People v. Barker ( 2007 )

NO. 4-05-0223 Filed: 1/4/07
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Morgan County
LaDONNA M. BARKER, ) No. 04CF106
Defendant-Appellee. )
) Honorable
) Richard T. Mitchell,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE KNECHT delivered the opinion of the court:
In 2004, the State charged defendant, LaDonna M.
Barker, with unlawful possession of methamphetamine-manufacturing
chemical with intent to manufacture. 720 ILCS 570/401(d-5) (West
2004). In October 2004, defendant filed a motion to suppress
evidence, which the trial court granted. The State appeals,
arguing the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion to
suppress evidence. We reverse and remand.
I. BACKGROUND
In June 2004, the State charged defendant with unlawful
possession of methamphetamine-manufacturing chemical with intent
to manufacture. 720 ILCS 570/401(d-5) (West 2004). She was a
passenger in her own vehicle driven by Robert Shaffer on the
night of June 26, 2004, when it was stopped for a traffic viola-
tion, malfunctioning headlights. 625 ILCS 5/12-201(b) (West
2004) (two functioning headlamps required). After the traffic
stop was complete, the vehicle was searched and the alleged
methamphetamine-manufacturing chemical found. In October 2004,
defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence alleging, among
other things, (1) no search or arrest warrant justified the
search and seizure; (2) the search had no reasonable connection
to the traffic stop; and (3) no reasonable, articulable suspicion
existed to search the vehicle once the traffic stop was complete.
In February 2005, the trial court conducted a hearing
on the motion to suppress. Officer Adam Mefford was the only
witness to testify. He was on patrol on Saturday evening, June
26, 2004. Officer Mefford saw a car heading toward him with only
one headlight working. He stopped the vehicle because of the
malfunctioning headlight. Officer Mefford informed the driver,
Robert Shaffer, of the problem with the headlight. He asked for
Shaffer's driver's license and insurance card. Defendant, a
passenger in the vehicle, stated she owned the vehicle and would
try to find the insurance card.
Shaffer told Officer Mefford he knew the headlight was
not working and asked to exit the vehicle to try to get it to
work. Officer Mefford agreed. He then told Shaffer he was going
to issue him a written warning. Officer Mefford ran a computer
check on Shaffer's driver's license and discovered Shaffer had a
criminal history and had been convicted of a drug offense.
Officer Mefford returned to the vehicle and handed
Shaffer the warning ticket. As he did so, he noticed a 12-pack
of beer in the backseat with some containers missing. Officer
Mefford knew it was legal to have an opened cardboard package of
beer in the car, but he asked Shaffer if any of the containers of
beer were open inside the vehicle. When Shaffer said "no,"
Officer Mefford asked Shaffer if he could search the vehicle to
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ensure that fact. Shaffer said "yes." Officer Mefford testified
no pause occurred between the return of Shaffer's license and
warning ticket and either of his two questions. The contraband
in question was discovered during the search.
The trial court found the initial stop was a valid,
proper traffic stop. It then evaluated whether the questioning
of Shaffer was reasonably related to the stop. The court stated
even though the partial 12-pack of beer was legal, it was proper
for Officer Mefford to inquire if there were any open cans in the
car. However, once that question was answered in the negative,
because the officer did not testify to anything else, such as the
odor of alcohol, the request to search was not proper. The
partial 12-pack in the backseat did not create a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. Thus, the stop was impermissibly
prolonged and the nature of the stop was changed. Based on these
findings, the trial court granted the motion to suppress.
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, the State argues the trial court erred in
granting defendant's motion to suppress evidence. We agree.
A. Standard of Review
Reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to sup-
press involves mixed questions of fact and law. People v. Gherna
203 Ill. 2d 165, 175, 784 N.E.2d 799, 805 (2003). On review, we
give great deference to the trial court's factual findings and
will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest
weight of the evidence. Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 175, 784 N.E.2d
at 805. However, we review the trial court's legal determination
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of whether suppression is warranted under those facts de novo.
Gherna, 203 Ill. 2d at 175, 784 N.E.2d at 805. Defendant had the
initial burden of proving the search and seizure were unlawful on
the motion to suppress evidence. 725 ILCS 5/114-12(b) (West
2004). "However, once the defendant makes a prima facie showing
of an illegal search and seizure, the burden shifts to the State
to produce evidence justifying the intrusion." People v. Ortiz,
317 Ill. App. 3d 212, 220, 738 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (2000).
B. Granting of Motion To Suppress
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." U.S. Const., amend. IV. The search and seizure
language found in section 6 of article I of the Illinois Consti-
tution is construed in a manner consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the fourth amendment. Ill.
Const. 1970, art. I, §6; People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220,
224, 789 N.E.2d 260, 264 (2003).
The temporary detention of an individual during a
vehicle stop is a seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 225, 789 N.E.2d at 264. All
occupants within the vehicle are considered to be seized.
Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 225, 789 N.E.2d at 264.
Although traffic stops are often supported by probable
cause, as in this case, the reasonableness of the stop is ana-
lyzed under Terry principles (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22,
20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)). Gonzalez,
204 Ill. 2d at 226, 228, 789 N.E.2d at 265-66 (noting that "as a
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general rule, a fourth amendment challenge to the reasonableness
of a traffic stop is analyzed under Terry principles" and "Terry
principles apply even in the presence of probable cause").
In Terry, the Court established a dual inquiry for
deciding whether an investigative detention is reasonable: (1)
"whether the officer's action was justified at its inception" and
(2) "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances which justified the interference in the first place."
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.
In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court of Illinois set forth
the analysis for determining whether police conduct during the
course of a traffic stop satisfies Terry's scope requirement.
Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235, 789 N.E.2d at 270. Gonzalez
requires us to determine whether Officer Mefford's questioning of
Shaffer was related in scope to the circumstances that justified
the stop in the first place. If so, no fourth-amendment viola-
tion occurred. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235, 789 N.E.2d at 270.
If the questioning was not reasonably related to the purpose of
the stop, we must consider whether the law-enforcement officer
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify the
questioning. If the questioning is so justified, no fourth-
amendment violation occurs. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235, 789
N.E.2d at 270. Absent a reasonable connection to the purpose of
the stop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion "we must consider
whether, in light of all the circumstances and common sense, the
question impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed the
fundamental nature of the stop." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235,
789 N.E.2d at 270.
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Applying Gonzalez to the facts here, we find under
these circumstances, Officer Mefford had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion to justify his questions as a matter of law
after the traffic stop was complete. We find his request to
search the vehicle was reasonable, and the driver gave his
consent. We therefore reverse.
At issue is whether the trial court erred in granting
defendant's motion to suppress, finding (1) it was proper for
Officer Mefford to question Shaffer concerning any open beer
containers but (2) once that question was answered in the nega-
tive, Officer Mefford had no reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity and (3) the traffic stop was impermissibly
prolonged and the nature of the stop was changed by Mefford's
actions in asking for permission to search the vehicle.
The traffic stop in this case began when Officer
Mefford observed the vehicle's malfunctioning headlights. The
parties agree the traffic stop was otherwise complete when
Officer Mefford handed the warning ticket to Shaffer. The State
argues Officer Mefford's interaction with the driver was a
consensual encounter not subject to Terry principles or, alterna-
tively, if a seizure occurred, any detention would have been
justified by reasonable suspicion of an open-container violation.
Defendant responds (1) she and Shaffer continued to be seized
when Officer Mefford asked Shaffer questions at the end of the
traffic stop; (2) no reasonable, articulable suspicion justified
Officer Mefford's request to search the vehicle; and (3) Officer
Mefford's question immediately after the traffic stop was other-
wise complete would make a reasonable person believe the stop was
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not complete and he or she was not free to leave. We disagree.
In applying the Gonzalez framework, we find Officer
Mefford did not exceed the scope of the stop by asking if Shaffer
had any open containers of beer in the car. Once Shaffer an-
swered in the negative, Officer Mefford asked if he could conduct
a search to verify no open containers of beer were in the car.
The questions posed to Shaffer were not related to the initial
justification for the stop for malfunctioning headlights, but the
questions were based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
criminal activity.
Officer Mefford made no mention of unusual odors
emanating from the vehicle or of the occupants exhibiting any
evidence of alcohol consumption. He noted Shaffer had no out-
standing warrants but had a previous conviction for a drug
offense. He also noted Shaffer was nervous and had a hard time
sitting still.
Officer Mefford saw a 12-pack of beer in the backseat
with some of the containers missing from the package. Section
11-502 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11-502 (West
2002)) prohibits a driver or passenger from having any alcoholic
liquor within any passenger area of any motor vehicle upon a
highway except in the original container with the seal unbroken.
An officer encountering occupants of a vehicle late on a summer
Saturday night with a 12-pack of beer minus a bottle or two would
have reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity,
i.e., drinking and driving, was afoot. We note the decision in
People v. Nadermann, 309 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 1021, 723 N.E.2d 857,
862 (2000), which held a ripped cardboard beer package holding
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beer cans with some missing is by itself innocuous and not
evidence of open individual containers of beer. That case
involved the issue of probable cause, whereas this case involves
reasonable suspicion.
Considering the number of drunk-driving arrests and
accidents on Illinois roadways, asking whether any open contain-
ers were in the vehicle under these circumstances was based on a
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. See
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451,
110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 420, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2485 (1990) (states have
an interest in eradicating problem of drunk driving); King v.
Ryan, 153 Ill. 2d 449, 461, 607 N.E.2d 154, 160 (1992) (Illinois
has a "compelling interest in protecting its citizens from the
hazards caused by intoxicated drivers"); Koeck v. Edgar, 180 Ill.
App. 3d 332, 337, 535 N.E.2d 1019, 1022 (1989) (public has an
interest in "curbing the epidemic number of deaths and injuries
attributable to drunk driving by keeping unsafe drivers off the
street"). It was a reasonable question, and it was good police
work, considering the danger when citizens engage in drinking and
driving.
Officer Mefford's second question as to whether he
could search the vehicle to ensure there were no open containers
was also based on a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal
activity. Such a question was a reasonable follow-up that was
justified by the situation. A driver of a vehicle who has been
drinking and driving is not likely to meekly admit the presence
of open containers and offer them up for inspection. Considering
the importance of keeping our roadways safe, Officer Mefford's
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request to search to ensure no open containers were present was
not unreasonable.
We also find Officer Mefford's questions to the driver
after the stop was complete amounted to a consensual encounter.
Shaffer, as the driver of the vehicle, had authority to consent
to the search even though defendant, the owner of the vehicle,
was present as a passenger. "A driver of a vehicle has authority
to consent to a search of the vehicle because he has immediate
possession and control of the entire vehicle. [Citations.] This
is true even when the owner of the vehicle is present and does
not object to the search." People v. Sanchez 292 Ill. App. 3d
763, 769, 686 N.E.2d 367, 371 (1997); see also People v. Mendoza,
234 Ill. App. 3d 826, 835, 599 N.E.2d 1375, 1381 (1992) (driver
has authority to consent to a vehicle search as the defendant,
who was present, never objected to the search); People v. Harris,
199 Ill. App. 3d 1008, 1013, 557 N.E.2d 1277, 1280 (1990) ("a
defendant assumes the risk that the driver will allow someone to
look inside [the vehicle]"). In this case, defendant did not
voice her objection to the search or limit Shaffer's consent.
Thus, Shaffer had authority to consent to the search.
The facts of the present case are similar to those in
our recent opinion in People v. Ramsey, 362 Ill. App. 3d 610, 839
N.E.2d 1093 (2005). In that case, a police officer stopped the
defendant driver because of a cracked windshield. Ramsey, 362
Ill. App. 3d at 615, 839 N.E.2d at 1098. After returning the
driver's documents, the officer asked him if he had anything
illegal in the truck, and when the defendant stated no, the
officer asked for consent to search the vehicle, to which the
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defendant agreed. Ramsey, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 616, 839 N.E.2d at
1099.
This court found the officer had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Ramsey, 362 Ill.
App. 3d at 616, 839 N.E.2d at 1099. Moreover, we found the
questions posed by the officer amounted to a consensual encoun-
ter. Ramsey, 362 Ill. App. 3d at 618, 839 N.E.2d at 1100.
"The fact that a police officer poses
questions to a driver after the purpose of
the traffic stop has concluded does not auto-
matically amount to a seizure. In a consen-
sual conversation, the officer could pose
questions to the driver or request consent to
search the vehicle. Therein, the driver
could decline to answer the officer's ques-
tions or refuse to give his consent. Unless
the totality of the circumstances indicate a
reasonable person would not have felt free to
leave, no seizure has occurred and the defen-
dant's consent to search the vehicle is not
constitutionally prohibited." Ramsey, 362
Ill. App. 3d at 619-20, 839 N.E.2d at 1101-
02.
As we noted in Ramsey, an officer may not demand or
direct compliance, but in this case there was no show of force,
brandishing of weapons, blocking of the vehicle's path, threats
or commands, or an authoritative tone of voice. The questions
posed by Officer Mefford did not force the driver to cooperate.
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As a practical matter, it is unrealistic to say this
was a friendly, innocuous encounter. Officer Mefford sought
information and wanted Shaffer to consent. We believe many
citizens would remain at the scene and comply with an officer's
request believing they had no choice. However, absent some show
of authority beyond the verbal request, the law presumes a
reasonable person would feel free to decline the request and
depart. "Police officers act in full accord with the law when
they ask citizens for consent." United States v. Drayton, 536
U.S. 194, 207, 153 L. Ed. 2d 242, 255, 122 S. Ct. 2105, 2114
(2002). Here, the evidence demonstrates Shaffer's consent was
voluntarily given.
III. CONCLUSION
We reverse the trial court's grant of defendant's
motion to suppress and remand.
Reversed and remanded.
STEIGMANN, P.J., and TURNER, J., concur.
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