People v. Arroyo , 328 Ill. App. 3d 277 ( 2002 )


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  • 1-99-4435
    )
    PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,             )     Appeal from the
    )     Circuit Court of
    Plaintiff-Appellee,               )     Cook County.
    )
    v.
    )
    )
    ULISES ARROYO,                               )     Honorable
    )     James M. Schreier,
    Defendant-Appellant.              )     Judge Presiding.
    )
    JUSTICE REID delivered the opinion of the court:
    Following a bench trial, Ulises Arroyo was convicted of first degree
    murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1)(West 1996)) in the shooting death of Rudy
    Dellatorre just after midnight on June 14, 1997, during the street
    "celebration" which occurred after the Chicago Bulls won the NBA
    championship.  He was sentenced to 35 years.  On appeal, the defendant
    asserts that the trial court committed reversible error by not allowing the
    inculpatory statement of a non-testifying third person into evidence.
    Defendant also argues judicial error in denying his motion to suppress
    statements, and in limiting testimony regarding incidents of past violent
    acts committed by members of the street gang which had initially instigated
    violence.  Defendant further argues his guilt was not proved beyond a
    reasonable doubt and his sentence was excessive.  For the following
    reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence.
    THE FACTS
    Arroyo, a member of the Milwaukee Kings street gang, watched the
    championship game on television at his girlfriend's house.  He is not a
    member of the Reese Park Imperial Kings.  After the game, he went to meet
    another friend at the Apple Pantry near Fullerton and Marmora in Chicago.
    He had previously been told that, even though he was not an official member
    of the Reese Park Imperial Kings, he would be working security at the Apple
    Pantry in case anything happened.  While this was transpiring, members of
    the Pachucos street gang were throwing bricks and bottles at cars passing
    through their territory.  The Pachucos hit a car driven by Pedro
    Villalobos, a member of the rival Imperial Gangsters street gang.  To help
    him retaliate, Villalobos recruited Imperial Gangsters as well as some of
    the Reese Park Imperial Kings.  Villalobos went to the Apple Pantry and
    told everyone there, including Arroyo, what had happened to him.  Several
    Imperial Gangsters and Reese Park Imperial Kings left the Apple Pantry,
    walking East on Fullerton toward Long where the bricks had been thrown.
    Once there, violence ensued.
    Arroyo claimed he heard gunshots and someone's voice saying "they are
    bursting!"  He claims he was told to shoot.  Arroyo pulled his gun and shot
    in a northerly direction, up and over the heads of the crowd.  He then left
    the scene to put the gun back in the Kings' hiding spot.  Arroyo claims he
    did not aim at anyone specific and did not know anyone had been shot.  When
    the shots were fired, Rudy Dellatorre was standing in the middle of a group
    of 20-25 people, waving a Mexican flag.  Dellatorre was shot during the
    gunfire.  He died the next day at Illinois Masonic Hospital.
    While those events were transpiring, another group led by Oscar
    Molina and Luis Villalobos drove in a van painted a dark color to Fullerton
    and Long and opened fire on the Pachucos standing on the corner.  On June
    15, 1997, Molina and Villalobos were arrested.  Molina confessed that he
    thought he hit someone while shooting his .9mm handgun.  Villalobos'
    statement corroborated Molina's statement.  After Molina gave his
    statement, he fled the jurisdiction and was a fugitive at the time of
    Arroyo's trial.
    Also, on June 15, 1997, at approximately noon, Arroyo was taken into
    custody by the police and brought to Area 5.  Arroyo made a statement to
    the police in which he confessed to the crime orally and in a signed,
    handwritten statement.
    During pre-trial discovery, Arroyo filed a motion to suppress his
    statement.  Arroyo claimed that the police had violated his fifth amendment
    rights because he was physically and psychologically coerced into
    confessing.  At the time of the interrogation, Arroyo had no attorney
    present and no one from his family had been notified of his arrest.  He was
    not arrested pursuant to a warrant and was not being interrogated by the
    arresting officers.
    At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Arroyo testified that the
    police never informed him of the charges against him and refused upon
    request to allow him contact with an attorney.  When Arroyo showed the
    police his attorney's business card, he claimed they tore it up and began
    slapping him.  After a full day of interrogation which he claimed lasted 30
    hours, Arroyo claims he succumbed to the pressure and signed the five-page
    statement written by an Assistant State's Attorney.  The claim that Arroyo
    was interrogated for 30 hours is disputed by the State.  The arrest report
    shows that he was arrested June 15, 1997 at 8:30 p.m.  The handwritten
    statement states it was created June 16, 1997 at 12 p.m.  Both of these
    documents are contained in the common law record.  By the State's
    calculation, Arroyo was interrogated for only 16 hours.
    During the motion to suppress, the defense called Arroyo, his mother
    Yolanda Sharon, and his girlfriend Lindora Cox.  Arroyo testified he was
    threatened, coerced and hit in the head during the interrogation process.
    He also accused the police of preventing him access to his attorney by
    tearing up the attorney's card, which Arroyo carried.  Arroyo's mother and
    girlfriend testified they had been looking for him the entire time he was
    being interrogated.  The girlfriend testified that the police denied having
    Arroyo in their custody, even though he had been there for quite some time.
    The mother and girlfriend claimed they knew the police were lying because
    they saw Arroyo's car in the parking lot.
    The investigation was conducted by Detectives Engel and Sofrenovic.
    At the motion to suppress, the State called Engel, who testified that he
    conducted a brief interview shortly after Arroyo arrived at the Area 5
    station wherein he did not ask Arroyo about Dellatorre's death and did not
    mentally or physically coerce him in any way.  He also denies that Arroyo
    requested his attorney or that the police contact Arroyo's family members.
    Sofrenovic testified that he interviewed Arroyo at approximately
    12:30 a.m. on June 16, 1997.  He claims Arroyo was not cuffed at the time.
    Reading from a printed form, Sofrenovic informed Arroyo of his rights
    pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
     (1966).  Sofrenovic testified that Arroyo indicated he understood his
    rights and agreed to speak.  The interview continued from 12:30 a.m. to
    approximately 4 a.m.  At that point, Sofrenovic testified he read the
    Miranda rights a second time.  Sofrenovic allegedly told Arroyo that his
    story did not wash because two witnesses placed defendant at the shooting
    and that the police had recovered a gun.
    Arroyo's statement was memorialized at approximately noon on the
    second day.  At that point, Assistant State's Attorney Gallagher again read
    Arroyo his Miranda rights and took the statement.  The statement was
    written by Gallagher, allegedly based on things Arroyo told him.  Portions
    of the statement were read aloud in front of Arroyo, who made corrections
    which were initialed.  Arroyo, Gallagher and Sofrenovic signed the
    statement once the corrections were made.  The statement is nearly 5 pages
    in length, containing language that Arroyo was well-treated and neither
    threatened nor coerced into making the statement.
    At the close of the hearing on the motion to suppress, the trial
    court denied the motion, holding that it would resolve all issues of
    credibility between the defendant and the State in favor of the State.
    Trial commenced on April 30, 1999.  The State called Enereida
    Zendejas, who testified how Rudy Dellatorre was struck by a bullet.  She
    testified that she observed a large group walking down Fullerton carrying
    bats and bottles.  Zendejas then saw a light-colored van and a dark-colored
    car drive by the area.  She testified she believed the shots came from one
    of the cars, not the group on the street.  She also testified that she saw
    a Hispanic man come from the car who was approximately 6'1" tall, weighing
    approximately 180-200 pounds.
    The State also called Sergio Hernandez and Terrence Rizzo, members of
    the Milwaukee Kings street gang.  They testified that they were with Arroyo
    on the night in question.  The Pachucos threw bricks at Hernandez and the
    group with him.  Hernandez testified he saw Arroyo fire a single shot, then
    run away.  As Arroyo was running, Hernandez testified he heard three or
    four other shots from what sounded to him like a larger gun.  Hernandez
    also testified that he did not see the bullet fired by Arroyo actually hit
    anyone.  Rizzo also saw Arroyo shoot but did not see the bullet strike
    anybody.  Rizzo testified to hearing a second volley of shots but that the
    shots did not come from Arroyo's gun.  After the incident, Rizzo met up
    with Arroyo.  According to Rizzo, Arroyo did not mention thinking he hit
    someone when he fired the gun.  Arroyo then asked another gang member to
    put the gun in the gang's stash.  Hernandez subsequently took the police to
    the stash where they recovered the .25 caliber handgun.
    The State then called Sofrenovic, who testified consistently with his
    testimony at the motion to suppress.  He testified that he spoke with
    Arroyo, Hernandez and Rizzo.  Sofrenovic witnessed the writing of the
    handwritten statement.  He also saw Arroyo sign the statement.  On cross-
    examination, Sofrenovic admitted there was no lawyer present for any of the
    interrogation and that certain details were missing from the statement.
    Sofrenovic, through testimony published the statement to the trial court.
    The statement indicated that Arroyo got the gun from a gang member named
    Jowers.  Arroyo was carrying the gun "just in case anything happened."
    Arroyo knew he was the only person in his group with a gun.   He also heard
    the Pachucos did not have guns.  The statement also states that defendant
    fired 4 shots into the crowd.  Arroyo thought he might have hit someone but
    was uncertain.
    On cross-examination, Sofrenovic testified about the oral statement
    Arroyo gave before the handwritten statement.  In the oral statement,
    Arroyo allegedly told the police that he did not know if the Imperial
    Gangsters or Maniac Latin Disciples carried firearms when they left to go
    to the scene of the shooting.  However, Arroyo later contradicted himself
    by stating that he knew someone had a .9mm gun.  Arroyo told Sofrenovic
    that he knew the person with the gun would be east of the Pachucos.
    Further, Arroyo stated that when he heard his own group members yell "shoot
    shoot" he did not know whether the Pachucos had a gun.  Sofrenovic
    testified that the police recovered a .9mm gun from Molina that same day.
    Prior to resting its case-in-chief, the State introduced two
    stipulations into evidence.  The first contained stipulated testimony of
    the medical examiner that the victim died from a gunshot to the right side
    of the head.  The medical examiner would have testified that the bullet was
    a small caliber, copper-jacketed bullet.  The second stipulation was of a
    firearms expert named Sanchez.  Sanchez would have testified that the
    bullet recovered from Dellatorre's head had been fired from the .25 caliber
    handgun recovered from the Milwaukee Kings' stash.  This concluded the
    State's case-in-chief.  Defendant unsuccessfully moved for a directed
    verdict.
    The defendant's case-in-chief began with Arroyo himself.  Arroyo
    testified that he and some others met members of the Imperial Gangsters and
    Maniac Latin Disciples around Fullerton and McVicker.  Arroyo said he
    agreed to go along and help the other gangs fight the Pachucos.  He
    admitted he was carrying a gun, "in case anything goes down, anybody ends
    up shooting or pulls a gun or anything like that."  When they arrived on
    the scene, both sides began throwing things at each other.
    Arroyo testified he stood by himself on the southwest corner of
    Fullerton and Long where he heard shots fired.  He testified he did not
    know from where the shots had come.  In response to the shots, Arroyo drew
    his gun and fired 3 or 4 bullets in an attempt to "scare them off."  Arroyo
    shot in a northwest direction but did not aim at anyone.  After the
    shooting, Arroyo headed westbound away from the scene.  He gave the gun to
    Jowers and did not learn anyone had been shot until he was arrested and
    taken to Area 5.  Arroyo testified that he spent 30 hours at Area 5 before
    giving his statement.  Arroyo claimed he did not read the statement or have
    it read to him by the police before he signed it.  Arroyo also testified
    about other incidents with the Pachucos.  This included an auto collision,
    an incident when a Pachucos member allegedly pointed a gun at Arroyo, and a
    third incident where Arroyo allegedly heard that the Pachucos shot at other
    gang members.
    Fernando Perez testified on Arroyo's behalf.  He was a co-defendant
    until he pled guilty and was sentenced to 4 years.  Luis Villalobos also
    testified on Arroyo's behalf.  He had been charged with murder but pled
    guilty to discharge of a firearm and was sentenced to 6 years.  Villalobos
    gave a statement which indicated that Molina also had a gun that evening.
    Perez testified that he learned that Molina's gun was a .9mm.  Though he
    heard 2 groups of gunshots that night, Villalobos testified he did not
    actually see anybody shooting either gun.
    At the close of his case-in-chief, Arroyo moved to have Molina's
    statement to the State's Attorney admitted into evidence.  The trial court
    took notice that Molina was out of the jurisdiction, possibly out of the
    country, and refused to admit the statement into evidence.  The trial court
    ruled that the statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to
    justify its admission into evidence.  Arroyo was found guilty of first-
    degree murder.  He was sentenced to 35 years.
    ANALYSIS
    I
    Arroyo argues on appeal that the trial court's refusal to admit the
    Molina statement because it purportedly lacked an indicia of reliability
    was error which he claims resulted in prejudice to him.  He argues that the
    indicia of reliability overwhelmingly favored admission of the confession
    because it was made when Molina was in custody, during an interrogation
    when Molina was anything but safe from prosecution.  Arroyo also argues
    that, since the confession was made while Molina was in police custody, it
    is far more reliable than had it been made outside of police custody.
    The State responds that the confession lacked sufficient indicia of
    reliability and therefore the trial court was correct in barring its
    admission.  The State argues that, since Arroyo failed to make the Molina
    statement part of the record on appeal, it is unclear what the confession
    actually said.  Since it was not included in the record, the State argues
    that Arroyo cannot actually show how the trial court allegedly abused its
    discretion.
    In determining whether or not to allow the admission of an
    incriminating statement by a third-party, courts follow the  guidelines
    articulated in Chambers v. Mississippi, 
    410 U.S. 284
    , 
    35 L. Ed. 2d 297
    , 
    93 S. Ct. 1038
     (1973), and its progeny.  In general, a declarant's unsworn,
    out-of-court statement that he committed the crime for which a defendant is
    charged is inadmissible hearsay, even though the statement is against the
    declarant's penal interest.  People v. McAllister, 
    193 Ill. 2d 63
    , 100
    (2000); citing People v. Tate, 
    87 Ill.2d 134
    , 143 (1981).  However, such a
    statement may be admitted under the statement-against-penal-interest
    exception to the hearsay rule if the statement contains sufficient indicia
    of reliability and if justice so requires.  McAllister, 
    193 Ill. 2d at 100
    ,
    citing People v. Bowel, 
    111 Ill.2d 58
    , 66 (1986), citing Chambers v.
    Mississippi, 
    410 U.S. 284
    , 302, 
    35 L. Ed. 2d 297
    , 313, 
    93 S. Ct. 1038
    , 1049
    (1973) ("the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the
    ends of justice").
    To determine whether a statement contains sufficient indicia of
    reliability, courts look foremost to whether the statement is self-
    incriminating and against the declarant's interest.  McAllister, 
    193 Ill. 2d at 100
    , citing People v. Keene, 
    169 Ill.2d 1
    , 29 (1995).  Courts also
    look to whether the statement was made spontaneously to a close
    acquaintance shortly after the crime occurred;  whether the statement was
    corroborated by other evidence;  and whether there was adequate opportunity
    for cross-examination of the declarant.  These latter factors are not "hard
    and fast requirements" for admissibility but, instead, are simply "indicia"
    of trustworthiness.  McAllister, 
    193 Ill. 2d at 100
    , citing People v.
    House, 
    141 Ill.2d 323
    , 390 (1990), citing Bowel, 
    111 Ill.2d at 67
    ; Keene,
    
    169 Ill.2d at 29
    .  In every case, the ultimate question in deciding the
    admissibility of the hearsay declaration is whether it was "made under
    circumstances which provide 'considerable assurance' of its reliability by
    objective indicia of trustworthiness." McAllister, 
    193 Ill. 2d at 100-01
    ,
    citing Bowel, 
    111 Ill.2d at 67
    , quoting Chambers, 
    410 U.S. at 300-01
    , 
    35 L. Ed. 2d at 311-12
    , 
    93 S. Ct. at 1048-49
    .  Whether a statement is admissible
    under the statement-against-penal-interest exception to the hearsay rule
    rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.    McAllister, 
    193 Ill. 2d at 101
    , citing Bowel, 
    111 Ill.2d at 68
    .
    In the case sub judice, the trial court properly held Molina's
    statement to be inadmissible because the Chambers exception to the hearsay
    rule applies only to "a declarant's unsworn, out-of-court that he committed
    the crime for which a defendant is charged."  McAllister, 
    193 Ill. 2d at 100
    .  Molina's statement that he fired a .9mm handgun in the vicinity where
    the victim was shot  in the head by a .25 caliber bullet fired from
    Arroyo's gun in no way indicates that Molina "committed the crime for which
    (Arroyo) is charged."  As Molina's unsworn, out-of-court statement did not
    comprise an admission that he committed the murder at issue, it could not
    have been admitted under the Chambers exception.  For the same reason,
    Molina's statement also did not contain sufficient indicia of reliability
    and, most importantly, justice did not require its admittance.  In both the
    trial court and on appeal, defendant has completely failed to present any
    plausible basis to find that the interests of justice would be served by
    admitting Molina's statement.  Indeed, a strong argument could be made that
    defendant's failure to make Molina's entire statement part of the record
    was a purposeful effort to obfuscate this issue.  The trial court's ruling
    that Molina's statement was inadmissible hearsay was correct.
    II
    Arroyo next argues that the trial court improperly denied his motion
    to suppress his confession.  He claims the confession was improperly
    obtained after 30 hours of interrogation in police custody without benefit
    of counsel.  Arroyo claims that the trial court failed to give sufficient
    weight to the effects of his prolonged isolation.  In this way, Arroyo
    argues he was effectively denied his constitutional right to counsel.  The
    State responds that the confession was voluntary and that Arroyo was
    repeatedly informed of his Miranda rights.  The State argues it established
    by a preponderance of the evidence that the confession was voluntarily
    given and that Arroyo was well treated during his interrogation.
    It is a fundamental principle of criminal procedure that a confession
    must be voluntary; otherwise it is inadmissible.  People v. Gilliam, 
    172 Ill. 2d 484
    , 501 (1996).  In determining whether a confession was
    voluntary, we must consider the totality of the circumstances.  In Re G.O.,
    
    191 Ill. 2d 37
    , 54 (2000); citing Gilliam, 
    172 Ill. 2d at 500
    .  Factors to
    consider include the respondent's age, intelligence, background,
    experience, mental capacity, education, and physical condition at the time
    of questioning;  the legality and duration of the detention;  the duration
    of the questioning;  and any physical or mental abuse by police, including
    the existence of threats or promises.  G.O., 
    191 Ill. 2d 37
    , 54; citing
    Gilliam, 
    172 Ill.2d at 500-01
    .   Significantly, no single factor is
    dispositive.  G.O., 
    191 Ill. 2d 37
    , 54; citing Gilliam, 
    172 Ill.2d at 500
    .
    The test of voluntariness is whether the respondent "made the statement
    freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort, or
    whether the [respondent's] will was overcome at the time he or she
    confessed."  G.O., 
    191 Ill. 2d 37
    , 54; quoting Gilliam, 
    172 Ill.2d at 500
    .
    "The benchmark for voluntariness is not whether the defendant would have
    confessed in the absence of interrogation but, rather, whether the
    defendant's will was overborne at the time of the confession."  People v.
    Brown, 
    169 Ill. 2d 132
    , 144 (1996); citing People v. House, 
    141 Ill. 2d 323
    , 376 (1990); People v. Terrell, 
    132 Ill. 2d 178
    , 198 (1990).
    "Consequently, in reviewing whether respondent's confession was voluntary,
    we will accord great deference to the trial court's factual findings, and
    we will reverse those findings only if they are against the manifest weight
    of the evidence.  However, we will review de novo the ultimate question of
    whether the confession was voluntary.  We caution that, for this standard
    of review to function as it is intended, trial courts must exercise their
    responsibility to make factual findings when ruling on motions to suppress.
    Reviewing courts should not be required to surmise what factual findings
    that the trial court made.  Instead, the trial court should make clear any
    factual findings upon which it is relying.  It is only through this synergy
    between the trial and reviewing courts that appellate courts can develop a
    uniform body of precedent to guide law enforcement officers in their
    determination of whether their actions may violate the constitution."
    G.O., 
    191 Ill. 2d at 50
    .
    The most disturbing claim made by Arroyo is that he asserted his
    right to an attorney, pulled out his attorney's business card, only to have
    the police officer seize the business card and tear it up in his face.
    This alone would be sufficient to invalidate the confession and exclude it
    from evidence as a violation of the defendant's right to counsel. U.S.
    Const., Amend. V and XIV; Miranda, 
    384 U.S. 436
    , 
    16 L. Ed. 2d 694
    , 
    86 S. Ct. 1602
    ; People v. Smith, 
    93 Ill. 2d 179
     (1982).  The State urges this
    court to accept the finding of the trial court which found the denial of
    this claim by the State to be more credible.  On this record, we cannot
    hold that the trial court's ruling is contrary to the manifest weight of
    the evidence presented on this issue.
    The undisputed evidence is that the interrogation took place over a
    substantial period of time.  Arroyo was repeatedly read his rights.  He was
    provided with food and drink.  He admitted he was well-treated during his
    interrogation and was not subjected to punishment.  Though Arroyo made some
    claims of mistreatment, the trial court also found those claims incredible.
    The trial court rejected Arroyo's arguments, in part, because the police
    gave him long breaks between questioning, allowed him time to rest in
    addition to providing him with food and drinks.
    Arroyo argues that this case should have the same result as People v.
    Hardway, 
    163 Ill. App. 3d 596
     (1987), wherein that defendant's confession
    was found to be the result of an unlawful detention.  Though Hardway might
    superficially seem similar to the case at bar, it is readily
    distinguishable.  Hardway turned on whether that detention resembled a
    traditional arrest or whether a reasonable person would not have believed
    he was free to leave.   Hardway, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 601; citing People v.
    Towers, 
    91 Ill. 2d 32
     (1982).  That defendant was not told whether or not
    he was under arrest.  He was also not told that he need not accompany the
    police officers to the station.  This is factually specific and quite
    unlike Arroyo's situation.   Arroyo had no doubt he was under arrest.  He
    does not dispute that he was detained, merely that, in his opinion, the
    detention was too long.  Arroyo would have this court consider the length
    of time of the detention as though that were the only fact to be
    considered.  This we cannot do because such an approach would be too rigid
    and would fail to take into account the totality of the circumstances.  The
    evidence presented at the motion to suppress is directly in conflict.  If
    the defendant's witnesses are to be believed, the statement should be
    suppressed.  If the State's witnesses are to be believed, the motion to
    suppress was properly denied.  These evidentiary conflicts were resolved by
    the trial court in favor of the State's witnesses.  Given the great
    deference we must give to such findings, we cannot say that the trial court
    abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to suppress.  G.O., 
    191 Ill. 2d at 50
    .
    III
    Arroyo next claims the trial court denied him his right to confront
    certain witnesses when it restricted testimony concerning prior acts of
    violence by the Pachucos against Arroyo personally and their previous
    history of violence in general.  In his testimony, Arroyo was allowed to
    make some mention of the Pachucos' prior acts but was limited in other
    respects.  He argues that any actions by the trial court to limit or
    foreclose such testimony was error.  The State responds that, since the
    trial court allowed Arroyo to elicit testimony from several witnesses about
    the Pachucos' reputation for violence, the rulings did not deny Arroyo his
    right of confrontation.  The State points out that, since Arroyo did not
    include this issue in a post-trial motion and did not object to the trial
    court's handling of the issue, it should be treated as having been waived.
    The State points out that, in the post-trial motion, Arroyo only argued
    that the trial court violated his right to impeach the witness, not the
    right of confrontation.  Next, the State argues that Arroyo failed to
    explain exactly how the alleged error actually deprived him of his right of
    confrontation.  Finally, the State urges this court to treat the alleged
    error as harmless.
    The trial court entertained a post-trial motion for a new trial on
    December 2, 1999.  Though Arroyo's motion included a claim of judicial
    error for restricting his witnesses' testimony to prior acts of violence by
    the Pachucos, it was raised in context of a self-defense claim.  No mention
    in the motion was made of the confrontation clause of the United States
    Constitution.  "Failure to specify grounds for a new trial in writing in a
    motion for a new trial has been held by this court to constitute waiver of
    the issue on review in the absence of plain error."  People v. Enoch, 
    122 Ill. 2d 176
    , 187 (1988).  Moreover, this court has previously held that
    "general and vague allegations in a post-trial motions are not sufficient
    to overcome waiver."  People v. Knight, 
    323 Ill. App. 3d 1117
    , 1124 (2001);
    quoting People v. Parchman, 
    302 Ill. App. 3d 627
    , 632 (1998).  "Failure to
    raise issues in the trial court denies that court the opportunity to grant
    a new trial, if warranted.  This casts a needless burden of preparing and
    processing appeals upon appellate counsel for the defense, the prosecution
    and upon the court of review.  Without a post-trial motion limiting the
    consideration to errors considered significant, the appeal is open-ended.
    Appellate counsel may comb the record for every semblance of error and
    raise issues on appeal whether or not trial counsel considered them of any
    importance."  Enoch, 
    122 Ill. 2d at 186
    .
    A trial court has wide discretion to restrict the scope of cross-
    examination but must first allow sufficient cross-examination to satisfy
    the confrontation required under the Sixth Amendment as a matter of right.
    People v. Brown, 
    243 Ill. App. 3d 1057
    , 1063 (1993).  "To determine if the
    cross-examination allowed satisfied the Constitutional requirement, a court
    'should not look at what a defendant had been prohibited from doing, but to
    what he had been allowed to do.'"  Brown, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 1063; quoting
    People v. Edwards, 
    218 Ill. App. 3d 184
     (1991).  A reviewing court should
    interfere with the trial court's decision involving the latitude of cross-
    examination only when the trial court clearly abused its discretion and
    manifest prejudice to the defendant resulted.   Brown, 243 Ill. App. 3d at
    1063; quoting People v. Edwards, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 193.  In the case at
    bar, the trial court gave the defense counsel latitude to question the
    witnesses about the Pachucos.  The trial court limited questions in scope
    but still allowed some questions, provided the questions were not vague or
    based upon hearsay.  These limitations were not outside the scope of the
    trial court's authority.  Absent an abuse of discretion, this court cannot
    find error on the part of the trial court.
    IV
    Arroyo next argues that the case against him was insufficient to
    convict him beyond a reasonable doubt.  "The State carries the burden of
    proving beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense and the
    defendant's guilt."  People v. Maggette, 
    195 Ill. 2d 336
    , 353 (2001);
    citing People v. Ware, 
    23 Ill. 2d 59
    , 62 (1961).  A reviewing court will
    not set aside a criminal conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence
    unless the proof is so improbable or unsatisfactory that there exists a
    reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.  When considering the
    sufficiency of the evidence, it is not the function of a reviewing court to
    retry the defendant.  Rather, the relevant question is whether, after
    reviewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational fact finder could have found beyond a reasonable
    doubt the essential elements of the crime.  Maggette, 
    195 Ill. 2d at 353
    ;
    citing People v. Tye, 
    141 Ill.2d 1
    , 13-14 (1990);  People v. Phillips, 
    127 Ill.2d 499
    , 509-10 (1989).  We note that this standard of review applies in
    all criminal cases, whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial.
    Maggette, 
    195 Ill. 2d at 353
    ; citing People v. Gilliam, 
    172 Ill.2d 484
    , 515
    (1996);  People v. Campbell, 
    146 Ill.2d 363
    , 374-75 (1992).  It is well-
    settled that when a case is tried without a jury, it is the responsibility
    of the trial judge to determine the credibility of the witnesses and weight
    to be given their testimony and where the evidence is merely conflicting ,
    a reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of
    fact who heard the evidence.  Hardway, 163 Ill. App. 3d at 601; citing
    People v. Woods, 
    81 Ill. 2d 537
     (1980).  In the case sub judice, two
    credible eyewitnesses watched Arroyo shoot a .25-caliber gun in the
    direction of the Pachucos on the night of the incident.  Sometime after the
    shooting, one of the eyewitnesses watched Arroyo turn a .25-caliber gun
    over to a fellow gang member and ask him to put it in the stash.  All of
    the eyewitness testimony exists in conjunction with Arroyo's own
    confession, in which he indicated that he shot his .25-caliber weapon which
    might have hit someone.  Additionally, all of this testimonial evidence is
    corroborated by the forensic evidence in this matter.  The medical examiner
    removed a .25-caliber bullet from the deceased's head.  This bullet was
    scientifically confirmed to have been fired from the same gun Arroyo fired.
    The State argues that this evidence is overwhelming in its support for
    Arroyo's conviction.  We agree.
    V
    Finally, Arroyo argues that the sentence imposed was disproportionate
    to the crime for which he was charged.  The State responds that a 35 year
    prison term for murder is within the statutory guidelines and is reasonable
    under the circumstances.  We agree.  It is well settled that the trial
    court has broad discretionary powers in imposing a sentence.  People v.
    Stacey, 
    193 Ill. 2d 203
    , 209 (2000); citing People v. Fern, 
    189 Ill. 2d 48
    ,
    53 (1999).  The trial court's sentencing decision is entitled to great
    deference.  Stacey, 
    193 Ill. 2d 203
    , 209; citing People v. Perruquet, 
    68 Ill. 2d 149
    , 154 (1977).  The trial court is granted such deference because
    the trial court is generally in a better position than the reviewing court
    to determine the appropriate sentence.  The trial judge has the opportunity
    to weigh such factors as the defendant's credibility, demeanor, general
    moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.  Stacey,
    
    193 Ill. 2d 203
    , 209; citing People v. Streit, 
    142 Ill.2d 13
    , 19 (1991);
    Perruquet, 
    68 Ill.2d at 154
    .   Consequently, the reviewing court must not
    substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would
    have weighed these factors differently.   Stacey, 
    193 Ill. 2d 203
    , 209;
    citing Streit, 
    142 Ill.2d at 19
    .  Arroyo's sentence is within the statutory
    guidelines for a crime of this nature.  "A sentence within statutory limits
    will not be deemed excessive unless it is greatly at variance with the
    spirit and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature
    of the offense.   Fern, 
    189 Ill. 2d at 54
    ; citing People v. Cabrera, 
    116 Ill. 2d 474
    , 493-94 (1987).  This record does not support Arroyo's claim
    that the sentence was disproportionate.
    CONCLUSION
    In light of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is
    affirmed.
    Affirmed.