Jones v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago ( 2013 )

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
Jones v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2013 IL App (1st) 122437
Appellate Court CHARLOTTE JONES, Petitioner, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION
Caption OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, DAVID VITALE, President, JESSE
RUIZ, HENRY BIENEN, MAHILIA HINES, PENNY PRITZKER, ROD
SIERRA, ANDREA ZOPP, Board Members; JEAN-CLAUDE
BRIZARD, Chief Executive Officer; ANNE WEILAND, Hearing
Officer, and THE ILLINOIS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondents.
District & No. First District, Second Division
Docket No. 1-12-2437
Opinion filed July 30, 2013
Rehearing denied August 30, 2013
Modified opinion filed September 3, 2013
Held Petitioner was properly terminated from her position as a school teacher
(Note: This syllabus in Chicago on the ground that she repeatedly provided her parents’
constitutes no part of Chicago address rather then her suburban address in registering her
the opinion of the court children in the selective-enrollment Chicago school where she taught and
but has been prepared later in a selective-enrollment Chicago high school, regardless of her
by the Reporter of incredible claim that she thought her children were entitled to the same
Decisions for the waiver of the requirement that she received as a pre-1996 employee of the
convenience of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago and that she used her parents’
reader.)
address when she enrolled her children online because their suburban
address was not accepted.
Decision Under Petition for review of Board Resolution No. 12-0725-RS3 of the Board
Review of Education of the City of Chicago.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Poltrock & Giampietro, of Chicago (Kurtis Hale, of counsel), for
Appeal petitioner.
Law Department of Board of Education of the City of Chicago, of
Chicago (James L. Bebley and Lee Ann Lowder, of counsel), for
respondents.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Connors and Simon concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 I. INTRODUCTION
¶2 Petitioner, Charlotte Jones, a tenured teacher was terminated from her position by the
Board of Education of the City of Chicago (Board) for repeatedly providing a false Chicago
address for her two children rather than their suburban resident address so she could enroll
them at the selective-enrollment Chicago elementary school where she taught. She continued
her daughter’s Chicago education at Morgan Park high school, a selective-enrollment
Chicago high school, in the same fraudulent manner. This is a direct appeal to the appellate
court for judicial review of the final administrative agency decision of the Board entered on
July 25, 2012, which disposed of all claims surrounding the petitioner’s termination in favor
of the Board.
¶3 II. JURISDICTION
¶4 Neither party cited authority for petitioner’s direct appeal to the appellate court from the
Board’s final administrative decision. Jurisdiction is conferred on this court pursuant to
section 34-85(8) of the Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/34-85(8) (West 2012)), which
states that “[t]he teacher may seek judicial review of the board’s decision in accordance with
the Administrative Review Law, *** except that the review must be initiated in the Illinois
Appellate Court for the First District.” The Administrative Review Law provides that
“[u]nless another time is provided specifically by law authorizing the review, an action for
direct review of a final administrative decision of an administrative agency by the appellate
court shall be commenced by the filing of a petition for review in the appellate court within
35 days from the date that a copy of the decision sought to be reviewed was served upon the
party affected by the decision.” 735 ILCS 5/3-113(a) (West 2012). The Board’s final decision
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is dated July 25, 2012. Petitioner’s petition for appellate review, filed on August 23, 2012,
is timely.
¶5 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶6 Our supreme court has carefully constructed guidance for judicial review of
administrative decisions, such as the Board’s order of termination in this case, and stated as
follows:
“Judicial review of administrative decisions is subject to important constraints
regarding the issues and evidence that may be considered. *** In addition, ‘[t]he findings
and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be
prima facie true and correct’ and ‘[n]o new or additional evidence in support of or in
opposition to any finding, order, determination or decision by the administrative agency
shall be heard by the court.’ 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2002). Consistent with these
statutory mandates, we have held that ‘it is not a court’s function on administrative
review to reweigh evidence or to make an independent determination of the facts.’
[Citation.] When an administrative agency’s factual findings are contested, the court will
only ascertain whether such findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the
evidence. [Citation.]
The standard of review is different when the only point in dispute is an agency’s
conclusion on a point of law. There, the decision of the agency is subject to de novo
review by the courts. Yet a third standard governs when the dispute concerns the legal
effect of a given set of facts, i.e., where the historical facts are admitted or established,
the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory
standard. In such cases, which we have characterized as involving a mixed question of
law and fact, an agency’s decision is reviewed for clear error.” Provena Covenant
Medical Center v. Department of Revenue, 236 Ill. 2d 368, 386-87 (2010).
¶7 These are the standards we implement in reviewing the Board’s final administrative
decision.
¶8 IV. BACKGROUND
¶9 Petitioner, Charlotte Jones, was terminated from her employment as a Chicago teacher
for enrolling her two children in the selective-enrollment school where she taught and
continuing her daughter’s Chicago high school education in another selective-enrollment
school by repeatedly providing a false Chicago address on all school record documents to do
so.
¶ 10 Petitioner has been employed by the Board as a Chicago school teacher since 1983. She
holds a bachelor’s degree in modern languages from Knox College and has two master’s
degrees–one in curriculum and instruction and another one in educational leadership. In
1980, the Board adopted a policy requiring its employees to live in Chicago. Petitioner, in
violation of that policy, resided in South Holland, Illinois, and outside of Chicago
exclusively since purchasing a home in South Holland in 1994 and residing there. Two years
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after petitioner moved to South Holland, the Board adopted a new policy which exempted
employees hired before August 26, 1996, from the Chicago residency requirement.
Petitioner, hired in 1983, benefitted from this new policy as she could continue to work in
the Chicago public school system without either moving back to Chicago or losing her job.
¶ 11 In June 2009, the Board’s office of inspector general received a complaint that
petitioner’s two children were enrolled in the Chicago public school system even though they
were not Chicago residents. The investigation confirmed that petitioner’s children resided
in South Holland, outside the Chicago school district during the entire time they were
enrolled in the Chicago schools. The investigation also confirmed that petitioner used her
parents’ Chicago address to enroll her children in Chicago’s school system from the first date
of enrollment in 1999 and throughout their entire attendance until her daughter graduated
from Chicago’s Morgan Park high school in 2011. Petitioner was interviewed by the
investigator and stated that because she had received a grandfather exemption regarding the
Chicago residency requirement for Board employees hired before 1996, she thought her
children, after being born, received a similar grandfather status as she had and were able to
reside outside of Chicago but could, nonetheless, attend Chicago public schools free of
charge, even special-enrollment Chicago public schools. Petitioner never confirmed her
unilateral belief with any officials and submitted her parents’ Chicago residence address
rather than provide the school with the children’s South Holland home address on all
enrollment documents and other forms that are a part of the record.
¶ 12 The Chicago school that petitioner chose to initially enroll her two children as students
was McDade Classical elementary school (McDade) where she worked as a teacher. McDade
is one of only five selective-enrollment elementary schools for gifted children in Chicago
with an admissions process that begins in the year before admission and where all applicants
are tested. Students are admitted on the basis of their test performance. There are between
500 to 600 applications received and 28 students or less are admitted. In other words, only
approximately 5% of the applicants can expect to be admitted. There were no issues raised
regarding this system of admission being rigged or overridden to favor both of petitioner’s
children, who were admitted in separate years to the school where she worked. Petitioner
continued to fraudulently enroll her nonresident daughter in Morgan Park high school,
another selective-enrollment Chicago public school, for the remainder of her education.
¶ 13 Following the investigation, on September 29, 2011, the chief executive officer of the
Board approved charges and factual specifications against petitioner and informed her of the
charges and facts in support, as well as notification that he sought termination of her
employment as the appropriate remedy. In total, petitioner was charged with 13 separate
violations of the Chicago public schools’ “Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy” and
Chicago Board of Education Rules, as well as statutory violations of the Illinois School Code
and conduct unbecoming an employee of the Chicago public schools. The notice also
enumerated the facts that supported the charges, including that petitioner provided false
residency information for her two children claiming they resided in Chicago when, in fact,
they were South Holland residents, in order to obtain a tuition-free education for them. The
notice also charged that petitioner’s actions took selective-enrollment student eligibility slots
from Chicago resident children who otherwise could have attended these selective schools.
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¶ 14 A hearing was held on March 14, 2012, before a hearing examiner on the charges lodged
against petitioner. Three witnesses testified at the hearing: (1) McDade school principal,
Rufus L. Coleman; (2) the investigator for the Board’s office of inspector general, Harold
Floyd; and (3) the petitioner, Charlotte Jones. Both the Board and petitioner were represented
by counsel.
¶ 15 On May 25, 2012, the hearing examiner issued her findings of facts and
recommendations. The hearing examiner found that petitioner repeatedly submitted false
documents and applications showing that her children were Chicago residents. She also
specifically held that petitioner’s children were not Chicago residents when they received
tuition-free education in Chicago and that it was petitioner’s conduct that led to her children
unlawfully receiving a tuition-free education in Chicago over a 12-year period. The hearing
examiner concluded that, had petitioner’s children not been enrolled at McDade, other
legitimate Chicago resident students would have been offered the opportunity to enroll in this
highly selective and desirable school. Although the hearing examiner found that petitioner
had provided false residency information for her two children on multiple emergency contact
forms and the registration cards, and provided a Chicago address as their residence to be
entered into the computer database, the hearing examiner held that petitioner did not violate
student residency and nonresidency rules and that “[p]roviding an incorrect address under
the mistaken belief that her children were entitled to a waiver of residency” is not
irremediable action warranting dismissal. She credited the petitioner’s testimony that
petitioner believed her children were entitled to a similar waiver of residency requirement
as she was given as a pre-1996 Board employee.
¶ 16 Petitioner stated she provided a Chicago address for her children for the online
enrollment because the computer program would not accept a suburban address. The
handprinted registration cards and emergency contact forms petitioner filled out that were
not entered into a computer stated: “Providing false information, incorrect student address,
on these forms does constitute a violation of Section 4-17” of the Board’s employee
discipline code. Petitioner filled in a Chicago address when using these forms, as well. In
spite of this, the hearing examiner found that “[n]o evidence was produced to demonstrate
that [petitioner] was informed of the residency requirements.” Further, the hearing examiner
found no evidence that petitioner knew or should have known that her South Holland
children were not eligible to attend Chicago public schools free of charge. The hearing
examiner concluded that petitioner’s conduct did not constitute cause for discharge and
recommended to the Board that all disciplinary action against petitioner be withdrawn.
¶ 17 After the parties were given an opportunity to submit posthearing briefs and argument
to the Board in support of and in opposition to the hearing examiner’s recommendations, the
Board reviewed the entire file received from the hearing examiner which included the
transcript of the hearing and exhibits.
¶ 18 On July 25, 2012, the Board issued its opinion and order in this teacher dismissal
proceeding. The Board accepted the hearing examiner’s findings that: (1) petitioner
repeatedly submitted false documents and applications showing, falsely, that petitioner’s
children were Chicago residents; (2) petitioner’s children were not Chicago residents when
they received tuition-free education while enrolled in Chicago’s school district and (3)
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petitioner’s fraudulent conduct led to her children unlawfully receiving tuition-free education
over a 12-year period. The Board rejected the hearing examiner’s conclusion that in order to
establish a violation of state law which stated that “a person who knowingly enrolls or
attempts to enroll in the schools of a school district on a tuition free basis a pupil known by
that person to be a nonresident of the district shall be guilty of a Class C misdemeanor” (105
ILCS 5/10-20.12b(e) (West 2012)), the Board should provide actual notice to petitioner of
these residency rules before the act of enrolling a nonresident student could form the basis
of any dismissal charges. Instead, the Board held it was not required to provide individual,
actual notice to anyone of this state law and petitioner was required to comport her conduct
with state law.
¶ 19 The Board further determined that petitioner’s actions constituted immoral conduct that
is irremediable per se when she did not disclose her children’s true address and thereby took
selective-enrollment seats away from qualified Chicago school children. It also found the
hearing examiner’s conclusion that petitioner’s fraudulent actions in obtaining 12 years
worth of free education for her children “had no impact on the orderly education process”
directly contradicted the examiner’s finding that if petitioner’s children had not been
fraudulently enrolled, “other students would have been offered the opportunity to enroll in
those available seats.” Instead, the Board held that petitioner’s actions constituted violations
of its policies and rules in that her actions disrupted the orderly educational process and was
irremediable because it caused damage to the functioning of the school. Contrary to the
hearing examiner’s conclusion regarding petitioner’s conduct, the Board also concluded that
“the proven fact that [petitioner] submitted a false address for her children numerous times
over 12 years in order to obtain free tuition constitutes archetypal conduct that is unbecoming
a [Chicago public school] employee.” In conclusion, the Board found sufficient cause existed
to dismiss petitioner from her employment.
¶ 20 V. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 Turning to the legal merits of this case, we begin by noting that there is no factual dispute
whatsoever concerning the petitioner’s children’s status as nonresidents of the Chicago
school district who are ineligible to receive tuition-free education in Chicago and that
petitioner fraudulently submitted school documents that provided a Chicago address where
the children did not live. Under the manifest weight of the evidence standard, we will disturb
such factual determinations only if an opposite conclusion is clearly apparent. Sangamon
County Sheriff’s Department v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 233 Ill. 2d 125, 142-43
(2009).
¶ 22 Petitioner’s defense to the Board’s action is that she believed her conduct in creating
fraudulent residency statements on enrollment forms and other documents when enrolling
her children in a Chicago school district was that she had no idea that her actions were in
violation of the law that required students, and especially selective-enrollment students, to
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reside within the district.1 This gets petitioner nowhere as it has long been the law that
everyone is presumed to know the law and ignorance of the law excuses no one. People v.
Donahoe, 223 Ill. App. 277 (1921); People v. Lander, 215 Ill. 2d 577, 588-89 (2005) (“It is
well settled that all citizens are charged with knowledge of the law.”); People v. Evans, 2013
113471, ¶ 13 (“all citizens are charged with knowledge of the law”); People v. Sevilla, 132
Ill. 2d 113, 127 (1989) (“ignorance of the law does not excuse unlawful conduct”).
¶ 23 Furthermore, the statute relied upon by petitioner in stating she was ignorant of the law
that states a student must be a resident of the district he or she is enrolled in, states, in
pertinent part:
“Ignorance or Mistake. (a) A person’s ignorance or mistake as to a matter of either fact
or law *** is a defense if it negatives the existence of the mental state which the statute
prescribes with respect to an element of the offense.
(b) A person’s reasonable belief that his conduct does not constitute an offense is a
defense if:
(1) The offense is defined by an administrative regulation or order which is not
known to him and has not been published or otherwise made reasonably available to
him, and he could not have acquired such knowledge by the exercise of due diligence
pursuant to facts known to him[.]” 720 ILCS 5/4-8 (a), (b)(1) (West 2012).
Assuming the above-quoted subsection 4-8 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/4-8
(a), (b)(1) (West 2012)) has some applicability to the instant civil case, petitioner would still
have to show that the residency rule was not known to her, and it was not published and she
could not have found it by the exercise of due diligence.
¶ 24 It has long been the law in Illinois that a school district provides a free education only to
children who reside within its district and Illinois courts have been enforcing this law for
almost a century. Ashley v. Board of Education, 275 Ill. 274 (1916); Kraut v. Rachford, 51
Ill. App. 3d 206, 212 (1977). As explained in footnote 1, supra, the Board’s residency rule
is found in chapter V, section 5-12 of the Board’s rules. Additionally, courts take a dim view
of educated professionals who attempt to excuse their illegal conduct by claiming ignorance
of the law. People ex rel. Ballinger v. O’Connor, 13 Ill. App. 2d 317, 331 (1957) (court
found it inconceivable that a probationary policeman who was a college graduate with one
year of law school did not know the rules governing suspension and discharge from the
police department); Singh v. Department of Professional Regulation, 252 Ill. App. 3d 859
(1993) (pharmacist’s claim of ignorance of reporting requirements when dispensing
1
Tuition-paying nonresidents who choose to pay tuition in advance and enroll in the Chicago
school district are barred from submitting applications to enroll in a selective-enrollment school.
Enrollment in selective-enrollment schools, like McDade and Morgan Park high school, are reserved
exclusively for Chicago residents. See Chicago Board of Education Rules, ch. V, § 5-12. (“Pupils
must reside within the limits of the City of Chicago to attend a Chicago Public School. For purposes
of enrolling or completing enrollment in an Options for Knowledge school or program, a student
must establish Chicago residency on or before July 1st prior to the start of the upcoming school
year.”).
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controlled substances was ineffective in preventing the suspension of his license). Petitioner
is a tenured teacher with two master’s degrees who was employed for over 25 years at
McDade. It is inconceivable that she was ignorant of the Chicago residency requirements for
McDade, especially given the fierce, yearly competition among Chicago residents to gain
admission to McDade, despite the odds.
¶ 25 One only needs to have a cursory knowledge of residential privileges to understand that
non-resident students, no matter who their parents may be, have no right or entitlement to a
free public school education in a district where they do not live. All school districts,
especially one like Chicago where current news events contain almost daily reports of their
limited funds, have a strong interest in ensuring that they do not provide free public
education to students whose families do not reside within its district. A statement by a parent
of the residency of their children in order to fraudulently enroll them affects many issues that
have high costs associated with them besides the physical building’s maintenance and
teachers’ salaries and benefits. It affects, among other things, rights to other school privileges
such as school meals and transportation, and also affects enforcement of attendance
requirements and determinations of liability for unforseen events.
¶ 26 Based on the facts of this case as presented at the hearing, both the hearing examiner and
the Board found that petitioner violated section 4-17 of the Chicago public schools’
Employee Discipline and Due Process Policy, which prohibits forging or falsifying official
school or Board documents, and violated section 5-1 of the same policy, which prohibits
repeated or flagrant acts of section 4 misconduct. Under the deferential review standard, the
Board’s final decision must be affirmed unless it is clearly erroneous.
¶ 27 The Board has the power to both establish and enforce standards that protect the Chicago
public education district. The termination of a teacher is not clearly erroneous if the
termination is based on the teacher’s failure to comply with the conditions, laws, policies
and/or other requirements imposed for the protection of the public education district. Ahmad
v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 365 Ill. App. 3d 155 (2006). The petitioner’s
termination is rationally related to the legitimate public interest the Board is charged with
protecting. Through this termination, the Board seeks to protect and deter the fraudulent
diminishment of public funds that should be used to teach Chicago school children. The
Board’s determination that petitioner should be terminated for her conduct in fraudulently
enrolling her nonresident children in the Chicago public school district to receive tuition-free
education was irremediable per se because it was immoral. This determination is in no way
clearly erroneous. Put another way, this is not the type of decision that has no rational basis
in the facts of petitioner’s case. In fact, had petitioner disclosed her children’s suburban
residency and been willing to pay nonresident tuition, she still would not have been able to
enroll her children in any of Chicago’s selective-enrollment schools, which are reserved for
Chicago residents exclusively.
¶ 28 Petitioner submits that there is no case directly on point dealing with the factual issue of
whether a teacher can be terminated for fraudulently enrolling her nonresident children
repeatedly for 12 years in the Chicago school system to receive tuition-free education.
Petitioner argues that such conduct cannot be deemed by the Board to be irremediable per
se as the facts do not fit the legal requirements established by the supreme court in Gilliland
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v. Board of Education of Pleasant View Consolidated School District No. 622, 67 Ill. 2d 143
(1977). First, we note that since the supreme court’s 1977 Gilliland decision, the school code
was amended in 1995, as follows: “ ‘No written warning shall be required for conduct on the
part of a teacher or principal which is *** immoral *** as that conduct is deemed to be
irremediable.’ ” Younge v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 338 Ill. App. 3d 522,
533 (2003) (quoting 105 ILCS 5/34-85 (West 1996)). The Younge case acknowledged that
“[i]t is well settled that the determination of whether a cause for dismissal is remediable or
irremediable is a question of fact that involves the exercise of judgment and, therefore, lies
within the discretion of the fact finder.” Younge v. Board of Education of the City of
Chicago, 338 Ill. App. 3d 522, 531 (2003). The Board’s factual findings on irremediability
will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. Additionally,
misrepresenting one’s status to redirect assets away from the Board’s mission has been
determined to constitute immoral conduct that is irremediable per se. Ahmad v. Board of
Education of the City of Chicago, 365 Ill. App. 3d 155 (2006) (tenured teacher’s termination
for misappropriating items from a nonprofit organization for her personal benefit deemed
immoral by the Board was affirmed). Additionally, the Illinois School Code provides that
conduct which is immoral or criminal is deemed to be irremediable per se. 105 ILCS 5/34-
85(a) (West 2012). Therefore, in cases involving such misconduct, “it is unnecessary to
employ the Gilliland test *** because the statute now makes this conduct irremediable per
se. Not only is no warning required for this type of conduct, but it is also unnecessary for the
Board to show that this type of conduct caused damage.” Younge v. Board of Education of
the City of Chicago, 338 Ill. App. 3d 522, 534 (2003).
¶ 29 In a separate proceeding before the Board, petitioner and her husband did not contest the
Board’s position that they were indebted to the Board in the amount of $125,226.79 for their
children’s nonresident tuition for 12 years. The Board’s decision on this matter became final
on June 27, 2012. In re Jones, The Board of Education of the City of Chicago, Notice of
Final Determination of Non-Residency, No. 12-0627-EX19, June 27, 2012. This is the
monetary damage created by petitioner’s fraudulent actions. All Purpose Nursing Service v.
Human Rights Comm’n, 205 Ill. App. 3d 816, 823-24 (1990) (judicial notice may be taken
of administrative decisions in related administrative proceedings involving the parties). No
one has quantified the damage created by not educating Chicago resident students rather than
petitioner’s nonresident children in McDade or Morgan Park high school, two selective-
enrollment schools. Even though the Board was not required to employ the Gilliland test and
prove that petitioner’s fraudulent actions caused damage (Younge v. Board of Education of
the City of Chicago, 338 Ill. App. 3d 522, 534 (2003)), we take judicial notice of the
significant monetary damage that was caused to the Chicago public school system by her
actions.
¶ 30 The administrative record contains strong evidence, some of which is uncontested, that
supports the affirmance of the agency’s decision. The Board considered the hearing
examiner’s conclusion that petitioner had a mistaken belief that her children were imbued
with a similar grandfather status because of the waiver of residency status that was statutorily
given to her in 1996 and she believed she could enroll her nonresident children free of charge
in Chicago. The Board’s rejection of the hearing examiner’s conclusion is reasonable as the
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Board found it was inconceivable that a tenured teacher employed since 1983 could have
been ignorant of student residency requirements in Illinois. More importantly, had petitioner
honestly believed her children were covered by a residency waiver linked to her own
employee waiver, she would not have repeatedly written a false Chicago address on the
children’s emergency contact forms and other printed enrollment forms as there would have
been no reason to falsify these documents, especially in light of their purpose to be relied on
in the event of an actual emergency.
¶ 31 Any evidence that petitioner performed her teaching work adequately does nothing to
assist her in this case. This is not a termination based on petitioner’s failure to meet her
performance expectations while teaching her students. The reasons for petitioner’s
termination were listed in the letter of charges with specific supporting facts. Clearly, those
charges did not arise out of her performance of her teaching assignments. The petitioner’s
performance in the classroom had nothing to do with the Board’s final decision to approve
her termination. Such evidence was irrelevant to the charges against petitioner.
¶ 32 VI. CONCLUSION
¶ 33 For the reasons stated above, this court affirms the final decision of the Board of
Education of the City of Chicago dated July 25, 2012, which terminated petitioner’s
employment.
¶ 34 Affirmed.
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