People v. Wlecke , 2014 IL App (1st) 112467 ( 2014 )

Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
People v. Wlecke, 2014 IL App (1st) 112467Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Caption v. DANIEL WLECKE, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. First District, Third Division
Docket No. 1-11-2467
Filed February 5, 2014
Held Defendant’s conviction for failing to register as a sex offender under
(Note: This syllabus the Sex Offender Registration Act was reversed, where the evidence
constitutes no part of the showed that he timely reported at a registration unit following his
opinion of the court but release from prison and made a good-faith effort to register but was
has been prepared by the turned away due to the officer’s refusal to complete the registration,
Reporter of Decisions for reasons other than any voluntary act by defendant.
for the convenience of
the reader.)
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 10-CR-12696; the
Review Hon. Vincent M. Gaughan, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Reversed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and S. Emily Hartman, all of
Appeal State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
Mary L. Boland, and Heather Fahrenkrog, Assistant State’s Attorneys,
of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Justices Neville and Pucinski concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a jury trial, defendant Daniel Wlecke (Wlecke) was convicted of failing to
register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq.
(West 2010)) (the Act) and sentenced to 22 years in prison.
¶2 The Act requires a person convicted of a criminal sexual offense to register with the
police or other law enforcement authority in whatever jurisdiction the offender resides. 730
ILCS 150/2 et seq. (West 2010). Section 3 of the Act provides that a sex offender “shall
register *** with the chief of police in the municipality in which he or she resides or is
temporarily domiciled for a period of time of 3 or more days.” 730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West
2010).
¶3 Section 6 of the Act provides in relevant part:
“Any person who lacks a fixed residence must report weekly, in person, to the
appropriate law enforcement agency where the sex offender is located. *** If any
person required to register under this Article lacks a fixed residence or temporary
domicile, he or she must notify, in person, the agency of jurisdiction of his or her last
known address within 3 days after ceasing to have a fixed residence and if the
offender leaves the last jurisdiction of residence, he or she, must within 3 days after
leaving register in person with the new agency of jurisdiction.” 730 ILCS 150/6
(West 2010).
¶4 The Act defines a “fixed residence” as “any and all places that a sex offender resides for
an aggregate period of time of 5 or more days in a calendar year.” 730 ILCS 150/2(I) (West
2010). Taking these provisions together, a convicted sex offender must register (1) a fixed
residence address (anywhere the offender lives for five days or more during a calendar year),
(2) a temporary residence address (e.g., while on vacation, at school or visiting relatives for
three or more days) or (3) every week if the offender lacks a fixed residence.
¶5 The obvious purpose of the Act is to assist law enforcement agencies in tracking the
whereabouts of sex offenders and to provide the public information about where they are
residing. Wlecke was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault in 1992 and was thus
required to register under the Act. In 2010, when Wlecke was released from prison on an
unrelated offense, he was required to re-register with the Chicago police department. For the
reasons that follow, we find that the State failed to prove Wlecke guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. We therefore reverse Wlecke’s conviction.
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¶6 BACKGROUND
¶7 Wlecke was tried on two counts of failure to register as a sex offender under the Act: one
count for failing to register in person within three days of establishing a residence or
temporary domicile (730 ILCS 150/3(a)(1) (West 2010)), and one count for failing to report
weekly while lacking a fixed residence (730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2010)). Although not
explicitly stated, these charges were in the alternative as Wlecke could not simultaneously
have a residence that he was required to register under section 3 and lack a fixed residence,
thus subjecting him to the weekly reporting requirement of section 6.
¶8 The State introduced the following evidence at Wlecke’s trial. On June 11, 2010 Wlecke
was released from the Dixon Correctional Center. Kathy Chavera, a counselor at the prison,
testified that prior to Wlecke’s release, she completed a sex offender registration form with
Wlecke. The reverse side of the form listed the requirements of registration, including the
requirement to register within three days of his release, by June 14, 2010. Chavera read those
requirements to Wlecke and Wlecke wrote his initials next to each of the requirements
indicating that he understood them.
¶9 At the time he was released, Wlecke was also issued a temporary Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC) identification card, listing his address (provided by him to IDOC) as 820
S. Damen Avenue in Chicago. 820 S. Damen is the Veterans’ Administration (VA) Hospital.
IDOC does not verify whether the given address for the temporary identification card is
valid. The form given to Wlecke by IDOC also does not advise registrants that the IDOC
temporary identification (ID) is not valid identification for purposes of registering with the
police department.
¶ 10 On June 14, 2010, three days after his release, Wlecke reported to the Chicago police
department’s criminal registration unit to register as a sex offender. Wlecke presented his
temporary IDOC identification card which listed 820 S. Damen as his residence. The
registering officer, Officer Meaders, testified that he knew that 820 S. Damen is the address
for the VA Hospital. Officer Meaders told Wlecke that the temporary IDOC identification
card could not be used to register and that he would need to have identification issued by the
Secretary of State, a driver’s license, a passport, or identification from a foreign government
to register. Officer Meaders wrote Wlecke’s name on a log, but did not document where
Wlecke was staying or inform him that until he had satisfactory proof of residence, he was
required to report weekly. Meaders also failed to photograph Wlecke or take his fingerprints.
¶ 11 Six days later, on June 20, 2010, Wlecke was arrested for failure to register as a sex
offender. Cook County Forest Preserve police officer William Ortlund testified that on that
day, he was patrolling a public swimming pool in a park. Officer Ortlund saw Wlecke, who
was carrying binoculars, staggering as he walked into the park. Officer Ortlund stopped
Wlecke and noticed a strong odor of alcohol on his breath. When the officer questioned
Wlecke as to how much he had to drink, Wlecke stated he had 8 to 10 beers within the past
hour. According to Officer Ortlund, when asked what he was doing there, Wlecke responded
he was going to the parking area to do some people watching and that he liked to look at
girls. Officer Ortlund then conducted a background check of Wlecke’s name and arrested
Wlecke for failing to register as a sex offender.
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¶ 12 Cook County Forest Preserve police officer Roberto Gonzalez was assigned to follow up
with Wlecke on June 21, 2010. Officer Gonzalez read Wlecke his Miranda rights and
Wlecke agreed to give the following statement, which was read to the jury:
“On 6-11-10, I was released from Dixon CC for a non-related crime (not S.O.).
During daylight hours I went to 35th and Michigan to register in accordance with law.
Upon reviewing my temp IDOC card, the detective said he would add my name to the
board and get a Illinois ID card with my permanent registering address on it. I was in
the process of getting this done (it took a few days longer than I expected due to
funding and work). In the interim, I was staying with friends on School Street near
Cicero, 4928 West School. The contact with the SOR unit occurred on the 14th as
Friday [June 11] was a late arrival on the bus. I apologize for not registering
completely, but I was waiting for a ride/funding to go to the DMV on Elston
Avenue.”
¶ 13 The State presented no evidence of where Wlecke was living between June 11 and June
20, 2010. Wlecke elected not to testify and did not put on any evidence.
¶ 14 During deliberations, the jury sent out two notes asking for the definitions of “temporary
domicile” and “fixed residence,” and for a copy of the sex offender registration notification
form. The court provided the jury with a redacted copy of the registration notification form
and read to the jury the statutory definitions of “temporary domicile” and “fixed residence.”
¶ 15 The jury found Wlecke not guilty of failing to register in person within three days of
establishing a residence or temporary domicile under section 3(a)(1) of the Act, but guilty of
failing to report weekly to the Chicago police department while lacking a fixed residence
under section 6.
¶ 16 Wlecke filed a motion for a new trial, raising the arguments that (1) the court erred in
denying his motion to preclude the State from introducing the circumstances of his arrest; (2)
the State violated the court’s order allowing the circumstances of his arrest to be introduced
to explain why he was arrested and instead used it as a theory in the case; and (3) the State
made multiple inflammatory statements during closing argument. The motion was denied.
¶ 17 Wlecke was sentenced to 22 years in prison and 1 year of mandatory supervised release.
¶ 18 ANALYSIS
¶ 19 On appeal, Wlecke argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt of failing to report weekly when lacking a fixed address. Specifically, Wlecke
contends the State introduced no evidence proving either that he lacked a fixed residence or
failed to report weekly. Although Wlecke raises other issues regarding the conduct of his
trial, we believe the foregoing arguments are dispositive and require reversal.
¶ 20 Wlecke claims that the evidence was insufficient to prove him guilty of failing to register
while lacking a fixed residence. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain his conviction, the standard on review is whether, after considering the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1,
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8 (2011). The trier of fact determines the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to
their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, and this court
will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on these matters. People v. Collins,
214 Ill. 2d 206, 217 (2005). Although the determinations of the trier of fact are given great
deference, they are not conclusive. People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill. 2d 236, 259 (2001). We will set
aside a criminal conviction if “the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory
as to raise a reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt.” People v. McGee, 398 Ill. App. 3d 789,
793 (2010).
¶ 21 To sustain Wlecke’s conviction for violating section 6 of the Act, the State was required
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Wlecke (1) lacked a “fixed residence” and (2) failed
to report weekly. 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2010). In the context of this case, proving that
Wlecke lacked a fixed residence would have required the State to adduce evidence that
during the nine days following his release from prison and before his arrest, Wlecke did not
stay in any one place for at least five days. But the record lacks any evidence of Wlecke’s
presence (or absence) at either of the two addresses given by him–820 S. Damen or 4928 W.
School Street–for an aggregate period of five days or more between June 11 and June 20,
2010.
¶ 22 Although the State argues that the VA Hospital cannot be considered a “fixed residence”
under the Act, the expansive language used by the legislature in defining that term does not
foreclose this possibility. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the legislature. Hartney Fuel Oil Co. v. Hamer, 2013 IL 115130, ¶ 25.
The best evidence of legislative intent is the language of the statute, which must be given its
plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We view the statute as a whole, construing words and
phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions and not in isolation. People v. Gutman,
2011 IL 110338, ¶ 12.
¶ 23 Given that a fixed residence under the Act includes “any and all places” where a sex
offender resides for an aggregate period of five days or more in a calendar year, it is not
readily apparent from the Act’s language that inpatient treatment at a medical facility would
necessarily be excluded. While the Act excuses registration by offenders who are unable to
comply because they are “confined, institutionalized, or imprisoned,” (730 ILCS 150/3(c)(4)
(West 2010)) (and thus do not pose a danger to the public), nothing in the Act suggests that
offenders who voluntarily avail themselves of inpatient treatment should likewise be
excused. In light of the Act’s overriding purpose to track the location of convicted sex
offenders, it makes sense that the legislature cast the widest net to accomplish that goal. And
if a sex offender anticipates residing at, for example, a hospital, rehabilitative facility, drug
treatment center or nursing home for a period of time aggregating three days or more, the
registration requirements of section 3 of the Act apply. Further, if, during a calendar year, the
offender resides in the facility for an aggregate of five days or more, the facility may be
considered a “fixed residence” under the Act.
¶ 24 The Act also differentiates between a “fixed residence” and a “temporary domicile” by
defining “temporary domicile” as “any and all places where the sex offender resides for an
aggregate period of time of 3 or more days during any calendar year.” 730 ILCS 150/3(a)
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(West 2010). If an offender lacks either a “fixed address” or a “temporary domicile,” the Act
instructs that the offender “must notify, in person, the agency of jurisdiction of his or her last
known address.” Id. Reading these provisions as a whole, it is clear that the intent of the
legislature was to require offenders to register any place where the offender stays, be it for
three or five days out of a year, and also to set a procedure to register those offenders who
lack either a “fixed residence” or “temporary domicile,” meaning those who have no place to
stay consistently for more than three days out of a year, and to notify the agency of
jurisdiction of their whereabouts. We would have to ignore the plain language of the Act to
conclude that a person who resides at an inpatient treatment facility has no consistent place to
stay and, therefore, has no “fixed residence” within the Act’s meaning.
¶ 25 Examination of other statutory provisions regarding sex offenders reinforces this
interpretation of the Act. The Nursing Home Care Act (210 ILCS 45/1-101 et seq. (West
2010)) requires that a long-term care facility request a criminal history background check for
all adults seeking admission to the facility. See 210 ILCS 45/2-201.5, 2-201.6 (West 2010).
If the background check reveals that an applicant is a convicted sex offender, a licensed
forensic psychologist must determine whether and to what extent the identified offender’s
criminal history necessitates the implementation of security measures within the facility. 210
ILCS 45/2-201.6(d) (West 2010). The facility must also provide notice to residents and
employees of the facility that they have the right to ask whether any “residents” of the facility
are identified offenders and that information regarding registered sex offenders may be
obtained from the Illinois State Police website. 210 ILCS 45/2-216 (West 2010). The
legislature therefore contemplated that some sex offenders may “reside” at nursing homes
and that the address of the nursing home will be listed on the internet as the offender’s
residence. In light of these provisions and, again, given the expansive definition of “fixed
residence” under the Act, there is no basis to conclude that sex offenders may not also
“reside” at other types of inpatient treatment facilities.
¶ 26 Based on the plain language of the Act and given that the purpose of the Act is to protect
the public by providing publicly available information regarding locations where sex
offenders reside, we find that a residential treatment facility like the VA Hospital can be a
“fixed residence” under the Act. Consequently, the State’s position throughout the trial and
on appeal that the VA Hospital cannot be a “fixed residence” is mistaken and its argument to
the jury that the VA Hospital could not be a “fixed residence” under the Act was an incorrect
statement of the law. The State introduced no evidence at trial eliminating the possibility that
Wlecke, who had a history of mental illness and multiple hospitalizations at the VA Hospital,
received inpatient treatment at the VA Hospital between the date of his release and the date
of his arrest.
¶ 27 The duty to register mandated under section 3 of the Act includes the duty to provide
“accurate information as required by the Department of State Police.” 730 ILCS 150/3(a)
(West 2010). The State argues that the duty to provide “accurate” information encompasses
the offender’s obligation to produce at registration a valid driver’s license, State ID or other
government-issued document showing the offender’s residence. Failing production of such
proof of residence, the State contends that the offender cannot complete the act of
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registration and must, as happened here, be turned away, and, from that point on, necessarily
be in violation of the Act’s registration requirements.
¶ 28 But nothing in the Act’s language supports the conclusion that “accurate information” is
synonymous with and limited to the categories of identification listed by the State as
satisfactory proof of residence. In fact, section 3 lists those types of “accurate information”
that sex offenders must provide, which do not include a valid government-issued ID:
“Such [accurate] information shall include a current photograph, current address,
current place of employment, the employer’s telephone number, school attended, ***
extensions of the time period for registering *** and, if an extension was granted, the
reason why the extension was granted and the date the sex offender was notified of
the extension.” Id.Further, as noted, although Officer Meaders notified Wlecke that his IDOC temporary ID
card could not be used to register, nothing in the registration form reviewed with Wlecke
prior to his release advised him of that fact and that conclusion is, in any event, not consistent
with the Act’s definition of “accurate information.”
¶ 29 The State’s insistence that sex offenders attempting to register who claim to have a fixed
residence must also present a government-issued ID listing that address is plainly
inconsistent with the reality faced by offenders recently released from prison. In order to
obtain an Illinois State ID, the applicant must present various categories of proof to the
Illinois Secretary of State. Among those are proof of the applicant’s signature (such as on a
validly issued driver’s license or a cancelled check issued within 90 days of the application),
proof of the applicant’s date of birth (such as on a birth certificate, social security card, or
passport), and proof of the applicant’s address (such as mail addressed to the applicant from a
government agency at the given address, or utility bills in the applicant’s name at that address
issued with 90 days of the application). 92 Ill. Adm. Code 1030.Appendix B (2013). Given
that offenders must register within three days of their release, in many cases a registrant will
not be in possession of the information necessary to obtain a state-issued ID within that
period of time. Here, for example, Wlecke arrived in Chicago on the “late bus” on a Friday
and was required to register by Monday. Under such circumstances, it is highly likely that for
individuals like Wlecke, it would be virtually impossible to comply with the Act if
compliance necessitated the type of identification the State insists is required to register.
Under these circumstances, we cannot agree that an offender like Wlecke who presents
himself for registration and is turned away because he lacks a form of identification the Act
does not require should be found to have violated the Act’s registration requirements.
¶ 30 The State further claims Wlecke admitted that he lacked a fixed address in his written
statement in which he said “I was staying with friends on School Street near Cicero, 4928
West School.” The State then reasons that, given this admission, it proved the corpus delicti
with corroborating evidence independent of the admission, such as Officer Meaders’
testimony that Wlecke did not provide satisfactory proof of address and proof that the
address given was the VA Hospital. These arguments are unavailing.
¶ 31 Whether Wlecke lacked a “fixed residence” was a critical element for the State to prove
to sustain a conviction for violation of section 6 of the Act. The expression “staying with
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friends” is subject to various interpretations given the Act’s liberal definition of “fixed
residence” as the offender need only reside “with friends” for an aggregate of five days out of
a year. This definition means that “[a] person could have a ‘fixed residence’ by the Act’s
definition and yet be homeless by the ordinary way of speaking.” People v. Peterson, 404 Ill.
App. 3d 145, 153 (2010). This court in Peterson recognized that under the Act, “[a] person
can be homeless by any normal standards and still have a ‘fixed residence’ if he or she has an
occasional but predictable place to stay.” Id. at 152. Therefore, Wlecke’s “admission” that he
was staying with friends is not an admission that he lacked a “fixed residence” as that term is
used in the Act.
¶ 32 The State and the jury apparently placed great weight on Wlecke’s statement that he was
“staying with friends,” the two different addresses given, and the legally unsupported
argument that a hospital could not be a “fixed residence.” Given the correct interpretation of
the Act’s definition of “fixed residence” and the State’s failure to prove that Wlecke did not
live at either address for an aggregate of five days between June 11 and June 20, 2010, the
evidence is insufficient to support a reasonable inference that Wlecke lacked a “fixed
residence.” Therefore, proof of an essential element of the crime of which Wlecke was
convicted is missing.
¶ 33 The State contends that the evidence proved Wlecke was guilty of violating the Act
because it established that Wlecke knew of his duty to register and he plainly failed to
register. However, Wlecke was acquitted by the jury of the charge of failure to register under
section 3 of the Act. The problem with the State’s argument is the somewhat conflicting
charges with which Wlecke was charged. At trial, the State argued both that Wlecke did not
register a residence or temporary domicile as required under the Act, and that Wlecke did not
have a fixed residence, which would require him to report weekly. Given the jury’s verdict,
the State clearly failed to prove that Wlecke did not register within three days of establishing
a residence or temporary domicile. 730 ILCS 150/3(a)(1) (West 2010). But now the State
reasons that because Wlecke did not register, he therefore lacks a “fixed residence.” The
State would have this court take the evidence that Wlecke failed to provide proof of his
residence when he attempted to register and infer that Wlecke did not reside at any of the
given addresses for at least five days between the date of his release and the date of his arrest.
However, given that the jury acquitted Wlecke of failure to register a fixed residence, the
State had to also prove that Wlecke lacked a “fixed residence” and failed to report weekly to
sustain a violation of section 6 of the Act.
¶ 34 This is not to say that the State had to prove that there is no address anywhere that could
be Wlecke’s “fixed residence.” Peterson, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 154 (It would probably be
absurd to require that the State prove that defendant did not have any place that he could be
staying for five days during a year.). Rather, in order to prove that Wlecke lacked a fixed
residence, the State had to prove whether Wlecke was living at either of the two addresses
given between June 11 and June 20, 2011. Records from the VA could have established
whether Wlecke received inpatient treatment and the residents of 4928 W. School Street
could have attested whether Wlecke stayed there during that period of time. If the State had
adduced evidence that Wlecke did not live at either address, then the element that Wlecke
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lacked a “fixed residence” under section 6 of the Act would have been met. 1 But lacking any
evidence of where Wlecke was living during that nine-day period, the State failed to prove a
violation of section 6 of the Act.
¶ 35 The State also argues that Wlecke was aware of his duty to register based on the sex
offender registration form he read and signed prior to his release. Although the evidence does
support that Wlecke understood his duty to register within three days of his release, which he
attempted to do, the form does not instruct an offender to request to be registered as a
homeless person lacking a “fixed residence” if the initial attempt to register a particular
address is unsuccessful. The form quotes only part of section 6:
“Any person required to register under this Act who lacks a fixed residence must
notify the agency with jurisdiction of the last known address within 3 days after
ceasing to have a fixed residence and if the offender leaves the last jurisdiction of
residence, the offender must within 3 days after leaving, register in person with the
new agency of jurisdiction and must report weekly in person with the agency having
jurisdiction.”
¶ 36 The form omits the language from the Act instructing that “[a]ny person who lacks a
fixed residence must report weekly, in person, to the appropriate law enforcement agency
where the sex offender is located.” 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2010). Therefore, the form only
explains the weekly reporting requirement in terms of someone who “ceases” to have a fixed
residence, but it provides no guidance to someone who must register initially upon release
from prison and who lacks either a “fixed residence” or adequate proof of a fixed residence.
¶ 37 The State also failed to prove the second element required for a violation of section 6 of
the Act, i.e., Wlecke’s failure to report weekly. As already noted, the Act requires those
offenders who lack a “fixed residence” to “report weekly, in person” to the appropriate law
enforcement agency where the offender is located. 730 ILCS 150/6 (West 2010). A person
required to register who lacks a “fixed residence” or “temporary domicile” must “notify, in
person, the agency of jurisdiction of his or her last known address.” Id. “The agency of
jurisdiction will document each weekly registration to include all the locations where the
person has stayed during the past 7 days.” 730 ILCS 150/3(a) (West 2010). The plain
language of the Act therefore requires a person who lacks a “fixed residence,” to “register”
his address by simply reporting and notifying the agency of jurisdiction that he lacks a “fixed
residence” and to report weekly thereafter.
¶ 38 Here, the evidence shows that Wlecke timely reported to the registration unit after his
release. Wlecke thus made a good faith effort to comply with the Act. The fact that Wlecke
was not registered at that time was not due to any voluntary act on his part, but rather was
due to Officer Meaders’ refusal to complete the registration. Officer Meaders refused to
register Wlecke either as a person with a “fixed residence” or as a person lacking a “fixed
residence.” Wlecke was simply turned away. If, as the State concedes, Officer Meaders knew
that the address Wlecke gave was the address for the VA Hospital and the temporary IDOC
1
Although, as discussed below, such evidence would still have been insufficient to show that
Wlecke violated the weekly reporting requirement.
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identification he presented was not valid proof of residence in any event, then Wlecke should
have been registered as an offender lacking a “fixed residence.” Imposing the most onerous
registration requirement–weekly reporting–on offenders who are unable to document their
residence is entirely consistent with the legislature’s effort to allow law enforcement and the
public to track the whereabouts of convicted sex offenders. Turning away offenders who are
unable to document their residence frustrates this purpose. 2 Had Wlecke been registered on
June 14, 2011, as an offender lacking a fixed residence, he would not have been in violation
of the Act six days later when he was arrested as he would not have been required to report
again until June 21, 2011.
¶ 39 The evidence at trial was insufficient to prove the offense of which Wlecke was
convicted. As Wlecke was acquitted under section 3 of the Act, double jeopardy precludes a
retrial on that charge. See People v. Placek, 184 Ill. 2d 370, 376 (1998) (noting that the
double jeopardy clause prohibits a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal).
Given the insufficiency of the proof of Wlecke’s violation of section 6, we reverse Wlecke’s
conviction outright.
¶ 40 Given our ruling on this issue, we need not address Wlecke’s other arguments supporting
his claim for a new trial.
¶ 41 For the reasons stated above, we reverse Wlecke’s conviction.
¶ 42 Reversed.
2
The record reveals that it is common practice for the Chicago police department’s criminal
registration unit to turn away sex offenders attempting to register for lack of proof of address. Between
June 14, 2010 and June 18, 2010, the registration logs show 117 persons reported to register but 19 were
turned away for failure to provide proof of address. Thus, for those 19 offenders, law enforcement lost
the ability to track their whereabouts unless and until they either reappeared with a “satisfactory” proof
or were arrested.
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