Champaign-Urbana Public Health District v. Board of Review of the Department of Employment Security of the State of Illinois ( 2009 )


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  • Filed 9/11/09              NO. 4-08-0809
    IN THE APPELLATE COURT
    OF ILLINOIS
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    CHAMPAIGN-URBANA PUBLIC HEALTH         )    Appeal from
    DISTRICT,                              )    Circuit Court of
    Plaintiff-Appellant,         )    Champaign County
    v.                           )    No. 08MR121
    THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT )
    OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY OF THE STATE    )
    OF ILLINOIS; JAMES P. SLEDGE, as       )
    Director of the Department of          )
    Employment Security of the State of    )
    Illinois; THE DEPARTMENT OF            )
    EMPLOYMENT SECURITY OF THE STATE OF    )    Honorable
    ILLINOIS; and SHELLEY J. SCOTT,        )    Thomas J. Difanis,
    Defendants-Appellees.        )    Judge Presiding.
    _________________________________________________________________
    JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
    In January 2006, plaintiff, Champaign-Urbana Public
    Health District (the District), hired codefendant Shelley J.
    Scott as its finance director.   In May 4, 2007, Scott submitted
    her unsolicited letter of resignation to the chairperson of the
    District's board.   Thereafter, Scott applied for unemployment
    benefits, which the Department of Employment Security granted.
    The District contested the Department's grant in this regard,
    citing section 601(A) of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Act)
    (820 ILCS 405/601(A) (West 2006)) and arguing that because Scott
    had resigned, she was not eligible for unemployment benefits.
    Following an administrative hearing, the Board of Review found
    that Scott had not resigned but had been discharged.
    In February 2008, the District filed a complaint for
    administrative review seeking reversal of the Board's decision.
    In October 2008, the circuit court affirmed the Board of Review's
    decision.
    The District appeals, arguing that Scott voluntarily
    resigned, rendering her ineligible for unemployment benefits
    under the Act.    We agree, reverse the circuit court's judgment,
    and remand with directions.
    I. BACKGROUND
    In May 2007, Scott anonymously reported to the Dis-
    trict's board that her supervisor had engaged in financial
    impropriety with District funds.    Thereafter, the District's
    board investigated these allegations.
    On May 4, 2007, Scott removed all personal items from
    her office and submitted an unsolicited letter of resignation to
    the chairperson of the District's board, Carol Elliott.    Scott's
    letter cited difficulty with her supervisor as the reason for her
    departure, which she noted was "effective immediately."    After
    receiving the letter of resignation, Elliott asked Scott if she
    would be willing to stay at her job if her supervisor was no
    longer employed by the District.    Scott responded that she would
    stay.    That same day, the District's board suspended Scott's
    supervisor pending the results of its investigation.    Elliott
    later testified that her question to Scott was merely hypotheti-
    cal.    However, Scott testified that she interpreted Elliott's
    question as an offer of continued employment, which she accepted.
    Scott returned to her empty office on Monday, May 7,
    2007.    Scott's acting supervisor, Julie Pryde, knowing that Scott
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    submitted her resignation on Friday, May 4, 2007, asked the
    District's counsel for clarification on Scott’s employment
    status.    Counsel responded that he required time to research the
    issue.    In the interim, Pryde treated Scott as if she were still
    an employee and left Scott to work on the District's budget.      (A
    failure to complete the budget by the end of the week would have
    resulted in the District's losing its funding.)
    Scott never completed the budget.   Instead, Scott went
    home sick on Tuesday, May 8, 2007, and on Wednesday, May 9, 2007,
    sent a letter to Elliott, attempting to negotiate a severance
    package.    Scott went home sick on Thursday, May 10, 2007, as
    well.    On Friday, May 11, 2007, the District's counsel informed
    Pryde that Scott’s resignation became final at the time her
    resignation letter was submitted to Elliott on May 4, 2007.
    Pryde immediately informed Scott in writing that her resignation
    had been effective on that date.    Thereafter, Scott filed for
    unemployment benefits, which she was granted.    The Board of
    Review upheld this benefit determination, and the circuit court
    affirmed.    (We note the Board of Review's decision referred to
    the referee's section 602(A) finding (820 ILCS 405/602(A) (West
    2006)) and correctly ignored it as irrelevant.    That section
    deals with employee misconduct, which no one raised as an issue
    in this case.)
    This appeal followed.
    II. ANALYSIS
    The District argues that Scott’s May 4, 2007, letter of
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    resignation was effective upon delivery and was not subject to
    rescission.   Scott responds that she rescinded her resignation
    when Elliott asked Scott if she would consider staying.    As
    evidence that she rescinded her resignation, Scott points to the
    fact that she worked on the budget the following week.    Scott
    posits that she was later discharged when she received Pryde's
    letter acknowledging her May 4, 2007, resignation.   We agree with
    the District that Scott's resignation was effective May 4, 2007.
    A. Undisputed Facts and the Standard of Review
    The following facts are undisputed: (1) Scott hand-
    delivered a resignation letter to Elliott on May 4, 2007; (2) the
    letter stated that Scott’s resignation was "effective immedi-
    ately"; and (3) Scott was a public employee.
    The legal effect of undisputed facts is a question of
    law, which we review de novo.    Fitzpatrick v. Human Rights
    Comm’n, 
    267 Ill. App. 3d 386
    , 392, 
    642 N.E.2d 486
    , 491 (1994).
    B. Scott's Resignation Was Final and Irrevocable
    When a public officer tenders a letter of resignation,
    "the resignation is an unalterable fact and the officer cannot
    withdraw the resignation and cannot negate it by continuing to
    perform the job."   (Emphasis added.)   Rohrback v. Department of
    Employment Security, 
    361 Ill. App. 3d 298
    , 305, 
    835 N.E.2d 955
    ,
    962 (2005).   This has long been the law in Illinois because
    "public policy requires that there be certainty as to who are and
    who are not public officers."    People ex rel. Adamowski v.
    Kerner, 
    19 Ill. 2d 506
    , 512, 
    167 N.E.2d 555
    , 558 (1960).    This
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    same standard applies to public employees as well.    Stearns v.
    Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 
    59 Ill. App. 3d 569
    , 572,
    
    375 N.E.2d 877
    , 880 (1978).
    In this case, the record reveals, and the parties do
    not dispute, that on May 4, 2007, Scott, a public employee,
    tendered her resignation "effective immediately."    In doing so,
    Scott’s resignation became a fait accompli.    Nevertheless, citing
    
    Kerner, 19 Ill. 2d at 512
    , 167 N.E.2d at 558, Scott asserts that
    Elliott took affirmative action to preclude her resignation for
    the public convenience--that is, the budget issue was so signifi-
    cant that Elliott was forced to disregard Scott's May 4, 2007,
    resignation--and that Scott agreed to do so.   However, given the
    facts of this case, whatever conversation Scott and Elliott had
    after the resignation letter was tendered is irrelevant.   As this
    court explained in 
    Rohrback, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 305-06
    , 835
    N.E.2d at 962, Scott’s return to the office the following week
    and subsequent work on the budget have no bearing on her employ-
    ment status.   Further, contrary to Scott's assertion, Pryde's May
    11, 2007, correspondence to Scott was nothing more than an
    official acknowledgment that Scott’s resignation became effective
    on May 4, 2007.
    Because we conclude that Scott resigned on May 4, 2007,
    she is ineligible for unemployment benefits unless she is other-
    wise qualified for such benefits pursuant to the terms of section
    601 of the Act (820 ILCS 405/601 (West 2006)).   Accordingly, we
    remand this matter for a determination as to whether Scott is
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    otherwise eligible for benefits under section 601 of the Act (820
    ILCS 405/601 (West 2006)).
    In closing, we note that when determining whether Scott
    is eligible for unemployment benefits, the Board of Review shall
    not consider anything done or said to Scott after she delivered
    her resignation letter to Elliott on May 4, 2007.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated, we reverse the circuit court’s
    judgment and remand with directions.
    Reversed and remanded with directions.
    TURNER and APPLETON, JJ., concur.
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