Schroeder v. RGIS, Inc. ( 2013 )

ILLINOIS OFFICIAL REPORTS
Appellate Court
Schroeder v. RGIS, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 122483
Appellate Court FREDERICK SCHROEDER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RGIS, INC.,
Caption Defendant-Appellee.
District & No. First District, Second Division
Docket No. 1-12-2483
Filed June 11, 2013
Held Plaintiff’s complaint against his former employer for intentional infliction
(Note: This syllabus of emotional distress was preempted and barred by the Illinois Human
constitutes no part of Rights Act and the exclusivity provision of the Illinois Workers’
the opinion of the court Compensation Act, notwithstanding plaintiff’s contention that the injuries
but has been prepared he suffered as a result of remarks made by other employees about his
by the Reporter of sexual orientation was a tort that did not fall under the scope of either
Decisions for the Act, since plaintiff’s claim was inextricably linked to the civil rights
convenience of the violation arising from the retaliation he suffered from reporting the
reader.)
discriminatory conduct of other employees and was preempted by the
Human Rights Act, and, furthermore, the claim was barred by the
Workers’ Compensation Act because plaintiff failed to show his
“physical-mental” trauma was not compensable under that Act.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-L-2228; the Hon.
Review Sanjay Tailor, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Law Office of Mitchell A. Kline, of Chicago (Mitchell A. Kline, of
Appeal counsel), for appellant.
Jackson Lewis LLP, of Chicago (Jody Wilner Moran and Stephanie E.H.
Shirley, of counsel), for appellee.
Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Connors and Simon concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff, Frederick Schroeder, brought a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress against his former employer, defendant RGIS. Defendant filed a combined motion
to dismiss, brought pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code)
(735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2010)), arguing, among other reasons, that plaintiff’s complaint
must be dismissed pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2010))
because his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted and, thus,
barred by the Illinois Human Rights Act (Human Rights Act) (775 ILCS 5/8-111(D) (West
2010)) and by the exclusivity provision of the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act (Workers’
Compensation Act) (820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2010)). Specifically, defendant asserted that
plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed, based on the Human Rights Act, because his claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress was inextricably linked with alleged civil rights
violations. Defendant argued that plaintiff’s claim was barred by the exclusivity provision
of the Workers’ Compensation Act because his alleged injury was compensable under the
Workers’ Compensation Act. The circuit court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss.
¶2 The following issues are before this court: (1) whether plaintiff is able to establish,
independent of any duties created by the Human Rights Act, the elements of the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (2) whether the exclusivity provision of the
Workers’ Compensation Act bars plaintiff’s claims. We hold that the circuit court properly
dismissed plaintiff’s second amended complaint because his tort claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress is inextricably linked to a civil rights violation. Therefore,
plaintiff’s claim is preempted and, thus, barred by the Human Rights Act. We further hold
that plaintiff’s alleged injury is compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Therefore, plaintiff’s claim is also preempted and, thus, barred by the Workers’
Compensation Act. Accordingly, the circuit court properly dismissed plaintiff’s second
amended complaint.
¶3 JURISDICTION
¶4 On July 25, 2012, the circuit court granted defendant’s motion to dismiss, with prejudice.
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On August 21, 2012, plaintiff timely filed his notice of appeal. Accordingly, this court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules 301 and 303 governing appeals from
final judgments entered below. Ill. S. Ct. R. 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994); R. 303 (eff. May 30,
2008).
¶5 BACKGROUND
¶6 On February 28, 2011, plaintiff filed his initial complaint against defendant alleging a
claim for retaliation under section 6-101(A) of the Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/6-101(A)
(West 2010)), constructive discharge, and negligence. Defendant filed a combined motion
to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1
(West 2010). In its motion, defendant alleged that plaintiff’s retaliation claim is time-barred,
that Illinois does not recognize an independent cause of action for constructive discharge, and
that it owed plaintiff no duty to investigate his complaints in order to sustain a negligence
action. Defendant attached to its motion the charge of discrimination that plaintiff filed
before the Illinois Department of Human Rights on August 23, 2010. Defendant also attached
a copy of the dismissal issued by the Illinois Department of Human Rights, concluding it
lacked jurisdiction to pursue the allegations made by plaintiff. The circuit court granted
defendant’s motion to dismiss, making the following findings: that plaintiff’s retaliation
claim was time-barred and subject to dismissal pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code (735
ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2010)); that there was no legal basis for plaintiff’s constructive
discharge claim and, thus, the claim was subject to dismissal pursuant to section 2-615 of the
Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2010)); and that plaintiff failed to plead a legally cognizable
duty to support his negligence claim, which was subject to dismissal pursuant to section 2-
615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2010)). Although the circuit court dismissed all
three counts of plaintiff’s complaint, it allowed plaintiff time to replead.
¶7 On October 19, 2011, plaintiff filed his amended complaint, which contained a single
count alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. Defendant filed a combined motion
to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code. 735 ILCS
5/2-619.1 (West 2010). Defendant argued that under section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS
5/2-619 (West 2010)), plaintiff’s claim was preempted and barred by both the Human Rights
Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act. Under the section 2-615 component of the motion
(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2010)), defendant argued that plaintiff’s complaint should be
dismissed because plaintiff did not, and could not, plead sufficient facts to support a claim
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, plaintiff failed to plead that
defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous. The circuit court granted defendant’s
motion to dismiss the first amended complaint, finding that it was not “convinced” that
plaintiff’s claim was preempted by the Workers’ Compensation Act, but was “convinced the
Human Rights Act preempts the claim insofar as it is based on allegations of discrimination
based on sexual orientation.” The circuit court further found that the complaint was not
sufficiently pled to rise to the level of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
¶8 On April 13, 2012, plaintiff filed his second amended complaint, which is at issue here.
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint contained a single count for the intentional infliction
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of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleged that he lived in Chicago, Illinois, and worked for
defendant, an inventory services business, from July 21, 2008, until February 25, 2010. He
counted inventory for clients and he worked at two locations during his time of employment:
Chicago, Illinois and Merrillville, Indiana. He alleged that “on or about November 25, 2008,”
his supervisor, Tonya Kaufman, called him a “ ‘faggot, flamer and queer.’ ” On January 7,
2009, in Chicago, plaintiff quit and left work after Kaufman called him a “ ‘fucking faggot’
in the presence of several co-workers.” The next day, plaintiff informed Perry Foy, a vice
president for defendant, and Steve McNeil, an operations manager for defendant, of
Kaufman’s actions. Plaintiff agreed to be reinstated to work in another district and was
promised that an investigation would be conducted regarding Kaufman’s conduct. Kaufman
continued to bully and verbally abuse plaintiff, which he again reported to McNeil, on
February 12, 2009.
¶9 According to plaintiff, on February 15, 2009, during a conference call, McNeil informed
defendant’s other district managers that plaintiff would be the district manager at
Merrillville, Indiana. During the conference call, two managers, Susan Powell and Roger
Cisco, stated that the commute to Indiana for plaintiff was “extreme.” Plaintiff alleged that
McNeil, in response to Powell and Cisco, stated “[e]xactly. If the drive doesn’t get rid of
him, the jungle from Gary will.” Plaintiff alleged that McNeil additionally told the other
seven district managers present during the conference call that they were not to communicate
with plaintiff and that “any manager caught helping Plaintiff would be disciplined.” McNeil
further demanded that he be copied on all emails sent to plaintiff. According to plaintiff,
Powell stated that during monthly calls, McNeil would repeat that any manager caught
helping plaintiff would be disciplined.
¶ 10 Also on February 15, 2009, defendant told plaintiff that a “ ‘thorough investigation’ was
in progress” and that he was to report to its Merrillville, Indiana office, a two-hour commute.
Plaintiff, as district manager, “was required to drive employees to various contracted
inventories, which required drives several times per week that were several hundred miles
round-trip.” He alleged that he called Louis Marty, an operations manager for defendant,
“[o]n a weekly basis,” to request assistance, to question policies, to tell him of the exhaustion
and excessive driving he endured, and to inform him that the conditions were putting himself
and other employees in danger. Plaintiff alleged “these calls were rarely answered.” He
described his normal work week as such: he would leave home at 5:30 in the morning and
arrive at the office at 8 in the morning. Approximately 40 different inventories at different
locations would be scheduled. He performed “all of the budgeting, hiring, training and
employee development.” He alleged that he would drive a van of employees to various
jobsites starting at 5 in the morning and “often not finishing *** until 3” in the morning the
next day. Plaintiff alleged that it was not uncommon for him to sleep on the office floor 4
days a week and to work 20 hours a day.
¶ 11 Plaintiff alleged that in March of 2009, McNeil told Powell, after she asked him about
how plaintiff was doing, that “ ‘It’s not like we sent him to Broadway *** to find a
boyfriend, we sent him to Merrillville to get the hell rid of his queer ass.’ ” Plaintiff further
alleged that on April 1, 2009, he called McNeil to report that he was sleeping on his office
floor and that the excessive driving was putting both himself and other employees in danger.
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According to plaintiff, McNeil told him he was “ ‘lucky to have a job.’ ” The next day, Marty
informed plaintiff that defendant could no longer afford to have his office floor cleaned.
Plaintiff alleged that Marty told him that if he “wanted to sleep on a clean floor, he could
clean it himself.”
¶ 12 On June 11, 2009, plaintiff spoke with Kim Wood, a member of defendant’s human
resources department. He called Wood to inform her about his concerns over the safety of
his excessive driving schedule. Plaintiff alleged Wood also told him that he “was lucky to
have a job.” Plaintiff further alleged that he told Marty approximately one time per week
“through February 2010, that he was regularly falling asleep on the road, in his office, and
in the presence of clients.”1
¶ 13 Plaintiff alleged that on February 22, 2010, he “felt extremely exhausted.” After
determining that no investigation regarding his complaints had occurred and that his safety
and that of his coworkers “were of no concern to his supervisors,” plaintiff sent a resignation
letter to Marty. Plaintiff’s last day at work was February 25, 2010.
¶ 14 According to plaintiff, Kaufman, McNeil, and Marty’s “extreme and outrageous” conduct
“arose from their abuse of their management positions, which gave them actual or apparent
authority over” him. Defendant was liable for Kaufman’s, McNeil’s, and Marty’s conduct
based on respondeat superior. Plaintiff alleged that as a direct and proximate result of
defendant’s actions, he suffered “severe emotional distress.” He sought damages in excess
of $50,000, as well as costs of the suit. He alleged damages for: physical injury; medical
expenses; severe mental anguish; emotional distress; humiliation; loss of income; and pain
and suffering.
¶ 15 Defendant filed a combined motion to dismiss plaintiff’s second amended complaint
pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2010). Defendant argued
that plaintiff’s second amended should be dismissed under section 2-6192 of the Code (735
ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2010)) because it was preempted and, thus, barred by both the Human
Rights Act and the Workers’ Compensation Act. Defendant argued that tort claims such as
plaintiff’s in this case must be brought under the Workers’ Compensation Act due to the
Act’s exclusivity provisions of section 5(a). 820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2010). According to
defendant, plaintiff’s claim could only survive if he could show that his injury was not
accidental, that the injury did not arise from his employment, that it was not received during
the course of his employment, or that the injury was not compensable under the Workers’
Compensation Act, which defendant argued plaintiff cannot do here. Defendant also argued
that plaintiff’s claim must be brought under the Human Rights Act because his claim was
inextricably linked to a civil rights violation. According to defendant, plaintiff failed to allege
the elements of his claim without relying on the duties owed under the Human Rights Act.
1
It is not clear from plaintiff’s second amended complaint when he started to call Marty
about his safety concerns. It is only clear that he called Marty “through February 2010.”
2
Defendant did not specify which subsection of section 2-619 (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West
2010)) it was bringing its motion under.
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Under the section 2-615 component of its motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West
2010)), defendant argued that plaintiff’s second amended complaint must be dismissed
because plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Specifically,
defendant argued that plaintiff offered only conclusory allegations that its conduct was
extreme and outrageous. Defendant requested plaintiff’s second amended complaint be
dismissed with prejudice.3
¶ 16 In response, plaintiff argued that his injury was not compensable under the Workers’
Compensation Act because he made no allegations of physical trauma. Rather, his emotional
distress was caused by gradual exhaustion based on working in Indiana. He clarified that “his
condition was not caused by a sudden severe emotional shock traceable to a definite time and
place,” and that he never filed a workers’ compensation claim. In response to defendant’s
assertion that his claim is barred by the Human Rights Act and that he failed to sufficiently
plead a cause of action, plaintiff argued that he asserted facts establishing the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
¶ 17 In reply, defendant pointed out that plaintiff admitted that his allegations were “nothing
more than day-to-day emotional strain and tension of the workplace that occurred over a one-
year period” and, therefore, defendant argued that plaintiff cannot allege sufficient facts of
extreme and outrageous behavior by defendant to support his cause of action. Defendant also
argued that plaintiff failed to show that his claims were not inextricably linked to duties
created by the Human Rights Act, asserting that plaintiff’s allegations in his second amended
complaint are the same as the allegations he made in the time-barred action he previously
filed under the Human Rights Act. According to defendant, a review of plaintiff’s second
amended complaint showed that plaintiff’s allegations of discrimination and retaliation based
on sexual orientation were inextricably linked to his claim for the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Defendant also pointed out that plaintiff’s admission that his injuries were
gradual showed that his injuries were compensable as a “non-traumatically induced mental
disability” under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
¶ 18 At oral argument before the circuit court, defendant characterized plaintiff’s allegations
as contradictory. Specifically, that plaintiff cannot argue that the Workers’ Compensation Act
does not bar his claim because his injury of gradual exhaustion over time is not compensable
while at the same time alleging that defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous. Based
on this premise, according to defendant, plaintiff cannot allege that defendant’s conduct was
extreme or outrageous enough to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Plaintiff agreed that he was arguing that his injury was suffered over a period of
time; therefore, it was not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Plaintiff
added, however, that there was no permanency to his injury because his exhaustion was
temporary. After he quit, he was able to rest. Regarding whether he is able to state a claim
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress independent of any duties owed under the
Human Rights Act, plaintiff pointed out that defendant’s actions, particularly those of its
3
Defendant also argued that plaintiff failed to allege any additional relevant facts from his
first amended complaint which the circuit court had previously dismissed.
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manager McNeil, showed extreme and outrageous behavior and an abuse of power.
Defendant argued that plaintiff would not be able to state a claim for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress without the sexual orientation allegations in his complaint.
¶ 19 The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, with prejudice. The
circuit court found that plaintiff’s complaint was barred by both the Human Rights Act and
the Workers’ Compensation Act. The circuit court found that plaintiff’s allegations were
inextricably linked to a civil rights violation under the Human Rights Act. The circuit court
further found that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act because
they were compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Specifically, the circuit court
found that plaintiff’s injury fell “within the theory, ‘physical mental.’ That is, the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant worked him so hard and for so long a period of time that he could
[not] physically take it anymore,” and “as a result of the physical exhaustion, he suffered
emotional distress.”
¶ 20 ANALYSIS
¶ 21 Before this court, plaintiff argues that his cause of action is not barred by the Human
Rights Act because he is able to establish the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress without relying upon any duty created by the Human Rights Act. To
support his argument that defendant acted in an outrageous manner, plaintiff points to the
following facts from his second amended complaint: his assignment to the Merrillville,
Indiana, office; his long commute, where he would have to leave his home in Chicago at 5
a.m. and arrive at the office at 8 a.m.; defendant’s refusal to allow other managers to help
plaintiff; a heavy workload, including scheduling approximately 40 inventories at different
locations, doing all the training and development, budgeting, hiring, and driving other
employees to various work sites; and working 20-hour days that “necessitated *** sleeping
on the office floor.” Plaintiff further argues that his injury is not compensable under the
Workers’ Compensation Act.
¶ 22 Defendant responds that plaintiff’s complaint is preempted and, thus, barred by the
Human Rights Act because his allegations are inextricably linked to his previously filed and
dismissed civil rights claim. According to defendant, plaintiff relies upon duties created by
the Human Rights Act to sustain his cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Defendant characterizes plaintiff’s claim as such: plaintiff was sexually harassed,
he complained, and then he was subjected to difficult working conditions. Defendant
maintains that plaintiff’s allegations amount to a viable cause of action for retaliation and
sexual orientation harassment under the Human Rights Act, and are not incidental to his
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Therefore, defendant asserts that
without plaintiff’s allegations of sexual harassment and retaliation, plaintiff is only left with
allegations of his difficult working conditions, which do not amount to the outrageous
conduct necessary to sustain a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress. Defendant also contends that plaintiff’s injuries are compensable under the
Workers’ Compensation Act.
¶ 23 Plaintiff did not file a reply brief before this court.
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¶ 24 We note initially that defendant filed its motion pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code,
which allows for combined motions to dismiss. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2010). Due to our
ultimate conclusion in this case, we need not address defendant’s argument, brought pursuant
to section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2010)), that plaintiff failed to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to section
2-619(a)(9) of the Code allows for the involuntary dismissal of a complaint when the “claim
asserted against defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of
or defeating the claim.” 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2010). When proceeding under
section 2-619 of the Code, the legal sufficiency of the complaint is admitted. Doe A. v.
Diocese of Dallas, 234 Ill. 2d 393, 396 (2009). All pleadings and supporting documents must
be interpreted in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Porter v. Decatur
Memorial Hospital, 227 Ill. 2d 343, 352 (2008). “Once a defendant satisfies the initial burden
of presenting affirmative matter, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the
defense is ‘unfounded or requires the resolution of an essential element of material fact
before it is proven.’ ” Reilly v. Wyeth, 377 Ill. App. 3d 20, 36 (2007) (quoting Kedzie &
103rd Currency Exchange, Inc. v. Hodge, 156 Ill. 2d 112, 116 (1993)). We review the circuit
court’s determination of a section 2-619 motion to dismiss using the de novo standard of
review. Czarobski v. Lata, 227 Ill. 2d 364, 369 (2008).
¶ 25 The Human Rights Act provides “a comprehensive scheme of remedies and
administrative procedures for redress of civil rights violations.” Veazey v. LaSalle
Telecommunications, Inc., 334 Ill. App. 3d 926, 933 (2002). The following limitation
provision is contained in the Human Rights Act: “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, no
court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation
other than as set forth in this Act.” 775 ILCS 5/8-111(D) (West 2010). Section 6-101(A) of
the Human Rights Act further provides: “[i]t is a civil rights violation for a person, or for two
or more persons to conspire, to *** [r]etaliate against a person because he or she has opposed
that which he or she reasonably and in good faith believes to be unlawful discrimination,
sexual harassment in employment.” 775 ILCS 5/6-101(A) (West 2010).
¶ 26 The circuit court, however, is not precluded from exercising jurisdiction over all tort
claims that relate factually to a civil rights violation. Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, 177 Ill. 2d 511,
517 (1997). Rather, our supreme court has held that “whether the circuit court may exercise
jurisdiction over a tort claim depends upon whether the tort claim is inextricably linked to
a civil rights violation such that there is no independent basis for the action apart from the
Act itself.” Id. Further, if a plaintiff is able to establish the necessary elements of the alleged
tort independent of any duties created by the Human Rights Act, then the common law tort
claim is not inextricably linked with a civil rights violation and the circuit court may exercise
jurisdiction. Id. at 519. The “fundamental nature” of a claim is not altered solely because a
plaintiff’s complaint frames the issue as that of a common law tort. Geise v. Phoenix Co. of
Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 517-18 (1994).
¶ 27 In order to properly plead a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
a plaintiff must allege facts to establish: “(1) that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and
outrageous; (2) that the defendant knew that there was a high probability that his conduct
would cause severe emotional distress; and (3) that the conduct in fact caused severe
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emotional distress.” Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp., 154 Ill. 2d 1, 20 (1992). Our
supreme court has warned that “mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
oppressions or trivialities” do not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct. Public Finance
Corp. v. Davis, 66 Ill. 2d 85, 89-90 (1976). “Rather, the nature of the defendant’s conduct
must be so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
intolerable in a civilized community.” Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 21. In determining whether
conduct is outrageous and extreme, we use an objective standard based on all the facts and
circumstances of the case. Duffy v. Orlan Brook Condominium Owners’ Ass’n, 2012 IL App
(1st) 113577, ¶ 36. Whether a defendant abused a position of actual or apparent authority is
a factor to consider when determining whether conduct is outrageous. Id. A complaint
alleging the intentional infliction of emotional distress “must be ‘specific, and detailed
beyond what is normally considered permissible in pleading a tort action.’ ” Welsh v.
Commonwealth Edison Co., 306 Ill. App. 3d 148, 155 (1999) (quoting McCaskill v. Barr,
92 Ill. App. 3d 157, 158 (1980)). This court has generally been hesitant to hold that an
employer’s retaliatory actions were extreme or outrageous enough to satisfy the first element
of the tort of the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 154. “This reluctance
seems to be grounded in a fear that, if the anxiety and stress resulting from discipline, job
transfers, or even terminations could form the basis of an action for emotional distress,
virtually every employee would have a cause of action.” Id.; Miller v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States, 181 Ill. App. 3d 954, 957 (1989).
¶ 28 In this case, our review of plaintiff’s second amended complaint shows that plaintiff pled
that his supervisor in Chicago called him derogatory names. He then quit and left work. The
next day he informed a vice president and an operations manager of his supervisor’s actions.
After being promised that an investigation would be conducted, plaintiff agreed to be
reinstated to work in another district. Plaintiff was then assigned to defendant’s Merrillville,
Indiana, office. Defendant’s other district managers were told not to help plaintiff. At the
Indiana office, plaintiff endured a long commute to work, as well as long hours. An
operations manager, McNeil, told another district manager, Powell, that “we sent him to
Merrillville to get the hell rid of his queer ass.” After feeling exhausted and worried that his
exhaustion was unsafe, plaintiff resigned. Plaintiff then brought this action for the intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
¶ 29 The Act provides that “[i]t is a civil rights violation for a person, or for two or more
persons to conspire, to *** [r]etaliate against a person because he or she has opposed that
which he or she reasonably and in good faith believes to be unlawful discrimination, sexual
harassment in employment.” 775 ILCS 5/6-101(A) (West 2010). Based on the allegations in
his second amended complaint, plaintiff’s allegations indicate a civil rights violation under
the Act. Retaliation under the Act is further indicated by plaintiff’s allegation that
defendant’s employee stated “we sent him to Merrillville to get the hell rid of his queer ass.”
In order for the circuit court to exercise jurisdiction over plaintiff’s tort claim, plaintiff had
to show that his tort claim was not inextricably linked to a civil rights violation, i.e., plaintiff
had to establish the necessary elements of the tort of the intentional infliction of emotional
distress independent of any duties created by the Human Rights Act. Maksimovic, 177 Ill. 2d
at 519. Therefore, plaintiff initially had to establish “that *** defendant’s conduct was
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extreme and outrageous.” Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 20. We hold that plaintiff failed to do so
here. A review of the allegations of plaintiff’s second amended complaint, stripped of the
alleged civil rights violations, results in the remaining allegations that plaintiff had a long
commute, difficult working conditions, long hours, and uncooperative colleagues and bosses.
We cannot say, based on these allegations, that such conduct is “so extreme as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and *** regarded as intolerable in a civilized community.”
Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 21. Accordingly, we hold plaintiff’s tort claim is inextricably linked
to a civil rights violation, i.e., the retaliation he endured after reporting his supervisor’s
discriminatory conduct toward him. See Maksimovic, 177 Ill. 2d at 519. Therefore,
defendant’s claim is preempted and, thus, barred, by the Human Rights Act.
¶ 30 Additionally, we agree with the circuit court’s finding that plaintiff’s claim is barred by
the exclusivity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. 820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West
2010); see also Doyle v. Rhodes, 101 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1984) (holding that the Workers’
Compensation Act provides employers with an affirmative defense to common law tort
claims against them). In order for plaintiff’s claim to survive in this case, he had to prove
“(1) that the injury was not accidental; (2) that the injury did not arise from his or her
employment; (3) that the injury was not received during the course of employment; or (4)
that the injury was not compensable under the [Workers’ Compensation] Act.” Meerbrey v.
Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill. 2d 455, 463 (1990). Before this court, plaintiff only argued
that his injury was not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Psychological
injuries, however, are compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act “where the
psychological injuries were related to and caused by a physical trauma or injury, i.e.,
‘physical-mental’ trauma.” City of Springfield v. Industrial Comm’n, 291 Ill. App. 3d 734,
738 (1997) (citing Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 62 Ill. 2d 556, 563 (1976)). We
agree with the circuit court’s finding that plaintiff’s injuries were “physical mental” because
“plaintiff allege[d] that the defendant worked him so hard and for so long a period of time
that he could [not] physically take it anymore, and [a]nd as a result of the physical
exhaustion, he suffered emotional distress.” Accordingly, plaintiff’s claim is additionally
barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act because plaintiff failed to show that his injury was
not compensable under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Therefore, the circuit court properly
dismissed plaintiff’s second amended complaint.
¶ 31 CONCLUSION
¶ 32 The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
¶ 33 Affirmed.
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