Clemens v. Greenberg ( 2022 )

2022 IL App (1st) 201129FIFTH DIVISION
July 22, 2022
No. 1-20-1129
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
MICHELLE CLEMENS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. )
)
DAVID GREENBERG, M.D.; TRI-COUNTY )
EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, LTD.; )
ADVOCATE HEALTH AND HOSPITALS )
CORPORATION, d/b/a Advocate Good ) No. 19 L 3362
Shepherd Hospital; MICHAEL LANDRUM, )
M.D.; and BELLIN HEALTH SYSTEMS, INC. )
d/b/a Bellin Health Infectious Disease, )
)
Defendants )
)
(Michael Landrum, M.D., and Bellin Health ) Honorable Christopher E. Lawler,
Systems, Inc., Defendants-Appellants). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Hoffman concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiff, Michelle Clemens, alleged a negligence action against defendants, Michael
Landrum, M.D., and Bellin Health Systems, Inc., d/b/a Bellin Health Infectious Disease (Bellin),
among others. Landrum and Bellin are located in Wisconsin, and Landrum treated Clemens for an
No. 1-20-1129
infection. The circuit court denied Landrum and Bellin’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction. On appeal, Landrum and Bellin contend that they do not have sufficient minimum
contacts with Illinois to satisfy the requirements for personal jurisdiction. We agree and reverse
and remand with directions.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Initially, Clemens named Landrum and Bellin respondents in discovery in a medical
malpractice action that Clemens filed in March 2019 against Dr. David Greenberg, Tri-County
Emergency Physicians, Ltd., and Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation, d/b/a Advocate
Good Shepherd Hospital, all three of which were alleged to be located in Illinois. Clemens stated
in part that on May 9, 2017, she presented to Greenberg with calf pain. After an ultrasound revealed
a deep vein thrombosis (DVT), Greenberg ordered a shot of Lovenox and started Clemens on
Eliquis, which was a nonreversible anticoagulant. Clemens later developed a massive brain bleed,
but her surgery had to be delayed because she was on Eliquis. Clemens later experienced severe
and nonreversible neurologic symptoms.
¶4 Landrum and Bellin filed a motion to terminate their status as respondents in discovery and
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Landrum and Bellin stated in part that Landrum provided
care to Clemens exclusively in Green Bay, Wisconsin. Attached to Landrum and Bellin’s motion
was an affidavit from Peter G. Vandenhouten, the senior vice president and general counsel for
Bellin Memorial Hospital, who averred in part that Landrum practiced in an office and at Bellin
Memorial Hospital, both of which were in Green Bay. Bellin had offices and facilities exclusively
in northeastern Wisconsin and the upper peninsula of Michigan. Landrum never provided any care
and treatment to Clemens in Illinois, never practiced medicine in Illinois, and was not licensed to
practice medicine in Illinois. Landrum did not have a significant number of Illinois patients
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compared to his Wisconsin patient population. Neither Landrum nor Bellin advertised their
services in Illinois or solicited any business in Illinois from Illinois residents.
¶5 In her response to Landrum and Bellin’s motion, Clemens recalled the care she received
from Landrum, citing in part to progress notes that are not in the record but were stated to be
available for in camera review. In April 2017, Clemens was treated at Bellin Memorial Hospital
for endocarditis. Clemens informed Landrum that once she was released, she would move home
to Illinois and return for her remaining treatments. Landrum completed a referral to Coram CVS
Specialty Infusion Services in Peoria, Illinois, so that Clemens could receive home infusion
antibiotic therapy. Landrum and Bellin were paid under a Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois
insurance policy. Before Clemens could complete Landrum’s treatment, she supposedly suffered
a DVT for which she was inappropriately anticoagulated, resulting in a massive brain bleed.
Landrum was consulted when Clemens went to the emergency room for the DVT and may have
amended Clemens’s ongoing treatment accordingly. Clemens asserted that Landrum and Bellin’s
services were fundamentally interstate in nature from the inception of the relationship.
¶6 In reply, Landrum and Bellin asserted in part that they did not have any contacts with
Illinois to satisfy the requirements for personal jurisdiction. The case involved the unilateral
activity of Clemens, who sought medical care from a non-Illinois doctor and then returned to
Illinois, where she claimed that she later received improper medical care from an unrelated Illinois
hospital and Illinois doctor.
¶7 On August 6, 2019, the circuit court denied Landrum and Bellin’s motion and ordered them
to comply with discovery. The court stated that, viewed in a light most favorable to Clemens, an
Illinois resident, her relationship to Landrum and Bellin was fundamentally interstate in nature.
Landrum and Bellin purposefully directed certain care and treatment. The court noted that Clemens
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sought to discover information about injuries that Landrum and Bellin’s care and treatment may
have contributed to or caused. The state had a significant interest in determining whether certain
activities affect a resident’s health. The court found it fair, just, and reasonable to assert specific
jurisdiction and compel Landrum and Bellin to participate in discovery.
¶8 Landrum and Bellin filed a motion to reconsider, stating in part that none of the activities
that the court relied on were alleged to be a cause of Clemens’s injuries. Also, Clemens’s unilateral
travel to Illinois did not support a finding that Landrum availed himself of the privilege of
conducting activities or the protections of Illinois law. The court denied the motion to reconsider
on October 22, 2019.
¶9 Clemens moved to amend the complaint and convert Landrum and Bellin from respondents
in discovery to defendants, which the court granted. Clemens’s first amended complaint asserted
a negligence claim against Landrum and Bellin, stating that “[o]n information and belief,”
Greenberg and Landrum “discussed the need to anticoagulate [Clemens] given the alleged DVT
and her infective endocarditis.” On May 9, 2017, “and continuing thereafter,” Bellin and Landrum
deviated from the standard of care by providing an anticoagulant, failing to admit Clemens and/or
order serial ultrasounds, and failing to prescribe Lovenox or warfarin if in fact anticoagulation was
needed.
¶ 10 Attached to the first amended complaint was a medical report from a certified internist and
infectious disease specialist. According to the report, “the record [revealed] that Dr. Greenberg
had a conversation with Dr. Landrum in the Emergency Department *** and informed him of the
DVT and how he was going to treat the patient.” Greenberg then gave Clemens an injection of
Lovenox and Eliquis, an oral anticoagulant. The report further stated that “[i]f in fact Dr. Landrum
was told of the plan to anticoagulate the patient, it was a deviation from the standard of care by
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Dr. Landrum to approve any such anticoagulation in this case,” especially a nonreversible
anticoagulant like Eliquis. Under the standard of care, Landrum should have informed the
emergency department doctor to monitor the DVT with serial ultrasounds and not start
anticoagulation.
¶ 11 On October 23, 2019, Landrum and Bellin filed a motion to dismiss the first amended
complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Landrum and Bellin asserted in part that the only
allegation that tried to connect Wisconsin-based Landrum and Bellin to the care Clemens received
in Illinois was Clemens’s unfounded claim that “on information and belief,” Greenberg and
Clemens discussed the need to anticoagulate Clemens. There was no foundation for the allegation
that Greenberg discussed DVT treatment with Landrum, and in any event, that discussion would
not satisfy the requirements for personal jurisdiction. Landrum’s care was provided exclusively in
Green Bay, and his interaction with Clemens was the result of her unilateral acts.
¶ 12 On January 7, 2020, the court entered an order that Landrum would be deposed over his
objection. In a subsequent motion for a protective order, Landrum and Bellin noted that Clemens
had requested leave to depose Landrum.
¶ 13 At his deposition on July 14, 2020, Landrum stated in part as follows. Landrum was
Clemens’s infectious disease physician for her endocarditis. At some point, Clemens stated that
she would be going to Illinois periodically to spend time with her parents. Landrum told Clemens
that he would continue to take care of her endocarditis, including her antibiotic care and
management, but Clemens would need to receive all of her medical care in Green Bay. Also,
Clemens would need to seek care for emergent issues in Illinois. A case manager made
arrangements for Clemens to receive ongoing IV antibiotics and complete her labs, and Landrum’s
office received the results of those labs for monitoring purposes.
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¶ 14 Landrum further recalled that on May 9, 2017, he received a phone call from Greenberg.
Landrum described the call as “a brief maybe a couple minute phone call that was informative.”
Greenberg stated that Clemens was in the emergency room, Clemens’s mother had asked
Greenberg to call Landrum to update him on Clemens’s status, tell Landrum that Clemens had
what appeared to be a DVT in her leg, and that Greenberg was going to start Clemens on some
anticoagulation. Landrum did not recall Greenberg mentioning what medicine Clemens would
receive. According to Landrum, not enough information was shared for Landrum to have given a
consult. Landrum did not ask Greenberg for more information, and Landrum did not recall if
Greenberg asked if Clemens should have been given anticoagulants. There was no request that
Landrum review any records. Between Clemens’s emergency room visit and her brain bleed,
Clemens’s mother called Landrum’s clinic, whereupon a nurse told her that Landrum’s office was
managing Clemens’s infection with antibiotics and Clemens needed to see a primary care doctor
about the anticoagulation. Landrum was not affiliated with any office in Illinois and did not have
any relationships with Illinois health care providers or institutions. Landrum did not know whether
Clemens had insurance through Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois or a Wisconsin subsidiary.
¶ 15 On August 25, 2020, Clemens responded to Landrum and Bellin’s motion to dismiss, citing
again to progress notes that are not in the record but were stated to be available for in camera
review. According to Clemens, nothing had changed and no new facts had been asserted since the
previous motion to dismiss. Landrum diagnosed an Illinois resident’s disease, provided an
ongoing, interstate course of treatment using an Illinois home nursing agency, and billed
Clemens’s Illinois-based insurance policy. A DVT was discovered between Clemens’s interstate
appointments with Landrum. At that point, Landrum “took part in a ‘consult’ ” with Greenberg,
an Illinois emergency physician.
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¶ 16 In reply, Landrum and Bellin stated in part that Clemens’s complaint was solely critical of
treatment provided at the Illinois hospital on May 9, 2017. On that date, Landrum’s only
involvement was as the recipient of a phone call from Greenberg. None of Landrum’s contacts
with Illinois involved the date or occurrence at issue. Clemens did not provide any evidence that
any of the alleged contacts—appointments with Landrum in Wisconsin, happenings with the
nursing agency, or anything related to insurance—were a cause or contributing cause to Clemens’s
alleged injuries.
¶ 17 On September 30, 2020, the court entered a written order that denied Landrum and Bellin’s
motion to dismiss. Citing Salerno v. Innovative Surveillance Technology, Inc., 402 Ill. App. 3d
490, 502 (2010), the court declined to review Landrum’s deposition transcript because it was
attached to Landrum and Bellin’s reply, and evidence, arguments, or exhibits raised for the first
time in a reply brief are waived. The court further stated that Landrum did not maintain sufficient
minimum contacts to exercise general jurisdiction, but it was fair, just, and reasonable to exercise
specific jurisdiction over Landrum and Bellin. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
Clemens, Landrum treated at least some Illinois patients, Clemens was an Illinois patient, and
Landrum treated her on a weekly, continuous basis. Landrum knew that Clemens commuted from
Illinois, billed Clemens under an insurance policy, and participated in her continued care, including
the Peoria nursing agency and the alleged consultation with Greenberg.
¶ 18 On October 21, 2020, Landrum and Bellin filed a petition for leave to appeal under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(3) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), which this court denied on November 16, 2020.
After Landrum and Bellin appealed to our supreme court, a supervisory order was entered that
directed this court to allow the petition for leave to appeal. We did so and now consider the appeal.
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¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 A. Landrum’s Deposition
¶ 21 Because it bears on our resolution of this appeal, we first address the status of Landrum’s
deposition, which the circuit court refused to consider. To review, after Landrum and Bellin were
converted to party defendants in Clemens’s first amended complaint, they filed a motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction. Clemens then requested that Landrum be deposed. The deposition
took place before Clemens responded to the motion to dismiss. The court declined to review the
deposition transcript because it was attached to Landrum and Bellin’s reply, and so it was waived.
¶ 22 Landrum and Bellin did not waive—or forfeit, for that matter—the use of the deposition
transcript. See People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 444 n.2 (2005) (waiver is the voluntarily
relinquishment of a known right, while forfeiture is the failure to timely assert a right). In stating
that Landrum and Bellin’s use of the deposition transcript was waived, the circuit court cited
Salerno, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 502, which found that a plaintiff waived an argument by raising it for
the first time in an appellate reply brief. Salerno does not address the circumstances here and offers
no guidance on whether a party may cite to a deposition transcript in the way that Landrum and
Bellin did in the circuit court.
¶ 23 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(l) (eff. July 1, 2014) allows a party to obtain discovery
on the issue of personal jurisdiction when a motion to dismiss is pending. Clemens requested the
deposition, and it was completed in time for Clemens to refer to it in her response. Landrum and
Bellin did not voluntarily relinquish a known right or fail to timely assert a right by referring to a
deposition that was provided for in our supreme court rules, requested by Clemens, and completed
in a time frame that allowed both parties to make use of it. We will consider Landrum’s deposition
in our analysis of the issues raised on appeal. See Zamora v. Lewis, 2019 IL App (1st) 181642,
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¶ 42 (when considering personal jurisdiction, the circuit court may consider the plaintiff’s
complaint, any affidavits submitted by the parties, and any discovery depositions).
¶ 24 B. Appellate Jurisdiction
¶ 25 Next, we consider the parties’ arguments about our jurisdiction to consider this appeal.
Landrum and Bellin contend that they timely appealed from the September 30, 2020, order that
denied the motion to dismiss that was filed as their initial responsive pleading in their new status
as party defendants. In contrast, Clemens asserts that we do not have jurisdiction because Landrum
and Bellin did not timely appeal from the August 6, 2019, order that denied the motion to dismiss
that they filed as respondents in discovery. Clemens argues that a party must seek review under
Rule 306 within 30 days of a denial of a motion to dismiss, regardless of the party’s procedural
status.
¶ 26 The panel that considers an appeal has an independent duty to determine whether it has
jurisdiction. In re Estate of Gagliardo, 391 Ill. App. 3d 343, 349 (2009). We recall that after
Landrum and Bellin were named as respondents in discovery in Clemens’s original complaint,
they filed a motion to terminate their status as respondents in discovery and dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. The court denied that motion on August 6, 2019. Landrum and Bellin filed
a motion to reconsider, which was denied on October 22, 2019. Clemens filed a first amended
complaint that named Landrum and Bellin as party defendants. Landrum and Bellin filed a motion
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, which was denied on September 30, 2020. Landrum
and Bellin filed a petition for leave to appeal on October 21, 2020.
¶ 27 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(3) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) states that a party may petition
for leave to appeal to the appellate court from an order of the circuit court denying a motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The petition must be filed within 30 days of the denial.
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Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(c)(1) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). The 30-day limit is jurisdictional, and the failure to meet
it or secure a timely extension results in dismissal of the appeal. Barnes v. Southern Ry. Co., 116
Ill. 2d 236, 241 (1987), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. Consolidated R. Corp., 173 Ill. 2d
252 (1996). A motion to reconsider directed against an interlocutory order will not toll the 30-day
limit. Odom v. Bowman, 159 Ill. App. 3d 568, 571 (1987). However, a motion that raises new
matter may be considered a new motion, and “in that event tolling is not at issue, and an order
denying the motion is appealable.” McClain v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 121 Ill. 2d 278, 286
(1988); see also Barnes, 116 Ill. 2d at 244 (denial of motion was appealable where the motion was
substantially independent of a prior motion, in that its content and basis “were such that it must be
considered in the nature of a new, original motion and not a motion reviving and rearguing” what
had already been presented).
¶ 28 Here, Landrum and Bellin’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint was a new
motion that was based on changed circumstances. Landrum and Bellin were no longer respondents
in discovery—they were party defendants. Section 2-402 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code)
(735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 2018)) allows a plaintiff to name as respondents in discovery those
persons or entities whose culpability cannot be determined when the complaint is filed. Westwood
Construction Group, Inc. v. IRUS Property, LLC, 2016 IL App (1st) 142490, ¶ 13. Respondents
in discovery must respond to discovery in the same way as defendants and may be added as
defendants if the evidence warrants it. 735 ILCS 5/2-402 (West 2018); Westwood Construction
Group, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 142490, ¶ 14. The stakes changed for Landrum and Bellin once
Clemens converted them to defendants. No longer was Clemens gathering discovery to determine
“whether a claim [could] be stated against potential defendants.” See Westwood Construction
Group, Inc., 2016 IL App (1st) 142490, ¶ 13. Landrum and Bellin now had to defend against a
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claim. See Lewis v. Dillon, 352 Ill. App. 3d 512, 520 (2004) (“being labelled a defendant has ***
been recognized as a burden”). Landrum and Bellin’s status as defendants was a significant change
in circumstances that made the motion to dismiss the first amended complaint a new motion.
¶ 29 The first amended complaint also added new allegations that Greenberg and Landrum
discussed the need to anticoagulate Clemens and that Landrum and Bellin deviated from the
standard of care. Another changed circumstance was that Landrum had been deposed, which raised
new facts about Landrum’s involvement in Clemens’s medical care and the alleged phone call
from Greenberg, among other topics. The addition of new facts in the motion to dismiss the first
amended complaint contrasts with the cases cited by Clemens, in which denials of motions were
not appealable because those motions only added detail to what had already been presented. See
Law Offices of Jeffery M. Leving, Ltd. v. Cotting, 345 Ill. App. 3d 495, 500 (2003) (facts in motion
to reconsider were more detailed, but not necessarily new facts that came to light between
motions); National Seal Co. v. Greenblatt, 321 Ill. App. 3d 306, 309 (2001) (motion to reconsider
did not allege any new facts and merely included more details in support of arguments raised in
the original motion); Buckland v. Lazar, 145 Ill. App. 3d 436, 440-41 (1986) (the plaintiff never
contended that the second motion was new and posited that the second motion should be
considered part of resolving the first motion).
¶ 30 Further, as Landrum and Bellin note, they had to object to personal jurisdiction after
Clemens named them party defendants or they would have lost the ability to raise the issue. A
party waives an objection to personal jurisdiction if he files a responsive pleading or other motion,
other than a motion seeking an extension of time to answer or appear, before filing the motion
objecting to jurisdiction. 735 ILCS 5/2-301(a-6) (West 2018); Cardenas Marketing Network, Inc.
v. Pabon, 2012 IL App (1st) 111645, ¶¶ 23-24.
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¶ 31 Based on Landrum and Bellin’s changed status to party defendants and the new facts raised
in the first amended complaint and Landrum’s deposition, the motion to dismiss the first amended
complaint was a new motion. After it was denied, Landrum and Bellin timely filed a petition for
leave to appeal to this court, granting us jurisdiction.
¶ 32 C. Personal Jurisdiction
¶ 33 Turning to the merits of the appeal, Landrum and Bellin contend that they are not subject
to the circuit court’s specific personal jurisdiction. Landrum and Bellin state that the analysis
focuses on their relationship to Illinois and not on their relationship with Clemens. Her unilateral
decision to periodically stay with her parents did not mean that Landrum purposefully directed
his activities at Illinois. Landrum and Bellin also argue that in finding that there was specific
personal jurisdiction, the circuit court incorrectly relied on activities that were unrelated to
Clemens’s lawsuit.
¶ 34 As the plaintiff, Clemens had the burden to establish a prima facie basis for exercising
personal jurisdiction over Landrum and Bellin, who are nonresident defendants. Rios v. Bayer
Corp., 2020 IL 125020, ¶ 16. A plaintiff’s prima facie case may be overcome by the defendants’
uncontradicted evidence that defeats jurisdiction. Campbell v. Acme Insulations, Inc., 2018 IL
App (1st) 173051, ¶ 10. Any conflicts in the pleadings and affidavits are resolved in the
plaintiff’s favor (id.), but any unrebutted allegations are taken as true (Zamora, 2019 IL App
(1st) 181642, ¶ 42). Where well-alleged facts in an affidavit are not contradicted by a
counteraffidavit, they must be taken as true notwithstanding the existence of contrary facts in the
adverse party’s pleadings. Robertsson v. Misetic, 2018 IL App (1st) 171674, ¶ 13. When the
circuit court decides the jurisdictional question only on documentary evidence, without an
evidentiary hearing, our review is de novo. Id.-12-
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¶ 35 Section 2-209 of the Code, commonly referred to as the Illinois long-arm statute, governs
the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants and is divided into subsections
identifying various grounds for exercising jurisdiction. 735 ILCS 5/2-209 (West 2018); Russell v.
SNFA, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 29. Historically, as a first step in the analysis, courts would determine
whether a specific statutory provision of the long-arm statute was satisfied, such as “[t]he
commission of a tortious act within this State.” 735 ILCS 5/2-209(a)(2) (West 2018); Russell,
2013 IL 113909, ¶ 29. That step has been eliminated with the addition of subsection (c), which is
known as the “catch-all provision.” 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West 2018); Russell, 2013 IL 113909,
¶ 30. Section 2-209(c) provides that courts “may also exercise jurisdiction on any other basis
now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.”
735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West 2018). The catch-all provision is an independent basis for exercising
personal jurisdiction. Kostal v. Pinkus Dermatopathology Laboratory, P.C., 357 Ill. App. 3d 381,
386 (2005). If the contacts between the defendants and Illinois satisfy federal and state due
process concerns, then the requirements of Illinois’s long-arm statute have been met, and no
other inquiry is needed. Id. at 387. Though Clemens briefly refers to the ability of a court to
exercise jurisdiction based on the commission of a tortious act, we will only consider whether
exercising personal jurisdiction over Landrum and Bellin satisfies federal due process concerns.
See Rios, 2020 IL 125020, ¶ 17 (only considering federal constitutional principles because the
party challenging jurisdiction did not argue that the Illinois Constitution imposed any greater
restraints on the exercise of jurisdiction than the federal constitution).
¶ 36 A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants if the
defendants have certain minimum contacts with the state “ ‘such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. ¶ 18 (quoting
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Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126 (2014)). Whether the minimum contacts test has been
satisfied depends on whether the plaintiff seeks general or specific jurisdiction. Russell, 2013 IL
113909, ¶ 36. The standard for finding general jurisdiction is very high, requiring that the
nonresident defendants carried out “systematic business activity in Illinois *** with a fair
measure of permanence and continuity.” Robertsson, 2018 IL App (1st) 171674, ¶ 15. Clemens
does not assert that the court should exercise general jurisdiction over Landrum and Bellin.
¶ 37 At issue here is specific jurisdiction, which is “case-specific” and “exists when the
plaintiff’s cause of action arises out of or relates to the [defendants’] contacts with the forum
state.” Id. Specific jurisdiction is proper only if the defendants have purposefully directed their
activities at residents of the forum and “ ‘if the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise
out of or relate to those activities.’ ” Rios, 2020 IL 125020, ¶ 20 (quoting Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)). “[T]he [defendants’] litigation-related ‘conduct must
create a substantial connection with the forum State.’ ” Zamora, 2019 IL App (1st) 181642, ¶ 46
(quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014)). If there is a substantial connection, then we
consider whether it would be reasonable to require the defendants to litigate in the forum state.
Id. ¶ 48.
¶ 38 According to Clemens, Landrum admitted that he treated Clemens while she was in
Illinois. Landrum referred Clemens to a Peoria nursing agency, prescribed antibiotics to Clemens
while she was in Illinois, and received Clemens’s lab results for monitoring purposes. According
to Clemens, Landrum was part and parcel of Clemens’s ongoing medical treatment in Illinois.
¶ 39 Yet, the allegations against Landrum and Bellin in Clemens’s first amended complaint do
not refer to Clemens’s care from the Peoria nursing agency, the antibiotics that Landrum
prescribed, or Clemens’s lab results. Clemens’s cause of action relates only to the care she
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received at an Illinois facility for a DVT. We focus on Landrum’s involvement in that
occurrence. See Robertsson, 2018 IL App (1st) 171674, ¶ 23 (relevant time period for
determining whether contacts were purposefully directed toward the forum state begins when the
claim arose). There are two documents that are relevant—the medical report attached to
Clemens’s first amended complaint and Landrum’s deposition. Landrum and Bellin assert that
the medical report cannot serve as an affidavit for the purposes of a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction. Even taking the medical report into account, it does not carry the day for
Clemens. It stated that Greenberg had a conversation with Landrum, informed Landrum of the
DVT and how he would treat Clemens, and then administered Lovenox and Eliquis. Key details
about the conversation with Greenberg are filled in by Landrum’s deposition. According to
Landrum, the phone call was prompted by Clemens’s mother and was brief and informative.
Landrum did not recall Greenberg mentioning what medicine Clemens would receive. Not
enough information was shared for Landrum to have given a consult, and there was no request
for Landrum to review any records. This brief phone call is the totality of Landrum’s
involvement in the basis for Clemens’s suit.
¶ 40 As noted above, for a state to exercise personal jurisdiction, “the defendant’s suit-related
conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 284.
Due process requires that a defendant be subjected to proceedings in the forum state based on his
own affiliation with the state and not based on “ ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated’ contacts he
makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the State.” Id. at 286 (quoting Burger
King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475). The phone call—the only act that connects Landrum to Clemens’s
cause of action—falls well short of a substantial connection with Illinois. The call was initiated
by Clemens’s mother and Greenberg. Landrum’s participation was extremely limited, and he did
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not provide any input into the treatment plan. To subject Landrum to personal jurisdiction based
on this attenuated connection with Illinois would violate due process. See Hanson v. Ahmed, 382
Ill. App. 3d 941, 945 (2008) (participation in two phone calls initiated by an Illinois claims
adjuster were “extremely attenuated” contacts with Illinois and so did not constitute minimum
contacts with Illinois sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction and satisfy due process).
Because Landrum and Bellin did not have sufficient minimum contacts for an Illinois court to
exercise personal jurisdiction, we need not consider whether it would be reasonable to require
Landrum and Bellin to litigate in Illinois. See Russell, 2013 IL 113909, ¶ 87 (a court must
consider the reasonableness of requiring defendants to litigate in Illinois if the court determines
that the defendants have sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois).
¶ 41 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 42 Clemens did not meet her burden to establish that Landrum and Bellin are subject to
personal jurisdiction in Illinois. The order of the circuit court that denied Landrum and Bellin’s
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is reversed, and the matter is remanded with
directions to enter an order dismissing Landrum and Bellin as party defendants.
¶ 43 Reversed and remanded with directions.
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Clemens v. Greenberg, 2022 IL App (1st) 201129Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 19-L-3362;
the Hon. Christopher E. Lawler, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Julie A. Teuscher, John J. Reid, and Ruth Anne B. Waldrop, of
for Cassiday Schade LLP, of Chicago, for appellants.
Appellant:
Attorneys Robert J. Napleton and Bradley Z. Schulman, of Motherway &
for Napleton, LLP, of Chicago, and Lynn D. Dowd, of Naperville, for
Appellee: appellee.
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