Davis v. The City of Country Club Hills ( 2013 )

2013 IL App (1st) 123634THIRD DIVISION
September 30, 2013
No. 1-12-3634
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
ANTHONY DAVIS, JOHN EDWARDS, ) Appeal from the
CYNTHIA SINGLETON, VINCENT ) Circuit Court of
LOCKETT, LEON WILLIAMS, TYRONE ) Cook County.
HUTSON, STEVEN BURRIS, and FRANK )
MARTIN, in Their Official Capacities as ) No. 12 COEL 25
Aldermen of the City of Country Club Hills, )
and OSCAR MCNEAL and CHESTER MILLER, ) Honorable
as Individuals, ) Maureen Ward Kirby,
) Judge Presiding.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. )
)
THE CITY OF COUNTRY CLUB HILLS, )
DEBORAH M. MCILVAIN, in Her )
Official Capacity as Clerk of the City of Country )
Club Hills, and DAVID ORR, in His )
Official Capacity as the Cook County Clerk, )
)
Defendants-Appellees. )
______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court with opinion.
Justices Pucinski and Mason concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 This interlocutory appeal challenges the trial court's denial of a petition to preliminarily
enjoin the results of a referendum reducing to five the number of aldermen in the City of Country
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Club Hills. A majority of eligible voters approved the referendum at the November 6, 2012,
general election, and in April 2013, the voters elected five aldermen, who then took office.
¶2 The only issue the trial court determined was the request for preliminary relief. That
issue is now moot, and the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine does not warrant
our exercise of review.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 The City of Country Club Hills' city council consisted of 10 aldermen, with 2
representing each of the City's five wards. Qualified voters petitioned to place a referendum on
the ballot for the 2012 general election seeking to reduce the number of elected aldermen to five,
with one alderman representing each ward. The petition requested that the following proposition
be placed on the ballot:
"SHALL THE CITY OF COUNTRY CLUB HILLS RESTRICT YES [ ]
NUMBER OF ALDERMEN TO 5, WITH ONE ALDERMAN NO [ ]
REPRESENTING EACH WARD?
All existing aldermanic terms shall expire as of the date of the next regular aldermanic
election, at which time a full complement of aldermen shall be elected for the full term."
¶5 This language was taken from section 3.1-20-20(a) of the Illinois Municipal Code (65
ILCS 5/3.1-20-20(a) (West 2008)). After the time for filing objections closed, the city clerk
submitted a written certification of the ballot proposal to the county clerk. The referendum
question as certified by the city clerk included the question as to whether the number of aldermen
should be reduced to five, but omitted the informational language regarding the expiration of
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current aldermanic terms. The referendum passed with 58.44% of the vote.
¶6 About three weeks later, on November 26, 2012, plaintiffs, which included nine aldermen
in their official capacities, as well as two proponents of the referendum, filed a complaint for
declaratory judgment, mandamus, and injunctive relief. They alleged the city clerk exceeded her
authority by failing to include all of the requested petition language on the ballot, rendering the
referendum election void. That same day, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a temporary
restraining order/preliminary injunction seeking to stop the county clerk from certifying the
election results the following day. At an emergency hearing on the plaintiffs' motion, the county
clerk's office stated that if the trial court issued an injunction in plaintiffs' favor, it would revoke
its November 27, 2012, certification. The plaintiffs then withdrew their request for a temporary
restraining order and proceeded on their request for preliminary injunctive relief.
¶7 A hearing on the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction was held on December 7,
2012. Plaintiffs argued that the city clerk had a duty to certify or reject the proposition as
requested in the petition and did not have discretion to alter the language of the petition by
omitting the informational language on the ballot. The trial judge denied the plaintiffs' motion
finding plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm because the aldermen still had time to file as
independent candidates. The trial judge also concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of the underlying action, noting that the city clerk
complied with the Municipal Code by placing the question on the ballot without the
informational language and the plaintiffs had time to file objections to the proposition before it
was certified. The trial court expressed doubt as to the appropriateness of ignoring the will of
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the 58% of Country Club Hills citizens who approved the proposition. Thus, the county clerk's
November 27, 2012, certification remained in place.
¶8 On December 13, 2012, plaintiffs filed this interlocutory appeal asking us to reverse the
trial court's order denying their motion for a preliminary injunction, void the results of the
November 6, 2012, referendum election, and order that the proposition with the explanatory
language be placed on the ballot for the April 9, 2013, consolidated election. Alternatively, if the
referendum election was found to be valid, plaintiffs asked the court to hold that their aldermanic
seats would not expire until the next aldermanic election in 2015. Plaintiffs did not seek an
expedited appeal until January 14, 2013, when they filed a motion to expedite along with their
initial brief in this case. That motion was denied by a different panel of this court, and plaintiffs
took no further steps to obtain an expedited ruling. The April 9, 2013 general election of the five
aldermen proceeded and the Cook County clerk certified the results on April 30, 2013.
¶9 ANALYSIS
¶ 10 A case must remain a legal controversy from the time filed in the appellate court until the
moment of disposition. Although neither party challenged our jurisdiction, as the reviewing
court, we have a duty to consider jurisdiction sua sponte. The circumstances raised the
possibility of mootness, and so we ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing
mootness. See Emery v. Northeast Illinois Regional Transportation Co., 374 Ill. App. 3d 974,
977 (2007). "The existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate
jurisdiction, and courts of review will generally not decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot
questions." In re Marriage of Nienhouse, 355 Ill. App. 3d 146, 149 (2004) (citing Steinbrecher
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v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 523 (2001)). “A case on appeal becomes moot where the issues
presented in the trial court no longer exist because events subsequent to the filing of the appeal
render it impossible for the reviewing court to grant the complaining party effectual relief.”
Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 28. "This court will not review
cases merely to establish a precedent or guide future litigation." Madison Park Bank v. Zagel, 91
Ill. 2d 231, 235 (1982). Even if the case is pending on appeal when the events that render an
issue moot occur, as a reviewing court, we generally will not issue an advisory opinion.
Bluthardt v. Breslin, 74 Ill. 2d 246, 250 (1979).
¶ 11 Where an election has already passed, a cause is moot. Jackson, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 36.
(“It is well established under Illinois law that the conclusion of an election cycle normally moots
an election contest.”). An otherwise moot issue may be considered in rare cases involving issues
presenting " 'a question of great public interest.' " Circle Management, LLC v. Olivier, 378 Ill.
App. 3d 601, 607 (2007) (quoting In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 257 (1989)). "The public
interest exception to the mootness doctrine allows a court to reach the merits of a case which
would otherwise be moot if the question presented is of a public nature, an authoritative
resolution of the question is desirable for the purpose of guiding public officers, and the question
is likely to recur." Jackson, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 44. Not only is the exception construed narrowly,
but all three elements must be present. In re India B., 202 Ill. 2d 522, 543 (2002).
¶ 12 In Jackson, our supreme court held that the public-interest exception applied to a
challenge of a candidate's eligibility for election to the Chicago city counsel, even though the
election had been held and another candidate had been in office for more than a year. First, the
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court noted that the appeal raised a question of election law, which inherently is a matter of
public concern. The specific issue presented was likely to recur in future municipal
elections–whether a determination that a candidate for municipal office owes more property tax
than he or she had paid means that the candidate owes a debt to a municipality within the
meaning of section 3.1-10-5(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code (65 ILCS 5/3.1-10-5(b) (West
2010). Lastly, the court found that a ruling would aid election officials and lower courts in
promptly deciding similar disputes in the future, "thereby avoiding the uncertainty in the electoral
process which inevitably results when threshold eligibility issues cannot be fully resolved before
voters begin casting their ballots." Jackson, 2012 IL 111928, ¶ 44.
¶ 13 Plaintiffs urge this court to follow the holding in Jackson, and argue that the public policy
exception applies. But the Jackson decision is entirely distinguishable. There, the trial and
appellate courts addressed the merits of the objection in determining whether the candidate's
name should be placed on the ballot. By contrast, the merits of plaintiffs' underlying complaint
have not been fully addressed by the trial court; namely, whether the City Clerk exceeded her
authority rendering the election invalid. Instead, the trial court's consideration was limited to
rejecting a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs having failed to establish irreparable harm or a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Under the record before us, an opinion from this
court on the trial court's denial of preliminary relief would not provide an authoritative
determination of the issues at the heart of this case. See Iowa–Illinois Gas & Electric Co. v.
Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 91 Ill. App. 3d 96, 97 (1980) (holding that case would not be
considered under public-interest exception where rulings by appellate court would be evidentiary
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in nature and evidence presented in trial court was incomplete). Therefore, the public-interest
exception is not satisfied.
¶ 14 CONCLUSION
¶ 15 In the absence of a continuing legal controversy and finding no reason for the exception
to the mootness doctrine to apply, we dismiss this appeal.
¶ 16 Appeal dismissed.
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