People v. Bates , 365 Ill. App. 3d 724 ( 2006 )

NO. 4-05-0851 Filed 6/16/06
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) Macon County
STACEY D. BATES, ) No. 03CF889
Defendant-Appellant. )
) Honorable
) Albert G. Webber,
) Judge Presiding.
_________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:
In November 2003, a jury convicted defendant, Stacey D.
Bates, of attempt (bribery) (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 33-1(a) (West
2002)). In January 2004, the trial court sentenced defendant in
absentia to two years in prison and assessed court-appointed
counsel fees totaling $520.
Defendant appeals, arguing only that the reimbursement
order must be vacated because the trial court failed to conduct a
hearing on his ability to pay. We disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In August 2003, the State charged defendant with
attempt (bribery) and two counts of aggravated assault (720 ILCS
5/12-2(a)(1) (West 2002)), and defendant posted a $1,000 cash
bond. The bond form defendant signed indicated that, as a
condition of the bond, he would appear in court as directed and
his bond might be forfeited for a violation of any of the bond
conditions.
In November 2003, the trial court severed the attempt
(bribery) charge from the remaining charges. Following a trial,
the jury convicted defendant. The court initially set sentencing
for December 2003, but at defendant's request, the court contin-
ued sentencing to January 2004.
At the January 2004 sentencing hearing, defense counsel
filed a motion to continue, which alleged as follows: (1)
defendant called defense counsel at 10:34 p.m. the previous
evening and left a message stating that his car had broken down
near East St. Louis, Illinois, and (2) that morning, defense
counsel spoke with defendant's fiancée, who indicated that
defendant intended to take the bus back to Decatur. The trial
court took defendant's motion under advisement and continued the
cause until 3:30 p.m. that day. The docket sheet contains a
second entry for that same day, noting (1) the presence of both
counsel, (2) a stipulation to waive the presence of a court
reporter, (3) the court's granting of the State's motions for
issuance of a bench warrant and forfeiture of defendant's bond,
and (4) the rescheduling of the sentencing hearing for the next
day at 2 p.m.
The next day, the cause was again called for sentenc-
ing, and defendant was again not present. Defense counsel stated
that defendant advised him he would be in court at 2 p.m. Noting
the time was almost 2:10 p.m., the trial court proceeded with the
sentencing hearing at the State's request and over defense
counsel's objection. As earlier stated, the court sentenced
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defendant to two years in prison and assessed court-appointed
counsel fees totaling $520. Defendant was later arrested, and
this appeal followed.
II. DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO INQUIRE
INTO HIS ABILITY TO PAY APPOINTED-COUNSEL FEES
Relying on section 113-3.1(a) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/113-3.1(a) (West 2002)) and
People v. Love, 177 Ill. 2d 550, 687 N.E.2d 32 (1997), defendant
argues that the reimbursement order should be vacated because the
trial court failed to inquire into his ability to pay prior to
entering the order. We disagree.
Although defendant is correct that in Love, 177 Ill. 2d
at 556, 687 N.E.2d at 35, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that
section 113-3.1(a) of the Code requires that the trial court,
prior to ordering reimbursement, conduct a hearing to determine
the defendant's ability to pay for court-appointed counsel, it
must be remembered that the defendant in Love was present at his
sentencing, thereby permitting the court to make such an inquiry.
However, defendant here was sentenced in absentia because he
failed to appear at his sentencing hearing as the trial court had
directed. As this court has previously observed:
"[D]efendants who wilfully choose to disre-
gard court orders to appear at trial or sen-
tencing hearings are entitled to no succor or
sympathy from the trial courts or this court.
*** The law provides the means for a defen-
dant to be heard in order to fully protect
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his rights at the sentencing hearing, and his
wilful failure to appear ought properly be
viewed as a self-inflicted wound." People v.
Burcham, 208 Ill. App. 3d 939, 943, 566
N.E.2d 832, 835 (1991).
Among the "self-inflicted wounds" that a defendant
suffers by failing to appear at his sentencing hearing is the
forfeiture of section 113-3.1's procedural right to have the
trial court inquire into his ability to pay a court-appointed
counsel fee before so ordering. By absenting himself from the
sentencing hearing (at the conclusion of which such reimbursement
orders are usually entered), a defendant renders any such inquiry
nugatory.
In reaching this conclusion, we view this court's
recent decision in People v. Kelly, 361 Ill. App. 3d 515, 838
N.E.2d 236 (2005), as supportive. However, the application of
this decision is broader than Kelly because that decision focused
on section 115-4.1(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/115-4.1(a) (West
2002)), which addresses the use of posted bond monies to pay
counsel. Here, we hold that whenever a defendant fails to appear
for sentencing, the trial court may enter a reimbursement order,
pursuant to section 113-3.1 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/113-3.1 (West
2002)), without inquiring into the defendant's ability to pay, no
matter how the court directs that order to be paid.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
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judgment.
Affirmed.
APPLETON and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.
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