Seymore v. Welker ( 2022 )

2022 IL App (2d) 210599-UNo. 2-21-0599
Order filed August 15, 2022
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
WAYNE T. SEYMOUR, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Ogle County.
Plaintiff-Appellant )
)
v. ) No. 20-CH-8
)
RICHARD H. WELKER and JEAN ELLEN )
WELKER, ) Honorable
) John C. Redington,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Bridges and Justice McLaren concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: At the bench trial on plaintiff’s complaint to declare an easement by necessity
across defendants’ property, plaintiff failed to prove that his property was
landlocked when it was severed from defendants’ property. Rather, at the time of
severance, plaintiff’s father and predecessor in title accessed the property through
an adjacent tract, title to which he had transferred to a trust in his name.
¶2 Plaintiff, Wayne T. Seymour, filed a complaint in the circuit court of Ogle County seeking
declaration of an easement on a driveway on property owned by defendants, Richard H. Welker
and Jean Ellen Welker. Plaintiff claimed the easement was necessary to afford him access to his
2022 IL App (2d) 210599-Uown property, which was otherwise landlocked. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered
judgment for defendants, and plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal. We affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In 1996, defendants purchased a 23.791-acre parcel of land in Ogle County. Defendants’
parcel was located west of Conger Road (which runs north and south). The parcel did not border
Conger Road but was accessible from Conger Road via a 718-foot driveway extending east from
the southern boundary of the parcel.
¶5 When defendants purchased their parcel, it was bordered on the south by two parcels. The
eastern parcel is owned by David L. Snyder and Carol C. Snyder. The western parcel was owned
at one point by plaintiff’s father, Jack W. Seymour (Jack), who is now deceased. During his life,
Jack formed a trust known as the “Jack W. Seymour Trust” (Trust) and transferred the western
parcel to the Trust (Trust parcel). Both the Snyders’ parcel and the Trust parcel had access to
Conger Road via a shared driveway running along the entire combined length of the parcels’
northern borders. The Snyders and the Trust each held an undivided one-half interest in the
property comprising the driveway.
¶6 In 2001, defendants subdivided their parcel into an eastern parcel, which was directly north
of the Snyders’ parcel, and a western parcel (the “back parcel”), which was directly north of Trust
parcel. Contemporaneously with the division, defendants sold the back parcel to Jack, who
accessed it from Conger Road via the shared driveway running across the Snyders’ parcel and the
Trust parcel. Defendants retained the eastern parcel. In 2006, Jack sold the back parcel to plaintiff,
who also accessed it via the shared driveway. After Jack’s death, the Trust parcel was sold to Brian
P. Zopel and Brenda Zopel. David L. Snyder informed plaintiff that he (plaintiff) would no longer
be permitted to use the Snyders’ and the Zopels’ shared driveway. Thus, plaintiff no longer had
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2022 IL App (2d) 210599-Uaccess to the back parcel. Plaintiff brought this suit to establish an implied easement by necessity
on the driveway from Conger Road to defendants’ parcel. Following a bench trial at which the
court heard the evidence described above, the court entered judgment for defendants. This appeal
followed.
¶7 II. ANALYSIS
¶8 Plaintiff argues on appeal that the evidence at the bench trial established his right to an
implied easement by necessity on defendants’ parcel so that he may access the otherwise
landlocked back parcel.
¶9 “The standard of review in a civil bench trial is whether the judgment is against the manifest
weight of the evidence.” Village of Lisle v. Spelson, 2019 IL App (2d) 180673, ¶ 11. “A judgment
is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is apparent or when
the court’s findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” Camelot,
Inc. v. Burke Burns & Pinelli, Ltd., 2021 IL App (2d) 200208, ¶ 50.
¶ 10 In evaluating the trial court’s decision, we are guided by the following general principles
of Katsoyannis v. Findlay, 2016 IL App (1st) 150036, ¶ 28:
“An easement is an individual’s right or privilege, for a limited purpose, to either
pass over or use the land of another. [Citation.] An implied easement is the product of the
parties’ intention and is ‘implied’ because courts must attempt to ascribe an intention to
parties who failed to express their intentions at the time of conveyance. [Citations.] To
establish an easement by necessity, the plaintiff must present evidence ‘that his property
and the defendants’ property were owned by a common grantor, that the properties were
severed, and that at the time of severance his parcel become landlocked.’ [Citation.] An
implied easement by necessity generally arises where, without the easement, the property
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2022 IL App (2d) 210599-Uhas no ready means of ingress or egress. [Citation.] In such circumstances, the owner of
the landlocked property is deemed to have a right-of-way for ingress and egress across
another’s land. [Citation.] Proof of necessity alone furnishes the probable inference of the
parties’ intention because the parties presumably did not intend to render the land
inaccessible. [Citation.]”
¶ 11 As the emphasized language in the above passage explains, to establish an implied
easement by necessity, a landowner must show that the landowner’s property became landlocked
when severed from the parcel on which the easement is claimed. Plaintiff faces a significant hurdle
in making that showing here. At the time the back parcel was severed from defendants’ property,
the new owner of the back parcel (Jack) had access to that parcel from the Trust parcel, which was
accessible from Conger Road via the shared driveway running across the Snyders’ parcel and the
Trust parcel. To clear that hurdle, plaintiff argues that “Jack *** and [the Trust] are not the same
person, as each is a legal entity.” Plaintiff argues that Jack merely had “a permissive license[ ]
from the Seymour Trust to access the property.” Plaintiff’s argument, as we understand it, is that,
when Jack acquired the back parcel, he had no enforceable right of access to the Trust parcel; he
was merely allowed onto that parcel as a matter of courtesy, and the permission from the Seymour
Trust could be withdrawn at any time, leaving him without access to the back parcel. The argument
is meritless.
¶ 12 A trust is a “fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom
the title to the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another
person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an intention to create it.” Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 2 (1959). As explained in Uskup v. Johnson, 2020 IL App (1st) 200330, ¶ 23:
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2022 IL App (2d) 210599-U“Once a trust is created and property is transferred into the trust, the trustee holds legal title
to the property while the beneficiary holds the equitable title. [Citation.] However, the
trustee’s holding of legal title to the property and his actions with respect to that property
are determined by the instrument that creates the trust, and the trustee must manage the
trust and its property in accordance with the terms of the trust. [Citation.]”
At trial, no evidence was presented regarding the terms of the Trust and Jack’s rights under the
Trust regarding the property held therein. Thus, plaintiff’s insistence that Jack had merely “a
permissive license,” not an enforceable right, to access the Trust parcel (and thus the adjacent back
parcel) is pure speculation. Unfortunately for plaintiff, the uncertainty on this point must be
resolved in defendants’ favor. “The party claiming an easement bears the burden of proof to
demonstrate facts necessary to create an implied easement and such proof must be by clear and
convincing evidence.” Katsoyannis, 2016 IL App (1st) 150036, ¶ 28. Plaintiff’s speculative
assertion that the Trust conferred no enforceable right to access the Trust parcel is insufficient to
meet his burden of proof. Consequently, we cannot say that the trial court’s judgment for
defendants was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 13 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 14 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Ogle County.
¶ 15 Affirmed.
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