Corn Belt Energy Corp. v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n , 2016 IL App (1st) 150311WC ( 2016 )

2016 IL App (3d) 150311WC
FILED: June 28, 2016
NO. 3-15-0311WC
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION DIVISION
CORN BELT ENERGY CORP., ) Appeal from
) Circuit Court of
Appellant,
) Bureau County
v. ) No. 14MR37
THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION )
COMMISSION et al. (James Lind, Appellee). ) Honorable
) Cornelius J. Hollerich,
) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion
Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hudson and Stewart concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
Justice Hoffman specially concurred in part and dissented in part, with opinion.
OPINION
¶1 In November 2012, claimant, James Lind, filed an application for adjustment of
claim pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 to 30 (West 2010)),
seeking benefits from the employer, Corn Belt Energy Corp. Following a hearing, the arbitrator
determined claimant sustained accidental injuries that arose out of and in the course of his em-
ployment on August 30, 2012, and awarded claimant (1) medical expenses of $1,480 less credits
to the employer of $390.91 and $536 for amounts paid by its workers' compensation carrier and
claimant's group health insurance and (2) 15 weeks' permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits
for a 3% loss of the person as a whole.
2016 IL App (3d) 150311WC
¶2 On review, the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission), with
one commissioner dissenting, modified portions of the arbitrator's decision but otherwise af-
firmed and adopted his award. On judicial review, the circuit court of Bureau County confirmed
the Commission.
¶3 The employer appeals, arguing (1) the Commission erred in finding claimant's
condition of ill-being was causally connected to his work accident, (2) the Commission erred in
awarding claimant PPD benefits where he failed to introduce into evidence a PPD impairment
report as described in section 8.1b(a) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8.1b(a) (West 2012)), and (3) the
Commission's PPD award must be reversed because it failed to adequately address the remaining
factors identified in section 8.1b(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8.1b(b) (West 2012)) for establish-
ing a PPD award. We reverse the portion of the circuit court's judgment confirming the Com-
mission's award of PPD benefits and remand to the Commission for compliance with section
8.1b(b) of the Act. We otherwise affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 At arbitration, claimant testified he worked for the employer for eight years. At
the time of his alleged accident, August 30, 2012, he worked for the employer as a lineman. His
job duties included "[a]nything from working out of a bucket truck to climbing a pole" and work-
ing with high voltage wires. On the day of his accident, claimant's job duties required him to
string three spans of primary wire to a transformer in the backyard of a residence. Upon arriving
at the job site, he parked his work truck in a ditch on an angle. When claimant exited the truck
he "had to twist and rotate out" and "felt a pull in [his] back." He immediately reported to his
foreman that he had "pulled something" but continued to work.
¶6 Claimant testified his pain and discomfort persisted. The following day, he
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sought chiropractic care at Farrell Chiropractic Clinic with Dr. Dennis Farrell. He testified his
pain and discomfort was primarily located in his lower back but he also experienced some pain
and discomfort in his cervical spine as a result of his work accident. Claimant rated his pain as
an eight or nine "because [he] was having problems walking." He stated Dr. Farrell took an x-
ray and provided him with lower back adjustments. Claimant testified he continued to follow up
with Dr. Farrell, initially seeing him every day or every other day. However, as his symptoms
reduced, so did his follow-up appointments.
¶7 Claimant believed the chiropractic care he received was helpful but stated he con-
tinued to experience pain and discomfort in his lower back. On direct examination, he agreed
that if Dr. Farrell noted the pain was primarily in his right lower lumbar region and right hip area
he would be correct. Further, claimant agreed that when he last saw Dr. Farrell he was experi-
encing pain which he rated at a 5 on a 10 point scale.
¶8 Claimant further testified that he continued to work following his accident. He
stated he felt capable of performing his work with discomfort. Currently, he noticed that his
lower back "stiffens up" on a daily basis. The stiffening he experienced was also accompanied
by pain from time to time. He testified that "[p]robably every day" he experienced "some sort of
pain or tightness in his lower back." Claimant stated his symptoms did not hinder his work. He
noted he had taken a different job with the employer and currently worked as a serviceman,
which did not require him to perform as much lifting or put as much stress on his body. Claim-
ant's current rate of pay was also higher.
¶9 Claimant denied experiencing any problems with the parts of his body that were
injured as a result of his work accident in the week before his accident occurred. However, on
cross-examination, claimant acknowledged that he received treatment from Dr. Farrell prior to
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August 2012. Specifically, he recalled seeing Dr. Farrell in May 2009, in connection with com-
plaints of pain and paresthesia in his neck, stating he fell off of a roof and landed on his head.
Claimant testified he did not specifically recall various other appointments with Dr. Farrell from
2010 through July 2012. However, he generally stated he could not disagree with what Dr. Far-
rell's records showed about the complaints he made or the treatment he received during that time.
¶ 10 At arbitration, claimant submitted his chiropractic treatment records from August
31, 2012, the day following his accident, through April 24, 2013, while the employer submitted
claimant's chiropractic treatment records from May 2009, through December 2012. Those rec-
ords show that, prior to his alleged August 2012 work accident, claimant was seen at Farrell Chi-
ropractic Clinic on multiple occasions, spanning from May 1, 2009, through July 6, 2012. Spe-
cifically, he sought treatment at Farrell Chiropractic Clinic 12 times in 2009; 22 times in 2010;
32 times in 2011; and 8 times between January and July 2012. During those visits, claimant
made various back-related complaints, reporting "pain and/or paresthesias" in his cervical, tho-
racic, and lumbar spine.
¶ 11 The record reflects claimant sought chiropractic care twice in January 2012. On
January 6, 2012, he complained of "pain and/or paresthesia" in the center of his lower lumbar
spine and right upper neck, as well as pain in his mid thoracic spine. On January 31, 2012, he
reported "pain and/or paresthesia" in the center of his lower lumbar spine, the center of his lower
neck, and the center of his upper and mid thoracic spine. Claimant also sought chiropractic care
twice in February 2012. On February 13, 2012, he complained of "pain and/or paresthesia" in
his neck and the center of his lower lumbar spine, as well as pain in his mid thoracic spine. On
February 28, 2012, he reported "pain and/or paresthesia" generally throughout his entire neck
and pain in his mid thoracic and lumbar spine.
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¶ 12 Thereafter, claimant was seen at Farrell Chiropractic Clinic once per month from
April to July 2012. During visits on April 24, May 25, and June 1, 2012, he complained of "pain
and/or paresthesia" in the center of his lower lumbar spine and in his thoracic spine, as well as
pain in his cervical spine or neck. On July 6, 2012, his last appointment prior to his alleged work
accident, claimant saw Dr. Farrell and reported "pain and/or paresthesia" in the center of his low-
er lumbar spine. Further, Dr. Farrell noted as follows:
"Pain/paresthesia is mild, intermittent[,] and aching. The pain re-
mains localized, it does not radiate or travel to any other parts of
the body. On a scale of 0 to 10 with 10 being the worst, [claimant]
rates the pain/discomfort a 2 of 10. Since the last treatment, his
low back pain is some better."
¶ 13 In providing treatment to claimant on July 6, 2012, Dr. Farrell noted an "electron-
ic thermal test" performed on claimant detected "imbalances" due to "subluxation" at the C2, C6,
T4, and L5 levels of claimant's spine. He recommended claimant return for treatment once a
week for the next month; however, the record reflects claimant did not seek further chiropractic
care until nearly two months later on August 31, 2012, the day after his alleged work accident.
¶ 14 Dr. Farrell's records from August 31, 2012, document the following complaints
and findings:
"Subjective:
Pain and/or paresthesia in the center of the lower lumbar spine and
in the left lower lumbar region. Pain began [on August 30, 2012].
The pain and/or paresthesia radiates into the left knee and down
the lateral side of the left calf, where it is described as [a] constant
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ache that can be sharp at times. Pain and/or paresthesia generally
throughout the entire neck. Pain/paresthesia is moderate, intermit-
tent, soreness[,] and stiffness. Secondary complaint of pain in the
following region(s): mid thoracic spine.
***
Assessment:
[Claimant] reports feeling better for a while after the last treatment,
but says the pain/paresthesia has manifested again. [Claimant] has
had an exacerbation. This is an episodic marked deterioration of
the patient's condition due to an acute flareup of the presenting
conditions."
¶ 15 In September 2012, claimant returned to see Dr. Farrell a total of nine times. On
September 5, 2012, Dr. Farrell documented complaints of "pain and/or paresthesia" in the center
of claimant's lower lumbar spine but noted claimant was "some better" since his last treatment.
Claimant rated his pain and discomfort as a 5 out of 10 and stated he noticed discomfort "55% of
[his] awake time." He further complained that his pain increased when moving from sitting or
laying down to standing and asserted his "pain/paresthesia [was] a constant ache that [could] be
sharp at times." Finally, claimant also reported experiencing pain in his mid thoracic and cervi-
cal spine.
¶ 16 On September 7, 2012, claimant followed up with Dr. Farrell and raised com-
plaints of "pain and/or paresthesia" in the center of his lower lumbar spine. Again, Dr. Farrell
noted claimant's pain was "some better." Claimant rated his pain and discomfort as a 4 out of 10
and stated he noticed discomfort "50% of [his] awake time." He reported his pain increased
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when lying down and decreased when walking. Additionally, he complained of pain in his mid
thoracic and cervical spine.
¶ 17 Claimant's chiropractic records from September 10, 2012, contain a history of his
alleged work accident, stating as follows:
"Pain and/or paresthesia in the center of the lower lumbar spine.
The pain began [on August 30, 2012]. [Claimant] [w]as getting
out of his work truck and twisted. Felt pain after that but it was not
too bad. When he woke up the next morning, he had severe pain.
Pain/paresthesia is moderate, intermittent[,] and sharp. On a scale
of 0 to 10 with 10 being the worst, he rates the pain/discomfort a 4
of 10. Was having pain down the back of the left leg to the knee,
but that is gone now. Worse in the mornings. If he sits or drives
for too long then tries to get up and get moving, the pain is really
bad. Sleeping fine."
Dr. Farrell found and adjusted subluxations at the L5, L1, T4, and C6 levels of claimant's spine.
¶ 18 Claimant continued to seek treatment at Farrell Chiropractic Clinic through April
2013. As stated, he was seen a total of nine times in September 2012. Claimant also returned for
follow up appointments six times in October 2012, once in November 2012, once in December
2012, twice in January 2013, once in February 2013, five times in March 2013, and three times
in April 2013. He reported similar symptoms of "pain and/or paresthesia" in various parts of his
spine. Also, during visits in September and October 2012 he reported "pain and/or paresthesia"
in the center of his lower lumbar spine that "[t]ravels into the SI joints."
¶ 19 In March and April 2013, claimant began reporting "pain and/or paresthesia" in
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the center of his lower lumbar spine that radiated into his right hip and right hip socket or into his
right gluteus. Claimant also described his pain as radiating down the front of his right thigh and
into his right knee and down the front of his right calf. At the time of his last visit with Dr. Far-
rell on April 24, 2013, subluxations at the L5, T4, and C2 levels of claimant's spine were discov-
ered and adjusted. Dr. Farrell noted claimant reported "feeling better for a while after the last
treatment" but his pain and paresthesia had "manifested again." Further, he stated claimant "con-
tinue[d] to struggle with pain, discomfort[,] and limitations while at work and performing activi-
ties of daily living."
¶ 20 On November 4, 2013, the arbitrator issued his decision in the matter, finding
claimant sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment on Au-
gust 30, 2012. The arbitrator determined claimant's "injury was in the form of a cervical, thorac-
ic[,] and lumbar strain along with subluxations throughout his spine." Further, he concluded
claimant's current condition of ill-being was "causally related to the injury." The arbitrator
awarded claimant (1) medical expenses of $1,480 minus credits to the employer of $390.91 and
$536 for amounts paid by its workers' compensation carrier and claimant's group health insur-
ance and (2) 15 weeks' PPD benefits for a 3% loss of the person as a whole.
¶ 21 On August 1, 2014, the Commission issued its decision in the matter. It modified
the arbitrator's decision by addressing section 8.1b of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8.1b (West 2012))
in connection with the arbitrator's PPD award but otherwise affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's
decision and award of benefits. One commissioner dissented, finding claimant was entitled to
PPD benefits for only a 1% loss of the person as a whole.
¶ 22 The employer sought judicial review with the circuit court. On April 20, 2015,
the court confirmed the Commission's decision.
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¶ 23 This appeal followed.
¶ 24 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 25 A. Causal Connection
¶ 26 On appeal, the employer first challenges the Commission's decision as to causal
connection. It argues the Commission's finding of a causal connection between the accident and
the condition complained of is both contrary to law and against the manifest weight of the evi-
dence.
¶ 27 "To obtain compensation under the Act, a claimant bears the burden of showing,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that he has suffered a disabling injury which arose out of
and in the course of his employment." Sisbro, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 207 Ill. 2d 193, 203,
797 N.E.2d 665, 671 (2003). "The 'arising out of' component is primarily concerned with causal
connection" and, to satisfy that requirement, a claimant must show "that the injury had its origin
in some risk connected with, or incidental to, the employment so as to create a causal connection
between the employment and the accidental injury." Id. at 203, 797 N.E.2d at 672.
¶ 28 A claimant may be entitled to benefits under the Act even though he suffers from
a preexisting condition of ill-being. Id. at 205, 797 N.E.2d at 672-73. "[I]n preexisting condition
cases, recovery will depend on the employee's ability to show that a work-related accidental inju-
ry aggravated or accelerated the preexisting disease such that the employee's current condition of
ill-being can be said to have been causally connected to the work-related injury and not simply
the result of a normal degenerative process of the preexisting condition." Id. at 204-05, 797
N.E.2d at 672. "Accidental injury need not be the sole causative factor, nor even the primary
causative factor, as long as it was a causative factor in the resulting condition of ill-being."
(Emphasis in original.) Id. at 205, 797 N.E.2d at 673.
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¶ 29 Additionally, "medical evidence is not an essential ingredient to support the con-
clusion of the *** Commission that an industrial accident caused the [claimant's] disability."
International Harvester v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Ill. 2d 59, 63, 442 N.E.2d 908, 911 (1982); see
also Pulliam Masonry v. Industrial Comm'n, 77 Ill. 2d 469, 471, 397 N.E.2d 834, 835 (1979) ("It
is not necessary to establish a causal connection by medical testimony."). "A chain of events
which demonstrates a previous condition of good health, an accident, and a subsequent injury
resulting in disability may be sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove a causal nexus between
the accident and the employee's injury." International Harvester, 93 Ill. 2d at 63-64, 442 N.E.2d
at 911.
¶ 30 "It is within the province of the Commission to resolve disputed questions of fact
***, to draw permissible inferences from the evidence, and to judge the credibility of the wit-
nesses." National Freight Industries v. Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2013 IL App (5th)
120043WC, ¶ 26, 993 N.E.2d 473. "Whether a causal connection exists is a question of fact for
the Commission, and a reviewing court will overturn the Commission's decision only if it is
against the manifest weight of the evidence." Land & Lakes Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 359 Ill.
App. 3d 582, 592, 834 N.E.2d 583, 592 (2005). "For the Commission's decision to be against the
manifest weight of the evidence, the record must disclose that an opposite conclusion clearly was
the proper result." Id. "The relevant inquiry is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the
Commission's finding, not whether this court or any other might reach an opposite conclusion."
Westin Hotel v. Industrial Comm'n, 372 Ill. App. 3d 527, 538-39, 865 N.E.2d 342, 353 (2007).
¶ 31 Initially, the employer argues the Commission erred in finding the existence of a
casual connection because claimant failed to present any medical opinion evidence and, as a mat-
ter of law, a "chain of events" theory of causation "should not be available to a claimant who has
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an unwitnessed accident and a preexisting condition involving the same area of the body for
which he now claims injury." We note the employer has failed to cite any authority to support its
position. Additionally, this court has previously addressed and rejected a substantially similar
argument. Specifically, in Price v. Industrial Comm'n, 278 Ill. App. 3d 848, 853-54, 663 N.E.2d
1057, 1060-61 (1996), we held as follows:
"With respect to the Commission's 'chain of events' analy-
sis, the employer acknowledges that a finding of causal connection
can be made based solely on a claimant's testimony, without sup-
porting medical evidence, but contends that in the present case
such finding was made in the face of medical evidence to the con-
trary. While there is medical evidence of a preexisting condition,
there is no medical evidence precluding an inference that such
preexisting condition was aggravated by [the claimant's] accident.
Indeed, contrary to the employer's assertions, there is medical evi-
dence to support it. The employer also contends that the facts of
the present case do not support the Commission's 'chain of events'
analysis because [the claimant] had a preexisting condition. The
employer cites no authority for the proposition that a 'chain of
events' analysis cannot be used to demonstrate the aggravation of a
preexisting injury, nor do we see any logical reason why it should
not. The rationale justifying the use of the 'chain of events' analy-
sis to demonstrate the existence of an injury would also support its
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use to demonstrate an aggravation of a preexisting injury." (Em-
phasis added.)
¶ 32 We continue to adhere to the rationale set forth in Price and reject the employer's
contention that, as a matter of law, causation must be supported by medical opinion evidence ra-
ther than a "chain of events" theory in preexisting injury cases. Further, we note that although
the employer emphasizes in its argument on appeal that claimant's accident was unwitnessed, it
does not challenge that an accident occurred in the course of claimant's employment on August
30, 2012. Under such circumstances, whether claimant's accident was witnessed or unwitnessed
does not change our analysis of the causation issue actually presented and argued by the employ-
er.
¶ 33 On appeal, the employer also contends the Commission's causal connection find-
ing was against the manifest weight of the evidence. It notes claimant's chiropractic records
demonstrate that claimant had "a significant preexisting condition involving the same area of the
body, and involving the same modes of treatment." Again, it maintains claimant should have
"come forth with medical opinion testimony—rather than simply rely upon the chain of events
theory—to establish his burden of proof."
¶ 34 We find the employer's arguments on appeal ignore that a claimant may obtain
compensation under the Act even when he suffers from a preexisting condition of ill-being. As
discussed, recovery in such cases depends upon the claimant's ability to establish that his work-
related accident aggravated or accelerated his preexisting condition. Further, causation in preex-
isting injury cases may be established without medical opinion evidence and through circumstan-
tial evidence, i.e., a chain of events. Here, the record undoubtedly shows claimant had a preex-
isting back condition of ill-being for which he sought chiropractic care from May 2009 through
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July 2012. However, it also shows that after his work accident, claimant's chiropractic visits in-
creased significantly, he reported different symptoms, and Dr. Farrell documented a deterioration
of his previous condition.
¶ 35 Prior to his work accident, the frequency of claimant's chiropractic visits varied.
During the first half of 2012, he sought chiropractic treatment only eight times and, from April to
July 2012, was seen for chiropractic care once per month. After his accident, claimant visited
Farrell Chiropractic Clinic total of 18 times from August 31 to December 12, 2012.
¶ 36 Additionally, during the last chiropractic visit prior to his work accident on July 6,
2012, claimant reported lumbar pain that he rated as a 2 out of 10 and which Dr. Farrell noted
did not radiate or travel to any other parts of claimant's body. Claimant reported feeling better
since his last treatment and did not seek any further chiropractic care until after his work acci-
dent, almost two months later. Following his August 2012 accident, claimant reported pain radi-
ating to his left lower extremity; pain that traveled to the SI joints; and, later, pain radiating to his
right lower extremity. In its reply brief, the employer argues claimant previously reported pain
radiating to his left lower extremity when seeking chiropractic care prior to his work accident;
however, such complaints occurred on only two occasions in August 2011 and once in December
2011. Claimant's medical records thereafter indicate such complaints resolved until after his
August 2012 work accident. Finally, on August 31, 2012, the day after his work accident, Dr.
Farrell documented that claimant "report[ed] feeling better for a while after the last treatment"
but his "pain/paresthesia ha[d] manifested again." He noted claimant had an "exacerbation" that
was "an episodic marked deterioration of [his] condition due to an acute flareup of the presenting
conditions."
¶ 37 Based on the circumstances presented, we find the record contains sufficient evi-
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dence to show claimant's work accident aggravated his preexisting back condition of ill-being
and supports the Commission's decision as to causation. An opposite conclusion from that of the
Commission is not clearly apparent and its causal connection decision is not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
¶ 38 We note, the employer also challenges the Commission's decision on the basis
that claimant's testimony lacked credibility. However, we find claimant's testimony regarding
his work accident and resulting symptoms was corroborated by his chiropractic records. Addi-
tionally, although he could not recall specific chiropractic visits that occurred prior to his work
accident or specific back-related complaints he had over the years, he acknowledged his previous
care and generally agreed that he received the care and treatment reflected in his medical records.
Finally, we note credibility determinations are within the province of the Commission and we
find nothing in claimant's testimony which warrants a different result from that reached by the
Commission in this case.
¶ 39 B. PPD Benefits
¶ 40 On appeal, the employer alternatively challenges the Commission's award of PPD
benefits. It argues the Commission's award should be set aside due to noncompliance with sec-
tion 8.1b of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8.1b (West 2012)). Specifically, the employer contends
claimant failed to introduce into evidence a PPD impairment report as described in section
8.1b(a) of the Act and the Commission failed to adequately address the remaining factors for
consideration identified in section 8.1b(b).
¶ 41 The issues presented involve matters of statutory construction, which are subject
to de novo review. Cassens Transport Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 218 Ill. 2d 519, 524, 844
N.E.2d 414, 418 (2006). "In interpreting the Act, our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect
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to the intent of the legislature." Id. at 524, 844 N.E.2d at 419. "The language used in the statute
is normally the best indicator of what the legislature intended" and "[e]ach undefined word in the
statute must be given its ordinary and popularly understood meaning." Gruszeczka v. Workers'
Compensation Comm'n, 2013 IL 114212, ¶ 12, 992 N.E.2d 1234. "[W]here the statutory lan-
guage is clear, it will be given effect without resort to other aids for construction." Id.
¶ 42 Section 8.1b of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8.1b (West 2012)) provides as follows
with respect to the determination of PPD benefits:
"For accidental injuries that occur on or after September 1, 2011,
[PPD] shall be established using the following criteria:
(a) A physician licensed to practice medicine in all of its branches
preparing a [PPD] impairment report shall report the level of im-
pairment in writing. The report shall include an evaluation of med-
ically defined and professionally appropriate measurements of im-
pairment that include, but are not limited to: loss of range of mo-
tion; loss of strength; measured atrophy of tissue mass consistent
with the injury; and any other measurements that establish the na-
ture and extent of the impairment. The most current edition of the
American Medical Association's [(AMA's)] 'Guides to the Evalua-
tion of Permanent Impairment' shall be used by the physician in
determining the level of impairment.
(b) In determining the level of [PPD], the Commission shall base
its determination on the following factors: (i) the reported level of
impairment pursuant to subsection (a); (ii) the occupation of the in-
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jured employee; (iii) the age of the employee at the time of the in-
jury; (iv) the employee's future earning capacity; and (v) evidence
of disability corroborated by the treating medical records. No sin-
gle enumerated factor shall be the sole determinant of disability. In
determining the level of disability, the relevance and weight of any
factors used in addition to the level of impairment as reported by
the physician must be explained in a written order."
¶ 43 The employer first argues section 8.1b of the Act "imposes a requirement that the
claimant tender an AMA rating report." It maintains that because claimant presented no "AMA
rating report" in the case at bar he failed to satisfy section 8.1b's requirements and was not enti-
tled to a PPD award.
¶ 44 In addressing this issue, the Commission stated as follows:
"The Commission finds that a complete reading of *** sec-
tion [8.1b] of the Act indicates that a party is not required to pro-
vide an AMA rating report for the purpose of determining perma-
nent disability. Instead, we find that the Act simply requires that if
an AMA rating report has been provided, then the Commission
must consider it, along with all the other criteria listed, when de-
termining permanent disability."
(We note both the employer and the Commission refer to the report referenced in section 8.1b as
an "AMA rating report"; however, consistent with the language of section 8.1b(a), we, hereinaf-
ter, refer to the report as a "[PPD] impairment report.") We find the Commission's interpretation
of section 8.1b is reasonable.
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¶ 45 First, subsection (a) of section 8.1b is addressed only to a "physician *** prepar-
ing a [PPD] impairment report." 820 ILCS 305/8.1b(a) (West 2012). It sets forth what a physi-
cian should include in his or her report and establishes that the report must be "in writing." Id.
Subsection (a) does not contain any language which obligates either a claimant or an employer to
submit a PPD impairment report. Additionally, it contains no language limiting the Commis-
sion's ability to award PPD benefits when no report is submitted.
¶ 46 Second, subsection (b) of section 8.1b of the Act is addressed only to the Com-
mission. 820 ILCS 305/8.1b(b) (West 2012). It lists five factors upon which the Commission
must base its determination of the level of PPD benefits to which a claimant is entitled, including
(1) the level of impairment contained within a PPD impairment report, (2) the claimant's occupa-
tion, (3) the claimant's age at the time of injury, (4) the claimant's future earning capacity, and
(5) evidence of disability corroborated by the treating medical records. Id. In subsection (b), the
legislature expressly directed that the Commission not consider any single enumerated factor to
"be the sole determinant of disability." Id. Further, it sets forth the requirement that the Com-
mission explain in writing the relevance and weight of factors it used to determine the level of
impairment in addition to the level of impairment contained within a physician's PPD impair-
ment report. Id. Again, subsection (b) does not require any action to be taken by either a claim-
ant or an employer. Also, similar to subsection (a), it contains no language limiting the Commis-
sion's ability to award PPD benefits in the absence of a PPD impairment report.
¶ 47 Clearly, the plain language of section 8.1b places no explicit requirement on ei-
ther party. Nor does it make the submission of a PPD impairment report a prerequisite to an
award of PPD benefits by the Commission. Rather, the section speaks in terms of what factors
the Commission is required to consider when determining the appropriate level of PPD.
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¶ 48 We note this construction of the Act is consistent with our recent decision in Con-
tinental Tire of the Americas, LLC v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 2015 IL App
(5th) 140445WC. In that case, the claimant was awarded PPD benefits based on a 5% loss of use
of his left hand. Id. ¶ 8. However, only the employer submitted the PPD impairment report de-
scribed in section 8.1b(a) of the Act and its report contained a 0% impairment rating. Id. ¶ 15.
On review, the employer asked this court to "hold that the claimant was required under section
8.1b to submit a [PPD impairment] report in support of his disability." Id. This court rejected
the employer's request, stating as follows:
"The statute does not require the claimant to submit a written [PPD
impairment] report. It only requires that the Commission, in de-
termining the level of the claimant's permanent partial disability,
consider a report that complies with subsection (a), regardless of
which party submitted it. In addition, section 8.1b does not specify
the weight that the Commission must give to the [PPD impairment]
report. Instead, section 8.1b(b) states that '[n]o single enumerated
factor shall be the sole determinant of disability.' 820 ILCS
305/8.1b(b) (West 2012)." Id. ¶ 17.
¶ 49 Under the Act, a PPD impairment report may be submitted by either party. Fur-
ther, when one is admitted into evidence, it must be considered by the Commission, along with
other identified factors, in determining the claimant's level of PPD. None of the factors set forth
in section 8.1b is to be the sole determinant of the claimant's disability. Further, nothing in the
plain language of the Act precludes a PPD award when no PPD impairment report is submitted
by either party. Consequently, we reject this contention by the employer.
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¶ 50 Finally, on appeal, the employer argues the Commission failed to comply with
section 8.1b(b) by failing to explain the relevance and weight of the factors it used to determine
claimant's level of disability. We agree.
¶ 51 As stated, section 8.1b(b) sets forth various factors the Commission must consider
when determining the claimant's level of PPD, including "(ii) the occupation of the injured em-
ployee; (iii) the age of the employee at the time of the injury; (iv) the employee's future earning
capacity; and (v) evidence of disability corroborated by the treating medical records." 820 ILCS
305/8.1b(b) (West 2012). That section also provides that "[i]n determining the [claimant's] level
of disability, the relevance and weight of any factors used in addition to the level of impairment
as reported by the physician must be explained in a written order." (Emphases added.) Id.
¶ 52 Here, when awarding PPD benefits, the Commission set forth each of the afore-
mentioned factors in its decision along with the basic facts applicable to each factor. However,
the Commission did not explain the relevance or weight it attributed to each factor when deter-
mining claimant's level of disability. Thus, we find the Commission failed to comply with sec-
tion 8.1b(b) of the Act. We reverse the Commission's PPD award and remand for compliance
with the Act's requirements.
¶ 53 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 54 For the reasons stated, we reverse the portion of the circuit court's judgment con-
firming the Commission's award of PPD benefits and remand to the Commission for compliance
with section 8.1b(b) of the Act. We otherwise affirm the circuit court's judgment.
¶ 55 Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.
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¶ 56 JUSTICE HOFFMAN, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part:
¶ 57 I concur in that portion of the majority's judgment which reverses that part of the
circuit court's order which confirmed the Commission's award of permanent partial disability
(PPD) benefits. I also concur in the majority's finding with respect to causation and its affir-
mance of that part of the circuit court's order which confirmed the Commission's award of medi-
cal expenses. However, I write separately in order to register my disagreement with that portion
of the majority's opinion which holds that section 8.1b of the Act does not require the filing of a
PPD impairment report before the Commission can award PPD benefits and to dissent from that
portion of the majority's judgment which remands this matter back to the Commission.
¶ 58 The majority takes the position that section 8.1b does not require the filing of a
PPD impairment report which the Commission must consider before awarding PPD benefits and
that the statute only requires the Commission to consider such a report if one is submitted. I dis-
agree.
¶ 59 As the majority correctly holds, the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Illinois State Treasurer v. Illinois Work-
ers' Compensation Comm'n, 2015 IL 117418, ¶ 20. The best evidence of the legislature's intent
is the language of the statute itself. Id. ¶ 21. When the language of a statute is clear and unam-
biguous, the statute must be given effect without resort to other aids for construction. Id.
¶ 60 Section 8.1b provides that, "[f]or accidental injuries occurring on or after Septem-
ber 1, 2011, permanent partial disability shall be established" using the criteria set forth in the
statute. (Emphasis added.) 820 ILCS 305/8.1b (West 2012). Subsection (b) states unambigu-
ously that, in determining the level of PPD, "the Commission shall base its determination" on
five enumerated factors, one of which is the reported level of impairment pursuant to subsection
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(a) of the statute which sets for the required contents of a PPD impairment report. (Emphasis
added.) 820 ILCS 305/8.1b(b) (West 2012). I do not believe it is possible for the Commission
to base its PPD determination on the five enumerated factors unless it has considered each of
those factors, including a PPD impairment report. Had the legislature intended to make the
Commission's consideration of a PPD impairment report mandatory only in those cases where
such a report is introduced in evidence, it could have said so. Instead, the legislature enumerated
the reported level of impairment" as one of the five factors that the Commission "shall base its
determination on." 820 ILCS 305/8.1b(b) (West 2012). Although the level of impairment set
forth in a PPD impairment report is not the sole determinant of disability, I believe that the stat-
ute requires that one be in evidence and considered by the Commission in determining the level
of PPD. My conclusion in this regard is supported by the last sentence in section 8.1 b(b) which
states that "[i]n determining the level of disability, the relevance and weight of any factors used
in addition to the level of impairment as reported by the physician must be explained in a written
order." 820 ILCS 305/8.1b(b) (West 2012). I believe that this sentence clearly requires that the
level of impairment as reported by a physician must always be considered in determining a
claimant's level of impairment and the weight and relevance of the other four factors for consid-
eration must be explained by the Commission.
¶ 61 My reading of section 8.1b of the Act leads me to conclude that, before the Com-
mission can award PPD benefits, it must consider a PPD impairment report prepared in accord-
ance with the requirements of section 8.1b(a). Stated otherwise, in the absence of its considera-
tion of a PPD impairment report prepared in accordance with the requirements of section 8.1b(a),
the Commission may not award PPD benefits. That is not to say that the level of impairment re-
ported in a PPD impairment report is determinative of the issue. I conclude only that such a re-
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port must be submitted to the Commission, and the Commission must consider it before making
a PPD award.
¶ 62 In this case, no PPD impairment report was presented to the Commission for its
consideration. Consequently, I too believe that the portion of the circuit court's order affirming
the Commission's PPD award must be reversed. However, unlike the majority, I would not re-
mand the matter back to the Commission; I would vacate the PPD award.
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