People v. Meginnes ( 2008 )


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  •                          NO.   4-07-1030           Filed 5/12/08
    IN THE APPELLATE COURT
    OF ILLINOIS
    FOURTH DISTRICT
    In re: JOHN C.M., Alleged to be a       )    Appeal from
    Neglected Minor,                        )    Circuit Court
    THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS     )    of McLean County
    Petitioner-Appellee,          )    No. 07JA23
    v.                            )
    ASHLEIGH MEGINNES,                      )    Honorable
    Respondent-Appellant.         )    Donald D. Bernardi,
    )    Judge Presiding
    _________________________________________________________________
    JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH delivered the opinion of the court:
    In February 2007, the State filed a petition for
    adjudication of wardship of respondent, Ashleigh Meginnes's son,
    John C.M. (born December 14, 2005), alleging he was abused.    In
    August 2007, the trial court entered an adjudicatory order
    finding John to be neglected and placed him in the custody of his
    father, Alan Carter.   On November 13, 2007, the court entered a
    dispositional order finding respondent unfit.   The court found
    Carter fit, placed John in Carter's custody, and closed the case.
    Carter is not a party to this appeal.
    Respondent appeals, contending (1) the trial court
    lacked jurisdiction to proceed at the dispositional hearing,
    which took place more than six months after John was removed from
    respondent's home; the court's dispositional order finding her
    unfit was against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3)
    the court abused its discretion in finding Carter fit.   We
    disagree and affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On the afternoon of February 5, 2007, respondent took
    John to his pediatrician.   John had bruising to the back of his
    head, extending from ear to ear.   Respondent told the pediatri-
    cian that she placed John in bed the previous night at approxi-
    mately 8 or 8:30 p.m.   On February 5, at approximately noon,
    respondent asked Andrew Mack, her then paramour, to wake John and
    change his diaper, at which time the bruising was discovered.
    Respondent and Mack denied causing the injury.     Respondent could
    provide no explanation to the pediatrician as to how John sus-
    tained the injuries.    The pediatrician referred John to BroMenn
    Hospital in Bloomington, Illinois.      John was immediately trans-
    ferred to St. Francis Hospital in Peoria, where a computerized
    tomography (CT) scan showed a subdural hematoma to the brain.
    On February 13, 2007, the State filed a petition for
    adjudication of wardship, alleging (1) John was abused, in that
    respondent or someone she entrusted inflicted on him physical
    injury by other than accidental means, which caused disfigure-
    ment, impairment of emotional health, or loss of impairment of
    any bodily function, in that John had bruising and swelling
    across the back of his head from ear to ear with no plausible
    explanation for the injury (705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(i) (West 2066)),
    - 2 -
    and (2) John was neglected in that he was residing in an environ-
    ment injurious to his welfare as respondent had unresolved issues
    of domestic violence creating a risk of harm for John (705 ILCS
    405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2006)).
    On February 14, 2007, a shelter-care hearing was held.
    The trial court found probable cause that John was abused as
    respondent had (1) no plausible explanation for the bruising and
    swelling to John's head and (2) unresolved issues of domestic
    violence.    A temporary custody order was issued placing guardian-
    ship of John with the Illinois Department of Children and Family
    Services (DCFS).    John was placed by DCFS with Carter, who lived
    apart from and was not involved in a current relationship with
    respondent.    Respondent had no prior involvement with DCFS and a
    law-enforcement-agencies-data-system (LEADS) check was negative.
    Carter had no prior involvement with DCFS, but a LEADS check was
    positive for residential burglary-criminal trespass to a resi-
    dence in 2005, and the manufacture or delivery of cannabis in
    2002.
    Respondent's paramour, Mack, had no prior involvement
    with DCFS, but he had several charges with no convictions for
    assault and drug possession.    Two of those assault charges
    involved respondent.
    At a pretrial hearing on March 15, 2007, all parties
    waived the requirement that the adjudicatory hearing be held
    - 3 -
    within 90 days of the child being taken into custody.    Additional
    pretrial hearings were held in April and May.
    In August 2007, the State amended the petition for
    adjudication of wardship, alleging (1) John was neglected and
    residing in an environment injurious to his welfare in that he
    suffered injuries to his head, (2) respondent acknowledged she
    was the primary caretaker for the minor, and (3) respondent had
    no plausible explanation consistent with the medical evidence to
    explain the injuries (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2006)).    On
    August 2, 2007, the adjudicatory hearing was held.    Respondent
    admitted the allegation in the amended petition, and the trial
    court entered an adjudicatory order finding John neglected.      At
    the adjudicatory hearing, the parties waived the right to hold
    the dispositional hearing within 30 days of the adjudicatory
    hearing.    The dispositional hearing was scheduled for September
    12, 2007.
    On October 17, 2007, the State filed a notice that the
    dispositional hearing had been reset for November 13, 2007.
    Nothing in the record indicates why the dispositional hearing was
    continued from September 12 to November 13, 2007, or whether it
    was agreed to by respondent.
    In November 2007, DCFS filed a dispositional report
    that recommended guardianship of John be placed with Carter, the
    court find respondent unfit and Carter fit, and the case be
    - 4 -
    closed.    In the dispositional report, DCFS outlined the parties'
    progress with service plans.   Respondent's goals included the
    following: (1) successful completion of domestic-violence assess-
    ment and counseling, (2) maintenance of stable housing for
    herself and John, (3) counseling, (4) successful completion of
    parenting classes, and (5) obtaining and maintaining employment.
    As part of her domestic-violence assessment, respondent reported
    a history of domestic violence in her relationship with Carter,
    including that Carter physically abused her and was manipulative
    and controlling.   While respondent was cooperative with services
    and deemed to have achieved or was satisfactory in her service-
    plan goals with the exception of housing, the report stated
    respondent did not seem to understand or apply the lessons from
    counseling as represented by her relationship with Mack.   At the
    time of the dispositional report, respondent no longer resided
    with Mack but was living with Michael Barnes, a new paramour.
    Carter's goals included the following: (1) successful
    completion of outpatient treatment for drugs and alcohol, (2)
    cooperation with DCFS, and (3) successful completion of parenting
    classes.   No domestic-violence or anger-management goals were
    established for Carter.   Carter was cooperative with services,
    and he was deemed to have achieved all of his service-plan goals.
    John was reported as having adjusted well to living with Carter.
    A psychological evaluation of respondent was conducted,
    - 5 -
    and the report was filed with the court as part of the service
    plan.   The psychologist, Joel Eckert, noted that the alleged
    perpetrator remained unknown and that caused him great concern as
    to respondent's ability to protect John or any other child from
    abusive or nonnurturing men.    Eckert recommended that if John
    were returned to respondent's care, it be done slowly and be
    monitored to ensure "such a process proceeds safely."
    On November 13, 2007, a dispositional hearing was held.
    Respondent did not object to proceeding with the hearing.     At the
    hearing, the State recommended that respondent be found unfit,
    Carter be found fit, the minor remain in Carter's custody, and
    the court close its file on the matter without proceeding to a
    best-interests hearing.    Respondent requested the court keep the
    file open for additional time to prove her fitness to parent.
    The trial court denied respondent's request for additional time
    to prove her fitness, entered an order finding respondent unfit,
    found Carter fit, and granted custody and guardianship of John to
    Carter.    The court closed the file.
    This appeal followed.
    II. ANALYSIS
    A. The Trial Court Had Subject-Matter
    Jurisdiction at the Dispositional Hearing
    1. Requirements of Statutory Scheme Limit Time To
    Hold Dispositional Hearing to Six Months
    Respondent argues that the trial court lacked subject-
    - 6 -
    matter jurisdiction to proceed to disposition as more than six
    months elapsed after the removal of the minor from respondent's
    home, and as such, the trial court's order was void.    The tempo-
    rary custody order was entered on February 14, 2007, the
    adjudicatory hearing was held August 2, 2007, and the
    dispositional hearing was held November 13, 2007.   Respondent
    argues that because section 2-22(4) of the Juvenile Court Act of
    1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-22(4) (West 2006)) limits the time to
    hold a dispositional hearing to a maximum of six months after
    removal of the minor from the home, the court was required to
    hold the dispositional hearing no later than August 14, 2007.
    Under the Act, the adjudicatory hearing must be com-
    menced within 90 days of the date of service upon the minor,
    parents, or guardian.   705 ILCS 405/2-14(b) (West 2006).   Upon
    motion of the parties and a finding by the trial court that a
    continuance is in the child's best interests, the adjudicatory
    hearing may be continued for up to 30 days.    705 ILCS 405/2-14(c)
    (West 2006).   There is no question that the parties waived the
    90-day time period to hold the adjudicatory hearing and the court
    found it in the child's best interests to do so, although the
    hearing was continued for more than 30 days.   Respondent did not
    object to the adjudicatory hearing being continued for more than
    30 days.
    The dispositional hearing must be set within 30 days
    - 7 -
    after an adjudicatory order is entered.     705 ILCS 405/2-21(2)(We-
    st 2006).    By consent of the parties and with approval of the
    court consistent with the health, safety and best interests of
    the minor, the 30-day time period may be waived.     705 ILCS 405/2-
    21(3) (West 2006).    Here, the parties waived the 30-day time
    period and the court found it in the child's best interests to
    continue the hearing.    Nothing indicates why the dispositional
    hearing was continued from September 12 to November 13, 2007.
    Respondent did not object to proceeding with the dispositional
    hearing on November 13, 2007.
    The Act provides that the dispositional hearing shall
    be held within six months of the child being removed from his
    home:
    "[T]he court may adjourn the hearing for
    a reasonable period to receive reports or
    other evidence, if the adjournment is consis-
    tent with the health, safety[,] and best
    interests of the minor, but in no event shall
    continuances be granted so that the
    dispositional hearing occurs more than 6
    months after the initial removal of [the]
    minor from his or her home."   705 ILCS 405/2-
    22(4) (West 2006).
    Respondent argues this provision of the Act was not complied
    - 8 -
    with, which dispossessed the trial court of subject-matter
    jurisdiction.
    2. Standard of Review Is De Novo
    Whether the circuit court properly exercised jurisdic-
    tion is reviewed de novo.     In re Marriage of Chrobak, 
    349 Ill. App. 3d 894
    , 897, 
    811 N.E.2d 1248
    , 1252 (2004).       A judgment
    entered by a court that lacked subject-matter jurisdiction is
    void and may be attacked at any time and in any proceeding.        In
    re Marriage of Adamson, 
    308 Ill. App. 3d 759
    , 764, 
    721 N.E.2d 166
    , 172 (1999).    Subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be for-
    feited.    Currie v. Lao, 
    148 Ill. 2d 151
    , 157, 
    592 N.E.2d 977
    , 979
    (1992).
    3. Respondent Argues Lack of Subject-Matter
    Jurisdiction Renders Order Void
    Respondent argues that the trial court's dispositional
    order was void for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.       "Whether
    a judgment is void or voidable presents a question of jurisdic-
    tion."    People v. Davis, 
    156 Ill. 2d 149
    , 155, 
    619 N.E.2d 750
    ,
    754 (1993).    A voidable judgment is one entered erroneously by a
    court and is not subject to collateral attack.        Davis, 
    156 Ill. 2d at 155-56
    , 
    619 N.E.2d at 754
    .    "'Judgments entered in a civil
    proceeding may be collaterally attacked as void only where there
    is a total want of jurisdiction in the court which entered the
    judgment, either as to the subject matter or as to the parties.'"
    - 9 -
    In re Marriage of Mitchell, 
    181 Ill. 2d 169
    , 174, 
    692 N.E.2d 281
    ,
    284 (1998), quoting Johnston v. City of Bloomington, 
    77 Ill. 2d 108
    , 112, 
    395 N.E.2d 549
    , 550 (1979).
    "Once a court has acquired jurisdiction, an
    order will not be rendered void merely be-
    cause of an error or impropriety in the issu-
    ing court's determination of the law. [Cita-
    tions.] 'Accordingly, a court may not lose
    jurisdiction because it makes a mistake in
    determining either the facts, the law[,] or
    both.' [Citation.]"    Marriage of Mitchell,
    
    181 Ill. 2d at 174-75
    , 
    692 N.E.2d at 284
    .
    If respondent is correct and the trial court lacked subject-
    matter jurisdiction, the dispositional order is void; if respon-
    dent is incorrect and the trial court had jurisdiction, the only
    issue on appeal is whether the trial court's findings of fitness
    were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    4.   Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Belleville Toyota
    Requires Courts To Follow Strictures of Statute
    Respondent relies on In re M.M., 
    156 Ill. 2d 53
    , 
    619 N.E. 2d 702
     (1993), in support of the position that the court
    lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.       In M.M., the Illinois
    Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction
    under the Act when it restricted the guardianship administrator's
    - 10 -
    authority to consent to adoption when the trial court required
    adoptive parents to agree to continued contact of the minors with
    their biological families.     M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 66, 619 N.E.2d
    at 710.
    In M.M., appellants argued that changes to the Illinois
    Constitution in 1964 and 1970 fundamentally changed the power of
    the trial court to invoke subject-matter jurisdiction and that
    subject-matter jurisdiction could not be limited by the legisla-
    ture.   M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 64, 619 N.E.2d at 709.    While recog-
    nizing that subject-matter jurisdiction was conferred on courts
    by the constitution (with the exception of administrative review
    actions), the supreme court held the change made to the constitu-
    tion did not give courts the power to proceed in derogation of a
    statute, as the effect of such a holding would render any statu-
    tory law a nullity.   M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 65, 619 N.E.2d at 709-
    10.   The legislature could define a "justiciable matter" so as to
    preclude or limit the circuit court's authority.      M.M., 156 Ill.
    2d at 65-66, 619 N.E.2d at 710.    When a court's power to act is
    controlled by statute, the court has limited jurisdiction and
    must proceed within the strictures of that statute.      M.M., 156
    Ill. 2d at 66, 619 N.E.2d at 710.    As juvenile court proceedings
    were special statutory proceedings, the scope and application of
    the Act were solely defined by the legislature.     M.M., 156 Ill.
    2d at 66, 619 N.E.2d at 710.    If a circuit court acts outside of
    - 11 -
    the strictures of the statute, the court exceeds its statutory
    authority.   M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 66, 619 N.E.2d at 710.    There-
    fore, when the trial court acted to limit, restrict, or condition
    the power of a guardian without specific statutory authority, the
    court exceeded its jurisdiction under the Act.     M.M., 156 Ill. 2d
    at 66, 619 N.E.2d at 710.   Here, respondent argues the trial
    court exceeded its jurisdiction under the Act when the
    dispositional hearing took place nine months after John was
    removed from respondent's home.   The State argues that M.M. is
    inapplicable to this case as the issue there was whether the
    trial court could restrict the guardian's power to consent to
    adoption; the supreme court did not even address the failure to
    comply with the time periods of the Act.
    Respondent also relies on In re S.G., 
    175 Ill. 2d 471
    ,
    
    677 N.E.2d 920
     (1997), to support her position that the time
    periods of section 2-22 are mandatory.     In S.G., the supreme
    court ruled that the time periods outlined in section 2-14 of the
    Act that required an adjudicatory hearing within 90 days of
    service of process upon the parties were mandatory and the court
    was obligated to dismiss a petition for adjudication of wardship
    that was not completed in the prescribed time frame.     S.G., 
    175 Ill. 2d at 483
    , 
    677 N.E.2d at 926
    .     In arriving at its conclu-
    sion, the court reviewed section 2-14 of the Act, which stated,
    in part:
    - 12 -
    "(a) Purpose and policy.    The legisla-
    ture recognizes that serious delay in the
    adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependency
    cases can cause grave harm to the minor and
    the family and that it frustrates the best
    interests of the minor and the effort to
    establish permanent homes for children in
    need.    The purpose of this [s]ection is to
    insure that *** the State of Illinois will
    act in a just and speedy manner to determine
    the best interests of the minor ***.
    (b) When a petition is filed alleging
    that the minor is abused, neglected, or de-
    pendent, an adjudicatory hearing shall be
    held within 90 days of the date of service of
    process upon the minor, parents, any guard-
    ian[,] and any legal custodian."       705 ILCS
    405/2-14(a), (b) (West 1994).
    Section 2-14(c) allowed for a continuance upon good cause shown,
    not exceeding 30 days, if the continuance was in the best inter-
    ests of the child.     S.G., 
    175 Ill. 2d at 480-81
    , 
    677 N.E.2d at 924-25
    ; 705 ILCS 405/2-14(c) (West 1994).       The section also
    allowed for a waiver of the time limits by consent of all the
    parties and on approval of the court.        S.G., 
    175 Ill. 2d at 481
    ,
    - 13 -
    
    677 N.E.2d at 925
    ; 705 ILCS 405/2-14(d) (West 1994).
    In S.G., the court concluded that the legislature
    intended a mandatory construction of section 2-14 and upheld
    dismissal of the petition.     S.G., 
    175 Ill. 2d at 482
    , 
    677 N.E.2d at 925
    .   The court distinguished an earlier decision, In re
    Armour, 
    59 Ill. 2d 102
    , 104, 
    319 N.E.2d 496
    , 498 (1974), which
    read the term "shall" in the Act as directory, rather than
    mandatory.   S.G, 
    175 Ill. 2d at 481
    , 
    677 N.E.2d at 925
    .   In the
    Armour decision, the supreme court construed a provision requir-
    ing that a petition "shall be set for an adjudicatory hearing
    within 30 days."   Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 37, par. 704-2.     In
    reaching the decision that the language was directory, the
    supreme court considered the intent of the legislature and
    concluded that dismissing a petition would not further the goals
    of the Act to rehabilitate and protect minors.     S.G., 
    175 Ill. 2d at 481
    , 671 N.E.2d at 925, citing Armour, 
    59 Ill. 2d at 104-05
    ,
    
    319 N.E.2d at 498
    .    The Armour court also concluded that the
    language of the statute did not evince the legislative intent
    necessary for a mandatory construction as it did not include a
    consequence for failure to set the adjudicatory hearing within
    the time period.     Armour, 
    59 Ill. 2d at 104-05
    , 
    319 N.E.2d at 498
    .
    In S.G., the court explained that the Armour decision
    was distinguishable because section 2-14 of the Act had an
    - 14 -
    explicit statement of policy that delay could cause harm to
    minors and the section gave direction as to how time periods were
    calculated and the manner of granting continuances.      S.G., 
    175 Ill. 2d at 481
    , 
    677 N.E.2d at 925
    .      The court highlighted that
    section 2-14 contained a specific provision for dismissal without
    prejudice of any petition where an adjudicatory hearing was not
    timely held, evidencing legislative intent to make the time
    period of section 2-14 mandatory.    S.G., 
    175 Ill. 2d at 481-82
    ,
    
    677 N.E.2d at 925
    .
    The State argues S.G. is distinguishable from the case
    sub judice as S.G. interpreted section 2-14 of the Act which
    provides for dismissal of the petition for failure to comply with
    the time periods.    The State argues that, as in Armour where the
    supreme court found the 30-day hearing requirement as directory
    rather than mandatory, section 2-22(4) does not have dismissal
    language.   The State argues the trial court retains subject-
    matter jurisdiction even when it fails to hold a hearing within
    the statutory time frames.
    In support thereof, the State relies on In re C.S., 
    294 Ill. App. 3d 780
    , 786, 
    691 N.E.2d 161
    , 165 (1998), where this
    court held that when a trial court fails to proceed "'within the
    strictures of the statute'" the court does not lose its constitu-
    tionally conferred subject-matter jurisdiction, but, instead,
    proceeds in error because it lacks statutory authority.     In C.S.,
    - 15 -
    this court stated any error a trial court commits by not holding
    the adjudicatory and dispositional hearings prior to the statu-
    tory deadlines of sections 2-14 and 2-21 of the Act did not
    render the order void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
    C.S., 299 Ill. App. 3d at 786, 
    691 N.E.2d at 165
    .
    Statutory authority and compliance with mandates of
    the Act were required for trial courts to obtain and maintain
    subject-matter jurisdiction.    In re A.H., 
    195 Ill. 2d 408
    , 416,
    
    748 N.E.2d 183
    , 189 (2001).    In A.H., the supreme court again
    recognized that statutory authority must be contained in the Act
    before a court may order removal of a child from a foster home.
    DCFS challenged the trial court's authority to order a placement
    change for a child in foster care, arguing that power lay only
    with the guardianship administrator of DCFS.   The court noted
    that removal of a child from a parent's care because of abuse,
    neglect, and dependency was not known at common law or equity.
    A.H., 
    195 Ill. 2d at 415-16
    , 
    748 N.E.2d at 188-89
    .    As that grant
    of authority to remove an abused child was purely statutory in
    nature, the trial court had to "'proceed within the strictures of
    the statute.'"   A.H., 
    195 Ill. 2d at 416
    , 
    748 N.E.2d at 189
    ,
    quoting M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at 66, 619 N.E.2d at 710.    The court
    found that the juvenile court had jurisdiction in that particular
    instance to order the removal of a child from a foster placement,
    as the language of the Act expressly granted that authority to
    - 16 -
    circuit courts.     A.H., 
    195 Ill. 2d at 420
    , 
    748 N.E.2d at 191
    .
    "In particular, section 2-10(2) autho-
    rizes the court to 'enter such other orders
    related to the temporary custody [of the
    minor] as it deems fit and proper, including
    the provision of services to the minor or his
    family to ameliorate the causes contributing
    to the finding of probable cause or the find-
    ing of the existence of immediate and urgent
    necessity.'      (Emphasis in original.)   [Cita-
    tion.]    ***    We believe, however, that the
    phrase 'such other orders' contemplates the
    authority to enter an order to remove a minor
    from his temporary foster care because the
    order is related to the minor's temporary
    custody."       A.H., 
    195 Ill. 2d at 419-20
    , 
    748 N.E.2d at 191
    .
    While the statutory language did not explicitly grant the trial
    court authority to order removal of a child, the appellate court
    found sufficient authorization in the general language of the
    statute to confer jurisdiction on the court to order removal of
    the child.
    5. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Reexamined in Belleville Toyota
    The supreme court reexamined subject-matter jurisdic-
    - 17 -
    tion in a series of cases sometimes referred to as the "Bellevil-
    le Toyota" cases.       Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 
    197 Ill. 2d 514
    ,
    
    759 N.E.2d 509
     (2001); Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor
    Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 
    199 Ill. 2d 325
    , 
    770 N.E.2d 177
     (2002);
    People ex rel. Graf v. Village of Lake Bluff, 
    206 Ill. 2d 541
    ,
    
    795 N.E.2d 281
     (2003).      The cases cited by respondent, M.M. and
    S.G., as well as A.H., reiterate that trial courts must strictly
    adhere to limitations set forth in statutes in order to possess
    subject-matter jurisdiction.      In Steinbrecher, issued five months
    after A.H., the court recognized the effect amendments made to
    the Illinois Constitution in 1964 and 1970 had on the power of
    courts to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction.      The amendments
    expanded circuit courts into courts of general jurisdiction, no
    longer restricted by statutory limitations.      The amendments
    provided:
    "'Circuit Court[s] shall have unlimited
    original jurisdiction of all justiciable
    matters."    Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI, §9
    (amended 1964); accord Ill. Const. 1970, art.
    VI, §9 ("Circuit Courts shall have original
    jurisdiction of all justiciable matters ex-
    cept when the Supreme Court has original and
    exclusive jurisdiction')."     Steinbrecher, 
    197 Ill. 2d at 530
    , 
    759 N.E.2d at 518
    .
    - 18 -
    The court stated the amendments "created a single integrated
    trial court vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate all controver-
    sies."   Steinbrecher, 
    197 Ill. 2d at 530
    , 
    759 N.E.2d at 518
    ,
    citing Zamarron v. Pucinski, 
    282 Ill. App. 3d 354
    , 360, 
    668 N.E.2d 186
    , 191 (1996).   Administrative agencies and pre-1964
    circuit courts had been powerless to act without specific statu-
    tory authority, but since the 1964 amendment, circuit courts
    became courts of general jurisdiction no longer required to look
    to statutes for jurisdictional authority.     Steinbrecher, 
    197 Ill. 2d at 530
    , 
    759 N.E.2d at 519
    .    No longer did a court's failure to
    follow the language of a statute divest a court of jurisdiction,
    but rather, that failure simply resulted in a voidable order.
    Steinbrecher, 
    197 Ill. 2d at 531-32
    , 
    759 N.E.2d at 519-20
    .
    Steinbrecher was then followed by Belleville Toyota,
    which addressed limitation periods contained in the Motor Vehicle
    Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/1 through 32 (West 2000)).    The
    supreme court emphasized that as a result of the amendments to
    the constitution "[w]ith the exception of the circuit court's
    power to review [an] administrative action, which is conferred by
    statute, a circuit court's subject[-]matter jurisdiction is
    conferred entirely by our state constitution."    Belleville
    Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 334
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 184
    .    A court's juris-
    diction extends to all justiciable matters.    Belleville Toyota,
    
    199 Ill. 2d at 334
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 184
    .   A justiciable matter is
    - 19 -
    defined as a definite and concrete controversy appropriate for
    review by the court, touching upon legal relations of parties
    with adverse legal interests.     Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 335
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 184
    .
    "The legislature may create new justiciable matters by
    enacting legislation that creates rights and duties that have no
    counterpart at common law or in equity."     Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 335
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 185
    , citing M.M., 156 Ill. 2d at
    65, 619 N.E.2d at 711.    When the legislature adopted the Motor
    Vehicle Franchise Act in 1979, it created a new justiciable
    matter.   Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 335
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 185
    .   However, the legislature's creation of a new justiciable
    matter did not mean the legislature conferred jurisdiction on
    circuit courts.    Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 335
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 185
    .    "Article VI is clear that, except in the area of
    administrative review, the jurisdiction of the circuit court
    flows from the constitution."    (Emphasis in original.)   Bellevil-
    le Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 335
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 185
    .    The General
    Assembly has no power to enact legislation that contravened
    article VI of the constitution.     Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 335
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 185
    .
    The supreme court rejected the suggestion that the
    legislature could impose conditions precedent to the court's
    exercise of jurisdiction, emphatically stating:
    - 20 -
    "We necessarily reject this view because it
    is contrary to article VI.     Characterizing
    the requirements of a statutory cause of
    action as nonwaivable conditions precedent to
    a court's exercise of jurisdiction is merely
    another way of saying that the circuit court
    may only exercise that jurisdiction which the
    legislature allows.    We reiterate, however,
    that the jurisdiction of the circuit court is
    conferred by the constitution, not the legis-
    lature. ***.
    The legislature's limited role, under
    our current constitution, in defining the
    jurisdiction of the circuit court stands in
    stark contrast to the significant role previ-
    ously exercised by the legislature under our
    former constitution."    Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 336
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 185
    .
    The supreme court differentiated current cases from those under
    the pre-1964 constitution.   Under the pre-1964 constitution, in
    cases that involved "purely statutory causes of action, we held
    that unless the statutory requirements were satisfied, a court
    lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested."       Belleville
    Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 336-37
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 185
    .     The 1964
    - 21 -
    amendments "radically changed the legislature's role in determin-
    ing the jurisdiction of the circuit court."    Belleville Toyota,
    
    199 Ill. 2d at 337
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 186
    .   Now circuit courts enjoy
    "'original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, and such
    powers of review of administrative action as may be provided by
    law.'" Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 337
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 186
    ,
    quoting Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI, §9 (amended 1964).   The court
    held that "the precedential value of case law which examines a
    court's jurisdiction under the pre-1964 judicial system is
    necessarily limited to the constitutional context in which those
    cases arose."    Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 337
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 186
    .   The court further recognized that "pre-1964 rules of law
    continue to be cited by Illinois courts, without qualification,
    creating confusion and imprecision in the case law."    Belleville
    Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 338
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 186
    .   To the extent
    earlier case law deemed time limitations in statutory actions to
    be jurisdictional, the Belleville Toyota court limited those
    cases to the pre-1964 constitutional context in which they arose.
    Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 340
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 187
    .
    The supreme court held the limitation period contained
    in the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act was not a jurisdictional
    prerequisite to suit.    Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 341
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 188
    .   This was "consistent with authority *** favoring
    finality of judgments over alleged defects in validity."
    - 22 -
    Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 341
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 188
    .       The
    court cautioned that under the current constitution, labeling
    requirements contained in statutory causes of action as jurisdic-
    tional allowed for the "unwarranted and dangerous expansion of
    the situations where a final judgment may be set aside on a
    collateral attack."   Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 341
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 188
    .   "Once a statutory requirement is deemed
    'nonwaivable,' it is on equal footing with the only other
    nonwaivable conditions that cause a judgment to be void, and thus
    subject to a collateral attack--a lack of subject[-]matter
    jurisdiction, or a lack of personal jurisdiction."    Belleville
    Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 341
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 188
    .    "'[O]rders should
    be characterized as void only when no other alternative is
    possible.'"   Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 341
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 188
    , quoting In re Marriage of Bernon, 
    253 Ill. App. 3d 783
    , 788,
    
    653 N.E.2d 823
    , 827 (1993).   After rejecting defendant's claim
    that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the
    court weighed whether the limitation period contained in the
    statute was an element of plaintiff's claim, which had to be pled
    and proved, or whether it was an ordinary limitation period,
    providing a technical defense to the claim.    Belleville Toyota,
    
    199 Ill. 2d at 342
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 188
    .    The court found the
    statute was an ordinary statute of limitation that provided a
    technical defense that could be waived.    Belleville Toyota, 199
    - 23 -
    Ill. 2d at 344-45, 
    770 N.E.2d at 190
    .
    In the supreme court's next case addressing subject-
    matter jurisdiction, the court expressly limited the precedential
    value of the case law that held statutory requirements were
    nonwaivable conditions to the constitutional context existing
    before the amendments to the Illinois Constitution.   Graf, 
    206 Ill. 2d at 552-53
    , 
    795 N.E.2d at 287
    .   The court noted the well-
    established principle that the legislature alone has the author-
    ity to create a justiciable controversy when it enacts a statute.
    Graf, 
    206 Ill. 2d at 553-54
    , 
    795 N.E.2d at 288
    .   Once the circuit
    court is thereafter presented with a controversy under that
    statute, the court has "jurisdiction to hear and determine the
    matter because the court’s constitutionally granted original
    jurisdiction extends to the general class of cases arising under
    the statute."   Graf, 
    206 Ill. 2d at 554
    , 
    795 N.E.2d at 288
    ,
    citing Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 340
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at
    187-
    88.   Once a justiciable matter is properly before the court, that
    court has the power to decide rightly or wrongly the issues
    properly before it.   Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 340-41
    ,
    
    770 N.E.2d at 188
    .
    The Belleville Toyota line of cases crystallized the
    principle that, as a result of the changes made to the Illinois
    Constitution, limitation periods contained in statutes were not
    jurisdictional prerequisites to suit and circuit courts did not
    - 24 -
    lose jurisdiction when they failed to follow the "strictures of
    the statute."    Belleville Toyota, 
    199 Ill. 2d at 340-41
    , 
    770 N.E.2d at 188
    .   However, more recently, the supreme court held
    that when a circuit court exercises authority over a minor
    pursuant to the Act, trial courts must proceed within the strict
    confines of that law and have no authority except as the Act
    specifically provides.    See In re Jaime P., 
    223 Ill. 2d 526
    , 
    861 N.E.2d 958
     (2006) (juvenile court possessed no jurisdiction to
    continue probation beyond juvenile's 21st birthday);    People v.
    Brown, 
    225 Ill. 2d 188
    , 199, 
    866 N.E.2d 1163
     (2007) (defendant's
    transfer from juvenile to criminal court was void under the Act).
    Neither Jaime P. nor Brown references the Belleville Toyota cases
    or attempts to harmonize the seemingly different interpretations
    of subject-matter jurisdiction.
    The determination of whether subject-matter jurisdic-
    tion has been lost when statutory mandates are not strictly
    followed is fact specific.   In In re O.H., 
    329 Ill. App. 3d 254
    ,
    258, 
    768 N.E.2d 799
    , 802 (2002), the appellate court quotes the
    M.M. holding that the scope and application of the Act are
    defined solely by the legislature and a circuit court must
    proceed within the stricture of the statute.   The court then
    found that the circuit court had inherent plenary power through
    the doctrine of parens patriae to enter an order in the best
    interests of the child.    O.H., 
    329 Ill. App. 3d at 260
    , 768
    - 25 -
    N.E.2d at 804.   Despite having positively cited the M.M. finding
    that the Act was a special statutory proceeding, the O.H. court
    stated that "[t]he court’s power to interfere with and control
    the persons and custody of all minors within its jurisdiction
    existed in the common law, prior to and independent of the
    Juvenile Court Act, by inheritance from the English courts of
    chancery."   O.H., 
    329 Ill. App. 3d at 260
    , 
    768 N.E.2d at 804
    .
    In a case involving the Mental Health and Developmental
    Disabilities Code (Code) (405 ILCS 5/1-100 through 6-107 (West
    2004)), the appellate court stated M.M. had largely been over-
    ruled by the supreme court as a result of the Belleville Toyota
    line of cases.   In re Alex T., 
    375 Ill. App. 3d 758
    , 761, 
    873 N.E.2d 1015
    , 1017 (2007).   The court nevertheless found strict
    statutory authorization was required under the Code before a
    court had jurisdiction to enter an involuntary admission order.
    Alex T., 375 Ill. App. 3d at 763, 
    873 N.E.2d at 1019
    .
    The respondent had a felony charge pending against him.
    Section 3-100 of the Code (405 ILCS 5/3-100 (West 2004)) provided
    that "'[t]he circuit court has jurisdiction under this [c]hapter
    over persons not charged with a felony who are subject to invol-
    untary admission.'"   Alex T., 375 Ill. App. 3d at 759, 
    873 N.E.2d at 1016
    , quoting 405 ILCS 5/3-100.     In making its determination
    that statutory authorization must exist before a court has
    jurisdiction to enter an order, the court looked to the holdings
    - 26 -
    of a pre-Steinbrecher case, People v. McCarty, 
    94 Ill. 2d 28
    , 
    445 N.E.2d 298
     (1983).   In McCarty, the supreme court stated that
    "'[t]he basis for the plain-error holdings in [four supreme court
    cases, including two juvenile cases,] was that a conviction or an
    order significantly restricting the liberty of a defendant must
    have statutory authorization and is a nullity otherwise.'"
    (Emphasis in original.)   Alex T., 375 Ill. App. 3d at 762-63, 
    873 N.E.2d at 1019
    , quoting McCarty, 
    94 Ill. 2d at 37
    , 
    445 N.E.2d at 303
    .   The cases referenced by McCarty included two juvenile
    cases, suggesting the court intended the principle of explicit
    statutory authority required in cases involving significant
    restriction of liberty to extend beyond criminal cases.    Alex T.,
    375 Ill. App. 3d at 763, 
    873 N.E.2d at 1019
    .   The court held that
    because an order for involuntary admission significantly re-
    stricted a person’s liberty, strict statutory authorization was
    required before a court had jurisdiction to enter an order.       "Any
    involuntary admission order entered against a person charged with
    a felony is thus an order entered by a court that lacks jurisdic-
    tion, and so is void."    Alex T., 375 Ill. App. 3d at 763, 
    873 N.E.2d at 1019
    .
    6. Respondent's Agreed Continuances Tolled Time
    Period To Hold Dispositional Hearing
    Recently, several appellate courts have addressed the
    question of whether the time periods of the Act are mandatory or
    directory and whether failure to comply with the time periods
    - 27 -
    deprives the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.   When a
    party fails to object at the hearing that the time periods of the
    Act were exceeded, parties have been found to have forfeited the
    issue.   See In re John Paul J., 
    343 Ill. App. 3d 865
    , 874, 877-
    78, 
    799 N.E.2d 769
    , 776, 779 (2003) (failure to conduct a tempo-
    rary custody hearing under section 2-9(3) of the Act within 48
    hours did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction; failure to
    conduct adjudicatory hearing within 90 days under section 2-14
    forfeited when petitioner failed to file motion to dismiss
    petition for adjudication); In re S.W., 
    342 Ill. App. 3d 445
    ,
    452, 
    794 N.E.2d 1037
    ,1042-43 (2003) (petitioner waived the time
    requirements of section 2-14 by failing to file motion to dismiss
    in circuit court).
    Respondent argues the mandatory construction the
    supreme court gave the provisions of section 2-14(b) of the Act
    in S.G. controls this court's finding.   However, S.G is distin-
    guishable from the case sub judice:    at the time, section 2-14
    mandated dismissal of the petition without prejudice if the
    adjudicatory hearing was not held within the time limits required
    by subsection (b) or (c) of the section.   The legislature did not
    include in section 2-22(4), like it did in section 2-14(b), a
    provision requiring dismissal of the petition.   This evidences
    legislative intent that the language of section 2-22(4) be read
    as directory.   See O.H., 
    329 Ill. App. 3d at 260
    , 768 N.E.2d at
    - 28 -
    803.
    Section 2-22(4) of the Act does not contain any lan-
    guage identifying a penalty for failure to comply with the six-
    month time period.   Because section 2-14 contains language
    requiring dismissal without prejudice of the petition for failure
    to comply with the limits, the legislature's failure to include
    the dismissal language in section 2-22 appears to be a deliberate
    exclusion.    "The inclusion of one is the exclusion of another, a
    generally accepted canon of construction, construes the express
    inclusion of a provision in one part of a statute and its omis-
    sion in a parallel section as an intentional exclusion from the
    latter."   (Emphasis in original.)   O.H., 
    329 Ill. App. 3d at 260
    ,
    
    768 N.E.2d at 803
    , citing Schanowitz v. State Farm Mutual Automo-
    bile Insurance Co., 
    299 Ill. App. 3d 843
    , 848, 
    702 N.E.2d 629
    ,
    633 (1998).
    In S.G., dismissal of the petition was without preju-
    dice.   S.G., 
    175 Ill. 2d at 493
    , 
    677 N.E.2d at 930
    .   When the
    State failed to comply with the statute, all the State had to do
    was refile the juvenile court petition.    Subject-matter jurisdic-
    tion serves to restrict judicial authority over the type of
    claims the circuit court may adjudicate.    Financial Freedom v.
    Kirgis, 
    377 Ill. App. 3d 107
    , 128, 
    877 N.E.2d 24
    , 42 (2007)
    (common-law principle of denying subject-matter jurisdiction in
    suit filed against deceased person did not apply to an in rem
    - 29 -
    action).   "Subject[-]matter jurisdiction refers to a court's
    power to both adjudicate the general question involved and to
    grant the particular relief requested."    A.H., 
    195 Ill. 2d at 415
    , 
    748 N.E.2d at 188
    .   The fact that dismissal was without
    prejudice reflects that the court did not "lose" subject-matter
    jurisdiction when it failed to comply with the time limits of the
    Act, as the State could refile the petition.   If the court did
    not have subject-matter jurisdiction because of failure to comply
    with the Act, the dismissal would be with prejudice and the State
    would not be able to cure the jurisdictional defect merely by
    refiling its petition.    As the supreme court held in Graf, once
    the circuit court is presented with a controversy under the
    statute, the court has jurisdiction to hear the matter and to
    decide rightly or wrongly the issues before it.   See Graf, 
    206 Ill. 2d at 554
    , 
    795 N.E.2d at 288
    .
    The dissent in S.G. expressed concern that the major-
    ity's literal interpretation of the Act would contribute to delay
    in resolving allegations of abuse and neglect and would not be in
    the best interests of the affected children.    S.G., 
    175 Ill. 2d at 493-94
    , 
    677 N.E.2d at 931
     (McMorrow, J., dissenting).   The
    dissent stated the desire for prompt adjudication "must yield
    when necessary or desirable to the best interests of the children
    in a particular case."    S.G., 
    175 Ill. 2d at 496
    , 
    677 N.E.2d at 932
     (McMorrow, J., dissenting).   While prompt adjudication was
    - 30 -
    clearly the purpose behind the 90-day time limitation of section
    2-14, Justice McMorrow stated that a quick resolution of
    adjudicatory hearings was not always consistent with the legisla-
    ture's overall intent of safeguarding children.     S.G., 
    175 Ill. 2d at 496
    , 
    677 N.E.2d at 932
     (McMorrow, J., dissenting).    The
    dissent expressed fear that parties may be willfully dilatory.
    S.G., 
    175 Ill. 2d at 499-500
    , 
    677 N.E.2d at 933
     (McMorrow, J.,
    dissenting).    The dissent suggested the legislature amend the
    Act.   S.G., 
    175 Ill. 2d at 502-03
    , 
    677 N.E.2d at 935
     (McMorrow,
    J., dissenting).
    Thereafter, the legislature amended section 2-14(b),
    changing the requirement that the hearing be "held" within 90
    days to "commenced" within 90 days.     Pub. Act 90-456, §10, eff.
    January 1, 1998 (
    1997 Ill. Laws 5159
    , 5160).    Additional language
    was also added to the subsection, providing: "Once commenced,
    subsequent delay in the proceedings may be allowed by the court
    when necessary to ensure a fair hearing."    Pub. Act 90-456, §10,
    eff. January 1, 1998 (
    1997 Ill. Laws 5159
    , 5160).    This change
    also evidences a legislative intent that the Act's time periods
    not be read as mandatory, as the amendment specifically recog-
    nized the need for flexible time periods when necessary to ensure
    fairness.
    As discussed by this court in In re D.E., 
    314 Ill. App. 3d 764
    , 
    731 N.E.2d 1282
     (2000), the legislative changes brought
    - 31 -
    by Public Act 90-456 reflected the legislature's understanding of
    the difficulty courts face in expeditiously resolving juvenile
    cases while ensuring fairness and full development of the facts.
    This court stated:
    "It is clear the legislature intended[] not
    slavish adherence to an arbitrarily fixed
    period of time, but concern for the overall
    purpose of the [Act].   It should not be for-
    gotten that the statute's statement of pur-
    pose and policy itself, section 2-14(a),
    speaks not just in terms of speedy adjudica-
    tion but 'just and speedy' adjudication.    The
    legislature is also apparently willing to
    entrust the courts to proceed with, in the
    words of the S.G. majority, 'a technical
    start of the hearing followed by an indeter-
    minate period of delay' [citation], so long
    as such delay is necessary to ensure a fair
    hearing."   D.E., 
    314 Ill. App. 3d at 770
    , 
    731 N.E.2d at 1286
    .
    In D.E., this court held that the time periods of section 2-14
    were tolled when a substitution of judge was requested by a
    party.   D.E., 
    314 Ill. App. 3d at 770
    , 
    731 N.E.2d at 1286-87
    .
    Tolling gave "deference both to concerns for the just and speedy
    - 32 -
    administration of justice and the fundamental fairness of the
    proceedings."    D.E., 
    314 Ill. App. 3d at 770-71
    , 
    731 N.E.2d at 1287
    .    If the time periods were not tolled, trial courts would be
    required to dismiss petitions:
    "Respondent parents would be empowered to
    unilaterally compel the dismissal of neglect
    petitions by lying in the weeds until, as in
    this case, waiting until the last possible
    moment to raise the issue."   D.E., 
    314 Ill. App. 3d at 771
    , 
    731 N.E.2d at 1287
    .
    In light of the Belleville Toyota cases, when the
    legislature sets time limitations in the Act and a circuit court
    fails to comply with those limitations, the judgment is not void,
    but the judgment is potentially voidable.    As this court noted in
    C.S., the trial court does not lose its constitutionally con-
    ferred subject-matter jurisdiction but, instead, may proceed in
    error.    However, neither can the cases be read so broadly to the
    contrary to suggest that courts may ignore the restrictions
    imposed by the legislature, as clearly the intent is to expedite
    juvenile cases so as to ensure that children are not in legal
    limbo for indefinite periods of time.     Courts may not ignore or
    reject the intent of the Act.    As this court recognized in D.E.,
    tolling the Act's time limitations gives deference to the con-
    cerns for the just and speedy administration of justice as well
    - 33 -
    as the fundamental fairness of the proceedings.
    Regardless, in the case sub judice, respondent cannot
    now complain of delays she herself supported and to which she
    agreed.    John was taken into custody on February 13, 2007, and a
    shelter-care order was issued February 14, 2007.        At a pretrial
    hearing on March 15, 2007, respondent waived the requirement that
    the adjudicatory hearing be held within 90 days of John being
    taken into custody.      As the respondent agreed to waive the
    requirement, the six-month time period of section 2-22(4) was
    tolled as of March 15.      At the adjudicatory hearing on August 2,
    2007, respondent agreed to waive the 30-day time period of
    section 2-21(2) in which to hold the dispositional hearing,
    continuing the tolling of the Act.         By agreement of the parties,
    the dispositional hearing was set for September 12, 2007.        As
    there is no explanation as to why the hearing date was changed
    from September 12 to November 13, 2007, or whether respondent
    opposed such continuance, the court will presume respondent was
    in agreement with the continuance.         The time period to hold the
    dispositional hearing began running on November 13, 2007.        As
    respondent agreed to toll the proceedings from March 15, 2007,
    through November 13, 2007, the trial court held the dispositional
    hearing in compliance with the time limits of section 2-22(4).
    The order was therefore neither void nor voidable.
    B.   The Trial Court's Dispositional Findings Were
    Not Against Manifest Weight of the Evidence
    - 34 -
    1. Unfitness Finding Against Respondent Mother
    Was Not Against Manifest Weight
    The State must prove parental unfitness by clear and
    convincing evidence, and the trial court's findings must be given
    great deference because of its superior opportunity to observe
    the witnesses and evaluate their credibility.     In re D.F., 
    201 Ill. 2d 476
    , 498, 
    777 N.E.2d 930
    , 942-43 (2002).    A trial court's
    finding of parental unfitness will not be reversed unless it is
    contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, meaning that the
    correctness of the opposite conclusion is clearly evident from a
    review of the record.     D.F., 
    201 Ill. 2d at 498
    , 
    777 N.E.2d at 942
    ; In re C.N., 
    196 Ill. 2d 181
    , 208, 
    752 N.E.2d 1030
    , 1045
    (2001).    A reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for
    that of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses,
    the weight to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be
    drawn.    D.F., 
    201 Ill. 2d at 499
    , 
    777 N.E.2d at 943
    .
    Respondent argues that the trial court's findings of
    fact at the dispositional hearing were against the manifest
    weight of the evidence.    In its order, the court found respondent
    unfit.    The order stated that respondent made little progress in
    counseling and had shown "an inability to refrain from abusive
    relationships; mom has still not offered any reasonable explana-
    tion as to how the minor received extensive head injuries while
    in her custody."
    The trial court could reasonably conclude respondent
    - 35 -
    failed to incorporate the teachings of her service plan into her
    life.   Dr. Eckert cautioned that significant improvement was
    necessary before respondent would be able to parent in a reli-
    able, predictive, and competent manner.    The court concluded that
    respondent's unhealthy relationships with men were not momentary
    lapses of parental judgment but were symptomatic of a more
    profound problem that impaired respondent's performance of her
    parental duties.   Under the applicable standard of review, the
    trial court's unfitness finding was not against the manifest
    weight of the evidence.
    2. Fitness Finding of Respondent Father
    Was Not Against Manifest Weight
    Respondent also alleges the trial court erred in
    finding Carter fit.    Again, the trial court’s determination will
    be reversed only if the findings are against the manifest weight
    of the evidence.   D.F., 
    201 Ill. 2d at 498
    , 
    777 N.E.2d at 942
    ;
    C.N., 
    196 Ill. 2d at 208
    , 
    752 N.E.2d at 1045
    .
    The dispositional report showed Carter successfully
    completed all of his service-plan goals.   The report also indi-
    cated that John had adjusted to living with his father and was
    doing well in his care.   In the course of her assessment and
    treatment, respondent identified Carter as having physically and
    mentally abused her.   Respondent takes issue with the fact that
    DCFS failed to follow up and require Carter to undergo any
    assessment or treatment for anger management or domestic vio-
    - 36 -
    lence.   Respondent also questioned whether Carter followed
    through on recommendations for counseling and to attend alcohol
    and drug recovery programs after the completion of his outpatient
    treatment program.
    While it may have been appropriate for DCFS to follow
    up on respondent's concerns about Carter, the trial court consid-
    ered the dispositional and psychological reports in making its
    fitness finding.    This court cannot substitute its judgment for
    that of the trial court unless the correctness of the opposite
    conclusion is clearly evident.     D.F., 
    201 Ill. 2d at 498
    , 
    777 N.E.2d at 942
    ; C.N., 
    196 Ill. 2d at 208
    , 
    752 N.E.2d at 1045
    .       The
    fact that he was fit was supported by substantial evidence.    The
    court's determination that Carter was fit was not against the
    manifest weight of the evidence.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's
    judgment.
    Affirmed.
    COOK and TURNER, JJ., concur.
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