In re A.P. ( 2014 )

Illinois Official Reports
Appellate Court
In re A.P., 2014 IL App (1st) 140327Appellate Court In re A.P., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-
Caption Appellee, v. A.P., Respondent-Appellant).
District & No. First District, Fifth Division
Docket No. 1-14-0327
Filed June 27, 2014
Held The habitual juvenile offender provision of the Juvenile Court Act was
(Note: This syllabus upheld over respondent’s contentions that it violates the eighth
constitutes no part of the amendment of the United States Constitution, the proportionate
opinion of the court but penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, the United States Supreme
has been prepared by the Court’s decision in Miller, and the due process and equal protection
Reporter of Decisions clauses, since respondent was sentenced to commitment to the
for the convenience of Department of Juvenile Justice as a habitual juvenile offender until his
the reader.) twenty-first birthday, the habitual juvenile offender provision of the
Act was held constitutional in Chrastka, that decision is binding on the
appellate court until revisited, and the same reasoning applies to
respondent’s claim that the provision violates the due process and
equal protection clauses.
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 12-JD-03423; the
Review Hon. Patricia Mendoza, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Alan D. Goldberg, and Heidi Linn Lambros, all of
Appeal State Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Anita M. Alvarez, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg and
Eve Reilly, Assistant State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Palmer concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 After a jury trial, respondent A.P. was adjudicated a delinquent minor for the offense of
robbery and sentenced as a habitual juvenile offender and committed to the Department of
Juvenile Justice (DJJ) until his twenty-first birthday, as required pursuant to section 5-815(f) of
the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-815(f) (West 2012)). On appeal from
that order, respondent contends that: (1) the habitual juvenile offender provision of the Act is
unconstitutional under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution, the
proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution, and the Supreme Court’s decision in
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012); and (2) the habitual juvenile offender
provision of the Act violates federal and state due process and the equal protection clauses of
the United States and Illinois Constitutions. We affirm.
¶2 On August 29, 2012, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship for respondent,
who was 15 years old at the time. The petition alleged that respondent committed two counts of
each of the following: aggravated robbery, robbery, theft from person, aggravated battery, and
battery, all based on an incident that occurred on August 28, 2012. Respondent does not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, so we will discuss the facts only to the extent
necessary to understand the current appeal.
¶3 At trial, Christian Gomez, who was 19 years old at the time of trial, testified that at
approximately 3 p.m. on August 28, 2012, he and his cousin, Jose Soria, were traveling from
Soria’s house to Gomez’s house. Gomez was on a scooter and Soria was on his rollerblades. As
they approached the intersection of 59th and Richmond Streets, Gomez noticed two
individuals, one he identified as respondent, crossing the street at the intersection and heard
someone say, “A.” Gomez continued walking with his cousin but saw respondent and the other
individual again on Richmond. Gomez stopped and respondent said, “What you is?” Gomez
believed respondent was asking what gang Gomez belonged to. Respondent also asked Soria
the same question in Spanish. Gomez told respondent that he was not in a gang, and then
respondent told Gomez to “Drop the crown.” Gomez believed respondent was asking him to
drop the rival gang sign and Gomez told respondent he did not know how. Respondent showed
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Gomez how to do it. Eventually Gomez did what respondent asked so respondent would leave
them alone. At this point, respondent was standing in front of Gomez about two feet away and
Gomez noticed that respondent had a tattoo on his arm with “[a] face, a knight going down
with the letter A going down.” After Soria also threw down the gang sign, respondent and the
other individual let Gomez and Soria leave. Gomez and Soria continued west on 59th Street,
but only traveled half of a block when respondent and the other individual stopped Gomez and
Soria again. Respondent stood in front of Gomez and the other individual stood in front of
Soria. Respondent told Gomez and Soria to “[l]ift up [their] shirts” and they did. Gomez was
wearing a gold chain with two gold medallions around his neck and respondent “snatched” the
chain from Gomez’s neck and the other individual grabbed a chain and medallion from Soria’s
neck. Respondent then was “still looking at [Gomez], but he was going back, *** pretending
he had a gun in his back.” As respondent continued walking backward, he said, “You do
something stupid, I’m going to kill you.” Gomez believed respondent had a gun. Gomez
watched respondent and the other individual continue north on Richmond Street, and then
Gomez and Soria went to Gomez’s house.
¶4 After speaking to his mother, Gomez called 9-1-1. Gomez then spoke with a police officer
in front of his house, told the officer what had happened, and gave the officer a description of
respondent, including the tattoo, and of the other individual. The officer left and Gomez
remained in front of his house with two other police officers. Eventually, those officers drove
Gomez to 59th Street and Francisco Avenue, about a block away from 59th and Richmond
Streets, where Gomez saw respondent and the other individual on the sidewalk, with their
hands behind their backs. Gomez immediately recognized and identified respondent to the
police as the individual that had stolen his chain. Gomez also identified the other individual as
responsible for stealing Soria’s chain. One of the officers showed Gomez and Soria a
medallion which Soria identified as his medallion that had been stolen that day.
¶5 Jose Soria, who was 18 years old at the time of trial, substantially corroborated Gomez’s
testimony. He testified that on August 28, 2012, he was wearing a gold chain with a fake gold
medallion that had a picture of the Virgin of Guadalupe on it. As Soria and Gomez approached
59th and Richmond Streets on their way to Gomez’s house, Soria noticed “two bad guys” who
started “saying things” to Soria and Gomez. Soria identified respondent as one of the
individuals he saw. Eventually, respondent stopped Soria and Gomez and asked them to
“throw down the crown” and demonstrated how to do it, and Soria complied because he
wanted respondent to leave him and Gomez alone. Soria and Gomez then continued on their
path until Soria felt respondent’s arm around Soria. Respondent told Soria and Gomez to lift up
their shirts. Soria lifted up his shirt but said to respondent, “Look, I don’t have anything, why
are you stopping us if we’re nothing, you know we’re nothing.” Then, respondent took
Gomez’s chain and the other individual took Soria’s chain. Respondent told Soria and Gomez
if they did something stupid, he would kill them, and respondent’s hand was behind his back,
“pretending that he had a gun but we didn’t know if he had a gun.” Soria was scared that
respondent would kill them. Respondent and the other individual then ran away toward 58th
and Richmond Streets. Soria and Gomez then went to Gomez’s house, and after Gomez called
9-1-1, they went out front to wait for the police. Gomez gave descriptions of the offenders to
the first officers that arrived. Those officers left and then a “truck” arrived with two police
officers. Soria and Gomez got into the truck and eventually were driven by the officers to 59th
and Richmond Streets, where Soria identified respondent and the other individual as the ones
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who had stolen the chains from Soria and Gomez. A police officer also showed Soria his chain
and medallion that had been stolen.
¶6 Officer Sean Donahue testified that at approximately 4 p.m. on August 28, 2012, he and his
partner received a dispatch call of robbery while they were on duty and they proceeded to the
area of 59th and Richmond Streets. They saw no possible offenders so they then proceeded to
60th Street and Albany Avenue where they spoke with Gomez and Soria, the victims. Donahue
discussed the robbery with them and asked Gomez for a description of the offenders. Gomez
gave a description of the two offenders, including a description of a tattoo on one offender’s
lower left arm: an upside-down knight’s head. Donahue and his partner then left to search for
possible offenders. Near 59th Street and Francisco Avenue, they saw two individuals walking
that matched the description from Gomez and Soria, respondent and another individual. As
they pulled up to the individuals, Donahue noticed respondent had a tattoo on his lower left
arm, the upside-down helmet of a knight in shining armor. Donahue and his partner exited their
vehicle and asked respondent and the other individual to approach them. The officers
performed a protective pat-down of the suspects and no weapons were found. Gomez and Soria
were relocated to 59th Street and Francisco Avenue and identified the two individuals as the
offenders that had robbed them. Donahue and his partner then performed custodial searches of
respondent and his co-offender. They recovered a medallion with a picture of the Virgin Mary
on it from respondent, which was Soria’s.
¶7 Officer Julian Morgan, Donahue’s partner on the afternoon of August 28, 2012,
substantially corroborated Donahue’s testimony. Morgan also testified that, after the victims
positively identified the offenders, he performed the custodial search on respondent and
recovered a medallion with a picture of the Virgin Mary on it. He took the medallion over to
the victims sitting in the vehicle and Soria identified it as his. Morgan further testified that
respondent’s tattoo was “[a]bsolutely” a sign of disrespect toward the Ambrose gang because
the tattoo was the upside-down knight’s helmet and the upside-down letter “A,” which was
respondent “throwing down the Ambrose symbol.” He said the upside-down tattoo was a “bold
statement.”
¶8 The jury found respondent guilty of robbery and not guilty of aggravated robbery.
¶9 At the sentencing hearing, the State presented evidence that respondent had been convicted
of aggravated battery in 2010 and of burglary in 2011. Certified copies of both adjudications
were admitted into evidence. The State asked that respondent be committed to the DJJ until his
twenty-first birthday pursuant to the habitual juvenile offender provision of the Act.
¶ 10 In mitigation, the defense presented evidence that, since respondent had been in custody at
the juvenile detention center, he had won first and second place in two different poetry
competitions, had a 3.9 grade point average in school, had at least one session to remove his
tattoos, had no desire to return to his old neighborhood, and had secured residential placement
as an alternative to prison. In allocution, respondent stated that no matter what happened at
sentencing, he was going to “make something of himself.”
¶ 11 The circuit court found respondent was a habitual juvenile offender and sentenced
respondent to a mandatory term of commitment to the DJJ until his twenty-first birthday.
¶ 12 On appeal, respondent first contends the habitual juvenile offender provision of the Act
violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution and the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution because the provision removes the trial court’s
discretion in sentencing minors who are adjudicated habitual juvenile offenders, primarily
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relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455(2012).
¶ 13 Initially, we note our supreme court has determined that the eighth amendment and the
proportionate penalties clause do not apply to juvenile proceedings initiated by a petition for an
adjudication of wardship. In re Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d 510, 521 (2006). The court explained
that both the eighth amendment and the proportionate penalties clause apply only to the
criminal process, “that is, to direct actions by the government to inflict punishment.” Id. at 518.
The court concluded that proceedings under the Act are not criminal in nature, and that an
adjudication of wardship is not a direct action by the State to inflict punishment within the
meaning of the eighth amendment and proportionate penalties clause. In re Rodney H., 223 Ill.
2d 510, 518, 521 (2006); see also In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 95 (noting that,
“[r]ecently, this court again reiterated that ‘it is undoubtedly true that a delinquency
adjudication is still not the legal equivalent of a felony conviction despite the amendments to
the Act’ ”) (citing In re Lakisha M., 227 Ill. 2d 259, 270 (2008)). Nonetheless, even if the
eighth amendment and proportionate penalties clause applied to the Act, we conclude that the
habitual juvenile offender provision is constitutional.
¶ 14 Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law and we therefore review it de novo.
People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 486-87 (2005). Statutes carry a strong presumption of
constitutionality. Id. at 487. To overcome this presumption, the party challenging the statute
has the burden of establishing that the statute violates the constitution. Id. “We generally defer
to the legislature in the sentencing arena because the legislature is institutionally better
equipped to gauge the seriousness of various offenses and to fashion sentences accordingly.”
Id. “The legislature’s discretion in setting criminal penalties is broad, and courts generally
decline to overrule legislative determinations in this area unless the challenged penalty is
clearly in excess of the general constitutional limitations on this authority.” Id.¶ 15 The eighth amendment, as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment for criminal offenses, as well as
punishments that are disproportionate in relation to the offense committed or the status of the
offender. U.S. Const., amend. VIII; Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. Our Supreme
Court has observed:
“As we noted the last time we considered life-without-parole sentences imposed on
juveniles, ‘[t]he concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.’
[Citation.] And we view that concept less through a historical prism than according to
‘ “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” ’
[Citation.]” Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
¶ 16 The proportionate penalties clause, or article I, section 11, of the Illinois Constitution, is
similar to but not identical with the eighth amendment. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11; People v.
Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 36. The section provides that “[a]ll penalties shall be determined
both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender
to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11. The second requirement of the clause, that
penalties must have the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship, was an
addition to the 1970 Illinois Constitution. Clemons, 2012 IL 107821, ¶ 39. “The convention
record indicates that the framers intended, with this additional language, to provide a limitation
on penalties beyond those afforded to the eighth amendment.” Id. However, our supreme court
has also stated that there is “no indication that the possibility of rehabilitating an offender was
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to be given greater weight and consideration than the seriousness of the offense in determining
a proper penalty.” People v. Taylor, 102 Ill. 2d 201, 206 (1984) (citing People v. Waud, 69 Ill.
2d 588, 596 (1977)).
¶ 17 Section 5-815 of the Act, which governs habitual juvenile offenders, provides:
“(a) Definition. Any minor having been twice adjudicated a delinquent minor for
offenses which, had he been prosecuted as an adult, would have been felonies under the
laws of this State, and who is thereafter adjudicated a delinquent minor for a third time
shall be adjudged an Habitual Juvenile Offender where:
1. the third adjudication is for an offense occurring after adjudication on the
second; and
2. the second adjudication was for an offense occurring after adjudication on
the first; and
3. the third offense occurred after January 1, 1980; and the third offense
occurred after January 1, 1980; and
4. the third offense was based upon the commission of or attempted
commission of the following offenses: first degree murder, second degree murder
or involuntary manslaughter; criminal sexual assault or aggravated criminal sexual
assault; aggravated or heinous battery involving permanent disability or
disfigurement or great bodily harm to the victim; burglary of a home or other
residence intended for use as a temporary or permanent dwelling place for human
beings; home invasion; robbery or armed robbery; or aggravated arson.
Nothing in this Section shall preclude the State’s Attorney from seeking to prosecute a
minor as an adult as an alternative to prosecution as an habitual juvenile offender.
***
(f) Disposition. If the court finds that the prerequisites established in subsection (a)
of this Section have been proven, it shall adjudicate the minor an Habitual Juvenile
Offender and commit him to the Department of Juvenile Justice until his 21st birthday,
without possibility of parole, furlough, or non-emergency authorized absence.
However, the minor shall be entitled to earn one day of good conduct credit for each
day served as reductions against the period of his confinement. Such good conduct
credits shall be earned or revoked according to the procedures applicable to the
allowance and revocation of good conduct credit for adult prisoners serving
determinate sentences for felonies.” 705 ILCS 405/5-815 (West 2012).
¶ 18 The Illinois Supreme Court has previously held that the habitual juvenile offender
provision of the Act is constitutional. People ex rel. Carey v. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d 67, 78-80
(1980). More specifically, relying on the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Rummel v.
Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), the Illinois Supreme Court in Chrastka found that “state
legislatures have traditionally been allowed wide latitude in setting penalties for State crimes
[citation], and we do not believe that the disposition authorized here rises to the level of cruel
and unusual punishment by any stretch of the imagination.” Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 81-82; see
also Rummel, 445 U.S. at 280-81, 284-85 (finding that the imposition of a life sentence with a
possibility of parole under a recidivist statute upon a defendant convicted, successively, of
fraudulent use of a credit card, passing a forged check, and obtaining money by false pretenses
was not a cruel and unusual punishment).
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¶ 19 In support of his argument that the habitual juvenile offender provision violates the eighth
amendment and the proportionate penalties clause, respondent primarily relies on the United
States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Miller, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2455. However, we
find that, contrary to respondent’s argument, the reasoning in Miller does not affect our
supreme court’s holding in Chrastka.
¶ 20 Miller involved two 14-year-old offenders that were convicted of murder and sentenced to
mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S.
Ct. at 2460. The Supreme Court ultimately held that mandatory life sentences without the
possibility of parole “for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes” violated the
eighth amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct.
at 2460. In coming to this conclusion, the Supreme Court relied on two of its previous
decisions: Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48(2010). Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2463-65. The Supreme Court explained:
“The cases before us implicate two strands of precedent reflecting our concern with
proportionate punishment. The first has adopted categorical bans on sentencing
practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the
severity of a penalty. [Citation.] *** Several of the cases in this group have been
specially focused on juvenile offenders, because of their lesser culpability. Thus, Roper
held that the Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment for children, and Graham
concluded that the Amendment also prohibits a sentence of life without the possibility
of parole for a child who committed a nonhomicide offense. Graham further likened
life without parole for juveniles to the death penalty itself, thereby evoking a second
line of our precedents. In those cases, we have prohibited mandatory imposition of
capital punishment, requiring that sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of
a defendant and the details of his offense before sentencing him to death. [Citations.]
Here, the confluence of these two lines of precedent leads to the conclusion that
mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.
*** Roper and Graham establish that children are constitutionally different from
adults for the purposes of sentencing. Because juveniles have diminished culpability
and greater prospects for reform, we explained, ‘they are less deserving of the most
severe punishments.’ [Citation.] Those cases relied on three significant gaps between
juveniles and adults. First, children have a ‘ “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility,” ’ leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless
risk-taking. [Citation.] Second, children ‘are more vulnerable … to negative influences
and outside pressures,’ including from their family and peers; they have limited
‘contro[l] over their own environment’ and lack the ability to extricate themselves from
horrific crime-producing settings. [Citation.] And third, a child’s character is not as
‘well formed’ as an adult’s; his traits are ‘less fixed’ and his actions less likely to be
‘evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].’ [Citation.]
***
Roper and Graham emphasized that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the
penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders,
even when they commit terrible crimes.” (Emphasis added.) Miller, 567 U.S. at ___,
132 S. Ct. at 2464-65.
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¶ 21 The Court emphasized that a mandatory sentence of life without parole for a juvenile did
not allow for consideration of the juvenile’s age and “its hallmark features–among them,
immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” Id. at ___, 132 S.
Ct. at 2465. The Court concluded that “in imposing a State’s harshest penalties, a sentencer
misses too much if he treats every child as an adult.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at
2468.
¶ 22 First, we note that Miller, Roper, and Graham all involved defendants who committed
crimes when they were under the age of 18 years old, but were charged and convicted in the
adult court system. See Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2461-63 (the two petitioners were
14 years old at the time they committed their crimes in separate cases and in both cases the
respective prosecutors exercised discretion to charge the petitioners as adults); Roper, 543 U.S.
at 557 (where the respondent was 17 years old when he committed his crime, he was outside
the Missouri juvenile court system and tried as an adult); Graham, 560 U.S. at 53 (the
petitioner was 16 years old at the time he committed his crime and the prosecutor elected to
charge him as an adult). In addition, the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller did not foreclose a
court’s ability to impose life without parole on a juvenile offender, although it expected “this
harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.” Miller, 567 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
More importantly, the Court did not hold that the eighth amendment prohibited any mandatory
penalties for juveniles, only mandatory natural life sentences without the possibility of parole,
which is not at issue in the present case. Id. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2469. Finally:
“Graham, Roper, and Miller stand for the proposition that a sentencing body must have
the chance to take into account mitigating circumstances before sentencing a juvenile
to the ‘harshest possible penalty.’ [Citation.] The harshest possible penalties involved
in those cases, i.e., the death penalty and life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole, are simply not at issue here.” People v. Harmon, 2013 IL App (2d) 120439, ¶ 54
(discussing whether the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the Act is unconstitutional).
¶ 23 Here, respondent was sentenced as a juvenile under the Act to commitment until the age of
21 years, a sentence that is not equivalent to being sentenced as an adult to death or to life
without parole. In addition, respondent was only sentenced as a habitual juvenile offender to a
mandatory commitment to the DJJ after he had committed two offenses that would have
constituted a felony if he had been prosecuted as an adult, and a violent third offense that was
specifically delineated by the legislature in the Act. 705 ILCS 405/5-815 (West 2012). The
legislature is entitled to find that, in the case of a recidivist, violent offender such as
respondent, there are no mitigating circumstances to allow for a lesser penalty. See Taylor, 102
Ill. 2d at 206 (finding that “[t]he rehabilitative objective of article I, section 11, should not and
does not prevent the legislature from fixing mandatory minimum penalties where it has been
determined that no set of mitigating circumstances” would make a sentence of less than natural
life proper for the crimes of two or more murders). Therefore, we find that section 5-815 does
not violate either the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution or the proportionate
penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution.
¶ 24 Respondent relies on People v. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d 328 (2002), as additional support for his
eighth amendment and proportionate penalty clause claim. However, we find Miller to be
distinguishable. In Miller, the defendant, a 15-year-old juvenile, was convicted of two counts
of first degree murder based on accountability based on a shooting that resulted in two murders
and in which the defendant agreed to be the lookout. Miller, 202 Ill. 2d at 330-31. The
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convergence of three statutes mandated a natural life sentence for the defendant, but the circuit
court refused to impose the sentence, finding it in violation of the eighth amendment and the
proportionate penalties clause. Id. at 331-32. Instead, the circuit court sentenced the defendant
to 50 years’ imprisonment. Id. at 332. The supreme court affirmed the judgment of the circuit
court, because the mandatory natural life sentence “eliminate[d] the court’s ability” to consider
the defendant’s “age or degree of participation in the crime.” Id. at 340-42. Here, however,
respondent was not convicted of a crime based on accountability and he was not sentenced to
natural life imprisonment, one of the harshest possible penalties available, and therefore Leon
Miller is inapposite to the present case.
¶ 25 Respondent also argues that Chrastka is not controlling because it relied on Rummel.
Respondent reasons that Rummel “found that a mandatory minimum sentence of natural life
for an adult offender did not violate the Eighth Amendment” and that the Supreme Court
rejected Rummel’s application to juveniles sentenced to mandatory minimum sentences of life
imprisonment in Graham. Respondent concludes that “the rationale behind the Illinois
Supreme Court’s decision in Chrastka” is therefore unsupported and “ripe for
reconsideration.” However, we first note that Rummel involved not just a mandatory life
sentence, but also involved a recidivist statute under which he was sentenced to a mandatory
natural life sentence only after he had been convicted of three felony convictions successively.
Rummel, 445 U.S. at 264. Similarly in Chrastka, and in the present case, the respondents were
sentenced as habitual juvenile offenders and to a mandatory minimum sentence of
commitment until the age of 21 years as a result of recidivism. Therefore, we still find
Chrastka to be applicable. Finally, as an appellate court, we are bound to honor our supreme
court’s conclusion on an issue “unless and until that conclusion is revisited by our supreme
court or overruled by the United States Supreme Court” and, accordingly, we must follow the
court’s conclusion in Chrastka. People v. Fountain, 2012 IL App (3d) 090558, ¶ 23 (citing
Mekertichian v. Mercedes-Benz U.S.A., L.L.C., 347 Ill. App. 3d 828, 836 (2004)).
¶ 26 Next, respondent contends that the habitual juvenile offender provision of the Act violates
principles of due process and equal protection. Specifically, respondent argues that the
habitual juvenile offender provision violates due process because there is no rational basis
related to the legitimate government interest of the Act. Respondent further argues that the
habitual juvenile offender provision violates equal protection principles because it treats
younger juveniles “more harshly” than older juveniles, contrary to the idea of “lessened
culpability” for the youngest juvenile offenders in Miller.
¶ 27 As discussed above, whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law and is therefore
reviewed de novo. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 486-87. Statutes carry a strong presumption of
constitutionality and, to overcome the presumption, the party challenging the statute has the
burden of establishing that the statute violates the constitution. Id. at 487. “We generally defer
to the legislature in the sentencing arena because the legislature is institutionally better
equipped to gauge the seriousness of various offenses and to fashion sentences accordingly.”
Id. “The legislature’s discretion in setting criminal penalties is broad, and courts generally
decline to overrule legislative determinations in this area unless the challenged penalty is
clearly in excess of the general constitutional limitations on this authority.” Id.¶ 28 The due process clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions provide that no
person shall be deprived of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.,
amend. XIV, Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. A statute violates substantive due process when there
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is no rational relationship between the classification in the statute and a legitimate
governmental purpose. People v. Williams, 329 Ill. App. 3d 846, 851 (2002).
¶ 29 The constitutional guarantee of equal protection requires the government to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. People v. Breedlove, 213 Ill. 2d 509, 518 (2004). If a
statute does not affect a fundamental right or involve a suspect class, it need only satisfy the
rational basis test. Id. Under the rational basis test, review is generally limited and deferential:
it simply inquires whether the means employed by the statute to achieve the stated purpose of
the legislation are rationally related to the purpose of the statute. Id. A statute will be upheld
under rational basis review if there is any conceivable set of facts to show a rational basis for
the statute. People v. Johnson, 225 Ill. 2d 573, 585 (2007). Moreover, although the language
used to describe the requirements for due process and for equal protection differs slightly, both
have identical standards of validity. People v. Reed, 148 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (1992).
¶ 30 Section 5-101 of the Act sets forth the Act’s purpose as promoting “a juvenile justice
system capable of dealing with the problem of juvenile delinquency, a system that will protect
the community, impose accountability for violations of law and equip juvenile offenders with
competencies to live responsibly and productively.” 705 ILCS 405/5-101 (West 2012). In
order to “effectuate this intent,” the following were declared to be “important purposes”: (1)
protecting citizens from juvenile crime; (2) holding each juvenile offender directly
accountable for his acts; (3) providing an individualized assessment of each alleged and
adjudicated delinquent juvenile in order to rehabilitate and prevent further delinquent
behavior; and (4) to provide due process through which each juvenile offender and all
interested parties will receive fair hearings and where legal rights are enforced and recognized.
705 ILCS 405/5-101(1) (West 2012). Section 5-101 also discusses various policies meant to
help accomplish the listed goals, including protecting the community from crimes committed
by minors, allowing minors to reside at home whenever possible, and holding minors
accountable for their unlawful behavior and not allowing minors to think their delinquent acts
have no consequences for themselves or others. 705 ILCS 405/5-101(2) (West 2012).
¶ 31 Our state supreme court has previously conclusively found that the habitual juvenile
offender provision in the Act was constitutional. Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 79. There, similar to the
present case, the respondents argued that the habitual juvenile offender provision violated their
rights to due process and equal protection. Id. at 78-80. The supreme court concluded that,
despite the habitual juvenile offender provision requiring mandatory commitment until the age
of 21 years, the means chosen by the legislature were reasonably designed to remedy the evils
which the legislature had determined to be a threat to the public health, safety, and welfare. Id.
at 79. The court explained:
“Under the Act, the court is dealing with a juvenile who has allegedly committed three
offenses within what is necessarily a short period of time. Significantly, the two
predicate adjudications afforded the juvenile the opportunity to have a hearing at which
he could present mitigating evidence and at which the trial judge could exercise his
discretion in determining the appropriate disposition. Additionally, the two predicate
adjudications must have been for offenses which would have been felonies if the
individual were prosecuted as an adult [citation], and the third offense must be of a
particularly serious nature to warrant the disposition authorized by the Act [citation].
The legislature could legitimately conclude that an individual who has committed three
such offenses benefited little from the rehabilitative measures of the juvenile court
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system and exhibits little prospect for restoration to meaningful citizenship within that
system as it had heretofore existed. The rehabilitative purposes of the system are not
completely forsaken, but after the commission by an individual of a third serious
offense, the interest of society in being protected from criminal conduct is given
additional consideration. We consider it to be entirely reasonable and constitutionally
permissible for the legislature to so provide and to authorize the disposition specified in
the legislative scheme it has developed.” (Emphases omitted.) Id. at 79-80.
See also People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157, 170 (2006) (observing that a policy that seeks to
“hold juveniles accountable for their actions and to protect the public does not negate the
concept that rehabilitation remains a more important consideration in the juvenile justice
system than in the criminal justice system and that there are still significant differences
between the two”).
¶ 32 The supreme court in Chrastka also found no equal protection violation because it believed
“the interest in protecting society from the habitual juvenile offender has, through experience,
proved to be as compelling as the interest in protecting society from the habitual adult
offender, and the broad authority of State legislatures to deal with adult recidivists is well
recognized.” Chrastka, 83 Ill. 2d at 81. The court concluded that the possible variance in the
ages of habitual juvenile offenders did not serve to invalidate the means chosen to effectuate
the purpose of the Act, because the “ ‘Constitution permits qualitative differences in meting
out punishment and there is no requirement that two persons convicted of the same offense
receive identical sentences.’ ” Id. (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1999)).
¶ 33 Respondent again relies on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Miller, Roper, and Graham,
for support. However, as we discussed above, we find these cases to be inapposite to the
present case, deciding only the more narrow issue that a sentencing body “must have the
chance to take into account mitigating circumstances before sentencing a juvenile to the
‘harshest possible penalty.’ ” Harmon, 2013 IL App (2d) 120439, ¶ 54 (quoting Miller, 567
U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 2475). Respondent’s sentence of mandatory commitment to the DJJ
until the age of 21 years is not one of these harshest possible penalties. As we discussed above,
we are bound to honor the supreme court’s conclusion unless and until our supreme court
revisits the issue or is overruled by the United States Supreme Court and are bound by the
decision in Chrastka. Fountain, 2012 IL App (3d) 090558, ¶ 23. Therefore, we conclude that
the habitual juvenile offender provision of the Act does not violate the principles of
constitutional due process or equal protection.
¶ 34 For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 35 Affirmed.
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