , 517, 
    319 N.E.2d 561
    , 566
    (1974); In re J.D., 
    317 Ill. App. 3d 419
    , 422, 
    739 N.E.2d 1036
    , 1039 (2000). Here, the
    application of section 11 barring Ann’s motion to revoke her consent to adoption established that
    Ann no longer had a legal right to custody of Samuel. Thus, the court also properly dismissed
    Ann’s habeas corpus petition. In any event, we need not rule on the merit of either of these
    causes of action, as Ann is foreclosed from maintaining any action to challenge her consent by
    section 11.
    CONCLUSION
    Based upon the foregoing considerations, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
    Affirmed.
    FITZGERALD SMITH and HOWSE, JJ., concur.
    19
    1-09-2473
    REPORTER OF DECISIONS – ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT
    Please Use
    Following                                  (Front Sheet to be Attached to Each Case)
    Form:
    IN RE THE PETITION OF: SHARON S.,
    Comple te
    TITLE
    Petitioner/Appellee,
    of Case
    TO ADOPT
    SAMUEL E.
    County,
    A Minor,
    consolidated
    Intervenor/Appellant..
    Docket No.
    1-09-2473
    COURT                                                         Appellate Court of Illinois
    First District, FIFTH Division
    Opinion                                                           March 31, 2010
    Filed                                                        (Give month, day and year)
    PRESIDING JUSTICE TOOMIN delivered the opinion of the court:
    JUSTICES
    FITZGERALD SM ITH and HOW SE ,         JJ.,                                         concur [s]
    APPEAL from                                  Lower Court and T rial Judge(s) in form indicated in the margin:
    the Circuit Ct. of
    Cook County,                                      The Honorable     Susan Fox Gillis, Judge Presiding.
    Chancery Div.
    Indicate if attorney represents APPELLANTS or APPELLEE S and include
    For                                          attorneys of counsel. Indicate the word NONE if not represented.
    APPELLANTS,
    John Doe, of             Appellant:                                                   Joan S. Colen
    Chicago.
    Attorney for Appellant
    For                                                                                   77 W Washington Street
    APPELLEES,                                                                            Chicago, IL 60602
    Smith and Smith                                                                       312/701-1075
    of Chicago,
    Joseph Brown,
    (of Counsel)             Appellee:                                                    Robert F. Harris
    Kass A. Plain
    Also add                                                                              Jean M. Agathen
    attorneys for
    Office of the Cook County Public Guardian
    third-party
    appellants or                                                                         2245 West Ogden Avenue, 4th Floor
    appellees.                                                                            Chicago, IL 60612
    312/433-4300
    20