People v. Phillip C. , 364 Ill. App. 3d 822 ( 2006 )

FOURTH DIVISION
March 31, 2006
1-04-1109
In re PHILLIP C., a minor, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
(The People of the State of Illinois, ) Cook County.
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. )
)
Phillip C., ) Honorable
) Terrence V. Sharkey,
Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the court:
After his arrest on March 27, 2003, the State filed a
petition for adjudication of wardship over defendant Phillip C.,
a 16-year-old minor, alleging armed robbery and aggravated
kidnapping of a minor as the bases for wardship. After a jury
trial conducted pursuant to the extended juvenile jurisdiction
prosecutions act (EJJ) (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2002)),
defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping of Miguel B., a
17-year-old.
The circuit court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate
period of time at the Juvenile Department of Corrections. The
circuit court also imposed a 20-year adult sentence, which was
automatically stayed and would not be executed unless he violated
the conditions of his juvenile sentence (705 ILCS 405/5-
810(4)(ii) (West 2002)). By virtue of his conviction for
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aggravated kidnapping of a minor, defendant was also required to
register as a sex offender pursuant to section 2(B)(1.5) of the
Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS
150/2(B)(1.5) (West 2002)). On appeal, defendant argues that (1)
the Registration Act is unconstitutional as applied to him and
(2) the circuit court's imposition of a 20-year adult sentence
was excessive. For the following reasons, we reject defendant's
as-applied challenge to the Registration Act and affirm the
circuit court's imposition of a 20-year adult sentence.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this case are largely undisputed. At trial,
Miguel B. testified that as he was standing by his car on the
afternoon of March 27, 2003, defendant came up from behind him,
stuck a black comb-knife in his back, forced him into the car,
and told him to "drive." As Miguel drove, defendant asked Miguel
whether he belonged to a gang or had any gang tattoos. When
Miguel said that he did not, defendant lifted up Miguel's shirt
and pant legs apparently searching for tattoos. Defendant then
took Miguel's wallet and told him to drive to the criminal courts
building at 26th and California.
As Miguel approached the criminal courts building, he spotted Cook County
sheriff=s deputy Thomas Scalise parked on the opposite side of the street. Miguel
swerved toward Deputy Scalise=s car, stopping about two feet shy of hitting the car, and
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exited his car. Deputy Scalise then arrested defendant.
Deputy Scalise testified that he was parked outside of the criminal courts building
when a car suddenly swerved toward him. After the car stopped just short of hitting his
car, Miguel B. jumped out of the car and told him that defendant, who was sitting in the
passenger seat, had a gun. Deputy Scalise arrested defendant. Deputy Scalise
testified that he saw a comb- knife on the car floor in front of the passenger seat.
Officer Antonio Torres testified that he was assigned to investigate the incident.
When he arrived at the scene, he was given Miguel=s wallet and a black comb-knife
from one of the officers already at the scene.
Defendant presented no evidence. After closing arguments, the jury found
defendant guilty of aggravated kidnapping and not guilty of armed robbery.
During the sentencing hearing, the State introduced defendant=s prior admissions
of guilt to unlawful use of a weapon, unlawful possession of ammunition, aggravated
robbery, and robbery. The State also noted that defendant had been on probation for
robbery at the time he kidnaped Miguel B. Defendant presented several character
witnesses in mitigation.
After argument, the circuit court discussed each aggravating and mitigating factor
listed in sections 5-5-3.1 and 5-5-3.2 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-
5-3.1, 5-5-3.2 (West 2002)) and whether each factor was applicable to the case at bar.
In aggravation, the circuit court noted that defendant=s conduct threatened serious
harm, defendant had a prior criminal history, the imposed sentence was needed to deter
others from committing similar acts, and defendant was on probation when he
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committed the kidnapping. In mitigation, the court found that defendant=s imprisonment
would entail an excessive hardship for his four-year-old daughter.
Because of defendant's prior criminal history, the court denied defendant's
request to be placed on probation and sentenced him to an indeterminate period of time
in the Juvenile
Department of Corrections. In determining defendant's adult
sentence, the court noted that, under the EJJ, should defendant
violate the terms of his juvenile sentence, the adult sentence
would kick in and, because defendant was convicted of a Class X
felony, he would be facing a minimum of six years, which the
court characterized as a "substantial" amount of time. In order
to keep defendant "on the straight and narrow," the court imposed
a 20-year adult sentence, but expressed the hope that that
sentence would never be executed. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
I. Sex Offender Registry
Defendant first argues that because there was no evidence of
sexual conduct or motive in connection with his kidnapping Miguel
B., requiring him to register as a sex offender violates his
rights to due process, privacy, and equal protection under both
the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Defendant asks
this court to find the Registration Act unconstitutional as
applied to him.
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The State concedes that there was no actual "sexual"
evidence presented in this case, but maintains that the
legislature had a rational basis for including aggravated
kidnapping of a minor as a triggering offense under the
Registration Act. Relying on People v. Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d
728 (2001), the State argues that the offense of aggravating
kidnapping of a minor can be a "precursor" to other offenses
which involve the sexual abuse or exploitation of a child.
It is well established that "[a]ll statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the
burden of rebutting that presumption is on the party challenging the validity of the
statute to demonstrate clearly a constitutional violation." People v. Greco, 204 Ill. 2d
400, 406 (2003), citing People v. Sypien, 198 Ill. 2d 334, 338 (2001). This presumption
means that, if possible, we must construe the statute "so as to affirm its constitutionality
and validity." Greco, 204 Ill. 2d at 406, citing People v. Fuller, 187 Ill. 2d 1, 10 (1999).
Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law that we review de novo. People
v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 418 (2000).
In this case, defendant has chosen to attack the
Registration Act on an "as applied" basis as violative of his
rights to procedural and substantive due process, privacy, and
equal protection of the laws. Our supreme court, however, has
rejected the argument that the Registration Act implicates the
right to privacy under either the United States or Illinois
Constitution. See People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 196-97
(2004); Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d at 425-26. Moreover, we have found
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that a defendant challenging whether he should have to register
as a sex offender is making a due process and not an equal
protection claim. See People v. Johnson, No. 1-04-1292, slip op.
at 9 (January 31, 2006) (finding defendant's challenge was "more
a due process claim than an equal protection claim" where he was
not "contend[ing] that the classification of some individuals as
sexual offenders is unconstitutional" "[r]ather, *** that he does
not belong within the classification"). Even though the
"standards used to determine the constitutionality of a statute
under equal protection and due process grounds are identical"
(see Johnson, slip op. at 9, citing People v. Williams, 358 Ill.
App. 3d 363, 366 (2005)), we will confine our discussion to
defendant's substantive and procedural due process arguments.
A. Substantive Due Process
To withstand a due process challenge under the rational
1
basis test, the statute in question needs to bear only a
rational relation to a legitimate legislative interest and be
1
Though defendant makes a perfunctory argument that this
Court should apply strict scrutiny, every court that has
addressed the constitutionality of the Registration Act has found
that the Act does not implicate a fundamental right and, thus,
has applied a rationality level of review. See Johnson, slip op.
at 9-10; Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 731-32; People v. Malchow,
306 Ill. App. 3d 665 (1999).
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neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. People v. Johnson, slip
op. at 10. In applying this test, the court first identifies the
public interest the statute is intended to protect, examines
whether the statute bears a reasonable relationship to that
interest, and then determines whether the method used to protect
or further that interest is reasonable. People v. Lindner, 127
Ill. 2d 174, 180 (1989).
The Registration Act was enacted to protect children from
sexual assault and sexual abuse by providing the police and
public with information regarding the whereabouts of convicted
2
sex offenders. People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 386 (1991);
Johnson, slip op. at 10, citing People v. Logan, 302 Ill. App. 3d
319, 328-29 (1998); Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 731 ("The
Registration Act was enacted by the Illinois Legislature 'to
create an additional method of protection for children from the
increasing incidence of sexual assault and sexual abuse. (84th
2
Under the Registration Act, a "sex offender" is defined as
anyone (other than a parent of the victim) who commits the
offense of aggravated kidnapping of a minor. See 730 ILCS
150/2(B)(1.5) (West 2002).
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Ill. Gen. Assem., House Proceedings, June 23, 1986, at 208.) The
Registration Act was designed to aid law enforcement agencies
***' by making 'the habitual offender's address *** readily
available to law enforcement agencies.' [Citation.]").
Defendant does not question the legitimacy of the
Registration Act's purposes (i.e., protecting children from sex
crimes and aiding law enforcement by letting them know where
sexual offenders live). He only questions whether, in this case,
those purposes are furthered by requiring him to register as a
sex offender; in other words, under the rational basis test,
whether the method used to protect or further the legislature's
interests (requiring him to register as a sex offender) is
reasonable. See Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d at 180. Two panels of this
court have addressed this very issue but have come to two
3
divergent results.
3
In People v. Hall, our supreme court had granted a
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petition for leave to appeal in a case where the defendant was
arguing that the Registration Act was "unconstitutional as
applied to him because there [was] no evidence that his offense
[of aggravated kidnapping of a minor] was sexually motivated."
See People v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324 (2005). The court did not
address the issue, however, and decided the case on a procedural
ground. See Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324.
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In Fuller, the defendant stole a van with two children in
the back. Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 730. Instead of
immediately releasing the children, the defendant drove around,
stopping twice to view Christmas lights. Fuller, 324 Ill. App.
3d at 730. When the van was stopped at a light, the children
opened the van's unlocked door and ran to a nearby service
station. Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 730. At no point did
defendant touch the children, though he spoke briefly with them
in response to their questions. Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 730.
Defendant was convicted of aggravated kidnapping and ordered to
register as a sex offender. Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 729-30.
On appeal, the defendant argued "that section 2(B)[(105)] of
the Registration Act violat[ed] due process because the
definition of sex offender is overly broad" and "there is no
rational relationship between the offense of aggravated kidnaping
and the legislative intent of the Registration Act." Fuller, 324
Ill. App. 3d at 731. The court rejected defendant's arguments.
Finding that the purpose of the Registration Act was to "help law
enforcement protect children from sexual assault and sexual
abuse," the court found a rational connection between the offense
of aggravated kidnapping and that purpose. Fuller, 324 Ill. App.
3d at 732. The court went on to note:
"It is particularly disingenuous for the defendant to
argue that there is no rational relationship between
the kidnaping of a child and the purpose of protecting
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children from the increasing incidence of sexual
assault and sexual abuse. The most obvious connection
between the offenses listed in section 2(B)(1.5) and
the purpose of the Registration Act is that kidnaping
or unlawful restraint of a minor is often a precursor
offense to juvenile pimping or exploitation of a child,
which are, indisputably, within the purview of the
Registration Act's purpose." Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d
at 733.
The court also noted that when asked what he had planned to do
with the children, the defendant " 'stated he was going to find a
hotel room and ask the girl if she had any friends.' " Fuller,
324 Ill. App. 3d at 733.
Recently, a different division of this court disagreed with
Fuller. See People v. Johnson, No. 1-04-1292 (January 31, 2006).
In Johnson, the defendant and four other men kidnaped a 20-
month-old girl in order to collect a ransom from her grandfather.
Johnson, slip op. at 1. After defendant pleaded guilty to
aggravated kidnapping, he was sentenced to 17 years in the
Illinois Department of Corrections and ordered to register as a
sex offender. Johnson, slip op. at 1-2. On appeal, the
defendant argued that the Registration Act was unconstitutional
as applied to him where his offense was not sexually motivated
and had no sexual purpose. Johnson, slip op. at 2-3.
A majority of the court agreed, noting that "[t]he record
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indicate[d] that defendant's offense of aggravated kidnaping was
not sexually motivated" and "[t]here were no allegations of any
kind that defendant or codefendants committed or attempted to
commit any sexual assault against the minor." Johnson, slip op.
at 11. Specifically, the court found:
"[T]here is no rational basis for requiring
defendant to register as a sex offender where he has no
history of committing sex offenses and his offense of
aggravated kidnaping was not sexually motivated and had no
sexual purpose. Consequently, defendant has met his burden
of establishing that the Registration Act, as applied to
him, violates his substantive due process rights under the
state and federal constitutions where his designation as a
sex offender bears no rational relationship to the State's
interest in protecting the public from convicted sex
offenders." Johnson, slip op. at 12. See State v. Reine,
No. 19157 (Ohio App. 2d Dist. 2003); State v. Robinson,
873 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2004); People v. Moi, 8 Misc. 3d
1012(A) (N.Y. County Ct.2005).
The majority distinguished Fuller by arguing that there was
evidence in that case that the crime was sexually motivated:
"The facts in Fuller indicated that the crime was
sexually motivated, as shown by the reviewing court's
following observations and comments:
'In defendant's own case, the arresting
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police officer testified that when the officer asked
defendant what he planned to do with the children,
defendant "stated he was going to find a hotel room and
ask the girl if she had any friends." This statement,
eerily suggestive of the nature of defendant's plans
for the children, in conjunction with defendant's
conduct in failing to release the children themselves,
supports the logical nexus between the act of kidnaping
a child and the very real possibility of subsequent
sexual exploitation of that child.'" Johnson, slip op.
at 11-12, quoting Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 733-34.
Justice Wolfson, however, dissented. Agreeing with Fuller's
"precursor" argument, he found that "[i]t is the nature of the
crime - kidnaping a child - that triggers the Registration Act
provisions." Johnson, slip op. at 14 (Wolfson, J., dissenting).
He went on to argue:
"It does not take much imagination to add to the
list of reprehensible acts an offender might commit.
Once an offender makes the decision to commit the
aggravated kidnaping of a child, there is a very real
possibility the child will become a victim of sexual
abuse. Our reports are filled with such cases.
In this case the crime was interrupted while it
was in progress. The child was being held in a stolen
van when the police arrived. The legislature has the
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authority to protect children from such an offender.
Requiring him to register his name and address with law
enforcement officials does not offend due process of
law." Johnson, slip op. at 15 (Wolfson, J.,
dissenting).
We agree with both the holding in Fuller and the views espoused
by Justice Wolfson in his dissent in Johnson.
The legislature clearly intended that individuals who commit
the offense of aggravated kidnapping of a minor register under
the act as a sex offender. We, like the Fuller court, believe
there to be a rational connection between the interests the
Registration Act seeks to further (protecting children and others
from sex offenders and aided law enforcement) and the method used
to protect or further those interests (in this case, making
kidnapers of children like defendant register as a sex offender),
regardless of whether there was any "sexual" evidence in a
particular case. See Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 733.
Though there is no evidence that defendant sexually
assaulted Miguel or that his motivation in kidnapping Miguel was
sexual in nature, we find that the legislature could rationally
conclude that kidnapers of children pose such a threat to
sexually assault those children as to warrant their inclusion in
the sex offender registry. See Johnson, slip op. at 15 (Wolfson,
J., dissenting); Fuller, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 733; State v. Brown,
273 Wis. 2d 785, 680 N.W.2d 833 (2004); but see Johnson, slip op.
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at 12, citing State v. Reine, No. 19157 (Ohio App. 2d Dist.2003);
State v. Robinson, 873 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 2004); and People v.
Moi, 8 Misc. 3d 1012(A), 801 N.Y.S.2d 780 (N.Y. County Ct. 2005);
People v. Bell, 3 Misc. 3d 773, 778 N.Y.S.2d 837 (2003).
B. Procedural Due Process
Defendant also argues that the Registration Act violates his
right to procedural due process because the registration
requirement is automatic under the Act and there is no
opportunity to challenge that requirement.
An attack based upon procedural due process focuses upon the
specific procedures employed in a statute and whether that
statute provides both an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner. See People v. R.G., 131 Ill. 2d
328, 353 (1989). In order to implicate this right, the defendant
must first show that the registration and notification statutes
at issue deprive him of a protected liberty or property interest.
See Logan, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 332.
Even assuming that the Registration Act implicates a
protected liberty or property interest (cf. People v. Stork, 305
Ill. App. 3d 714 (1999) (finding section 9.3 did not implicate
any protected liberty interests)), defendant had a meaningful
opportunity to be heard at trial (see In re J.R., 341 Ill. App.
3d at 784, 796-97 (2003); Logan, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 332-33).
As defendant points out, a sex offender is not permitted to
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live or be within 500 feet any school building or public park.
See 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(a), (b), (b-5) (West 2002); 720 ILCS 5/11-
9.4 (a), (b), (b-5) (West 2002). Sex offenders are also not
permitted to "operate, manage, be employed by, volunteer at, be
associated with, or knowingly be present at any facility
providing programs or services exclusively directed towards"
minors. 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4(c) (West 2002).
However, defendant had the opportunity at his trial by jury
to challenge whether he committed aggravated kidnapping.
Defendant has not indicated what more process is "due." See In
re J.R., 341 Ill. App. 3d at 796-97; see also Connecticut
Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7-8 155 L. Ed.2d
98, 105, 123 S. Ct. 1160, 155 L. Ed. 2d 98 (2003) (finding that
even if liberty interest is implicated by sex offender registry,
no need for further process than trial that had been provided).
II. Adult 20-year Sentence
Defendant next argues that the circuit court abused its discretion when it
imposed a 20-year adult sentence because the court had offered an 8-year sentence for
both the aggravated kidnapping and armed robbery during the pretrial Rule 402
conference (177 Ill. 2d R. 402) and defendant was acquitted of the latter charge; the
court had noted that the minimum sentence defendant was facing for committing a
Class X felony was "substantial and;" the court indicated it was imposing a 20-year
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sentence to ensure defendant would comply with his juvenile sentence.
Under the EJJ, the circuit court is required to impose both a juvenile sentence
and "an adult criminal sentence in accordance with the provisions of Chapter V of the
Unified Code of Corrections." 705 ILCS 405/5-810(4)(ii) (West 2002); In re Matthew M.,
335 Ill. App. 3d 276 (2002); see 730 ILCS 5/1-1-2 (West 2002) (stating the objectives in
fashioning a sentence should be to "(a) prescribe sanctions proportionate to the
seriousness of the offenses and permit the recognition of differences in rehabilitation
possibilities among individual offenders; (b) forbid and prevent the commission of
offenses; (c) prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons adjudicated offenders
or delinquents; and (d) restore offenders to useful citizenship"). The "adult sentence"
does not kick in unless and until the defendant violates the provisions of his juvenile
sentence. 705 ILCS 405/5-810(4)(ii) (West 2002).
Initially, though not raised by the parties, we question whether defendant has
standing to complain about the conditional adult sentence imposed by the circuit court.
See In re J.W., 346 Ill. App. 3d 1, 15 (2004) (finding the defendant's constitutional
challenge to the revocation of the stay provision was "premature until a petition to
revoke the stay is filed"). As noted above, that adult sentence is automatically stayed
and will not be executed unless defendant violates the terms of his juvenile sentence.
See 705 ILCS 405/5-810(4)(ii) (West 2002). Thus, defendant has it within his own
power to determine whether the adult sentence will kick in.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that defendant has standing, we find that
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed the 20-year adult sentence.
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As defendant notes, because aggravated kidnapping is a Class X felony (720 ILCS
5/10-2(b) (West 2002)), he was facing no less than 6 years and no more that 30 years
in prison (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 2002)). In fashioning the sentence, the circuit
court painstakingly discussed each statutory aggravating and mitigating factor and
whether any of those factors were applicable.
First, the 20-year sentence that the circuit court imposed, being within the
statutory range, is presumed proper. See People v. Malin, 359 Ill. App. 3d 257, 264-65
(2005). Second, though the circuit court noted that the minimum sentence for a Class
X felony was "substantial," the court in no way indicated that the minimum sentence
was the appropriate sentence for defendant. Nor does defendant cite any case where
such a comment has been held to lock the circuit court into imposing that sentence.
Third, though the 20-year sentence was intended to deter defendant from violating his
juvenile sentence, defendant cites no case where the use of the carrot/stick approach to
sentencing has been found to be improper, much less an abuse of discretion.
Attempting to deter the individual from committing further crimes is as much an
appropriate sentencing objective as is restoring him to useful citizenship. 730 ILCS 5/1-
1-2 (a) through (d) (West 2002).
In light of defendant=s prior criminal history, including the fact that he was on
probation for robbery when he kidnaped Miguel B., we find that the 20-year adult
sentence was neither excessive nor an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
GREIMAN and MURPHY, JJ., concur.
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