Childress v. Department of Employment Security ( 2010 )

THIRD DIVISION
December 1, 2010
1-09-2733
JUANITA CHILDRESS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. )
)
THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY; )
DIRECTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT )
SECURITY; THE BOARD OF REVIEW ) No. 09 L 50694
)
Defendants-Appellants )
)
(Chicago Park District, c/o Cambridge )
Integrated Services, ) Honorable
) Sanjay T. Tailor,
Defendant). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE STEELE delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendants, the Illinois Department of Employment Security
(Department), its Director, and the Board of Review, appeal from
the circuit court’s order reversing the Board’s decision denying
plaintiff, Juanita Childress, unemployment benefits under section
601(A) of the Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act (Act) (820 ILCS
405/601(A) (West 2008)). Defendants contend that under the Act,
plaintiff was ineligible to receive benefits because she
voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to her
employer when she accepted her employer’s severance package.
Defendants contend that, as a result, the circuit court erred in
reversing the Board’s decision. We agree and therefore reverse.
1-09-2733
BACKGROUND
The record shows that plaintiff was employed as an advanced
buyer by the Chicago Park District (hereafter Park District) from
September 1999 until October 15, 2008, when she accepted the Park
District’s voluntary severance package. She then applied for
unemployment benefits and the Park District protested her claim.
The Park District alleged that plaintiff was ineligible for
benefits because she voluntarily accepted the severance package,
along with monetary compensation. The Park District further
alleged that plaintiff was not threatened with a layoff, nor did
her resignation impact another employee.
On February 19, 2009, a claims adjudicator for the
Department determined that plaintiff was ineligible for
unemployment benefits because she left work voluntarily without
good cause attributable to her employer when she accepted the
Park District’s voluntary severance package.
Plaintiff requested reconsideration of this decision. She
stated that she had requested information from upper management
regarding whether an alleged layoff would affect her, but "they
could not guarantee [her] that [she] would remain an employee."
She stated that was sufficient reason for her to accept the
severance package offered and search for employment elsewhere.
On March 31, 2009, a Department referee conducted a
telephonic hearing in the matter. Plaintiff testified that she
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accepted the severance package, along with $15,000 in monetary
compensation, because the Park District was "talking about doing
major layoffs." She testified, however, that she was never
notified that she would be laid off from her position, in which
she held the most seniority. She testified that the job cuts
were not directed at any one person or department or based on
seniority but, rather, were "across the board." She further
stated the number of people the Park District intended to lay off
was reported in the newspaper, but she could not recall that
number. Plaintiff testified that she questioned the Director
about the targeted employees, but he could not confirm who would
be affected by the cuts. Moreover, plaintiff testified that
although the severance package permitted employees to work until
the end of October, she left before then because she was seeking
alternative employment. She acknowledged that three other
employees held the same position but did not accept the buyout
package.
Plaintiff further testified that another reason she left her
employer was because her work was "being taken and misconstrued
or done a different way or given to someone else" even after she
had completed it. She stated that it was her responsibility to
ensure the work was performed properly; however, she had no
knowledge it had been changed. She testified that, prior to
leaving, she notified her director that work on the computer had
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been deleted by other staff. Plaintiff believed she also
reported the deletion of her work to human resources, but was
unsure. She testified that based on the deletion, she believed
she "wasn’t needed."
Park District human resources manager Michele Gage next
testified that the Park District offered the voluntary severance
package to all full-time Park District employees, notifying them
via a letter. She testified that she was unaware of any meetings
where layoffs were threatened and there were no layoffs of full-
time staff at the Park District. Gage testified that when
plaintiff submitted her resignation, she stated that, for a
number of reasons, it was time for her resignation and that she
was not happy with the departmental management. Gage further
testified that plaintiff had resigned from her position prior to
the end of the incentive period, citing personal issues unrelated
to work and good timing.
On April 1, 2009, the referee affirmed the claims
adjudicator’s determination, finding that plaintiff was
ineligible to receive unemployment benefits under section 601(A)
of the Act (820 ILCS 405/601(A) (West 2008)), because she
voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to her
employer. The referee held the evidence did not reflect that
plaintiff was in imminent danger of losing her job and that she
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could have worked an additional two weeks under the terms of the
offer, but declined to do so because of personal issues.
Plaintiff appealed to the Board. On June 3, 2009, the Board
affirmed the referee’s decision, citing the Illinois
Administrative Code (56 Ill. Adm. Code §2840.125, added at 17
Ill. Reg. 17929, eff. October 4, 1993), which governs when a
person is eligible for unemployment benefits after accepting an
employment buyout package. The Board found the Park District’s
severance offer was voluntary and not coerced by the threat of
layoff. That is, the Board observed that the Park District did
not announce any specific layoffs in conjunction with its offer
and did not set any fixed goals regarding the number of employees
expected to retire. The Board also found plaintiff was not
informed that she would face a layoff if she did not accept the
buyout. It further found there was no evidence that plaintiff
sought assurances from the employer that her employment would
not, in the proximate future, be terminated under terms
substantially less favorable to the terms of the buyout or that
the terms of her employment would not, in the proximate future,
become substantially less favorable. Rather, it found a
substantial reason for her decision to leave was her
dissatisfaction with the allocation of work, and this, the Board
held, did not constitute good cause attributable to her employer.
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Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint for administrative
review in the circuit court of Cook County. The circuit court
reversed the Board’s decision on September 9, 2009. Defendants
appealed.
Although plaintiff has not filed a brief on appeal, we will
consider the merits of the appeal under the standard set forth in
First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63
Ill. 2d 128, 131, 133 (1976).
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendants contend that the Board’s decision,
that plaintiff left work voluntarily without good cause
attributable to her employer, was neither against the manifest
weight of the evidence nor clearly erroneous, and therefore, the
circuit court erred in reversing the Board’s decision.
Our review of the administrative law proceeding is limited
to the propriety of the Board’s decision. Oleszczuk v.
Department of Employment Security, 336 Ill. App. 3d 46, 50
(2002). The question of whether an employee left work without
good cause attributable to her employer involves a mixed question
of law and fact to which we apply the "clearly erroneous"
standard of review. AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of
Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 395 (2001); Horton v.
Department of Employment Security, 335 Ill. App. 3d 537, 540
(2002). An agency decision may be deemed clearly erroneous only
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where a review of the record leaves the reviewing court with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. AFM
Messenger Service, 198 Ill. 2d at 395. For the following
reasons, we cannot say the Board’s decision was clearly
erroneous.
Receipt of unemployment benefits is conditioned on
eligibility under the Act, and the burden of proving eligibility
rests with the claimant. Grigoleit Co. v. Department of
Employment Security, 282 Ill. App. 3d 64, 68 (1996); Collier v.
Department of Employment Security, 157 Ill. App. 3d 988, 991
(1987). Section 601(A) of the Act disqualifies a former employee
from receiving unemployment benefits if she left work voluntarily
without good cause attributable to the employer. 820 ILCS
405/601(A) (West 2008). Good cause results from circumstances
that produce pressure to terminate employment that is both real
and substantial and that would compel a reasonable person under
the circumstances to act the same manner. Collier, 157 Ill. App.
3d at 992. An example of good cause is a unilateral change in
the terms and conditions of employment that renders the job
unsuitable. Collier, 157 Ill. App. 3d at 994.
When, as here, an employee accepts the employer’s buyout
package, good cause does not exist, and the employee is
ineligible to receive unemployment benefits under section 601 of
the Act, unless at the time she accepts the buyout: (1) the
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employee knows or reasonably believes that her employment will be
terminated by the employer within the proximate future under
terms substantially less favorable than the terms of the buyout
offer; (2) the employee knows or reasonably believes that her
employment will continue in the proximate future, but under terms
substantially less favorable than the terms of her employment
immediately prior to the buyout offer; or (3) the employee knows
that a layoff will follow if a sufficient number of employees do
not accept the buyout offer and the employee accepts the offer to
avoid the layoff of another employee. 56 Ill. Adm. Code
§2840.125(a), added at 17 Ill. Reg. 17929, eff. October 4, 1993.
In this case, the Board rightly found that plaintiff failed
to satisfy the exceptions to the general rule that an employee
who accepts an employer buyout package is ineligible for
unemployment benefits under section 601 of the Act. As the Board
noted, there was no evidence that plaintiff was coerced into
accepting the buyout package based on the threat of layoffs,
where the Park District neither announced any specific layoffs in
conjunction with its offer nor indicated the number of employees
it expected to accept the package.
Moreover, by plaintiff’s own testimony, she was never
notified that she would face a layoff if she did not accept the
buyout and none of the other employees in her position accepted
the buyout. The employer’s human resources director testified
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that ultimately no full-time employees were laid off. While
plaintiff did ask the Director which employees might be laid off,
there is no evidence that she specifically sought assurances from
her employer that, in the proximate future, her employment would
not be terminated under terms less favorable than those of the
offer or that the terms of her employment would become less
favorable than the terms of her employment immediately prior to
the offer. See 56 Ill. Adm. Code §§2840.125(b),(b)(2), added at
17 Ill. Reg. 17929, eff. October 4, 1993; see also Henderson v.
Department of Employment Security, 230 Ill. App. 3d 536, 539
(1992) (employee should make reasonable efforts to resolve
employment conflicts). She also did not accept the severance
package in order to avert the layoff of another employee.
Rather, the evidence shows that plaintiff voluntarily accepted
the severance package.
Plaintiff thus failed to prove she was subject to any
exceptions to the general rule prohibiting her from receiving
unemployment benefits upon acceptance of a severance package and
the evidence does not show a unilateral change in the terms of
employment that rendered her job unsuitable. See Collier, 157
Ill. App. 3d at 994. The reasons plaintiff cites for leaving her
employment therefore do not constitute good cause attributable to
her employer, and thus, plaintiff failed to meet her burden of
proving eligibility under the Act. See White v. Department of
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Employment Security, 376 Ill. App. 3d 668, 672 (2007); Collier,
157 Ill. App. 3d at 994.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we reverse the decision of the
circuit court of Cook County and uphold the Board’s decision
finding plaintiff ineligible to receive unemployment benefits.
Reversed.
QUINN, P.J., and NEVILLE, J., concur.
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REPORTER OF DECISIONS – ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT
Please Use (Front Sheet to be Attached to Each Case)
Following
Form:
JUANITA CHILDRESS,
Complete
TITLE
of Case Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY;
DIRECTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
SECURITY; THE BOARD OF REVIEW
Defendants-Appellants
(Chicago Park District, c/o Cambridge Integrated Services,
Docket No. Defendant).
COURT No. 1-09-2733
Appellate Court of Illinois
Opinion
First District, THIRD Division
Filed
December 1, 2010
(Give month, day and year)
JUSTICES
JUSTICE STEELE delivered the opinion of the court:
Quinn, P.J., and Neville, J., concur
dissent[s]
APPEAL from
the Circuit
Ct. of Cook
County, Lower Court and T rial Judge(s) in form indicated in the margin:
Chancery Circuit Ct. of Cook County, Law Division
Div. The Honorable Sanjay T. Tailor , Judge Presiding.
Indicate if attorney represents APPELLANTS or APPELLEE S and include
attorneys of counsel. Indicate the word NONE if not represented.
For
APPELLANTS, Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants: Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, State of Illinois
John Doe, Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General
of Chicago. (Janon E. Fabiano, Assistant Attorney General, of Counsel)
100 West Randolph St., 12th Flr.
For Chicago, IL 60601
APPELLEES,
Smith and
Smith of Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee: NONE
Chicago,
Joseph
Brown, (of
Counsel)
Also add
attorneys
for third-
party
appellants
or
appellees.
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