People v. Campen , 2022 IL App (3d) 190684-U ( 2022 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2022 IL App (3d) 190684-UOrder filed June 27, 2022
____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2022
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
) Peoria County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-19-0684
v. ) Circuit No. 19-CF-93
)
STEVEN REIS CAMPEN, ) Honorable
) Kevin W. Lyons,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE LYTTON delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Hauptman and Schmidt concurred in the judgment.
____________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for new trial or, in the
alternative, judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
¶2 Defendant, Steven Reis Campen, appeals from his conviction for home invasion.
Defendant contends that the Peoria County circuit court erred in denying his motion for new trial,
or in the alternative, judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) where the State failed to present
evidence sufficient to support a finding of guilt and the State’s improper and prejudicial assertion
in opening statements deprived defendant of a fair trial. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The State charged defendant with two counts of home invasion. (720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2)
(West 2018)). The charges stem from a February 13, 2019, incident where defendant was alleged
to have entered the home of Amanda Boucher through a broken window and injured both Boucher
and her son, Blaine Reichard. Defendant’s case proceeded to a jury trial.
¶5 During opening statements, the State queried: “What is he going in there for? He’s telling
them he is acting as collection man. One of Tony Soprano’s guys.” Defendant did not object to
this statement. After the State finished its opening statement, defendant moved for a mistrial on
other grounds. The circuit court denied defendant’s motion.
¶6 Boucher testified that she lived on Wiswall Street in Peoria on February 13, 2019, with her
son Reichard, which she rented from Donnie Gibbs, Sr. At approximately 9:30 p.m., she was at
home, asleep in her bedroom upstairs. She awoke to the sound of Reichard screaming. She heard
him yell “why are you hitting me?” Boucher came downstairs and saw defendant standing in her
living room striking Reichard. She began yelling at defendant and tried to intervene. Defendant
followed Boucher into the kitchen and began striking and kicking her. He struck her head against
the countertop. During that time, defendant was yelling “give me my uncle’s fuckin’ money.
Tammy sent me to get my uncle’s fuckin’ money. Give me all the fuckin’ money right now.”
Reichard pulled defendant off Boucher and defendant began to attack him again. Boucher called
the police. She informed defendant “[t]he cops are on their way. You need to get the hell out.”
Defendant “shook” a door off its hinges and fled the residence. Boucher indicated that she was
bleeding and described injuries to Reichard that she had observed. She observed the broken
window and indicated that there were glass shards both inside and outside the residence, with the
majority being inside. Boucher denied inviting defendant into her home.
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¶7 Reichard testified substantially to the same events as Boucher. He added that while he was
asleep in his bedroom, downstairs, he heard a window breaking. He observed defendant come
through the window and take a metal object and break more glass out of the window. Reichard
saw glass shards outside the residence the next morning.
¶8 Charles Walls testified that he lived next door to Boucher. On the night of the incident, he
heard glass break. He attempted to look out his window but could not see anything. He stepped
out his back door and looked across the privacy fence that separated the houses. The area was
illuminated by a streetlight. He observed a figure’s legs crawl into a window at the Boucher
residence. Walls called the homeowner’s son, Donnie Gibbs Jr. He did not call the police.
¶9 Officer Drew Flynn of the Peoria Police Department testified that he responded to the
Boucher residence to investigate the incident. He photographed the scene and recorded damage to
the door with his body camera. These photographs and body camera footage were admitted into
evidence and included an image of the broken window which had glass shards on the windowsill
and curtains out of place. Flynn testified that some broken glass had landed inside but the majority
was outside.
¶ 10 At the close of the State’s case, defendant made a motion for directed verdict which was
denied. Defendant then testified that, on February 13, 2019, at approximately 9 p.m., he went to
the residence on Wiswall Street because he had been told by Tammy Benner, his longtime friend
and the girlfriend of homeowner, Gibbs, Sr., that there were issues around the house that needed
to be repaired. He knocked on the door of Boucher’s residence. Boucher answered and defendant
followed her into the house. As he entered, defendant complained about visible garbage and the
poor condition of the house and Boucher began screaming profanities at him. At this point,
Reichard came out of the first-floor bedroom and struck defendant in the eye, causing bruising.
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Defendant fought back after being struck and exchanged angry words with Boucher. The entire
exchange lasted several minutes. Defendant exited through the front door. Defendant indicated
that the window was intact when he entered the residence and that Reichard broke the window by
either punching it or throwing something at it.
¶ 11 On cross-examination, defendant testified that he had one alcoholic beverage before going
to Boucher’s residence and was mostly sober at that point. Defendant admitted to abusing the
medication, Klonopin. He indicated that after the incident, he took a large quantity of the
medication. Defendant did not recall much of what happened after the incident, including the
things he said and did during his transport to the jail that night, stating “I don’t know nothing from
there to the jail for the next two days. I don’t remember.”
¶ 12 Benner testified that she was in a relationship with Gibbs Sr. She had been friends with
defendant for more than a decade. Benner indicated that she spoke with defendant on the night of
the incident. He had inquired as to whether Gibbs Sr. had work for him to do at Boucher’s
residence. Benner did not know if any work was needed as Boucher had been avoiding their calls.
Benner told defendant that Boucher owed money to Gibbs Sr. She went to repair the window the
day after the incident. She observed glass on the window and outside the residence. She did not
enter the residence.
¶ 13 On cross-examination, Benner explained that she only relayed that information to
defendant because he was a friend, and she was conversing with him. She did not send defendant
to Boucher’s residence at 9:30 p.m. to do maintenance work, only to see if any maintenance work
needed to be done.
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¶ 14 Gibbs Sr. testified that he was the owner of the residence on Wiswall Street. Boucher rented
it from him. He learned of the incident when Boucher called him that evening, shortly after the
altercation. Gibbs Sr. indicated that his son, Gibbs Jr. would be fixing the window.
¶ 15 Gibbs Jr. testified that he received a call from Walls the evening of the incident regarding
the breaking glass noise. Walls wanted to call the police, but Gibbs Jr. did not feel that was
necessary as he “thought it would be handled.” Gibbs Jr. went to the residence the day after the
incident to inspect the damage to the window.
¶ 16 Officer Megan Rosenak testified for the State as a rebuttal witness. She transported
defendant to the county jail in the early morning hours of February 14, 2019, approximately 5½
hours after the incident occurred. Defendant made several statements to Rosenak, stating that:
(1) he had never been on Wiswall Street, (2) he did not know anyone on that street, and (3) he
asked Rosenak to take him to Wiswall Street where he broke the window. Video and audio clips
of those statements were admitted and published to the jury. Rosenak testified that defendant was
intoxicated.
¶ 17 The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts of home invasion. Defendant filed a
motion for a new trial, or in the alternative, JNOV. At the hearing, defendant argued that the facts
did not support the State’s evidence, specifically citing the location of the broken glass and lack
of evidence to substantiate that defendant crawled through the broken window to enter the
residence. Defendant made no argument regarding comments made during opening statements.
When asked by the court how he accounted for the testimony of Walls, defendant replied that
Walls’s testimony about seeing legs crawling through the broken window was “the only thing that
supports the victims in this case because the officer does not support that position at all”. When
rendering its decision on the motion, the court stated:
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“I think the evidence is entirely the opposite. There was lots of questions
asked about the glass and the window, but there wasn’t a single answer that I recall
that was favorable to the defendant other than there might have been some shards
or something on the outside, but a lot of glass was on the inside.
It just seems so immaterial and irrelevant because the next-door neighbor
said I heard a noise, a breaking of some type. *** and he sees two legs sticking out
of a window that was on his side of the house and scurrying themselves into the
place.”
The court discussed the other evidence presented during the trial and found “no evidence
of reliability that the defendant had been let into the door, or allowed in through the door, or even
knocked at the door.” The court further opined that defendant’s fleeing from the scene was
indicative of his guilt. Defendant’s motion was denied. Defendant was sentenced to 26 years’
imprisonment. Defendant appeals.
¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 First, defendant argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for a new trial or,
in the alternative, JNOV because the evidence was insufficient to support a guilty verdict.
Specifically, defendant argues that the evidence showed that the broken glass was primarily
outside the residence which refutes Boucher’s testimony, and the court failed to consider evidence
that defendant was let into the residence.
¶ 20 The circuit court’s decision to grant a new trial is an exercise of discretion which should
not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. People v. Abdullah, 336 Ill. App. 3d 940,
949 (2002). An abuse of discretion occurs where the court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or
unreasonable. People v. Becker, 239 Ill. 2d 215, 234 (2010). “In determining whether the trial court
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abused its discretion, the reviewing court should consider whether the jury’s verdict was supported
by the evidence and whether the [defendant] was denied a fair trial.” Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill.
2d 445, 455 (1992).
¶ 21 Defendant was charged with two counts of home invasion. Both counts required the State
to prove that defendant knowingly and without authority entered Boucher’s residence with the
intent to cause injury to another individual. 720 ILCS 5/19-6(a)(2) (West 2018).
¶ 22 Here, the jury’s verdict is clearly supported by the evidence. The evidence showed that
Boucher, Reichard, and Walls heard a window break. Reichard witnessed defendant enter the
Boucher’s residence through the broken window. Boucher testified that she did not let defendant
into her home. Walls witnessed legs crawling through the broken window. Glass was both inside
and outside the residence. Defendant attacked and injured both Reichard and Boucher once inside
the residence, damaging a door to escape when Boucher called the police. Defendant asked
Rosenak to bring him to the house on Wiswall Street where he broke the window. This evidence
is sufficient to establish defendant’s guilt.
¶ 23 Further, the court clearly considered the placement of the broken glass and defendant’s
claims when it rendered its decision. The court mentions the glass specifically, finding that the
glass outside the residence was immaterial considering the neighbor witnessed legs crawling in
through the window. It further discussed the evidence presented at trial and indicated that it found
no reliable evidence that defendant was let in or otherwise authorized to be in the residence.
Accordingly, the court’s decision to deny defendant’s motion was reasonable and, therefore, not
an abuse of discretion.
¶ 24 Next, defendant contends that the court erred in denying his motion for new trial, or in the
alternative, a JNOV due to an improper comment made by the prosecutor during opening
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statements. Defendant specifically challenges the prosecutor’s statement that defendant went to
the residence “acting as a collection man. One of Tony Soprano’s guys.”
¶ 25 Defendant failed to make a contemporaneous objection to this comment and did not raise
the issue in his written posttrial motion. “Both a trial objection and a written post-trial motion
raising the issue are required for alleged errors that could have been raised during trial.” (Emphases
in original.) People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). A reviewing court may remedy plain
errors affecting substantial rights, even if those errors were not objected to during trial or raised in
the posttrial motion. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967). The plain error rule may be invoked
in two limited circumstances, where: (1) “the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone
threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the
error,” or (2) “that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and
challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.” People
v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). Under both prongs of the plain error doctrine, the
defendant has the burden of persuasion. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). If the
defendant fails to meet his burden, the procedural default will be honored. Id.¶ 26 Defendant does not ask for plain error review of this issue, nor does he argue how either
prong of the plain error doctrine is satisfied. Where a defendant fails to argue that the evidence
was closely balanced or explain why the error is so severe that it must be remedied to preserve the
integrity of the judicial process, he forfeits plain error review. People v. Nieves, 192 Ill. 2d 487,
502-03 (2000). As defendant has made no argument for plain error review under either prong, we
must honor his forfeiture.
¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 The judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is affirmed.
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¶ 29 Affirmed.
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