Sorrells v. City of Macomb ( 2015 )

2015 IL App (3d) 140763
Opinion filed October 23, 2015
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
A.D., 2015
DUANE SORRELLS and ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
MILDRED SORRELLS, ) of the 9th Judicial Circuit,
) McDonough County, Illinois.
Plaintiffs-Appellants, )
)
v. )
) Appeal No. 3-14-0763
CITY OF MACOMB, a Municipal ) Circuit No. 07-CH-38
Corporation, )
)
Defendant-Appellee )
)
(DK Linde Construction, Inc., ) The Honorable
) Rodney Clark,
Defendant). ) Judge, presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Lytton and Schmidt concurred in the judgment and opinion.
_____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiffs, Duane and Mildred Sorrells, filed a complaint against defendant, DK Linde
Construction, Inc., (DK Linde), for flooding that occurred on their property allegedly caused by
DK Linde developing the adjacent property. Plaintiffs amended the complaint to add a claim for
inverse condemnation against defendant, the City of Macomb (City), who owned the streets that
had been developed by DK Linde. The trial court granted the City's section 2-615 motion to
dismiss the plaintiffs' inverse condemnation claim with prejudice. 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West
2012). The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their inverse condemnation claim. We affirm the
trial court's judgment.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 I. Original Complaint Against DK Linde
¶4 On August 30, 2007, plaintiffs filed a one-count complaint for an injunction against DK
Linde, who was developing a residential complex adjacent to their property known as the Scotch
Pine Planned Unit Development (Scotch Pine). Plaintiffs alleged that non-percolating surface
water had naturally drained from defendant's property onto their property until 1997 when DK
Linde installed a detention basin that altered the natural flow of the surface water drainage.
Since the installation of the basin, DK Linde acquired additional property to develop Phase 2 of
Scotch Pine, which included a new and expanded detention basin and drain. The plaintiffs
alleged that DK Linde diverted the natural flow of water and caused an increased amount of
surface water to drain onto their property. Plaintiffs requested that DK Linde be enjoined from
unreasonably increasing the surface water that drained onto their land and that DK Linde be
ordered to install and maintain appropriate drainage facilities.
¶5 After DK Linde answered the complaint, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary
judgment with the affidavit of plaintiff, Duane Sorrells, attached thereto. Sorrells attested to the
allegations of the complaint and attested to the fact that defendant had moved the point at which
water discharged onto plaintiffs' land. In response, DK Linde filed the affidavit of the engineer
who had planned the development. The engineer attested that: (1) defendant did not
unreasonably divert water; (2) the rate of surface water flow onto plaintiffs' land would decrease;
(3) the discharge from Scotch Pine had not been relocated; (4) the development complied with
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applicable engineering standards and the subdivision ordinance; and (5) the defendant's storm
water management plan did not alter the point of discharge.
¶6 II. Amended Complaint against DK Linde and the City
¶7 On March 15, 2012, with leave of court, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, alleging
two additional counts against DK Linde and two counts against the City. In count II against DK
Linde, the plaintiffs alleged that the construction of Phase 2 of Scotch Pine would unreasonably
discharge water onto their property that had not previously drained onto their property and the
drainage system, as designed, would create an unnatural channel on their property and cause an
increase of surface water that was diverted from other drainage basins to flow toward their land.
For count II, plaintiffs requested a permanent injunction against DK Linde. In count III against
DK Linde for negligence, plaintiffs realleged the allegations of count II and that defendant's
trespass and other conduct would damage their property. For count III, plaintiffs requested
money damages.
¶8 In count IV for inverse condemnation against the City, the plaintiffs alleged that DK
Linde was developing a residential complex adjacent to the their property called Phases 1 & 2 of
Scotch Pine, which included the installation of residential structures, streets, lawns, drainage
ways, and other improvements, with the streets having been dedicated to the City. Plaintiffs
alleged that the surface water from the streets and the development on Phase 1 was directed into
unnatural channels on their land and that the surface water from Phase 2 had not previously
drained naturally onto their land. Plaintiff claimed that the drainage design would cause water
from the development to unreasonably discharge from two storm water detention basins onto
their property where there had been no natural drainage, causing erosion, creating an unnatural
channel, and increasing the amount of surface water drainage.
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¶9 Plaintiffs further alleged that the City failed to follow applicable drainage standards,
engineering standards, and ordinances in approving the construction and design of Phases 1 and
2. Plaintiffs alleged that the unnatural and diverted drainage of surface water had and would in
the future result in a permanent, continuing, and substantial physical interference with the use
and enjoyment of their land, amounting to a taking of a drainage easement by the City for its
streets and public ways, which would continue in the future as further streets and public ways
were developed in Phase 2. Plaintiffs claimed that the taking was "by invasion by taking
drainage rights and by permanently taking [their] lands due to an increase in the water level of
plaintiffs' lake." Plaintiffs requested, inter alia, money damages for damage to their land not
taken and an order of mandamus requiring the City to initiate condemnation proceedings for the
portion of their property that had been taken. In count V, plaintiffs alleged negligence against
the City based on the City's alleged breach of duty to refrain from altering the natural flow of
water.
¶ 10 In response, the City filed a motion to dismiss counts IV and V pursuant to section 2-619
of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2012)). The City argued, inter alia,
that the plaintiffs' claim regarding Phase 1 should be dismissed pursuant to the applicable one
year statute of limitations. The City also argued that it was immune from liability under section
2-104 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Illinois Tort
Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/2-104 (West 2012)) (providing immunity to a local public entity
for issuing a permit, license, certificate, approval, or similar authorization), section 2-105 of the
Illinois Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-105 (West 2012)) (providing immunity to a local
public entity for the failure to inspect or for an inadequate or negligent inspection), and section
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2-103 of the Illinois Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/2-103 (West 2012)) (providing immunity
to a local public entity for adopting or failing to adopt an enactment or failing to enforce a law).
¶ 11 In support of its motion to dismiss, the City provided the affidavit of Ed Basch, who had
been the Community Development Coordinator for the City. According to Basch's affidavit, the
City would transmit proposed engineering plans to a professional engineer for review. The
engineering plans for Phase 1 were prepared by McClure Engineering, Inc., and reviewed by
Benton & Associates, Inc., who found the Phase 1 drainage calculations complied with the
Macomb Municipal Code and Illinois drainage requirements. The City Council approved the
final subdivision plans for Phase 1. The engineering plans for Phase 2 were prepared by
McClure Engineering and reviewed by Hutchison Engineering, Inc., who offered suggestions for
improvements to the detention basin. The City Council approved Phase 2 in a 5 to 3 vote.
¶ 12 The trial court granted the City's motion to dismiss "on the immunity grounds," with
leave granted to plaintiffs to amend their complaint.
¶ 13 III. Second-Amended Complaint
¶ 14 The plaintiffs filed a second-amended complaint, asserting claims of inverse
condemnation in count IV and negligence in count V. In response, the City filed a section 2-619
motion to dismiss, attaching the Basch affidavit in support thereof.
¶ 15 On July 17, 2013, the trial court found that the City was immune from tort liability for the
alleged negligence count, which was dismissed with prejudice. The trial court also dismissed the
inverse condemnation count, with leave granted to amend, if possible, to allege that "it is the
streets in and of themselves that's causing the taking not th[e] entire subdivision." The plaintiffs
filed a motion for the trial court to reconsider its dismissal of counts IV and V, which the trial
court denied.
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¶ 16 IV. Third-Amended Complaint
¶ 17 On August 5, 2013, plaintiffs filed a third-amended complaint, alleging an inverse
condemnation claim against the City in count IV. Plaintiffs alleged that they owned real estate
adjacent to land on which DK Linde was developing a residential complex known as Phases 1 &
2 of Scotch Pine, which included "residential structures, street, lawns, drainage ways, and other
improvements, which streets have been dedicated to the City." The surface water from the
streets and the development on Phases 1 and 2 was being channeled and directed, by the streets,
into unnatural channels onto their land and surface water from Phase 2 had not previously
drained naturally onto their land. Plaintiffs alleged the water from the development, including
from the streets, was channeled and directed by the streets to unreasonably discharge from two
storm water detention basins onto the land: (1) where there had been no natural drainage
channel; (2) where their land would be eroded into an unnatural channel on their property; (3) at
a point where there had not been any natural drainage or runoff from Phase 2; (4) causing
increased discharge from the streets due to the construction of residential facilities, streets and
sidewalks, which would have ordinarily percolated into the soil, and from rooftops draining into
the streets; (5) with the flow of surface water having never previously before flowed toward
plaintiffs' land; (6) with the unreasonable and improper artificial drainage from the development
and streets causing damage to their lake, dam, and other structures on plaintiffs' land; and (7)
with the ditches and drainage facilities on Phases 1 and 2 unreasonably increasing the surface
water drainage onto their land.
¶ 18 Plaintiffs further alleged that in approving the construction and design of Phases 1 and 2,
the City failed to follow applicable drainage standards, engineering standards, laws and
ordinances, and failed to consider the damage to plaintiffs' land. Plaintiffs claimed that the
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unnatural and diverted drainage of surface water in increased amounts, which was diverted onto
their land by the streets, resulted in a "permanent, continuing and substantial interference with
[their] use and enjoyment of their land, amounting to a taking of an interest in plaintiffs' property
without compensation." The plaintiffs claimed that the City: (1) discharged surface water from
the streets and other locations onto their land that "would not normally flow upon plaintiffs'
lands"; (2) diverted surface water from the streets "in channels other than natural drainage
channels"; (3) failed to comply with City ordinances; (4) caused flooding on their property; (5)
failed to correct defects in the design and construction of the streets; and (6) by way of the
streets, unreasonably increased the flow of surface water from the development onto their land
"beyond a range consistent with the policy of reasonableness of use which led initially to the
good-husbandry exception." Plaintiffs claimed that the City had taken a drainage easement and
drainage rights, and "the unreasonable and unauthorized discharge of surface water and increase
thereof from the defendant's streets" had and will cause damage to other property that was not
taken. For relief, plaintiffs requested, inter alia, money damages and an order of mandamus
requiring the City to initiate condemnation proceedings.
¶ 19 On September 20, 2013, the City filed a section 2-619.1 combined motion to dismiss
count IV of the third-amended complaint pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (Code). See 735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619, 2-619.1 (West 2012). On January 17,
2014, the trial court noted that the third-amended complaint was not specific as to the streets
being the cause of the alleged taking and the plaintiffs "continued to attempt to bootstrap the
entire subdivision into the complaint and the City enjoys certain immunities in relation to the fact
that this was a private subdivision." The trial court granted the City's section 2-615 motion to
dismiss count IV with prejudice, finding count IV failed to state a cause of action for inverse
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condemnation. Thereafter, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider but granted
their request for a finding that there was no just reason to delay an appeal pursuant Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010). Plaintiffs appealed.
¶ 20 ANALYSIS
¶ 21 On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting the City's section 2-615
motion to dismiss count IV of their third-amended complaint for failure to state a claim for
inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs claim that the allegations were sufficient wherein they alleged a
taking by the City of a drainage easement to drain surface water onto their land, channeled by the
City's streets, in unreasonable amounts, and in an unnatural channel. 1 The City argues the
allegations were insufficient to support plaintiffs' claim of a governmental taking. The sole issue
1
Under Illinois common law, a landowner has a duty to refrain from increasing the
natural flow of surface water onto the property of an adjacent landowner. Van Meter v. Darien
Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 369 (2003) (citing Templeton v. Huss, 57 Ill. 2d 134, 141 (1974)).
When surface water falling or coming on one tract naturally descends upon the other, the owner
of the higher (dominant) land has a natural easement in the lower (servient) tract. Mileur v.
McBride, 147 Ill. App. 3d 755, 758 (1986). The owner of an upper field cannot construct drains
or ditches to create new channels for water in a lower field. Templeton, 57 Ill. 2d at 138-39
(quoting Peck v. Herrington, 109 Ill. 611 (1884)). However, under the "good husbandry"
exception, the owner of dominant land may increase or alter the flow of water upon a servient
estate as may be required by good husbandry. Id.at 139. Nonetheless, the good-husbandry
exception is limited to that which is incidental to the reasonable development of the dominant
estate. Id.; Bollweg v. Richard Marker Associates, Inc., 353 Ill. App. 3d 560, 575 (2004).
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presented for review is whether the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to establish a cause of
action for inverse condemnation.
¶ 22 This court reviews de novo an order granting a section 2-615 motion to dismiss. Pooh-
Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 232 Ill. 2d 463, 473 (2009). A section 2-615 motion to
dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint based on defects apparent on the face of
the complaint and should not be granted unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be
proven that would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Id. The critical inquiry in determining whether a
pleading should be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 is whether the allegations, when
construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to establish a cause of action
upon which relief may be granted. Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 33. Thus, we must
determine whether the allegations in Count IV of the third-amended complaint, construed in the
light most favorable to the plaintiffs, were sufficient to establish a cause of action for inverse
condemnation.
¶ 23 Both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution prohibit the taking of
private property for public use without just compensation. Hampton v. Metropolitan Water
Reclamation District of Greater Chicago, 2015 IL App (1st) 132317, ¶ 12 (opinion not released
for publication in the permanent law reports and is subject to revision or withdrawal).
Specifically, the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits private property
from being "taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. Const., amend. V. The
Illinois Constitution provides, "[p]rivate property shall not be taken or damaged for public use
without just compensation." Ill. Const. 197, art. I, § 15. The same provision was stated in the
1870 Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1870, art. II, § 13.
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¶ 24 Eminent domain is a state's sovereign power to take private property for public use,
subject to the constitutional requirement that just compensation be paid. City of Edwardsville v.
County of Madison, 251 Ill. 265, 266 (1911). In an eminent domain proceeding, the condemning
body files a condemnation action under the Eminent Domain Act (735 ILCS 30/1-1-1 et seq.
(West 2012)) to officially take real property from its owner. 735 ILCS 30/10-5-5 (West 2012).
¶ 25 In an inverse condemnation proceeding, the property owner initiates an action to obtain
an order of mandamus to compel the government to file a condemnation claim. Herget National
Bank of Pekin v. Kenney, 105 Ill. 2d 405, 411-12 (1985). There is a distinction between property
that has been physically taken and property that has been damaged. Patzner v. Baise, 133 Ill. 2d
540, 546-47 (1990). Where no part of the land is taken, a property owner cannot, by mandamus,
compel proceedings under eminent domain. Id. at 547; Granite City Moose Lodge No. 272 v.
Kramer, 96 Ill. 2d 265, 270-71 (1983); People ex rel. Pratt v. Rosenfield, 399 Ill. 247, 250-51
(1948) (overruling by United States Supreme Court, in part, recognized in Hampton, 2015 IL
App (1st) 132317 to the extent the Pratt holding is that a temporary flooding can never constitute
a compensable taking under the Illinois Constitution); Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 Ill. 64, 71-
72 (1881); Rothschild v. Baise, 157 Ill. App. 3d 481, 483 (1987).
¶ 26 The addition of the word "damaged" in the 1870 Illinois Constitution, now found in the
1970 Illinois Constitution, provided for compensation to property owners whose property was
"injuriously affected" by government action but there had not been a government taking. Rigney,
102 Ill. at 66; see also Citizens Utilities Co. of Illinois v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of
Greater Chicago, 25 Ill. App. 3d 252, 255-57 (1974) (providing the word "damaged" within the
1870 constitution means some direct physical disturbance of a property right which gave the
property additional value, the disturbance of which causes special damage in excess of that
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sustained by the general public). Before the addition of the word "damaged" to the Illinois
Constitution, a landowner had no relief for property damage that was caused by a public
improvement unless there was an actual physical invasion of the land itself. Horn v. City of
Chicago, 403 Ill. 549, 554 (1949). Section 15 of article I of the 1970 Illinois Constitution
retained the addition of the word "damaged" and afforded a property owner in Illinois greater
protection than its federal counterpart because the Illinois Takings clause guarded against both a
governmental taking of property and governmental damage to property. See, e.g., Hampton,
2015 IL App (1st) 132317, ¶ 14; International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d
356 (7th Cir. 1998). Thus, where no taking of property has occurred, the property owner's
remedy for a governmental disturbance of a property right is an action at law for damages to
recover compensation under the Illinois Constitution. Patzner, 133 Ill. 2d at 546-47; Pratt, 399
Ill. at 250-51; Cuneo v. City of Chicago, 379 Ill. 488, 493 (1942); Rigney, 102 Ill. at 67; Euwema
Co. v. McKay Engineering & Construction Co., 316 Ill. App. 650, 653 (1942).
¶ 27 There is "no magic formula" to determine, in every case, whether the government's
interference with property is a "taking." Arkansas Game & Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568
U.S. __, __, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012). Most takings claims turn on the specific facts of the
case. Id. at __, 133 S. Ct. at 518. Factors relevant to determining whether there has been a
compensable taking are: (1) the duration of the physical invasion; (2) the degree to which the
invasion was the intended or foreseeable result of authorized government action; (3) the
character of the land and the owner's reasonable economic expectations regarding the use of
property; and (4) the severity of the interference. Id. at __, 133 S. Ct. at 522; Hampton, 2015 IL
App (1st) 132317, ¶ 25.
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¶ 28 In Arkansas Game & Fish, the United States Supreme Court focused on the factors of
duration and foreseeability in holding that "government-induced flooding temporary in duration
gains no automatic exemption from Takings Clause inspection." The United States Supreme
Court in Arkansas Game & Fish addressed its prior decision in Sanguinetti v. United States, in
which it held there was no taking where the factors of foreseeability and causation were not
present where the government did not intend to flood the land and had no reason to expect that
flooding would result from the construction of its canal. Arkansas Game & Fish, 568 U.S. at __,
133 S. Ct. at 520 (citing Sanguinetti v. United States, 264 U.S. 146, 147-49 (1924)). Also, the
property in Sanguinetti was subject to seasonal flooding prior to the construction of the canal and
the landowner failed to show that the causal connection between the construction of the canal
and the increased flooding was anything other than pure conjecture. Id. at __, 133 S. Ct. at 520
(citing Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. at 149).
¶ 29 After Arkansas Game & Fish, public improvements that cause a temporary accumulation
of water on property may be considered to be a taking in some circumstances. See Hampton,
2015 IL App (1st) 132317. Under the Illinois Constitution, a temporary flooding of property can
give rise to either a taking or an action at law for damages, depending on the circumstances. See
Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 15. Thus, the requirement within the Illinois Constitution that the
government pay just compensation for property that has been either taken or damaged is satisfied
with an action at law for damages where the property was damaged for public use but no part of
the property was taken. See Patzner, 133 Ill. 2d at 546-47; Horn, 403 Ill. at 559; Pratt, 399 Ill.
at 250-51; Kane v. City of Chicago, 392 Ill. 172, 175 (1945); Catello v. Chicago, Burlington. &
Quincy R.R. Co., 298 Ill. 248, 256 (1921); Euwema, 316 Ill. App. at 653.
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¶ 30 In this case, the plaintiffs alleged that the streets were constructed by DK Linde and
"dedicated" to the City. According to plaintiffs' allegations, the City had taken the plaintiffs'
property in the form of a "drainage easement" for the drainage of its streets. "It is well
established that the government may not take an easement without just compensation." Ridge
Line, Inc. v. United States, 346 F.3d 1346, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v.
Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 748 (1947), and Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
834 (1987)). However, plaintiffs alleged that the private development as a whole caused the
alleged unreasonable amount of surface water to drain onto their land from the detention and
drainage basins.
¶ 31 Specifically, plaintiffs alleged, "the water from the development, including from the
streets, is being channeled and directed by said streets and is and will be unreasonably
discharged from two Storm Water Detentions Basins onto Plaintiffs [property]." At most, the
allegations, taken as true, indicate that the increased drainage onto the plaintiffs' land was for the
benefit of both the private development and the public streets. Although temporary or permanent
government-induced flooding can constitute a taking of property by flooding, the flooding as
alleged in this case was induced by the private developers, not government action. Plaintiffs'
complaint makes clear that the water allegedly invading the plaintiffs' property was drainage
from two storm water detention basins or other drainage basins.
¶ 32 Thus, the allegations of count IV of the third-amended complaint are insufficient to
support plaintiffs' claim of a taking for public use where the alleged increased water drainage
was coming from the entire development, including streets, through detention or drainage basins.
The development was not a public property and the acceptance of the dedication of the streets
inside the development does not give rise to a taking where the drainage was from the basins. In
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addition, plaintiffs failed to allege that the water draining from the development onto their land,
in an unreasonable amount and unnatural channels, was the intended or foreseeable result, in
whole or part, of the City's actions rather than that of the development. See Bay Bottoms
Drainage District v. Cache River Drainage District, 295 Ill. 301 (1920); Arkansas Game & Fish,
568 U.S. at __, 133 S. Ct. at 522 (property loss is compensable as a "taking" only when the
government intended to invade a protected property interest or the invasion was the direct,
natural, or probable result of authorized activity as opposed to a resulting incidental or
consequential injury) (citing Ridge Line, Inc., 346 F.3d at 1355-56).
¶ 33 Furthermore, condemnation cases traditionally arise from government action alone; not
from multiple causes that would include actions of private actors, as in this case where the water
was from the whole development flowing into detention basins. See, e.g., Patzner,133 Ill. 2d
540 (alleged a taking by the secretary of transportation where the Illinois Department of
Transportation's construction machinery parked on adjacent property caused the landowner to
relocate his business); Herget, 105 Ill. 2d 405 (plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus to compel the
Director of Department of Conservation to undertake eminent domain proceedings for
compensation where government caused plaintiff's property to become submerged after it
enlarged a lake); Granite City, 96 Ill. 2d 265 (property owner sought writ of mandamus to
compel the Secretary of Transportation to institute eminent domain proceedings for the alleged
taking and damaging of property due to construction of an adjacent roadway overpass); Pratt,
399 Ill. 247 (landowners sought a writ of mandamus to require the city, mayor, members of city
council, Illinois Central Railroad Company, and the Director of Public Works and Buildings of
the State of Illinois to file a petition to determine damages allegedly caused by a change in grade
that was made in connection with the removal of an old viaduct); Rigney, 102 Ill. 64 (landowner
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brought suit against the city for damages to plaintiff's land allegedly caused by the city's
construction of a viaduct or bridge). To constitute a government taking or compensable
government action, the water overflow must be the result of a structure or action imposed by the
governmental entity, even if after Arkansas it is only a temporary invasion of the property.
Compare Herget, 105 Ill. 2d 405 (affirming trial court's order for issuance of a writ of mandamus
to compel eminent domain proceedings where the government submerged plaintiff's land by
enlarging a lake), with Sanguinetti, 264 U.S. 146 (no taking found because landowner failed to
show that overflow onto his land was causally connected to the government's canal construction
rather than to increased seasonal flooding). In this case, the alleged flooding of the plaintiffs'
land was from the overflow of drainage and detention basins, not from the City's actions.
¶ 34 Consequently, we find plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action against the City for
inverse condemnation. We affirm the trial court's 2-615 dismissal of count IV of the plaintiffs'
complaint for inverse condemnation.
¶ 35 CONCLUSION
¶ 36 The judgment of the circuit court of McDonough County is affirmed.
¶ 37 Affirmed.
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