Green v. Carlinville Community Unit School District No. 1 ( 2008 )

Filed 3/28/08 NO. 4-07-0297
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
MISTY GREEN, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macoupin County
CARLINVILLE COMMUNITY UNIT SCHOOL ) No. 05L7
DISTRICT NO. 1, )
Defendant-Appellee, )
and ) Honorable
LUCILLE MANSFIELD, ) Roger W. Holmes,
Defendant. ) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In February 2005, plaintiff, Misty Green, sued defen-
dants Carlinville Community Unit School District No. 1 (District)
and Lucille Mansfield, based on Green's allegation that Mansfield
sexually abused her when Green was a minor. In July 2006, the
District moved for summary judgment, and in November 2006, the
trial court granted the District's motion.
Green appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by
granting the District's motion for summary judgment. We affirm
in part and reverse and remand in part with directions.
I. BACKGROUND
From August 1991 through May 1992, Green attended
kindergarten at North Elementary, which was operated by the
District. Green rode the District's school bus to and from
school. In September 1991, Green told her mother that Mansfield,
a school bus driver employed by the District, had sexually
molested her. In May 1992, Mansfield was convicted of three
counts of child abuse and sentenced to four years in prison.
In September 1992, Green's parents, along with six
other families, collectively filed a complaint in federal dis-
trict court against the District (case No. 92-3238). Their
complaint alleged that over the course of several months,
Mansfield sexually abused and assaulted their children. The
District filed a motion to dismiss, arguing in part that it was
not liable for the intentional torts of Mansfield because the
District was not a common carrier. In July 1993, the federal
court denied the District's motion upon determining that Illinois
courts had previously held that school districts that transport
children by bus must be held to the same standard of care as
common carriers. Hammann v. Carlinville Community Unit School
District No. 1, No. 92-3238 (C.D. Ill. July 8, 1993). However,
prior to trial, Green's parents voluntarily withdrew their
complaint, and the federal court dismissed their case without
prejudice. Hammann v. Carlinville Community Unit School District
No. 1, No. 92-3238 (C.D. Ill. April 8, 1994).
In February 2005, Green filed a complaint against the
District and Mansfield. Green alleged that the District (1)
engaged in intentional infliction of emotional distress (count
I), (2) committed assault and battery (count III), (3) was
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negligent per se (count V), (4) negligently hired Mansfield
(count VI), (5) engaged in negligent supervision (count VII), and
(6) was a common carrier (count VIII). All of the counts against
the District were primarily premised on count VIII's allegation
that the District was a common carrier and, thus, "had a non-
del[e]gable duty of care towards its passengers, with such duty
to retain direct and primary responsibility for operating the bus
with the highest degree of care." However, during the course of
the trial court proceedings, Green also argued that the District
owed its student bus passengers the highest degree of care,
regardless of whether it was a common carrier.
In April 2005, the District filed a motion to dismiss
Green's complaint arguing, in part that (1) it was not a common
carrier and (2) the complaint placed a greater duty on the
District than that imposed by law.
Following an August 2005 hearing, the trial court
denied the District's motion upon determining that the 1992
federal court ruling denying the District's motion to dismiss
should be given great weight since Green was a party to the
federal action at the time of the federal court's ruling. The
court also found that the District's standard of care, rather
than its status as a common carrier, governed the court's review
of the complaint.
In December 2005, the case was reassigned to another
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trial judge. In July 2006, prior to any District representative
being deposed, the District filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that (1) the District was not operating as a common
carrier; (2) Mansfield was not acting within the scope of her
employment when the alleged conduct occurred; (3) the statute
mandating that school districts perform criminal-background
checks before hiring an employee (105 ILCS 5/34-18.5 (West
2006)), which Green relied on in count V of her complaint, was
not in effect when the District hired Mansfield; (4) the District
had immunity over its hiring decisions, pursuant to section 2-201
of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immu-
nity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2006)); and (5) no factual
support existed that the District negligently supervised
Mansfield when she was acting within the scope of her employment.
The District's affidavit in support of its motion stated that the
purpose of the District's buses was to transport registered
District students to and from school and school-related
activities.
In November 2006, the trial court granted the
District's motion for summary judgment. In so doing, the court
determined that (1) each of Green's counts against the District
was premised on the allegation that the District was a common
carrier, which imposes a heightened duty of care, (2) the
District was not a common carrier, and (3) Green's negligence per
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se allegations against the District failed because the statute
Green relied on was not in effect when the District hired
Mansfield. The court later found that no just reason existed to
delay either enforcement or appeal of its ruling (210 Ill. 2d R.
304(a)).
This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo a trial court's decision to grant a
motion for summary judgment. Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of
Illinois, 191 Ill. 2d 278, 291, 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1127 (2000). A
party is entitled to summary judgment if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with any
affidavits, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
(735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2006)).
B. The Trial Court's Grant of Summary Judgment
as to Counts I, III, and VII
Green first argues that the trial court erred by
granting summary judgment as to count I (intentional infliction
of emotional distress), count III (assault and battery), and
count VII (negligent supervision). Specifically, she contends
that (1) the court erred by determining that the District was not
acting as a common carrier, which imposes a heightened duty of
care; and (2) even if the District was not acting as a common
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carrier, it should be held to the same standard as a common
carrier. We agree with Green's second contention.
1. The Trial Court's Determination That the
District Was Not Acting as a Common Carrier
In Doe v. Rockdale School District No. 84, 287 Ill.
App. 3d 791, 793-94, 679 N.E.2d 771, 773 (1997), the Third
District discussed the distinction between common and private
carriers, as follows:
"Long-standing authority in Illinois has
held that a common carrier is 'one who
undertakes for the public to transport from
place to place such persons or the goods of
such as choose to employ him for hire.'
[Citations.] A common carrier 'undertakes
for hire to carry all persons indifferently
who may apply for passage so long as there is
room and there is no legal excuse for
refusal.' [Citation.] Moreover, a common
carrier may be liable for an unexcused
refusal to carry all who apply. [Citation.]
The definitive test to be employed to
determine if a carrier is a common carrier is
whether the carrier serves all of the public
alike. [Citations.]
A private carrier, by contrast,
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undertakes by special agreement, in a
particular instance only, to transport
persons or property from one place to another
either gratuitously or for hire. [Citation.]
A private carrier makes no public profession
to carry all who apply for carriage,
transports only by special agreement, and is
not bound to serve every person who may
apply."
In Doe, the plaintiff sued the Rockdale School
District, alleging that another student sexually assaulted her
son on a school bus while traveling to school. After denying the
Rockdale School District's motion to dismiss, the trial court
presented the following certified question to the appellate
court: "whether the defendant providing transportation to
students to and from special[-]education classes out of county
pursuant to contract with Crawford Bus Service, Inc. (Crawford),
is operating as a common carrier." Doe, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 793,
679 N.E.2d at 772.
The Third District concluded that the contract between
the Rockdale School District and Crawford did not provide for the
transportation of any additional passengers or cargo by Crawford
other than the school district's special-education students.
Accordingly, the court stated the following:
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"Given the total absence of any
allegation that Crawford either held itself
out to, or in fact did, serve the general
public or any members thereof except those
students it contracted to carry, we are
compelled to agree that Crawford, and by
extension any principal of Crawford [i.e.,
Rockdale], was acting as a private carrier
[and not a common carrier] when the alleged
injury occurred." Doe, 287 Ill. App. 3d at
795, 679 N.E.2d at 774.
In this case, Green did not allege that the District
(1) advertised its bus services to members of the general public
or (2) transported all members of the general public in a
indiscriminate manner. Further, according to the District's
unrebutted affidavit, the District only transported its students
to and from school and school-related activities. Thus, we
conclude that the trial court did not err by determining that the
District was not acting as a common carrier.
2. Green's Claim That the District Should Be Held to
the Same Standard of Care as a Common Carrier
Besides not being a common carrier, the District argues
that Green cannot overcome the fact that under Illinois law an
employer is not vicariously liable for acts of its employees that
were not within the scope of their employment or performed for
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their employer's benefit. Ordinarily, employers are not liable
for the acts of their employees if the employee's acts were not
committed within the scope of his or her employment. Pyne v.
Witmer, 129 Ill. 2d 351, 359, 543 N.E.2d 1304, 1308 (1989). "In
the context of respondeat superior liability, the term 'scope of
employment' excludes conduct by an employee that is solely for
the benefit of the employee." Deloney v. Board of Education of
Thornton Township, 281 Ill. App. 3d 775, 784, 666 N.E.2d 792, 798
(1996). "[G]enerally, acts of sexual assault are outside the
scope of employment." Deloney, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 783, 666
N.E.2d at 798.
Exceptions to this general rule do exist, and one such
exception involves common-carrier liability. Our supreme court
has long held that if an employee of a common carrier
intentionally injures a passenger, the common carrier is liable
for the passenger's injuries, even if the employee's actions were
not in his actual or apparent scope of authority. Chicago &
Eastern R.R. Co. v. Flexman, 103 Ill. 546, 552 (1882). Thus, a
common carrier can be liable for the intentional acts of its
employees even if the intentional act is outside the employee's
scope of employment and does not benefit the employer. Under
this long-standing Supreme Court of Illinois precedent, a common
carrier could be liable for the sexual assault of one of its
passengers by one of its employees.
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As we previously stated, a school district that
operates buses to transport its students is not a common carrier.
However, it is performing the same basic function, transporting
individuals. Like a passenger on a common carrier, a student on
a school bus cannot ensure his or her own personal safety but
must rely on the school district to provide fit employees to do
so. Accordingly, we conclude that school districts that operate
school buses owe their students the highest degree of care to the
same extent common carriers owe their passengers the highest
degree of care. To hold that adults on public transportation
buses are entitled to more protection than the most vulnerable
members of our society--namely, children on a school bus--is
ludicrous. In fact, holding a school district that buses
children to such a high standard is more compelling than holding
a common carrier to the same standard.
We are not the first Illinois court to hold that a
school district that transports its students by bus owes the
student passengers the highest degree of care. In Garrett v.
Grant School District No. 124, 139 Ill. App. 3d 569, 575, 487
N.E.2d 699, 702 (1985), the Second District held that a school
district that transports its students by bus should be held "to
the same standards of care as that imposed on a private party
operating as a common carrier."
The District suggests that this court should not follow
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Garrett because (1) Doe somehow overruled Garrett and (2) Garrett
dealt with a negligent act, not an intentional one, as in this
case. We are unpersuaded.
We first note that we would have reached the same
decision based on the reasons stated above even if Garrett had
never been decided. Further, we are not persuaded that Doe
overruled Garrett. The sole question answered in Doe was whether
a school district that provided transportation to and from
classes was a common carrier (Doe, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 793, 679
N.E.2d at 772), not what standard of care applies to a school
district operating a bus for its students. In addition, whether
the school bus passenger suffered his injury as a result of
negligence or an intentional act is irrelevant.
The District also contends that it should be treated
differently than a private party because it is a public,
governmental entity. In this regard, the District points out
that the duty it owes to students being transported on its school
buses is a public-policy decision better left to the Illinois
General Assembly.
While common-law rules may not impose liability on a
public entity where the Tort Immunity Act applies (Floyd v.
Rockford Park District, 355 Ill. App. 3d 695, 704, 823 N.E.2d
1004, 1012 (2005)), that is not the issue before us. Here, this
court has a duty to determine what common-law duty a school
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district owes to its student passengers when they are being
transported on the school district's bus.
Defendant is free to argue on remand that it has
immunity as a public body, regardless of its common-law duty, or
to lobby the General Assembly, the policymaking body of the
State, to specifically make school districts immune from future
claims of this type. The legislature may determine, for sound
policy reasons, that school districts should not be held to this
standard of care. However, as we decide the case before us, we
must do so in the context of the law as it now stands, not as
policymakers may change it.
We thus conclude that the trial court erred by granting
summary judgment on count I (intentional infliction of emotional
distress), count III (assault and battery), and count VII
(negligent supervision), based on its determination that because
the District was not a common carrier, it did not owe Green the
highest degree of care that a common carrier would have owed her.
3. Scope of Our Holding on This Issue
Our holding on this issue is limited to the common-law
duty school districts owe student passengers while the students
are being transported on a school bus. It neither enhances nor
weakens the duties school districts already owe their students in
other circumstances.
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C. The Trial Court's Rulings on Counts V, VI, and VIII
1. Count V--Negligence Per Se
Green also argues that the trial court erred by
granting summary judgment as to count V. We agree.
Count V alleged that the District negligently and
carelessly failed to perform proper criminal, child abuse, and
neglect investigations of Mansfield, pursuant to section 34-18.5
of the School Code (105 ILCS 5/34-18.5 (West 2002)). In its
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, the
District argued that Mansfield was hired in 1987 before this
statute took effect. However, the trial court stated the
District hired Mansfield many years before the statute became
effective in 1985. Thus, a question of fact remains regarding
when the District hired Mansfield--before 1985 or in 1987.
2. Count VI--Negligent Hiring
Green also argues that the trial court erred by
granting summary judgment as to count VI (negligent hiring). The
District responds that it has immunity under section 2-201 of the
Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2006)). We agree with
Green.
Section 2-201 provides as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided by
[s]tatute, a public employee serving in a
position involving the determination of
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policy or the exercise of discretion is not
liable for an injury resulting from his act
or omission in determining policy when acting
in the exercise of such discretion even
though abused." 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West
2006).
The District claims that because its decision to hire Mansfield
was discretionary, it has immunity under section 2-201. See
Johnson v. Mers, 279 Ill. App. 3d 372, 380, 664 N.E.2d 668, 675
(1996) (village's decision to hire a police officer was
discretionary).
Green cites Mueller v. Community Consolidated School
District 54, 287 Ill. App. 3d 337, 678 N.E.2d 660 (1997), for the
proposition the Tort Immunity Act does not apply to the negligent
hiring claim alleged in count VI. In Mueller, the First District
stated as follows:
"[S]ection 2-201 gives government
entities immunity from liability for injuries
resulting from exercise of discretionary
authority. Here the School District's
discretion is fettered by the criminal-
background-check statute. The statute
provides that the School District 'shall not
knowingly employ a person for whom a criminal
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background investigation has not been
initiated.' 105 ILCS 5/34-18.5(d) (West
1994). Given the statute's mandatory
language, we find that it requires the School
District to at least commence an
investigation of employment applicants before
it is vested with the discretionary authority
to hire. We therefore conclude that the
School District's failure to comply with the
statutorily imposed condition precedent
vitiates any immunity it might otherwise have
enjoyed under section 2-201 of the Tort
Immunity Act for hiring [its employee]."
Mueller, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 346, 678 N.E.2d
at 666.
We agree with Mueller. However, as stated earlier, a
question of fact remains as to when the District hired Mansfield.
Thus, we cannot determine whether the District would have
immunity under the Tort Immunity Act. Accordingly, we conclude
that the trial court erred by granting the District's motion for
summary judgment as to count VI.
3. Count VIII--Common Carrier
Last, Green argues that the trial court erred by
granting summary judgment as to count VIII. We disagree.
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The trial court did not err by granting summary
judgment as to this count, in which Green alleged a separate
cause of action based on the District's status. First, as
earlier discussed, the District was not operating as a common
carrier. Second, even if the District was so operating, this
only created a heightened duty of care for its passengers, not a
separate cause of action based merely on that status.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial
court's judgment as to count VIII, reverse as to counts I, III,
V, VI, and VII, and remand for further proceedings. We also
direct the trial court to allow Green to amend her complaint,
eliminating all references to the District being a common
carrier.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded
with directions.
KNECHT, J., concurs.
COOK, J., dissents.
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JUSTICE COOK, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the decision of
the trial court, granting summary judgment on counts I, III, V,
VI, VII, and VIII.
A. Vicarious Liability--Counts I (Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress) and III (Assault and Battery)
The majority concludes that the District, in the
operation of its school bus program, was not acting as a common
carrier because it did not hold itself out to serve or, in fact,
serve the general public. The majority goes on, however, to
create a new "common carrier" rule that would apply to school
districts. One problem with that approach is that even common
carriers are not vicariously liable for the intentional or
criminal acts of their employees unless those acts are within the
scope of employment, clearly not the case here. Common carriers,
unlike other actors, have a duty to come to the aid or protection
of others, but that duty is not the same as vicarious liability.
The majority improperly equates the vicarious liability of
employers with common-carrier liability.
Under the theory of respondeat superior, an employer
can be vicariously liable for the torts of an employee, but only
for those torts that are committed within the scope of
employment. The employer's vicarious liability extends even to
the intentional or criminal acts of its employees when such acts
are committed within the scope of employment. Bagent v. Blessing
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Care Corp., 224 Ill. 2d 154, 163-64, 862 N.E.2d 985, 991 (2007).
Conduct is within the scope of employment only if it is actuated,
at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master. Restatement
(Second) of Agency §228, at 504 (1958). Summary judgment was
appropriate in Bagent where no reasonable person could conclude
that an employee was acting within the scope of employment.
Bagent, 224 Ill. 2d at 170-71, 862 N.E.2d at 995 (hospital
employee disclosed medical information to patient's sister in a
tavern).
Common carriers have duties that others do not have.
Generally speaking, Illinois law does not impose a duty to
protect another from a criminal attack by a third person unless
the attack is reasonably foreseeable and the parties stand in one
of four "special relationships," namely: (1) common carrier and
passenger, (2) innkeeper and guest, (3) business invitor and
invitee, and (4) voluntary custodian and protectee. Hernandez v.
Rapid Bus Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 519, 524, 641 N.E.2d 886, 890
(1994), citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §314A (1965). In
Hernandez, a student was raped by a special[-]education student
as she walked unescorted from a bus to the school. The First
District reversed summary judgment for the bus company because
the company may have been aware that some of the special[-
]education students riding its bus with this student had
propensities toward violent and criminal behavior. The common-
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carrier relationship did not apply in Hernandez because the
student had exited the bus safely, but the court applied a
similar rule that applied to voluntary undertakings. Hernandez,
267 Ill. App. 3d at 524-25, 641 N.E.2d at 890-91.
The majority cites an 1882 case, Flexman, for the
proposition that an employer is vicariously liable for the
intentional acts of its employees outside the scope of
employment, if the employer is a common carrier. Slip op. at 8-
9. The employee in Flexman may have been acting within the scope
of employment, helping a passenger look for his watch, when an
altercation developed. Flexman, 103 Ill. at 548-49. Even
intentional torts may be so reasonably connected with the
employment as to be within its "scope." W. Prosser & W. Keeton,
Torts §70, at 505 (5th ed. 1984). An employer will be held
liable where his bus driver crowds a competitor's bus into a
ditch or assaults a trespasser to eject him from the bus. A
railway ticket agent who assaults, arrests, or slanders a
passenger, in the belief that he has been given a counterfeit
bill for a ticket, is within the scope of his employment. But if
the employee acts from purely personal motives, he is considered
in the ordinary case to have departed from his employment, and
the master is not liable. W. Prosser & W. Keeton, Torts §70, at
506 (5th ed. 1984). Whatever the holding in Flexman, Illinois
now follows the Restatement, which would not impose vicarious
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liability for acts outside the scope of employment. Bagent, 224
Ill. 2d at 163-65, 862 N.E.2d at 991-92.
The majority cites Garrett, which stated that a school
district engaged in the transportation of students by bus would
be held to the same standard of care as that imposed on a private
party operating as a common carrier. Garrett, 139 Ill. App. 3d
at 575, 487 N.E.2d at 702. Garrett did not, however, address the
vicarious liability of a school district for the actions of its
driver. Garrett instead addressed the carrier's duty to protect
passengers, despite the general rule that there is no duty to act
for the protection of others, a duty which does not terminate
until the passenger has had a reasonable opportunity to reach a
place of safety. Garrett, 139 Ill. App. 3d at 575-78, 487 N.E.2d
at 702-05; see Restatement (Second) of Torts §314A (1)(a) (1965).
The complaint in Garrett was that the bus driver had dropped the
student off near a railroad track, where she eventually fell.
The question did not concern the actions of the bus driver but
the actions of the district, which had a duty to select a
discharge point that did not "'needlessly expose the pupils to
any serious hazards to safety exceeding those which normally
attend school bus operations.'" Garrett, 139 Ill. App. 3d at
576, 487 N.E.2d at 703, quoting Posteher v. Pana Community Unit
School District No. 8, 96 Ill. App. 3d 709, 713, 421 N.E.2d 1049,
1052 (1981).
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The trial court properly entered summary judgment on
counts I and III. Even assuming the District was a common
carrier, the District could only be held liable for acts of its
employee that were within the scope of employment. No reasonable
person could conclude the acts here were within the scope of
employment.
B. Direct Liability--Counts VI (Negligent Hiring) and
VII (Negligent Supervision)
Apart from vicarious liability, the school district may
be responsible for its own negligence if it knew or should have
known of the necessity and opportunity for controlling its
servant to prevent the servant from intentionally harming others.
Hills v. Bridgeview Little League Ass'n, 195 Ill. 2d 210, 229,
745 N.E.2d 1166, 1179 (2000), quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts §317 (1965). To establish this claim of direct negligence,
plaintiffs do not have to show that the attack was committed
within the scope of employment. Plaintiffs must show, however,
that the employer knew or had reason to know of the need to
control the servant and negligently failed to act on that
information. Hills, 195 Ill. 2d at 231-32, 745 N.E.2d at 1180.
"Under a theory of negligent hiring or retention, the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury is the employer's negligence in
hiring or retaining the employee, rather than the employee's
wrongful act." Van Horne v. Muller, 185 Ill. 2d 299, 311, 705
N.E.2d 898, 905 (1998). In a case where a kindergarten student
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was sexually abused by a school bus driver, a directed verdict in
favor of the bus company was affirmed where there was no evidence
the company knew or should have known the hiring would create a
danger of harm to third persons. Giraldi v. Community
Consolidated School District No. 62, 279 Ill. App. 3d 679, 692,
665 N.E.2d 332, 340 (1996) (First District).
The trial court here properly dismissed counts VI and
VII because there are no allegations that the District had any
knowledge that the bus driver had any propensity to commit these
acts or that there was a danger of harm to students.
C. Negligence per se--Count V
Count V alleges negligence as a matter of law arising
from a statutory violation. Count V alleges that the District
failed to perform a criminal background investigation as required
by section 34-18.5. However, that section does not apply to the
District. The section is contained within article 34 of the
School Code, which only applies to cities of over 500,000
inhabitants (105 ILCS 5/34-1 through 34-129 (West 2006)). The
section that does apply to the District, section 10-21.9(a),
excepts school bus driver applicants, at least after its 1995
amendment. 105 ILCS 5/10-21.9(a) (West 2006). Another
paragraph, section 10-21.9(f), was amended effective January 1,
1990, to add the following words:
"After January 1, 1990[,] the provisions
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of this Section shall apply to all employees
of persons or firms holding contracts with
any school district including, but not
limited to, food service workers, school bus
drivers and other transportation employees,
who have direct, daily contact with the
pupils of any school in such district." Pub.
Act 86-411, §1, eff. January 1, 1990 (1990
Ill. Laws 2549, 2552).
Section 10-21.9(a) was then amended, effective July 1, 1995, to
add the words "except school bus driver applicants." Pub. Act
88-612, §5, eff. July 1, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 1325, 1326).
In any event, even though there is no question there
has been a breach of duty in a negligence per se action, a
plaintiff must still show that the defendant's violation of the
statute proximately caused the injury. Price v. Hickory Point
Bank & Trust, 362 Ill. App. 3d 1211, 1216-17, 841 N.E.2d 1084,
1089 (2006). No evidence in this case suggests that a criminal
background check of the bus driver would have disclosed any
information that would have placed the District on notice. See
Browne v. SCR Medical Transportation Services, Inc., 356 Ill.
App. 3d 642, 649, 826 N.E.2d 1030, 1036 (2005) (even if the
transportation company had complied with the statute, the company
would not have learned of the driver's prior arrests); Giraldi,
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279 Ill. App. 3d at 692, 665 N.E.2d at 340 (only thing which
could have been known was that driver had a tendency to be late;
failure to investigate not a proximate cause of sexual attack on
a student).
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