People v. Johnson ( 2018 )

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Appellate Court Date: 2018.08.23
09:07:16 -05'00'
People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st) 153634
Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption TERRY JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant.
District & No. First District, Second Division
Docket No. 1-15-3634
Filed May 29, 2018
Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 14-CR-10019; the
Review Hon. Charles P. Burns, Judge, presiding.
Judgment Affirmed.
Counsel on Michael J. Pelletier, Patricia Mysza, and Talon K. Nouri, of State
Appeal Appellate Defender’s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.
Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
Matthew Connors, and Elizabeth Reilly, Assistant State’s Attorneys,
of counsel), for the People.
Panel JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Mason and Justice Pucinski concurred in the
judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Terry Johnson and others planned to rob a video game store. After one of his companions
used pepper spray to incapacitate the store clerk, Johnson tackled the clerk to the floor and
struggled with him. They took the clerk’s keys and several video game systems.
¶2 Before trial, Johnson requested a conference under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff.
July 1, 2012) to discuss a possible plea deal. The trial court offered Johnson a 13-year
sentence, which Johnson rejected. After a bench trial, Johnson was convicted of armed
robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to 16 years of imprisonment.
¶3 Johnson argues that he should not have been convicted of armed robbery because the
pepper spray was not a “dangerous weapon” within the meaning of the armed robbery statute
(720 ILCS 5/18-2 (West 2014)). We reject this claim for the same reasons laid out in People v.
Curry, 2018 IL App (1st) 153635, a case involving the getaway driver. We also reject
Johnson’s argument that the trial court improperly increased his sentence from the rejected
13-year offer because nothing in the record makes it “clearly evident” that the sentence was
imposed as punishment for rejecting the plea offer and exercising his right to a trial.
¶4 Background
¶5 Before trial, Johnson’s counsel requested a Rule 402 conference with the trial court to
discuss a potential plea bargain. The State asserted that Johnson and Curry committed the
crime with possibly two accomplices and that Johnson “struggled” with a store employee after
the employee was pepper sprayed. The State also noted that Johnson had four prior felony
convictions (all for robbery or attempted robbery), and two juvenile adjudications, and offered
Johnson an 18-year sentence. Johnson’s counsel argued that Johnson was not alleged to have
pepper sprayed the employee and had not been caught with any of the robbery’s proceeds.
Counsel also noted that Johnson was 22 years old and had been paroled for his previous felony
sentences less than a year before the commission of this robbery. Counsel asked for a sentence
of six to eight years. The trial court offered Johnson a sentence of 13 years, which Johnson
rejected.
¶6 What follows repeats some of the “Background” section in Curry, 2018 IL App (1st)
153635. At trial, Alonzo Mitchell, an employee of the Game Stop, described how he was
working behind the counter when three men entered, wearing hooded sweatshirts. One man
approached the counter and squirted pepper spray on him, another man (later identified as
Johnson) went behind the counter and tackled Mitchell, and the first man squirted Mitchell
again. The men took Mitchell’s store keys and stole several video game systems.
¶7 Meanwhile, a coworker who had been hiding in the store’s break room called police. An
officer, who was nearby at the time of a police radio call for assistance, saw individuals come
out of the store and get into a silver Pontiac. The officer followed the Pontiac, which was later
found unoccupied and parked on a residential street. The backseat and trunk of the Pontiac
contained several video game systems, as well as Mitchell’s store keys. On the sidewalk
nearby lay a hooded sweatshirt and a can of pepper spray. The car’s registration revealed that a
woman owned the car; she gave police the name of a potential suspect, Terry Johnson.
¶8 Johnson told police that he and some friends robbed the Game Stop store while Deontae
Curry acted as getaway driver. Curry told police that his friends had planned only to shoplift
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while he waited in the car. The trial court was able to view the store’s surveillance video,
showing the robbery and Johnson’s actions.
¶9 Johnson was convicted of armed robbery at a bench trial, with the trial court noting that the
evidence showed the robbery was “preplanned” and “very methodical.” At sentencing, defense
counsel asked the trial court to give Johnson the 13-year sentence originally offered during the
Rule 402 conference. The trial court rejected this, stating that it had offered that sentence
before trial. At trial, “I hear[d] much more detail with regard to what happened and the
sequence of the events, the planned nature of this, all the different steps that were involved here
and I heard specifically about your role in this and I believe being one of the major actors in
this particular situation.” The trial court sentenced Johnson to 16 years.
¶ 10 Analysis
¶ 11 Is Pepper Spray a “Dangerous Weapon”?
¶ 12 Johnson, like his codefendant Curry, argues that he should have been found guilty of
robbery, rather than armed robbery, because the pepper spray was not a “dangerous weapon”
within the meaning of the armed robbery statute. See 720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(1) (West 2014)
(person commits armed robbery if he or she commits a robbery and carries, or is otherwise
armed with, “a dangerous weapon other than a firearm”). We rejected this argument in Curry’s
appeal. See Curry, 2018 IL App (1st) 153635.
¶ 13 The armed robbery statute leaves “dangerous weapon” undefined; the term is a holdover
from common law. People v. Hernandez, 2016 IL 118672, ¶ 12. Johnson suggests that we
should look to the armed violence statute for a definition of “dangerous weapon,” but our
supreme court already rejected that approach. Id. ¶ 16. What constitutes a “dangerous
weapon” presents a question of fact, not law. People v. Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 21. So we
will review the claim under the familiar sufficiency of the evidence standard. See People v.
Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 114 (2007) (when reviewing sufficiency of evidence, court considers
whether, viewing evidence in light most favorable to State, any rational trier of fact could have
found essential elements of crime beyond reasonable doubt).
¶ 14 “Dangerous weapon” includes “any object sufficiently susceptible to use in a manner
likely to cause serious injury.” Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 22 (citing People v. Skelton, 83 Ill. 2d
58, 66 (1980)). This comprises not just objects that are per se dangerous, but objects that can
be used in a dangerous manner. Hernandez, 2016 IL 118672, ¶ 12; see also People v. Dwyer,
324 Ill. 363, 365 (1927) (distinguishing between an object “made for the purpose of destroying
life” and an object that is dangerous in “the manner of its use”).
¶ 15 Pepper spray would not qualify as “per se dangerous,” as a loaded handgun would. Rather,
pepper spray falls into the category of objects that can be used in a dangerous manner, so it is
for the trier of fact to determine whether the pepper spray actually was used that way on
Alonzo Mitchell. See People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255, 276 (2008) (reviewing cases and
concluding that “the trier of fact may make an inference of dangerousness based upon the
evidence”). The trial court determined that it was, noting that the robbers used the pepper spray
to immobilize Mitchell from the beginning. This agrees with precedent finding that pepper
spray is “ ‘disabling’ ” and can “ ‘temporarily incapacitate[ ]’ ” its victims. People v. Lampton,
385 Ill. App. 3d 507, 514 (2008) (quoting People v. Elliott, 299 Ill. App. 3d 766, 773 (1998)).
That Mitchell did not suffer a long-term injury from the pepper spray is of no moment. See
People v. Brown, 87 Ill. App. 3d 368, 370-71 (1980) (effects of incapacitating were temporary,
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but whether weapon was “dangerous” for trier of fact to resolve). We defer to the trier of fact.
¶ 16 Was the Sentence Punishment for Rejecting a Plea Offer?
¶ 17 Johnson next asserts that the trial court punished him for rejecting the plea offer and
exercising his constitutional right to a trial. Johnson argues that the three-year increase
between the offer and the eventual sentence shows the court’s intent. And Johnson deems as
pretextual the court’s explanation for the disparity.
¶ 18 A trial court may not punish a defendant for exercising his or her right to a trial. People v.
Ward, 113 Ill. 2d 516, 526 (1986). If it is “evident from the judge’s remarks” that the sentence
was at least partly a penalty for rejecting a plea offer, we will set aside the sentence. Id. But it
must be “clearly” evident that the sentence was improper, and we must review the entire record
rather than focusing on “a few words or statements.” Id. at 526-27. We review the trial court’s
sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 526.
¶ 19 The 16-year sentence is not markedly longer than the rejected 13-year offer. So this is not a
case like People v. Dennis, 28 Ill. App. 3d 74, 78 (1975), where the defendant rejected an offer
of 2 to 6 years and received a sentence of 40 to 80 years after trial and “there [was] nothing in
the record to indicate why the court found appropriate the imposition of an extremely harsh
sentence after [Dennis’s] jury trial.” The Dennis court, which based its ruling on the disparity
and the absence of justification, limited its holding to its unusual facts. Id.
¶ 20 Nor is this a case like People v. Young, 20 Ill. App. 3d 891, 894 (1974), where the
defendant rejected a two- to five-year offer and was sentenced to three to nine years of
imprisonment, which the trial court justified by stating, “ ‘you shot the dice and they just came
up craps.’ ” Or People v. Moriarty, 25 Ill. 2d 565, 567 (1962), where the trial judge linked the
increased sentence to the rejected offer by stating that the defendant’s rejection of a plea deal
“ ‘will cost you nine years additional.’ ”
¶ 21 Here, the trial court stated that the additional detail heard at trial, pertaining to the “planned
nature” of the crime, justified the increase. Johnson contends this statement is pretextual, and
the State’s proffer during the Rule 402 conference and the trial evidence were essentially
identical. But the State’s bare-bones description of the crime did not include evidence of
premeditation. The trial evidence (including Johnson’s statement to police and the surveillance
video) illuminated that this armed robbery was not a spur-of-the-moment decision but, rather, a
planned escapade where each participant had a defined role. On this record, it is not “clearly
evident” that the 16-year sentence in any way served as punishment for rejection of the plea
offer. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Johnson. See Ward,
113 Ill. 2d at 526.
¶ 22 Affirmed.
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