American Access Casualty Company v. Griffin , 2014 IL App (1st) 130665 ( 2014 )


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  •                                   Illinois Official Reports
    Appellate Court
    American Access Casualty Co. v. Griffin, 
    2014 IL App (1st) 130665
    Appellate Court              AMERICAN ACCESS CASUALTY COMPANY, Plaintiff-
    Caption                      Appellee, v. KIONNA GRIFFIN, Defendant-Appellant (Erica
    Perkins, Beverly Perkins, and LaTonya Reese, Defendants).
    District & No.               First District, Sixth Division
    Docket No. 1-13-0665
    Filed                        March 31, 2014
    Held                         The appellate court reversed the entry of summary judgment for
    (Note: This syllabus         plaintiff insurer in its action seeking a declaratory judgment that it had
    constitutes no part of the   no duty to defend or indemnify defendant for the losses arising from
    opinion of the court but     an automobile accident that occurred when a vehicle owned by
    has been prepared by the     defendant’s mother and driven by defendant was involved in a
    Reporter of Decisions        collision with another vehicle, notwithstanding the facts that
    for the convenience of       defendant had a nonowners automobile insurance policy and both she
    the reader.)                 and her mother were defaulted in plaintiff’s action, since genuine
    issues of material fact existed as to whether defendant had to ask her
    mother for permission to use the car, the nature of the permission that
    was granted, whether defendant was the “regular” or “primary” driver
    of the car, and whether any exclusions applied under the
    circumstances.
    Decision Under               Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-CH-014807;
    Review                       the Hon. Moshe Jacobius, Judge, presiding.
    Judgment                     Reversed and remanded.
    Counsel on              Larsen Law Firm, P.C., of Chicago (Scott J. Larsen and Michael C.
    Appeal                  Keefe, of counsel), for appellant.
    Giamanco & Ooink Law Office, of Bolingbrook (Phyllis Roman, of
    counsel), for appellee.
    Panel                   JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with
    opinion.
    Justices Hall and Reyes concurred in the judgment and opinion.
    OPINION
    ¶1         Plaintiff, American Access Casualty Company (American), filed a complaint for
    declaratory judgment against defendants Erica Perkins, Beverly Perkins, LaTonya Reese, and
    Kionna Griffin. Erica Perkins is plaintiff’s insured. The remaining defendants are named as
    necessary parties from whom no relief is sought. The complaint sought a declaration that
    plaintiff owes no duty to defend or indemnify Erica Perkins for losses caused by her use of a
    1995 Dodge Avenger owned by defendant Beverly Perkins. The complaint also sought a
    declaration of whether the vehicle is covered by any primary insurance policy, and that Erica
    Perkins had breached her duty of assistance and cooperation under her insurance policy with
    plaintiff. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment supported by an affidavit from one of
    its attorneys. Plaintiff’s attorney made averments as to statements Erica Perkins allegedly
    made to him in two telephone conversations, which plaintiff argued constituted admissions
    eliminating her use of the subject vehicle from the insurance policy’s coverage. The circuit
    court of Cook County granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
    ¶2         For the following reasons, we reverse.
    ¶3                                           BACKGROUND
    ¶4         In September 2008, Erica Perkins was involved in an automobile accident while driving a
    1995 Dodge Avenger allegedly owned by Beverly Perkins. Defendants LaTonya Reese and
    Kionna Griffin filed separate complaints against Erica Perkins for injuries each allegedly
    sustained as a result of the collision. American issued a nonowners automobile insurance
    policy to Erica Perkins. American is providing a defense to Erica Perkins against each
    complaint under a reservation of rights.
    ¶5         The policy contains the following pertinent language:
    “If this policy is written as a Non-Owner’s Filing Policy ***, it is agreed that such
    insurance as is afforded for Bodily Injury and Property Damage only applies with
    respect to the use of an ‘non-owned automobile’ and not any ‘owned automobile’ by
    the name[d] insured ***.
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    1. ‘non-owned automobile’ means an automobile not owned by or furnished for the
    regular use of the named insured ***;
    2. This policy does not apply to any automobile owned by or furnished for the
    regular use of the named insured ***.
    3. This insurance shall be excess over any other valid and collectible insurance.”
    ¶6       The policy also contains a provision requiring the insured to “cooperate with the
    Company” and, upon request, to answer all questions and provide any written proofs of loss
    American requires. The policy states that American “has no duty to provide coverage under the
    policy unless there has been full compliance with these responsibilities.” The complaint states,
    on information and belief, that Beverly Perkins furnished the vehicle to Erica Perkins for
    regular use. American alleged it made repeated attempts to contact both Erica Perkins and
    Beverly Perkins to verify ownership and whether any person had taken out a primary insurance
    policy on the vehicle, and to ascertain whether Erica Perkins used the vehicle on a regular
    basis. The complaint also alleged that Erica Perkins has continually failed to cooperate in
    American’s investigation of this matter. The complaint alleged that as a consequence of the
    foregoing, American does not have a duty to defend or indemnify Erica Perkins against the
    Reese and Griffin lawsuits because the vehicle was furnished by a close relative for regular
    use.
    ¶7       Plaintiff sought a declaration staying any and all proceedings related to the vehicle
    accident, a declaration that American owes no duty to defend Erica Perkins in the Reese and
    Griffin lawsuits or for any losses caused by the vehicle accident because the vehicle is not a
    “non-owned automobile” under the policy, a determination of whether the vehicle is covered
    by a primary insurance policy, and a declaration that Erica Perkins violated the terms and
    conditions of the policy by failing to cooperate with American by providing documentation
    and information regarding ownership, insurance coverage, and usage of the vehicle.
    ¶8       Plaintiff issued a summons to defendants. In June 2011 plaintiff filed a motion to appoint a
    special process server and to issue alias summonses for Beverly Perkins, LaTonya Reese, and
    Erica Perkins. Plaintiff’s motion alleged the sheriff’s office returned summonses as not found.
    In July 2011 the trial court appointed a special process server and plaintiff issued alias
    summonses. On July 27, 2011, the special process server executed an affidavit of attempted
    service, stating that he had been unable to effect service on Erica Perkins or Beverly Perkins
    because neither resided at the given address and that the process server was unable to obtain
    any information from the current resident. On August 16, 2011, the Illinois Secretary of State
    accepted service of the summons and complaint for Erica Perkins. On August 31, 2011,
    plaintiff filed a motion for alternative service on Beverly Perkins through the Illinois Secretary
    of State. On October 6, 2011, the court granted the motion and granted plaintiff leave to serve
    Beverly Perkins by Secretary of State service and to issue a second alias summons. On October
    31, 2011, the Illinois Secretary of State accepted service of the summons and complaint for
    Beverly Perkins.
    ¶9       On January 30, 2012, plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment as to all defendants. On
    January 31, 2012, plaintiff moved for summary judgment. On February 9, 2012, the trial court
    granted plaintiff’s motion for default judgment as to Erica Perkins, Beverly Perkins, and
    LaTonya Reese. The court granted Griffin leave to file an appearance and answer. In August
    2012, the court vacated default judgment against Reese and granted her leave to file an
    appearance. In October 2012, the court entered an order for Reese to appear or otherwise plead
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    by October 30, 2012. The court then set a briefing schedule for plaintiff’s motion for summary
    judgment. In December 2012, Reese filed an agreed motion for entry of an order entering her
    stipulation to be bound by any judgment of the trial court in this cause of action without her
    active participation.
    ¶ 10       Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment states that all of the facts stated therein are
    alleged in plaintiff’s complaint, the pleadings on file, the certified documents attached to the
    motion, and in the affidavits attached to the motion. As it pertains to the issues in this appeal,
    the motion states as follows: Erica Perkins was the primary driver of the vehicle involved in the
    accident for which Reese and Griffin seek damages from Erica Perkins. In support, the motion
    cites to an affidavit prepared by Joseph Paul Giamanco, one of plaintiff’s attorneys. Plaintiff’s
    motion for summary judgment also claims that proof of service on file with the circuit court
    clerk shows service in this matter on Erica Perkins “on August 16, 2011 through Illinois
    Secretary of State Service, as a non-resident.”
    ¶ 11       Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment argues that there is no genuine issue of material
    fact, and that the undisputed facts establish that the vehicle at issue was a vehicle furnished for
    Erica Perkins’ regular use and therefore was not covered by her insurance policy with plaintiff.
    Plaintiff’s motion does not argue that plaintiff owes no duty to defend or indemnify Erica
    Perkins because she failed to cooperate with plaintiff’s investigation. Plaintiff asked the trial
    court to find and declare that plaintiff has no duty to defend or indemnify Erica Perkins for
    liability stemming from the automobile accident at issue.
    ¶ 12       Plaintiff’s argument in its motion for summary judgment characterizes the allegations in
    Giamanco’s affidavit, which allegedly memorializes statements Erica Perkins made to
    Giamanco in two separate telephone conversations, as admissions. The affidavit contains the
    following pertinent averments:
    “3. On November11, 2011, I received a phone call from Defendant, ERICA
    PERKINS who identified herself as such and advised that she had received a copy of
    the Declaratory Judgment Complaint filed against her which was served on her via the
    Illinois Secretary of State. At that time Ms. Perkins advised that she was living in
    Minnesota and moving around quite a bit and as such could not provide me with a
    phone number or a permanent address; however, she advised me that all
    correspondence intended for her could be sent to 4301 Nobel 78th Avenue North,
    Brooklyn Park, Minnesota 55443.
    ***
    5. During that conversation ERICA PERKINS made the following admissions:
    a. On September 28, 2008 [sic] she was involved in a collision with LaTonya
    Reese, while driving a 1995 Dodge Avenger. At the time of the collision Kionna
    Griffen [sic] was riding as a passenger in LaTonya Reese’s vehicle.
    b. Her mother, Beverly Perkins was the owner of the 1995 Dodge Avenger.
    c. ERICA PERKINS was not the owner of the 1995 Dodge Avenger.
    d. She previously drove the 1995 Dodge Avenger on many occasions with her
    mother’s permission.
    e. She was the primary driver of the 1995 Dodge Avenger.
    f. Her mother, Beverly Perkins, owned a second vehicle which Beverly Perkins
    used as her primary vehicle.
    g. Because of ERICA PERKINS’ regular use of the 1995 Dodge Avenger she
    -4-
    was familiar with its operation.
    ***
    8. After the telephone conversation was concluded I looked at the caller ID and
    noted that the number she called from was (708) 793-0344.
    9. On January 17, 2012, I called ERICA PERKINS, at (708)793-0344 ***. At that
    time she again identified herself as ERICA PERKINS. ***
    ***
    11. During that conversation ERICA PERKINS confirmed all the admissions she
    made to me during our November 11, 2011 telephone conversation, outlined above in
    paragraph 5, subparagraphs a-g.”
    ¶ 13       Mr. Giamanco’s affidavit relates how Erica Perkins agreed to execute an affidavit stating
    the information she provided to him in these telephone conversations, that he twice attempted
    to send her an affidavit for her signature at an address she provided, but that Erica Perkins
    never executed and returned an affidavit to him.
    ¶ 14       On January 23, 2013, the trial court held a hearing on plaintiff’s motion for summary
    judgment. Erica and Beverly Perkins did not appear at the hearing. Griffin’s attorney argued
    that the affidavit plaintiff attached to its motion for summary judgment consisted entirely of
    hearsay, lacked adequate foundation, and that Erica Perkins was not properly made a party to
    the proceedings. The same day, the court entered its written order granting summary judgment
    in favor of plaintiff on the grounds “the pleadings, admissions, and affidavits on file show that
    there is no genuine issue as to whether the Dodge Avenger was an automobile furnished for
    Erica’s regular use” and therefore it “is not covered by the Policy issued by Plaintiff to Erica.”
    The court’s order also entered a declaration that plaintiff has no duty to cover Erica Perkins’
    losses from the accident at issue in this case and has no duty to defend or indemnify Erica
    Perkins in the underlying lawsuits in this case or for any other matter arising out of the
    accident.
    ¶ 15       On February 22, 2013, Griffin filed a notice of appeal. In October 2013, this court allowed
    Reese’s motion to adopt Griffin’s brief. We now address the merits of the appeal.
    ¶ 16                                            ANALYSIS
    ¶ 17       Defendants argue the question of whether a vehicle is furnished for the regular use of a
    driver for purposes of determining whether coverage is excluded under a provision like the one
    at issue in this case is a question of fact that cannot be resolved on summary judgment.
    Defendants also argue that the facts alleged in plaintiff’s affidavit do not demonstrate the
    absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the question of whether the vehicle was
    furnished for Erica Perkins’ regular use. Rather, defendants argue, Erica Perkins’ alleged
    statement that she was the “primary driver” of the vehicle is not so clear as to demonstrate that
    there is no question of material fact because that expression is subject to a “fluid definition”
    that may not equate to the vehicle being provided for the “primary” driver’s “regular use.”
    Defendants also argue the affidavit contains conflicting statements about the usage of the
    vehicle, because the affidavit claims that Erica Perkins stated she was the “primary driver” but
    also that she drove the vehicle with the owner’s permission. Alternatively, defendants’ argue
    the affidavit is insufficient to establish plaintiff’s right to summary judgment because the
    affidavit is inadmissible hearsay and the admission by a party-opponent exception to the
    -5-
    hearsay rule does not apply. Defendants also argue that if the caller’s statements are not
    hearsay, plaintiff has failed to provide a proper foundation to admit the affidavit because it
    contains insufficient facts to authenticate the identity of the nonaffiant party to the telephone
    conversation. Finally, defendants argue that plaintiff’s counsel’s affidavit should not be
    allowed because counsel is a third party with a vested interest in the case.
    ¶ 18       Plaintiff responds defendants forfeited any argument not raised in the trial court and,
    consequently, defendants are barred from arguing that the question of regular use is not
    amenable to determination by summary judgment or that plaintiff failed to properly serve Erica
    Perkins and, therefore, she is not a party to these proceedings. Plaintiff also argues defendants
    failed to support their argument the affidavit should not be allowed because the affiant is a
    third party with a vested interest in the case with citation to relevant authority, thereby
    forfeiting that argument as well.
    ¶ 19       We need not address plaintiff’s argument that certain of defendants’ arguments are
    forfeited. Nor do we have need to address defendants’ alternative arguments the trial court
    erred in considering the affidavit at all. “A circuit court may properly grant a motion for
    summary judgment where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
    affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party
    is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Citation.]” West v. American Standard Insurance
    Co. of Wisconsin, 
    2011 IL App (1st) 101274
    , ¶ 6. “Summary judgment should not be granted
    unless the moving party’s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt. If the undisputed
    material facts could lead reasonable observers to divergent inferences, *** summary judgment
    should be denied and the issue decided by the trier of fact.” Pielet v. Pielet, 
    2012 IL 112064
    ,
    ¶ 53. “We review de novo rulings on summary judgment.” Bartlow v. Costigan, 
    2014 IL 115152
    , ¶ 17.
    “The purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact, but to determine
    whether a genuine issue of triable fact exists. [Citation.] In determining whether a
    question of fact exists, a court must construe the pleadings, depositions, admissions,
    and affidavits strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent.
    [Citation.] Summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and thus
    should only be awarded when the moving party’s right to judgment as a matter of law is
    clear and free from doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of
    Maurice B.H., 
    2012 IL App (1st) 121105
    , ¶ 17.
    ¶ 20       For reasons explained more fully herein, plaintiff may not rely on Beverly and Erica
    Perkins’ default in support of its motion for summary judgment on its complaint against
    defendants Griffin and Reese. Thus, we can resolve this appeal from the face of the affidavit,
    without relying on defendants’ arguments the affidavit should not be considered. We also
    make no decision as to whether “regular use” is always a question for the trier of fact that
    cannot be disposed of by summary judgment. 1 In this case, a triable issue of fact exists. We
    1
    We decline to reach this and the other issues noted because our supreme court has warned that
    “[a]dvisory opinions are to be avoided.” Marion Hospital Corp. v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning
    Board, 
    201 Ill. 2d 465
    , 475 (2002). Nonetheless, we acknowledge the fact that this court has affirmed,
    in a nonprecedential order, summary judgment on a complaint seeking declaratory relief on the grounds
    an insurance policy excluded coverage because a vehicle was available for regular use. See Illinois
    Farmers Insurance Co. v. Estate of James, 
    2011 IL App (1st) 110759-U
    , ¶¶ 1-2.
    -6-
    cannot say that the vehicle was furnished for the regular use of Erica Perkins as a matter of law.
    Quite to the contrary, even accepting all of the facts alleged in the affidavit as true and
    admissible, those averments leave open questions of fact that are material to whether the
    vehicle was furnished for her regular use for purposes of the exclusion in the nonowner’s
    automobile insurance policy. Accordingly, we cannot say that plaintiff’s right to judgment as a
    matter of law is clear and free from doubt.
    ¶ 21        “The construction of an insurance policy is a question of law that this court determines
    de novo.” American Standard Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 
    2011 IL App (1st) 101274
    , ¶ 6.
    “General contract law governs the interpretation of insurance policies. [Citation.] As such,
    courts seek to effectuate the intention of the parties, primarily as expressed through the policy
    language itself.” American Standard Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 
    2011 IL App (1st) 101274
    ,
    ¶ 5. The policy at issue does not define the term “regular use.” The term “regular use” is “not
    subject to absolute definition and *** each case is dependent upon its own facts and
    circumstances.” State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Differding, 
    69 Ill. 2d 103
    ,
    107 (1977). Nonetheless, this court has long recognized:
    “[T]he exclusion of cars furnished for regular use to the insured or a member of his
    household would seem to indicate the intention of the company to protect itself from a
    situation where an insured could pay for one policy and be covered by the insurance in
    driving any car that he decided to use whether owned by him or members of his family,
    or cars that had been furnished for his regular use; in other words, cars under his
    control that he could use at will and might use often. Without some such exclusion it is
    obvious that the company might lose premiums and also that the hazard under the
    insurance would be increased. It is evident that the purpose on the part of the company
    in extending the driver’s regular insurance without the payment of any additional
    premiums would apply to the occasional driving of cars other than his own, but would
    be inapplicable to an automobile furnished to the insured for his regular use.”
    (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted.) Continental National
    American Group v. Vaicunas, 
    26 Ill. App. 3d 835
    , 838 (1975).
    ¶ 22        Plaintiff’s affidavit does not state that Erica Perkins used the vehicle at will or often. The
    affidavit states that she previously drove the 1995 Dodge Avenger on many occasions with her
    mother’s permission. The scope and duration of permission to use a nonowned vehicle can be
    “particularly determinative of whether [the] vehicle was or was not available for [the driver’s]
    regular use.” Knack v. Phillips, 
    134 Ill. App. 3d 117
    , 122 (1985). The permission may be
    “more consistent with a limited and casual use, and not a regular use.” 
    Id. The affidavit
    says
    nothing about the scope or duration of her mother’s permission. The affidavit does not state
    whether “the duration of her permission to use the automobile was [ever] precisely agreed
    upon.” 
    Knack, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 122
    . The affidavit does not state how long Erica Perkins
    would be permitted to use the vehicle when Beverly Perkins allegedly granted the permission,
    or how long Erica Perkins had been permitted to use the automobile at the time of the collision.
    See Sheary v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
    207 Ill. App. 3d 1067
    , 1071
    (1991) (trial court’s judgment driver’s use of vehicle not excluded by regular use provision
    was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where driver “had been allowed to use the
    car for only 15 minutes prior to the accident”). The Sheary court distinguished 
    Differding, 69 Ill. 2d at 105
    (affirming trial court judgment insurance policy provided no coverage), on the
    basis that, in Differding, “the car was available to the insured *** [for] a period substantially
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    longer than that involved here.” 
    Sheary, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 1071
    . In this case, we do not know
    the length of time the car was available to Erica Perkins.
    ¶ 23        Plaintiff is correct that the “affidavit does not state that Erica Perkins had to ask for her
    mother’s permission to use the car.” Nor does it state that she did not have to ask for her
    mother’s permission to use the car. It only states that she used the car on many occasions with
    her mother’s permission. A trier of fact could reasonably infer that Erica Perkins did not have
    to ask permission. A trier of fact could also reasonably infer that Erica Perkins did have to ask
    permission. If permission was required, the affidavit does not state whether Beverly Perkins
    permitted Erica Perkins to use the vehicle for all purposes, or whether the permission was
    limited to a specific purpose. The affidavit does not state whether the permission was a
    “temporary accommodation” to Erica Perkins. 
    Knack, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 122
    . The answers to
    these questions affects the determination of whether the vehicle was provided for her regular
    use. See 
    Knack, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 122
    . Further, in Auto Owners Insurance Co. v. Miller, 
    138 Ill. 2d 124
    , 127 (1990), our supreme court affirmed the trial court’s judgment that the vehicle
    was not provided for the driver’s regular use where the vehicle was provided for business
    purposes only and the driver was involved in an accident while using the vehicle for personal
    reasons. 
    Miller, 138 Ill. 2d at 130
    . The owner of the vehicle, the driver’s employer, authorized
    the driver to use the vehicle for business purposes only. 
    Id. at 129.
    Our supreme court held that
    based on those facts, “it is clear the truck was not furnished *** for his regular use.” 
    Id. Rather, the
    court held, the driver’s “personal use of the truck was isolated, casual, and unauthorized.”
    
    Id. ¶ 24
           The affidavit in this case does not state whether, on the day of the accident, Erica Perkins
    was using the vehicle with permission, for what purpose she was given permission to use the
    vehicle, if any, or if she was using the vehicle for that purpose at the time of the collision. Nor
    does the affidavit say how Beverly and Erica Perkins regarded the permission to use the
    vehicle, i.e., whether Beverly Perkins’ permission was “anything more than a temporary,
    casual use of the automobile.” 
    Knack, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 122
    . Thus, even accepting the
    statements in the affidavit as true, whether Erica Perkins required permission to use the car, or
    was or was not using the car with permission on the date of the collision, are material questions
    of fact which preclude summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. Mashal v. City of Chicago,
    
    2012 IL 112341
    , ¶ 49 (a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment exists if
    the material facts are undisputed but reasonable persons might draw different inferences from
    the undisputed facts).
    ¶ 25        Moreover, accepting as true that Erica Perkins stated that she was the “primary driver” of
    the vehicle and that she was familiar with its operation from “regular use,” we find that
    summary judgment is not proper. Those statements are facially ambiguous. Even if the former
    is taken to mean that no one else used the vehicle, that fact does not automatically translate into
    regular and frequent use of the automobile by Erica Perkins. See Econo Lease, Inc. v.
    Noffsinger, 
    63 Ill. 2d 390
    , 394 (1976) (holding regular use exclusion applied where the facts
    showed that the driver “was going to regularly and frequently use the automobile”). Even if
    Erica Perkins “regularly” (i.e., “at regular intervals”) 2 used the vehicle, as demonstrated above,
    a reasonable trier of fact could also infer from plaintiff’s affidavit that when Erica Perkins did
    use the vehicle, she did so only with permission and for a limited purpose. Taking the affidavit
    2
    See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/regularly (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
    -8-
    at full face value, many other facts left unresolved could affect the determination of whether
    the vehicle was provided for her regular use within the meaning of the exclusion in plaintiff’s
    insurance policy. Accordingly, summary judgment is not proper. Mashal, 
    2012 IL 112341
    ,
    ¶ 49.
    ¶ 26        In Knack, the case was submitted to the trial judge upon evidence depositions, together
    with the insurance policy in question. 
    Knack, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 118
    . There, the court had the
    benefit of a full exposition of the facts and circumstances surrounding the driver’s use of the
    vehicle at issue. 
    Id. at 118-19.
    In this case, we have no factual background or context for Erica
    Perkins’ alleged statements. Therefore, even accepting those statements as true, in this case we
    cannot say that the vehicle was available for her regular use as a matter of law. Compare
    
    Knack, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 122
    (“Addressing the facts at the case at bar, we find the following to
    be particularly determinative of whether [the] vehicle was or was not available for [the
    driver’s] regular use.”). Our holding is simply that we cannot make the necessary
    determination as a matter of law on the record before this court. This holding in no way
    precludes the trial court from finding, after a trial, that the vehicle was available for Erica
    Perkins’ regular use.
    ¶ 27        Although plaintiff did not urge the Perkinses’ default judgment as a ground on which it is
    entitled to summary judgment in the trial court, we must address plaintiff’s argument on appeal
    that it is entitled to summary judgment because the trial court entered a default judgment
    against Erica Perkins and Beverly Perkins, thus the allegations in the complaint are deemed
    true. Argueta v. Krivickas, 
    2011 IL App (1st) 102166
    , ¶ 5 (“The trial court’s summary
    judgment may be affirmed on any basis appearing in the record whether or not the court relied
    on that basis or its reasoning was correct. [Citation.]” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).
    Plaintiff argues that the pertinent allegations in the complaint are that Erica Perkins is not the
    owner of the vehicle at issue, and that Beverly Perkins, her mother, provided the vehicle for her
    regular use. Based on those “admitted” facts, plaintiff argues it is entitled to summary
    judgment on its complaint that it does not owe a duty to defend or indemnify Erica Perkins for
    any liability arising out of the collision at issue. Griffin responds she is not bound by the
    Perkinses’ admission, therefore, absent the affidavit, plaintiff has adduced no evidence the
    vehicle was provided for Erica Perkins’ regular use. We agree.
    ¶ 28        “A default admits the facts alleged against a defendant in the complaint to be true.
    [Citation.] A default does not admit the conclusions present in the complaint. [Citation.] A
    default for failure to plead is effective against only the party in default.” Direct Auto Insurance
    Co. v. Beltran, 
    2013 IL App (1st) 121128
    , ¶ 66. In Beltran, the plaintiff insurance company
    filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify
    its insured because the insured made material misrepresentations in her application. Beltran,
    
    2013 IL App (1st) 121128
    , ¶ 13. The defendant insured the parties seeking to recover from the
    plaintiff’s insured, and filed a cross-motion for summary judgment as their subrogee. 
    Id. ¶ 31.
           The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant-subrogee. 
    Id. ¶ 36.
    On
    appeal, the plaintiff-insurer argued that because its insureds were in default, “the allegations in
    the complaint are admitted against them and may be used as evidence.” 
    Id. ¶ 65.
    There, the
    plaintiff made clear it was not arguing that the allegations in the complaint were admitted
    against the defendant-subrogee or the injured parties, but “rather that the allegations are now
    evidence that [they] must ‘meet and overcome.’ ” 
    Id. The Beltran
    court rejected the plaintiff’s
    basic premise that “because facts in the complaint are deemed judicially admitted against some
    -9-
    parties, those facts are to be treated as presumptively proven against the nondefaulting
    defendants, and the nondefaulting defendants now have the burden to rebut the presumption.”
    
    Id. ¶ 67.
    The Beltran court noted that “[t]he default of one defendant is not an admission by the
    others, and does not relieve the complainant from the necessity of establishing his case against
    those who appear and plead.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
    Id. ¶ 68
    (quoting Chamblin
    v. Chamblin, 
    362 Ill. 588
    , 593 (1936)). The court held that the complainant must “prove the
    issues to the answering defendants.” (Emphasis in original and internal quotation marks
    omitted.) 
    Id. (quoting Chamblin,
    362 Ill. at 593).
    ¶ 29       The Beltran court would not even permit another party’s default to be used as evidence
    against a non-defaulting defendant. Plaintiff’s assertion that Beverly and Erica Perkins’ default
    is actually binding on defendants in this appeal is contrary to law. Universal Casualty Co. v.
    Lopez, 
    376 Ill. App. 3d 459
    , 466 (2007) (“[W]here, as here, some defendants default and others
    answer, [a] default judgment entered against one set of defendants may not be used as an
    admission of a disputed evidentiary matter by the nondefaulting defendants. [Citation.]”
    (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). “A judgment or decree against one defendant for want of
    a plea or answer does not prevent any other defendant from contesting, so far as respects
    himself, the very fact which is admitted by the other party. [Citation.]” (Internal quotation
    marks omitted.) 
    Id. at 467
    (quoting 
    Chamblin, 362 Ill. at 593
    ). Thus “[u]nder Chamblin and its
    progeny, an admission attributable to defaulting defendants could not be attributed to the
    nondefaulting defendants.” 
    Id. ¶ 30
          Plaintiff has not argued on appeal that it is entitled to summary judgment on the alternative
    grounds that Erica Perkins breached her duty of cooperation under the policy, and, therefore,
    American has no duty to provide coverage. “An argument of an otherwise properly preserved
    issue on appeal is waived when it fails to comply with Supreme Court Rule 341 [citation] or
    another supreme court rule.” Ryan v. Yarbrough, 
    355 Ill. App. 3d 342
    , 346 (2005).
    “[I]f a point is not argued, it is waived and cannot be raised in a reply brief, oral
    argument, or petition for rehearing. [Citation.] The well-established rule is that mere
    contentions, without argument or citation of authority, do not merit consideration on
    appeal. [Citation.] Contentions supported by some argument but by absolutely no
    authority do not meet the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 341([h])(7). [Citation.]
    A reviewing court is entitled to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority
    cited and is not simply a depository into which the appealing party may dump the
    burden of argument and research. [Citation.] Accordingly, we may treat the issue raised
    as having been waived for failure to cite authority.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
    Palm v. 2800 Lake Shore Drive Condominium Ass’n, 
    401 Ill. App. 3d 868
    , 881-82
    (2010).
    ¶ 31       Plaintiff may not rely on Beverly and Erica Perkins’ default in support of its motion for
    summary judgment on its complaint against defendants Griffin and Reese. Plaintiff’s affidavit
    is not sufficient to demonstrate that plaintiff’s right to judgment is clear and free from doubt.
    Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff is
    reversed.
    ¶ 32                                         CONCLUSION
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    ¶ 33       For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded
    for further proceedings.
    ¶ 34      Reversed and remanded.
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