People v. Crossley ( 2011 )

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
People v. Crossley, 2011 IL App (1st) 091893Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
Caption MARTHA CROSSLEY, Defendant-Appellee.
District & No. First District, Third Division
Docket No. 1-09-1893
Filed December 7, 2011
Held In the prosecution of defendant for DUI, the appellate court dismissed the
(Note: This syllabus State’s appeal from the trial court’s denial of the State’s petition for an
constitutes no part of order certifying the keeper of the records of the hospital where
the opinion of the court defendant’s blood was drawn as a material witness for the purpose of
but has been prepared establishing that a trained phlebotomist drew defendant’s blood under the
by the Reporter of supervision of a licensed physician and that a state trooper took the
Decisions for the correct sample into custody for transportation to the State Police lab,
convenience of the since the order did not prevent the State from presenting any evidence at
reader.)
trial and the State could call the phlebotomist and the trooper to testify
about the information included in the medical records, thereby satisfying
the foundation requirements for admitting the blood-alcohol test results
into evidence.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Nos. 35271851,
Review M9229879; the Hon. Patrice Ball-Reed, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Appeal dismissed.
Counsel on Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
Appeal Susan Schierl Sullivan, and Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant
State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Abishi Cunningham, Jr., Public Defender, of Chicago (Michelle
Hendrickson, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee.
Panel JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Steele and Justice Salone concurred in the judgment and
opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Martha Crossley suffered injuries in a car accident in Illinois on August 17, 2008. A state
trooper found her at the scene of the accident and arranged transportation to take her to St.
Margaret Mercy Hospital in Hammond, Indiana. Prosecutors charged Crossley with driving
under the influence of alcohol and driving with a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of
0.08. See 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (a)(1) (West 2008).
¶2 The State alleged that a phlebotomist at St. Margaret Mercy drew Crossley’s blood after
the accident and gave the blood sample to an Illinois state trooper for analysis in an Illinois
police lab. The State claimed that the lab test showed a blood-alcohol level of 0.128. The
State petitioned the court for an order certifying the keeper of records at St. Margaret Mercy
as a material witness for the prosecution of Crossley. The State explained that it sought the
medical records as a necessary step in proving that a trained phlebotomist drew the blood
under the supervision of a licensed physician and the state trooper took the correct blood
sample into custody for transportation to the Illinois State Police lab.
¶3 The trial court denied the petition to certify the keeper of records as a material witness.
The State now appeals.
¶4 ANALYSIS
¶5 The State asserts that Supreme Court Rule 604(a) (Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(a) (eff. July 1, 2006))
gives this court jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The rule permits this court to consider the
State’s appeal in a criminal case from an order suppressing evidence. In re K.E.F., 235 Ill.
2d 530, 537 (2009). Crossley argues that we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal because
the trial court’s order does not suppress any evidence. We review de novo the issue of
whether this court has jurisdiction to hear the State’s appeal. K.E.F., 235 Ill. 2d at 538.
¶6 An order suppresses evidence “within the meaning of Rule 604(a)(1) when the trial
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court’s order ‘prevents [the] information from being presented to the fact finder.’ ” K.E.F.,
235 Ill. 2d at 538 (quoting People v. Drum, 194 Ill. 2d 485, 492 (2000)). An order that only
affects the means by which the State may present information does not suppress evidence,
so this court lacks jurisdiction to consider appeals from such orders. K.E.F., 235 Ill. 2d at
540.
¶7 In K.E.F., the State sought to use K.M.F.’s out-of-court statements to prove that K.E.F.
committed offenses against K.M.F. The trial court denied the motion to admit the out-of-
court statements, holding that the State needed to first question K.M.F. in court about the
alleged occurrences. The trial court clarified that it would admit K.M.F.’s prior statements
into evidence after the State presented her live testimony. The State invoked Rule 604 as
authority permitting the reviewing court to hear the State’s appeal from the denial of its
motion to use the out-of-court statements. Our supreme court held that it lacked jurisdiction
to consider a similar appeal, because the trial court’s order only required the State to present
live testimony from K.M.F. The order did not effectively suppress information about what
K.M.F. said K.E.F. did to her. K.E.F., 235 Ill. 2d at 540.
¶8 The K.E.F. court analogized the case to People v. Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d 148 (1997),
overruled in part on other grounds by People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002). In Truitt, the
State sought to use a lab report to prove that the material it recovered from the defendant
contained a controlled substance. The trial court denied the motion, thereby requiring the
State to present live testimony to prove the chemical composition of the substance. Our
supreme court held:
“The order will not prevent any facts or opinions from being presented to the jury. From
the record before us, it appears that its sole impact will be on the manner in which those
facts and opinions are presented. Instead of being able to rely on a piece of paper, the
State will have to present testimony from an actual witness. There is no way this can
reasonably be viewed as a suppression.” Truitt, 175 Ill. 2d at 152 (quoted in K.E.F., 235
Ill. 2d at 539).
¶9 Here, the State admits that it can call the phlebotomist and the state trooper as witnesses
to testify about most of the relevant information included in the medical records. The State
asks us to distinguish this case from K.E.F. and Truitt because the State here does not know
the name of the physician who supervised the phlebotomist, and medical privacy rules may
prevent the phlebotomist from naming the physician. However, we see no law that requires
the State to name the supervising physician, as long as the State can present admissible
evidence that a physician supervised the phlebotomist. The State has not stated grounds for
us to conclude that the phlebotomist could not present the requisite testimony. The State
concedes that we should dismiss the appeal if the phlebotomist and the state trooper, along
with personnel from the Illinois State Police lab, can present sufficient testimony to meet the
foundation requirements for admitting the blood-alcohol test results into evidence.
¶ 10 We agree with Crossley that testimony from those witnesses could suffice to meet the
foundation requirements for the evidence the State seeks to admit. Because the court’s order
does not prevent the State from presenting any evidence at trial, we dismiss the appeal.
¶ 11 Finally, the State argues that our order dismissing the appeal should estop Crossley from
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objecting to the blood-alcohol test results on grounds that the supervising physician failed
to testify to his credentials. We note that Crossley asserted the position in this appeal that the
phlebotomist and the state trooper could testify to all the information the State sought to use
from the medical records. We also note that Crossley’s argument persuaded this court to
grant Crossley the relief she sought, the dismissal of this appeal. The trial court should
consider the estoppel effect of our decision if Crossley objects to the admissibility of the
blood test on grounds inconsistent with the position she took in this appeal.
¶ 12 Appeal dismissed.
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