People v. Atou ( 2007 )

Second Division
March 30, 2007
No. 1-05-3741
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the
OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of
) Cook County
Plaintiff-Appellant )
)
v. ) No. TG246268
)
JOHN ATOU, ) Honorable
) Larry G. Axelrood
Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HALL delivered the opinion of the court:
The primary issue in this appeal is whether the trial court
correctly determined there was a conflict between local circuit
court rule 14.2 and section 103-5(b) of the Illinois Code of
Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (commonly referred to as the
Speedy Trial Act) (725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 1998)), where the
local rule requires a defendant to serve the State's Attorney
with a speedy-trial demand in open court but the statutory
provision does not contain an open-court requirement.
Cook County circuit court rule 14.2 provides that "[a]ny
demand for trial made in felony or misdemeanor cases by a
defendant pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 38, Section 103-
5, Illinois Revised Statutes [now see 725 ILCS 5/103-5], shall be
in written form. No demand for trial shall be accepted by the
Court nor recorded by the Clerk unless filed in accordance with
this rule. The original of the written demand shall be filed at
1-05-3741
the time of the demand with the Clerk and made part of the Court
file and a copy of such demand shall be served upon the State's
Attorney in open court." Cook Co. Cir. Ct. R. 14.2 (eff. March 1,
1977).
Section 103-5(b) of the Code provides in relevant part that
"[e]very person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the
court having jurisdiction within 160 days from the date defendant
demands trial unless delay is occasioned by the defendant. * * *
Any demand for trial made under this subsection (b) shall be in
writing." 725 ILCS 5/103-5(b) (West 2000). The statutory
language contained in section 103-5(b) of the Code does not
require a defendant to serve the State's Attorney with a speedy-
trial demand in open court.
The relevant facts are as follows. On February 20, 2005,
defendant drove his car into a light pole, killing the front-seat
passenger. Defendant was issued traffic citations charging him
with driving under the influence of alcohol, driving with a
suspended license, failure to reduce speed, and reckless driving.
The traffic citations issued defendant required him to appear in
court on April 8, 2005. Defendant was admitted to bail on
February 22, 2005.
The next day, on February 23, 2005, defense counsel filed a
written speedy-trial demand with the clerk of the circuit court
-2-
1-05-3741
and served a copy of the demand at the traffic division of the
Cook County State's Attorney's office by hand delivering a copy
of the demand to the office during regular business hours.
On April 8, 2005, defendant appeared in court for his first
scheduled court date, answering ready for trial and demanding
trial. Defense counsel also filed another written speedy-trial
demand, noting the previous demand made on February 23, 2005.
The case was then continued upon motion of the State to April 22,
2005.
On April 22, 2005, defendant again answered ready and
demanded trial. Another written demand for trial was tendered,
noting the previous demands made on February 23 and April 8,
2005. The case was again continued upon motion of the State to
May 13, 2005.
The State was not ready for trial on the ensuing court dates
of May 13, June 24, and August 2, 2005. On each of these dates,
defendant renewed his written demand for trial, noting prior
demands made on previous dates, including the first demand made
on February 23, 2005. On August 2, 2005, the case was again
continued upon motion of the State to September 8, 2005.
On August 3, 2005, the State filed a motion seeking a
continuance beyond the speedy-trial term. In response, defendant
-3-
1-05-3741
filed a motion to dismiss all charges pursuant to section 103-
5(b) of the Code on the ground that the State's motion was
untimely because more than 160 days had passed since he filed his
first speedy-trial demand on February 23, 2005.
On August 5, 2005, the trial court heard arguments on the
two motions. The State argued, among other things, that
defendant's speedy-trial demand of February 23, 2005, was invalid
as a violation of local circuit court rule 14.2 because the
demand was not served on the State's Attorney in open court.
After hearing arguments from both sides, the trial court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. The trial court
agreed with defendant that a conflict existed between local
circuit court rule 14.2 and section 103-5(b) of the Code in that
the local rule required a defendant to serve the State's Attorney
with a speedy-trial demand in open court while the statutory
provision did not contain such an open-court requirement. The
trial court pointed out that under section 103-5(b) of the Code,
a written speedy-trial demand was valid even if it was not served
on the State's Attorney in open court, provided it was filed with
the clerk of the circuit court and a copy served on the State's
Attorney's office.
The trial court stated that "where there is conflict between
a state's statute and a local rule, the state's statute clearly
-4-
1-05-3741
takes precedent." In applying section 103-5(b) to the facts in
the case at bar, the trial court determined that the effective
demand-date triggering the running of the 160-day speedy-trial
period was not defendant's first scheduled court date of April 8,
2005, as the State argued, but rather, February 23, 2005, the
date defense counsel filed his first written speedy-trial demand
with the clerk of the circuit court and served a copy of the
demand on the State's Attorney's office by hand delivery.
At the hearing on its motion to reconsider, the State argued
there was no conflict between local circuit court rule 14.2 and
section 103-5(b) of the Code concerning the demand for a speedy-
trial because the statute was silent as to whether the demand had
to be made in open court. The State then went on to argue that
even though it received notice of defendant's speedy-trial demand
on February 23, 2005, this notice was invalid under local court
rule 14.2 because it was not served on the State's Attorney in
open court. The State argued that the local court rule was
enacted to address the large volume of cases coming through Cook
County. The State maintained that in light of Cook County's
large size, defendants should be required to give the State's
Attorney notice of speedy-trial demands in open court.
Defendant responded that the State's position was untenable,
arguing that if the running of the 160-day speedy-trial period
-5-
1-05-3741
could be triggered by serving the State's Attorney by mail, it
was inconceivable that it could not also be triggered by
physically serving the State's Attorney by hand delivering the
speedy-trial demand to the State's Attorney's office.
In denying the State's motion to reconsider, the trial court
acknowledged that the State's Attorney's office of Cook County
was a large office, but the court also posed the following
rhetorical questions, "what [was] a defense attorney supposed to
do besides file with the state's attorney's office their written
demand and their motion and get it filed stamped *** and what
else is an attorney supposed to do except when he is in court and
filing written demands which lists all the previous dates. You
know at some point there's no other way to give notice other than
to do what [defense counsel] did at this point."
The trial court concluded that the State's arguments were
considerably weakened "by the fact that at each juncture that
this case was up a demand was filed in writing and the previous
demands were listed including February 23rd." The trial court
went on to state that "[e]ven if [the parties] were relying on
the local rule as opposed to the state statute it seems to me
that at some point that's waived when time after time after time
there's a written demand that's filed relating back to the
February 23rd date and isn't until after the term has been passed
-6-
1-05-3741
that anyone notices it. *** I think at the time that this went
beyond the term date I think that this court lost jurisdiction."
ANALYSIS
The State contends there is no conflict between local
circuit court rule 14.2 and section 103-5(b) of the Code and
therefore the trial court erred when it failed to require
defendant to serve his speedy-trial demand in open court pursuant
to the rule. The State asserts there is no conflict between
local court rule 14.2 and section 103-5(b) concerning the demand
for a speedy-trial because they are consistent with one another
in that both are primarily concerned with giving the State formal
notice of speedy-trial demands. We disagree.
Resolution of this issue involves statutory interpretation,
a matter of law subject to de novo review. People v. Bradley M.,
352 Ill. App. 3d 291, 294, 815 N.E.2d 1209 (2004) (construction
or interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de
novo review).
Supreme Court Rule 21(a) (134 Ill.2d R. 21(a)) authorizes
circuit courts to adopt local rules governing criminal and civil
cases provided they do not conflict with supreme court rules or
statutes, and so far as practical, they are uniform throughout
the state. Phalen v. Groeteke, 293 Ill. App. 3d 469, 470, 688
N.E.2d 793 (1997). Local rules promulgated under Rule 21(a) "may
-7-
1-05-3741
not abrogate, limit or modify existing law." People v. Sims, 165
Ill. App. 3d 204, 207, 518 N.E.2d 730 (1988). "Moreover, local
rules must not place additional burdens on litigants, as compared
to the requirements of corresponding statutes or supreme court
rules." People v. Bywater, 358 Ill. App. 3d 191, 196, 830 N.E.2d
695 (2005), rev'd on other grounds, 223 Ill. 2d 477 (2006).
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S.
Const., amend VI), and article I, section 8, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8), provide that every
criminal defendant is entitled to a speedy trial. People v.
Durham, 193 Ill. App. 3d 545, 546, 550 N.E.2d 259 (1990).
Section 103-5(b) of the Code implements a defendant's
constitutional right to a speedy trial by providing that every
person on bail or recognizance shall be tried by the court having
jurisdiction within 160 days from the date the defendant demands
trial unless the delay is occasioned by defendant. People v.
Watkins, 220 Ill. App. 3d 201, 205, 581 N.E.2d 145 (1991); People
v. Lendabarker, 215 Ill. App. 3d 540, 552, 575 N.E.2d 568 (1991).
Because the speedy-trial provision of the Code enforces a
defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial, this
provision must be liberally construed in favor of the defendant.
People v. Campa, 353 Ill. App. 3d 178, 181, 818 N.E.2d 787(2004).
-8-
1-05-3741
The constitutional right of a defendant to receive a speedy
trial militates against the use of local court rule 14.2 to limit
or burden the constitutional protections provided by section 103-
5(b) of the Code. In comparison to section 103-5(b) local court
rule 14.2 improperly places an additional burden on a defendant
seeking to file a speedy-trial demand by requiring defendant to
serve the demand on the State's Attorney in open court. See,
e.g., Bywater, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 197, rev'd on other grounds,
223 Ill. 2d 477 (2006) (local court rule conflicted with
corresponding statute and placed improper additional burden on
defendant seeking to request a hearing on a petition to rescind
the summary suspension of his driving privileges where rule
required defendant to make request in open court while statute
only required the request be written).
The statutory language contained in section 103-5(b) does
not require a defendant to serve the State's Attorney with a
written speedy-trial demand in open court. Under section 103-
5(b) of the Code, a written speedy-trial demand is valid even
though it is not served on the State's Attorney in open court,
provided the demand is filed with the clerk of the circuit court
and a copy served on the State's Attorney's office. See
Lendabarker, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 552 (speedy-trial demand valid
and effective when it was filed with clerk of circuit court and
-9-
1-05-3741
notice of the demand was sent to State's Attorney's office).
Here, the trial court correctly determined there was a
conflict between local circuit court rule 14.2 and section 103-
5(b) of the Code, where the local rule requires a defendant to
serve the State's Attorney with notice of a speedy-trial demand
in open court while the statutory provision does not contain such
an open-court requirement. Moreover, the trial court correctly
resolved the conflict in favor of section 103-5(b) of the Code
where application of local court rule 14.2 would effectively
limit and burden the constitutional protections provided by the
statute.
Finally, the record does not support the State's contention
that defendant failed to make his February 23, 2005, speedy-trial
demand a part of the record. The trial court determined that
after defense counsel filed the demand with the clerk of the
circuit court, it was the clerk's ministerial responsibility to
ensure that the demand was made a part of the court file. In
addition, the record does not support the State's assertion that
defense counsel's failure to serve the demand in open court
indicates that counsel was attempting to hide the demand from the
State.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we affirm the
judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.
-10-
1-05-3741
Affirmed.
HOFFMAN and SOUTH, JJ., concur.
-11-