In re L.L. ( 2022 )

2022 IL App (1st) 220403-UTHIRD DIVISION
September 14, 2022
No. 1-22-0403
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
In re L.L., K.L., E.L., and G.L., Minors, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
) Cook County.
(The People of the State of Illinois, )
) Nos. 17 JA 388
Petitioner-Appellee, ) 18 JA 723
) 19 JA 1079
v. ) 20 JA 1436
)
A.A., )
) Honorable
Respondent-Appellant). ) Patrick Murphy,
) Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Gordon and Burke concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s order terminating respondent mother A.A.’s parental rights as to
her minor children is affirmed where (1) the trial court’s finding of parental
unfitness was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and (2) the
termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the minors.
¶2 Respondent A.A. appeals the trial court’s order to terminate her parental rights to the
minors, L.L., K.L., E.L., and G.L., finding her unfit to parent for failure to protect the children.
No. 1-22-0403
Respondent argues that: (1) the trial court’s finding of parental unfitness is against the manifest
weight of the evidence, and (2) the trial court’s determination that it was in the best interest of
the minors to terminate their mother’s parental rights was against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶3 L.L. was born on March 31, 2017, K.L. was born on July 27, 2018, E.L. was born on
September 21, 2019, and G.L. was born on September 5, 2020. Respondent and B.L. 1 are the
parents of all minor children.
¶4 On April 28, 2017, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship for L.L., a male
child born on March 31, 2017. The petition alleged that he was neglected under the Juvenile
Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) due to an injurious environment (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b)
(West 2016)) and abused under the act because a person in the household creates a substantial
risk of physical injury to such minor by other than accidental means (id. § 2-3(2)(ii)). The
supporting facts for both allegations stated:
“Mother is currently a youth in care and is inconsistent with services. Mother is
being offered parenting, individual therapy, domestic violence and mental health
services. Mother has mental [health] diagnoses and requires psychiatric services.
Mother often elopes from her placement and takes this minor to putative father’s
home. There is a history of domestic violence between parents. Putative father has
failed to make himself available to be assessed for services.”
¶5 The trial court entered an adjudication order for L.L. on March 27, 2018, finding that
L.L. had been abused or neglected due to an injurious environment and a substantial risk of
physical injury. The order stated that respondent was a youth in care and that services were
1
B.L. is not a party to this appeal. His parental rights to all of the minors were terminated and affirmed on appeal.
See In re L.L., K.L., E.L., and G.L., Appeal No. 1-22-0416 (filed Aug. 31, 2022).
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No. 1-22-0403
offered to her, but she was noncompliant. Respondent admitted a history of domestic violence
with B.L. but minimized the domestic violence in their ongoing relationship. The court further
found both parents were not cooperative with offers to ensure the safety of the minor, and
respondent had judgment issues and was deemed to be a flight risk. On June 13, 2018, the court
entered a disposition order adjudging L.L. a ward of the court and found respondent and B.L.
were unable to care for L.L. The order indicated that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent
or eliminate the need to remove L.L. from the home but were unsuccessful.
¶6 The August 2018 family service plan stated that respondent was a youth in care with
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and had multiple placements within her
family and outside her family, but she ran away from each placement. Respondent had not
complied with recommended services and was placed under a safety plan with L.L., but she
violated the plan by taking her son to the home of B.L., who was alleged to be a gang member,
and there were reports of domestic violence between respondent and B.L.
¶7 On August 2, 2018, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship for K.L., a
female child born on July 27, 2018. The petition alleged that she was neglected under the
Juvenile Court Act due to an injurious environment (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2016)) and
abused under the act because a person in the household creates a substantial risk of physical
injury to such minor by other than accidental means (id. § 2-3(2)(ii)). The supporting facts for
both allegations stated:
“Mother has one prior indicated report for substantial risk of physical
injury/environment injurious to health and welfare by neglect. Parents have one
other minor who is in DCFS custody with findings of abuse and neglect having
been entered. Offered and recommended reunification services are on-going for
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No. 1-22-0403
mother. Putative father is non-compliant with services. Mother has been
diagnosed [with] major depressive disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder.
There is a history of domestic violence between parents.”
¶8 The trial court entered an adjudication order for K.L. on November 26, 2018, finding that
K.L. had been abused or neglected due to an injurious environment and a substantial risk of
physical injury. The order stated to see the transcript from the hearing for the court’s findings,
but the report of proceedings does not include this hearing. The parties entered an agreed
stipulation of facts. The stipulation stated that respondent “was inconsistent with the services put
in place to address the conditions that caused the removal of her son” L.L. There had been an
“ongoing issue of domestic violence” between respondent and B.L. On March 6, 2018, B.L.
“began punching mom about the face and body. At the time, mom was four months pregnant
with [K.L.] and sustained bruises to her face and arms.” A DCFS child protection investigator, if
called to testify, would state that she met with respondent and that L.L. resided with his maternal
aunt with respondent having supervised visits at her aunt’s home and was allowed to see L.L.
daily. Respondent was involved in individual therapy, domestic violence classes, and had a
parenting coach. Respondent admitted to marijuana use prior to becoming pregnant. She also
previously took Lithium for depression but had not taken the medication since 2015 because she
no longer needed it. K.L. was taken into protective custody because respondent had been
inconsistent with services, and she had run away from her teen living program.
¶9 On the same date, the court entered a disposition order adjudging K.L. a ward of the court
and found respondent and B.L. were unable to care for K.L. The order indicated that reasonable
efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need to remove K.L. from the home but were
unsuccessful. A February 2019 permanency order for L.L. and K.L. indicated the appropriate
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No. 1-22-0403
permanency goal was to return home within five months because services were ongoing. In July
2019, respondent and B.L. were granted unsupervised day and overnight visits at the home of the
paternal grandmother. The November 2019 permanency order allowed supervised visitation at
the home of the paternal grandmother and also listed the goal of return home in five months.
¶ 10 On September 28, 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship for E.L., a
male child born on September 21, 2019. The petition alleged that he was neglected under the
Juvenile Court Act due to an injurious environment (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)) and
abused under the act because a person in the household creates a substantial risk of physical
injury to such minor by other than accidental means (id. § 2-3(2)(ii)). The supporting facts for
both allegations stated:
“Mother has two prior indicated reports for substantial risk of physical
injury/environment injurious to health and welfare by neglect. Parents have three
other minors who are in DCFS custody with findings having been entered. On
September 21, 2019 mother presented at the emergency room by ambulance due
to a domestic altercation between her and father. Mother was observed to have a
busted, swollen lip and bruises. Mother went into labor with this minor while she
was at the hospital being treated for her injuries. Parents need to be reassessed for
services due to this recent incident of domestic violence. Parents reside together.”
¶ 11 On January 3, 2020, the trial court entered an adjudication order for E.L. and found he
was neglected due to an injurious environment and abused due to a substantial risk of physical
injury, the order points to the exhibits entered into evidence and the transcript of the hearing,
which are not part of the record on appeal. The same day, the trial court conducted the
dispositional hearing and found both parents unable to care for E.L. and the minor was adjudged
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No. 1-22-0403
a ward of the court. Also in January 2020, the court ordered that the parents were not to visit the
minors at the same time.
¶ 12 In February 2020, a goal of return home in 12 months was entered for E.L., finding that
both parents had not made substantial progress towards the return home of the minor and noting
that parents “must engage in further services.” In October 2020, a permanency goal of return
home within five months was set for L.L. and K.L. and noted that “parents need to make
progress in services.”
¶ 13 On October 15, 2020, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship for G.L., a
male child born on September 5, 2020. The petition alleged that he was neglected under the
Juvenile Court Act due to an injurious environment (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)) and
abused under the act because a person in the household creates a substantial risk of physical
injury to such minor by other than accidental means (id. § 2-3(2)(ii)). The supporting facts for
both allegations stated:
“Mother and putative have three other minors under the guardianship of the
[DCFS] with findings of abuse and neglect having been entered. During a visit
with those children on or about December 11, 2019, mother and father were
involved in a domestic violence incident in which mother was struck about the
body with implements. Mother is a ward of the court and is currently residing
with putative father outside her authorized placement. Mother and putative father
have not made progress in services recommended to aid in reunification with
minor’s siblings.”
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No. 1-22-0403
¶ 14 In February 2021, the permanency orders entered for L.L., K.L., and E.L. changed the
permanency goal to substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights.
The reason for this change was “parents have not made sufficient progress towards return home.”
¶ 15 On March 26, 2021, the trial court entered an adjudication order for G.L. finding him to
neglected due to an injurious environment and abused based on a substantial risk of injury. The
reason stated in the order was “siblings in DCFS care for up to 4 years, mother/father Dec. 2019
domestic violence, unrebutted young parents, ongoing need for services, not attending court.”
The dispositional hearing was also conducted that day and the court found both parents unable to
care for G.L. and the minor was adjudged a ward of the court. A permanency order for G.L. was
also entered with a permanency goal of return home pending a status hearing with parents not
making substantial progress. In November 2021, the permanency goal for G.L. was changed to
substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights.
¶ 16 On January 24, 2022, the State filed petitions for each of the minors to permanently
terminate parental rights and to appoint a guardian with the right to consent to adoption. The
petitions alleged that the parents had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern,
or responsibility as to the children’s welfare in violation of section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act
(750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)) and section 2-29 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-
29 (West 2020)) and that they had failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions
which were the basis for the removal of the children under section 1(D)(m) (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m) (West 2020)) and section 2-29 (705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 2020)). The petitions
further alleged that it was in the best interests of the minors that a guardian be appointed with the
right to consent to adoption where the children had been living with their foster parents for an
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No. 1-22-0403
extended period of time, the foster parents desired to adopt the minors, and the adoption was in
the best interests of the children.
¶ 17 On March 9, 2022, the trial court conducted the termination hearing with testimony
regarding parental unfitness presented first. The State detailed the previous findings of neglect
and the adjudication of wardship for each minor. The State also set forth the nine-month period
to consider for termination for each minor. For L.L., a basis for termination Grounds (b) and (m)
during the nine-month periods of March 27, 2018, through December 27, 2018, and December
29, 2019, through September 28, 2020, and May 8, 2020, through February 8, 2021. For K.L.,
grounds (b) and (m) were alleged with nine-month periods of time from November 26, 2018,
through August 26, 2019, and August 27, 2019, through May 27, 2020, and May 8, 2020,
through February 8, 2021. The nine-month periods for E.L. were from January 3, 2020, through
October 3, 2020, and May 8, 2020, through February 8, 2021, under the same grounds. The nine-
month periods of time for G.L. were March 26, 2021, through December 26, 2021, based on the
same grounds for termination.
¶ 18 Lacrecia Long, a case manager for Universal Family Connection, testified at the hearing
that she was assigned to the minors’ cases. As of September 2020, she was servicing all four
children. Respondent’s contact information was not reliable, and respondent called her from
different telephone numbers. Respondent has not been employed through the duration of the
case.
¶ 19 When she was first assigned, she provided reunification services for respondent which
required respondent to complete individual therapy, drug treatment, a mental health assessment,
domestic violence classes, and parenting classes. Long made referrals for all of these services for
respondent. Respondent was rated unsatisfactory for the individual therapy, domestic violence
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No. 1-22-0403
classes, and drug treatment. Long spoke with respondent about respondent’s interest in
complying with the services, but there was never any follow through. According to Long, there
was never a recommendation for unsupervised visits for respondent because respondent “was not
involved in the services, nor making herself available to the agency for us to staff some type of
visitation to be assessed for unsupervised.” Long “re-referred” respondent to multiple services,
but there was always “some kind of disconnect,” such as, respondent did not get the information
in the mail, she did not get the e-mail from the service provider, or no one contacted her.
Respondent did complete an individual therapy service in June 2019, as well as a psychiatric
consultation in September 2019 and no medication was prescribed. Respondent also completed a
nurturing parenting program in June 2020. Long never observed respondent to be under the
influence of drugs.
¶ 20 During supervised visits, respondent was often supervised by family members while
Long supervised a couple of visits. She found the visits “safe and appropriate.” Respondent
called Long on occasion and asked about the wellbeing of the children, but never sent gifts,
cards, letters, or similar items for the children. Long asked respondent for documents showing
respondent’s engagement in services for reunification, but although respondent said she had
these documents, Long never received them. Long needed the certificates from the referred
services to prove that respondent had finished the services.
¶ 21 Long also discussed the parents’ history of domestic violence and their intention for
reunification as a couple. They were referred for couple’s counseling around the end of 2019 to
early 2020, but they did not want to be engaged in couple’s counseling. Respondent told Long
that she wanted to focus on herself but continued in her relationship with B.L.
¶ 22 The goal changed to a recommendation for the termination of parental rights in 2021
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No. 1-22-0403
because the case had been ongoing since 2018 and there had been no substantial progress
towards reunification by either parent. Long testified that it was “time to find some permanency
for the children.” The agency did not consider refraining from pursuing termination for G.L., as
the youngest, because no progress had been made from his birth until the change in the goal.
¶ 23 The State asked the court to take judicial notice of L.L.’s adjudication order from March
2018, including statements that respondent was a youth in care, was noncompliant, minimized
the domestic violence, and was a flight risk after running away from her housing. The State also
requested that judicial notice be taken of G.L.’s adjudication from March 2021, which noted the
ongoing services for the siblings and domestic violence between the parents. Finally, the State
requested judicial notice be taken of a January 2020 order that the parents were not to visit the
minors at the same time. The State asked to admit three service plans from 2019, 2020, and 2021
into evidence.
¶ 24 In the first service plan, dated April 1, 2019, the permanency goal for L.L. and K.L. was
to return home within 12 months, with the planned achievement date of October 31, 2019. The
plan noted that respondent and B.L. were engaging consistently in services. Respondent was able
to continue to receive services and remain at the teen living program (TLP) with UCAN, but she
was inconsistent in complying with the TLP. The identified needs were compliance with
placement, and she needed to agree to maintain contact with foster parent prior to visits and
doctor appointments. Respondent had begun engaging with domestic violence services.
¶ 25 The second service plan was dated October 2, 2020, and now included E.L. as well as the
older children. In the summary since the last review, respondent was not consistent with TLP and
needed to be referred for domestic violence services, individual therapy, and the nurturing
parenting program. Respondent resided at the TLP, but had been missing from there and staying
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No. 1-22-0403
with B.L. since December 24, 2019. The court-set permanency goal continued to be return home
within 12 months, but the evaluation of progress towards that goal was unsatisfactory.
Respondent and B.L. were not engaging consistently in the recommended services. Respondent
was not compliant with outstanding services, but she had completed her psychiatric evaluation.
The psychiatric recommendation was to maintain therapy, but respondent was not compliant.
Respondent was also not compliant in receiving domestic violence services, but had agreed to
start domestic violence services.
¶ 26 The third service plan was dated October 4, 2021, and now included G.L. The summary
of the family’s progress stated that respondent was reported to be six months pregnant, and she
had been referred to domestic violence services, individual therapy, and the nurturing parenting
program. Neither respondent nor B.L. were working. The court set permanency goal was
substitute care pending court determination on termination of parental rights. The stated reason
for this goal was because “natural parents had a very long time to correct the conditions that
brought the case to DCFS attention [and] they have [been] reluctant to do so.” For G.L., the
permanency goal was return home within 12 months, but the evaluation of the goal progress was
unsatisfactory. Respondent and B.L. were not engaging consistently in recommended services at
that time. Respondent was not compliant with outstanding services. She had not been in
communication with foster parents and was rated unsatisfactory on this progress. Respondent
was inconsistent in complying with TLP and was not currently in placement. The psychiatric
recommendation was again to maintain therapy, but respondent was not then engaging in
services. Respondent was also not engaging in the domestic violence services.
¶ 27 The State, the Guardian, and respondent then rested.
¶ 28 B.L. testified that he completed domestic violence classes in April 2019. He stated that he
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No. 1-22-0403
was never given a referral for individual therapy. He asked for referrals for services, but the
caseworker was never available. He testified that he “completed everything that was
recommended. As long as they gave me the time and place, [he] was there to finish it.”
According to B.L., Long’s testimony was “false” because he “would have completed everything
she gave me” and he “would have completed any task for my kids,” but he was not “given the
opportunity because they never told me where to go and at what time.” B.L. never brought up the
issue regarding lack of referrals to the judge during the dozen court dates they have had since
2020 because he had “trust in Ms. Long” that she could give him “the services so [he] could
complete them.” He believed it was the agency’s fault that the case had been in the system so
long because Long “would never give us anything to do. She would just call us and *** ask
about visits and stuff like that.” Long would tell them that they needed to do these services, but
“she never gave us a time and place to do it.”
¶ 29 Respondent presented a certificate of completion for individual counseling services at
Metropolitan Family Services, dated June 3, 2019, and a certificate awarded to her for
successfully completing the Nurturing Parenting Program at Lutheran Child and Family Services
of Illinois, dated June 13, 2019, as exhibits, which the trial court admitted. B.L. presented a
certificate of completion for a 26-week domestic violence class at Universal Family Connection
as an exhibit, which the trial court admitted.
¶ 30 Following arguments by the parties, the trial court found that State had proven both
grounds for parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence. The court detailed its findings
as follows.
“When this case first came in 2017, I believe the record will show that I
bent over backwards for the parents. Primarily because the mother was a Ward of
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No. 1-22-0403
the Court and for the first child and even for the second. But, over the course of
this case, neither parents ever reached a situation where they could visit the
children unsupervised. And I continually pushed for that.
Services sporadic, in and out, in and out. Promises to separate and then
back together and domestic violence, another child. More domestic violence. And
to blame the agency. You know, in my experience, a caring parent would walk
over a mountain of cut glass barefoot to get his or her child back. And in this case,
I don’t see it. I see two parents who are very, very immature. And I think they are
both very satisfied in having relatives raise the kids where they can come in every
week or two or three or four and visit and wave to the kids and pick up the kids
and be a nice kindly uncle or aunt type person.”
¶ 31 The parties then proceeded to the best interest portion of the hearing. Long provided
testimony related to the best interests of the children.
¶ 32 L.L., K.L., and E.L. are all placed in a relative placement with a maternal great aunt A.T.
The court asked if it was correct that A.T. was a police officer and lived near her mother who
assisted with the children, and Long confirmed that was correct. The children have been placed
with A.T. for around four years as the children entered the system. Long observed them in
January 2022 and found the placement to be safe and appropriate. There were no signs of abuse
or neglect or risk of harm. L.L., K.L., and E.L. are bonded with A.T. and none of the children
have any special needs or developmental concerns. Long stated that it would be in their best
interest to remain together as a sibling unit. A.T.’s mother lives with them as well and everyone
gets along “great.”
¶ 33 Long testified that G.L. was placed with a paternal relative since he was born. She
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No. 1-22-0403
observed G.L. in his placement in January 2022 and it was safe and appropriate with no signs of
abuse or neglect or risk of harm. There are no developmental concerns for G.L. The foster home
also has children under the age of 13 as well as the foster mother’s older daughter. The siblings
see each other “frequently,” and the children want to see each other more.
¶ 34 Both foster parents have signed a permanency commitment and have not changed their
minds. The agency is recommending that the parental rights of all minors be permanently
terminated with the court to appoint a guardian of all four children with the right to consent to
their adoption. The foster parents are the prospective adoptive homes. Long was never directly
told by A.T. that she might move to Texas.
¶ 35 X.G. testified with the assistance of a Spanish interpreter. She is G.L.’s aunt and she
would like to adopt G.L. because she has had him since he was five days old.
¶ 36 The State rested after X.G.’s testimony.
¶ 37 Respondent testified that A.T. told her earlier in 2022 that she was going to move to
Texas. Respondent has a bond with her children and she would like to play a role in her
children’s life. Respondent believed that the services she engaged in helped her to become a
better parent by teaching her things she did not know. She did not agree that her parental rights
should be terminated and it is “unfair” because she did not get to voice her opinion. She asserted
that while “it might not be enough progress for you. But it’s an amount of progress for [her].”
She has “changed so much” and “learned so much.” Her goal is to be there for her kids and to
protect them, provide for them, and nurture them. She testified that her children were
“traumatized” and cry when their visits end.
¶ 38 B.L. also testified that he did not believe it was in the children’s best interest to terminate
his parental rights because the children have “already had enough” and the children “just want to
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No. 1-22-0403
be with us” and they “cry when it’s time for them to go back.”
¶ 39 At the end of the hearing, the trial court found that it was “clearly in the best interest to
terminate rights” and appointed a guardian with the right place the children. Termination hearing
orders were entered for each child on March 9, 2022, finding that respondent was unfit by clear
and convincing evidence and it was in the best interests of the children to terminate respondent’s
parental rights.
¶ 40 This appeal followed. A.A. filed timely a notice of appeal on March 18, 2022, listing the
order terminating her parental rights for L.L., K.L., E.L., and G.L. Accordingly, this court has
jurisdiction for respondent’s appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 301 (eff. Feb. 1, 1994).
¶ 41 Respondent first argues that the trial court erred when it found her unfit to parent because
she had made both reasonable efforts and reasonable progress toward the reunification with her
children. Specifically, respondent contends that she has made reasonable efforts because the
main allegation for wardship was domestic violence, but there was insufficient evidence of
domestic violence presented at the hearing. She further asserts that she has made reasonable
progress based on her completion of two courses, visiting the children, the lack of allegations
related to her use of drugs or alcohol, and the psychological assessment indicated that she did not
require ongoing mental health treatment. Respondent also argues that there was insufficient
evidence to suggest she had lost interest, concern, or responsibility toward her children. The
State maintains that the evidence at the parental unfitness hearing demonstrated respondent’s
failure to progress in services and her inability to proceed to unsupervised visits with her
children after more than four years in the system.
¶ 42 “ ‘In Illinois, the authority to involuntarily terminate parental rights is purely statutory
and the scope of the court’s authority is defined by the Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption
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No. 1-22-0403
Act.’ ” In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 19 (quoting In re E.B., 231 Ill. 2d 459, 463 (2008)).
“Illinois policy ‘favors parents’ superior right to the custody of their own children.’ ” Id.(quoting In re E.B., 231 Ill. 2d at 464).
¶ 43 The termination of parental rights is a two-step process. First, the State must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the parent is “unfit” as defined by section 1(D) of the
Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2016); 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2016). “Parental
unfitness must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Adoption of K.B.D., 2012 IL
App (1st) 121558, ¶ 196. “ ‘A parent’s rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground
for unfitness is supported by clear and convincing evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Gwynne P., 215
Ill. 2d 340, 349 (2005)). Second, “[a]ssuming the parent is found unfit, the circuit court must
then consider whether it is in the best interests of the children to terminate parental rights.” In re
J.B., 2014 IL App (1st) 140773, ¶ 49. “ ‘When ruling on parental unfitness, a court is not to
consider the child’s “best interests.” ’ ” In re M.I., 2016 IL 120232, ¶ 20 (quoting In re Adoption
of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 276 (1990)). Each case concerning parental unfitness is considered sui
generis and is decided on its own facts and circumstances presented. In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d
340, 354 (2005). “A court may not terminate a parent’s rights on grounds not charged in the
petition. At the same time, however, the State is not required to prove every ground it has
alleged for finding a parent unfit.” Id. at 349.
¶ 44 “On appellate review, this court ‘will not disturb a finding of unfitness unless it is
contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and the record clearly demonstrates that the
opposite result was proper.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Konstantinos H., 387 Ill. App. 3d 192, 203
(2008)). “We give great deference to the trial court’s finding of unfitness, defer to the trial
court’s factual findings and credibility assessments, and will not re-weigh the evidence anew on
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No. 1-22-0403
appeal.” Id. This court will only find the trial court’s ruling to be against the manifest weight of
the evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident from a review of the evidence
presented. In re Nicholas C., 2017 IL App (1st) 162101, ¶ 25.
¶ 45 The termination petitions for each of the minors alleged that respondent was unfit under
sections 1(D)(b) and 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act. At the conclusion of the unfitness hearing,
the trial court found respondent unfit under both grounds. “It is well established that a failure to
comply with an imposed service plan and infrequent or irregular visitation with the child may
support a finding of unfitness under both sections (b) and (m).” In re Jeanette L., 2017 IL App
(1st) 161944, ¶ 18.
¶ 46 Under section 1(D)(m), the petitions alleged that respondent failed
“to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for the
removal of the child from them and/or have failed to make reasonable progress
toward the return of the child to them within 9 months after the adjudication of
neglect or abuse under the Juvenile Court Act, or after an adjudication of
dependency under the Juvenile Court Act, and/or within any 9 month period after
said finding.” See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2020).
¶ 47 The grounds for unfitness set forth in section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act are phrased in
the disjunctive. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 210 (2001). “Thus, section 1(D)(m) provides two
independent bases for a finding of unfitness: (1) the failure by a parent to make
reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the child, or (2)
the failure to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child.” Id. at 210-11.
¶ 48 Reasonable efforts relate to the goal of correcting the conditions that caused the removal
of the child from the parent. In re L.J.S., 2018 IL App (3d) 180218, ¶ 24. “The reasonable efforts
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inquiry is a subjective one, focusing on the efforts of the parent that would be reasonable for that
parent under the circumstances.” In re J.O., 2021 IL App (3d) 210248, ¶ 51. “The inquiry is
narrow, as it considers only the correction of those conditions originally providing the basis for
removal of the children.” Id.¶ 49 “Whether a parent has made reasonable progress ‘is judged by an objective standard
based upon the amount of progress measured from the conditions existing at the time custody
was taken from the parent.’ ” In re Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 62 (quoting In re
Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1067 (2006)). Progress is considered in light of both the
circumstances that gave rise to the original loss of custody as well as any other conditions that
later become known. In re J.O., 2021 IL App (3d) 210248, ¶ 57. At minimum, reasonable
progress necessitates measurable or demonstrable movement toward the goal of reunification. In
re Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 62. Reasonable progress exists when the trial court can
conclude that it will be able to order the child returned to parental custody in the near future. Id.¶ 50 Termination under section 1(D)(m) contains a timeframe limitation (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m) (West 2020)), and thus in this section, we narrow our examination of respondent’s
progress towards reunification, including aspects such as her service plan and regularity of
visitation, within the nine-month periods set forth by the State. As stated above, the State set
forth the following nine-month periods for each of the minors. For L.L., a basis for termination
under ground (m) was during the nine-month periods of March 27, 2018, through December 27,
2018, and December 29, 2019, through September 28, 2020, and May 8, 2020, through February
8, 2021. For K.L., ground (m) was alleged with nine-month periods of time from November 26,
2018, through August 26, 2019, and August 27, 2019, through May 27, 2020, and May 8, 2020,
through February 8, 2021. The nine-month periods for E.L. were from January 3, 2020, through
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No. 1-22-0403
October 3, 2020, and May 8, 2020, through February 8, 2021, under the same grounds. The nine-
month periods of time for G.L. were March 26, 2021, through December 26, 2021, based on the
same grounds for termination.
¶ 51 Respondent contends that she has made reasonable efforts and reasonable progress
because there was minimal evidence of domestic violence after G.L. was placed into wardship,
she visits the children, and she completed the nurturing parenting program and the individual
counseling. However, the evidence presented at the unfitness hearing detailed an ongoing issue
of domestic violence and a failure to engage in the services and make progress as set forth in the
service plans.
¶ 52 The reasonable efforts and reasonable progress grounds are based on respondent’s actions
to correct the conditions that led to the removal of the minors from her care. Contrary to her
argument, the record does not show that she made a reasonable effort to reunify with her
children. She continued her relationship with B.L. and failed to engage in the domestic violence
services as set forth in all three service plans. Respondent’s argument regarding reasonable
progress fails to demonstrate any measurable progress beyond the completion of two services,
while the service plans from 2020 and 2021 show her inconsistent and noncompliant progress,
including running away from her placement, and a lack of communication.
¶ 53 As the service plans observed, respondent had a very long time to progress in services
beginning when L.L. was a baby. DCFS became involved when L.L. was first removed from
respondent’s care in 2017 and continued annually as respondent gave birth to each of the
additional minors. L.L.’s petition for adjudication of wardship alleged that respondent was a
“youth in care” and often ran from her placement to go to B.L.’s home. She was “inconsistent”
with services and there was a history of domestic violence. The allegations of domestic violence
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and the need for ongoing DCFS services continued in the subsequent petitions for K.L., E.L., and
G.L. In the stipulated facts for K.L.’s adjudication hearing, respondent admitted to the ongoing
issue of domestic violence, including an incident from March 2018, in which B.L. “began
punching” respondent about the face and body while she was four months pregnant with K.L.
She sustained bruises to her face and arms. E.L.’s petition stated that on September 21, 2019,
respondent presented at the emergency room after a “domestic altercation” between her and B.L.
Respondent was observed to have a “busted, swollen lip and bruises,” and she then went into
labor with E.L. while at the hospital being treated for these injuries. The petition stated that
respondent and B.L. needed to be reassessed for services following this incident of domestic
violence. G.L.’s petition alleged further domestic violence in December 2019 in which
respondent was struck about the body with implements and that respondent had not made
progress in recommended services.
¶ 54 At the hearing, the caseworker Long testified that she referred respondent to the required
services, including individual therapy, drug treatment, a mental health assessment, domestic
violence classes, and parenting classes, but respondent was rated unsatisfactory for the individual
therapy, domestic violence classes, and drug treatment. Long discussed with respondent about
respondent’s interest in complying with the services, but respondent failed to follow through.
According to Long, there was never a recommendation for unsupervised visits for respondent
because respondent “was not involved in the services, nor making herself available to the agency
for us to staff some type of visitation to be assessed for unsupervised.” Long noted that
respondent did complete an individual therapy service in June 2019, a psychiatric consultation in
September 2019, and a nurturing parenting program in June 2020. Long referred respondent and
B.L. to couple’s counseling to help with reunification as a couple, but they failed to participate.
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As discussed, the three service plans admitted into evidence showed that respondent failed to
make any consistent progress towards reunification. The service plans from 2020 and 2021 found
that she was not compliant, not engaged in services, and had run away from her placement at
TLP.
¶ 55 Further, while a July 2019 order granted respondent and B.L. unsupervised day and
overnight visits at the home of the paternal grandmother, the November 2019 permanency order
returned to supervised visitation at the home of the paternal grandmother. In January 2020, the
court entered an order requiring respondent and B.L. were not to visit the minors at the same
time. In the five years this case was in the system, unsupervised visitation was never again
recommended for respondent. This does not reflect progress towards reunification during any of
the nine-month timeframes set forth for each of the minors. Based on the evidence presented, we
cannot say the trial court’s finding of unfitness on these grounds was against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
¶ 56 However, even if this finding was in error, which we do not find, the trial court also
found respondent unfit under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West
2020). Under section 1(D)(b), the petitions alleged that respondent failed to maintain a
reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child’s welfare. Id.¶ 57 Because the language of section 1(D)(b) is in the disjunctive, any of the three elements
may be considered on its own as a sufficient basis for unfitness. In re Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st)
190467, ¶ 49. A finding of unfitness under ground (b) is based on a subjective analysis. In re
Nicholas C., 2017 IL App (1st) 162101, ¶ 24. “This ground does not focus on the parent’s
success but, rather, the reasonableness of her efforts and takes into account the parent’s
difficulties and circumstances.” Id. “However, simply because a parent demonstrates some
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No. 1-22-0403
interest or affection toward her child does not render her fit under this ground; rather, her
interest, concern, and/or responsibility must be reasonable.” Id. “ ‘[N]oncompliance with an
imposed service plan, a continued addiction to drugs, a repeated failure to obtain treatment for an
addiction, and infrequent or irregular visitation with the child have all been held to be sufficient
evidence warranting a finding of unfitness under [ground] (b).’ ” Id. (quoting Jaron Z., 348 Ill.
App. 3d 239, 259 (2004)).
¶ 58 Respondent contends that “there is very little, if anything, in the record to suggest” that
she had lost interest, concern, or responsibility for her children. She argues that the record
showed that she made ongoing and continuous efforts to visit her children and she completed
two of the recommended services. She admits that Long testified that respondent’s visits were
sporadic at times, but asserts that Long failed to provide those time periods. The State responds
that although respondent showed an interest in her children, “her inability to change the domestic
violence afflicting her life, comply with required services, and regularly visit the children
showed a lack of parental responsibility.”
¶ 59 In his ruling, the trial judge observed that he
“bent over backwards for the parents. Primarily because the mother was a Ward
of the Court and for the first child and even for the second. But, over the course of
this case, neither parents ever reached a situation where they could visit the
children unsupervised. And I continually pushed for that.”
The judge found that respondent’s participation in services was sporadic, she would return to
B.L. and an incident of domestic violence would occur, and then another child was born. The
judge found respondent and B.L. to be “very, very immature.”
¶ 60 As thoroughly discussed above, respondent failed to comply with the services plans, she
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No. 1-22-0403
continued in a relationship with B.L. despite repeated instances of domestic violence, including
one that led to E.L.’s birth, and never engaged in services sufficient for unsupervised visitation
or reunification. Rather than improving as her case continued in the system, respondent regressed
with less compliance, communication, and visitation. She repeatedly ran away from her TLP
placement to live with B.L. Respondent’s argument that she visited her children is insufficient to
demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility. Based upon our thorough
review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision finding respondent unfit
for her failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for the
minors’ welfare was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 61 Next, we consider respondent’s argument that the trial court’s determination that it was in
the best interest of the children to terminate her parental rights was against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
¶ 62 “Once a parent has been found unfit pursuant to one or more grounds set out in the
Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2016)), the State must establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that it is in the minor’s best interest to terminate parental rights.” In re Tyianna J.,
2017 IL App (1st) 162306, ¶ 97. Following an unfitness finding, the trial court focuses on the
needs of the child in determining whether the parental rights should be terminated. In re J.V.,
2018 IL App (1st) 171766, ¶ 249. “In determining the best interests of a child, the parent’s
interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable,
loving home life.” Id. “ ‘A child’s best interest is superior to all other factors, including the
interests of the biological parents.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Curtis W., 2015 IL App (1st) 143860,
¶ 52).
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¶ 63 In determining the best interest of a child under the Juvenile Court Act, the following
factors shall be considered in the context of the child’s age and developmental needs: (1) the
physical safety and welfare of the child, including food, shelter, health, and clothing; (2) the
development of the child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties, including familial,
cultural, and religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including (i) where the child actually
feels love, attachment, and a sense of being valued (as opposed to where adults believe the child
should feel such love, attachment, and a sense of being valued), (ii) the child’s sense of security,
(iii) the child’s sense of familiarity, (iv) continuity of affection for the child, and (v) the least
disruptive placement alternative for the child; (5) the child’s wishes and longterm goals; (6) the
child’s community ties, including church, school, and friends; (7) the child’s need for
permanence, which includes the child’s need for stability and continuity of relationships with
parent figures and with siblings and other relatives; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child;
(9) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the
persons available to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2020).
¶ 64 “Additionally, the court may consider the nature and length of the child’s relationship
with her present caretaker and the effect that a change in placement would have upon her
emotional and psychological well-being.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19.
The court’s best interest determination need not contain an explicit reference to each of these
factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court below in
affirming its decision. Id. We will reverse the trial court’s finding that termination of parental
rights is in a minor’s best interest only if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re
Tyianna J., 2017 IL App (1st) 162306, ¶ 97.
¶ 65 Respondent offers only a brief argument regarding why it was not in the children’s best
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No. 1-22-0403
interests to terminate her parental rights. She asserts that although Long testified that the
placements of the children were safe and appropriate, there “was testimony that if an adoption
was allowed to go forward, the children would presumably be split up once [A.T.] moved to
Texas,” citing her own testimony. She also pointed to her own testimony that “the children were
calling her mommy” and that she “believed terminating their relationship with her would be
traumatizing to them.”
¶ 66 However, the evidence at the best interest clearly established that the minors were safe
and bonded to their foster parents, who wished to adopt the children. Long testified that L.L.,
K.L., and E.L. are placed together with a maternal great aunt A.T., who is a police officer.
A.T.’s mother also lives with them and cares for the children. The children have been placed
with A.T. for around four years as the children each entered the system. When Long observed
them in January 2022, she found the placement to be safe and appropriate with no signs of abuse
or neglect or risk of harm. L.L., K.L., and E.L. are bonded with A.T. and none of the children
have any special needs or developmental concerns. Long stated that it would be in their best
interest to remain together as a sibling unit. Long was never directly told by A.T. that she might
move to Texas.
¶ 67 G.L. was placed with a paternal aunt X.G. since he was five days old. In January 2022,
Long observed G.L. in his placement and found it was safe and appropriate with no signs of
abuse or neglect or risk of harm. There are no developmental concerns for G.L. The foster home
also has children under the age of 13 as well as the foster mother’s older daughter. The siblings
see each other “frequently,” and the children want to see each other more. X.G. testified that she
wants to adopt G.L. Both foster parents signed a permanency commitment and have not changed
their minds.
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¶ 68 In contrast to the evidence presented, respondent’s argument before us focuses only on
her testimony that she believed A.T. was going to move with L.L., K.L., and E.L. to Texas and
that the children would be traumatized. The trial court heard all of the evidence and rejected
respondent’s testimony. The court found it was “clearly in the best interest” of the children to
terminate the parents’ parental rights. Respondent has not presented any argument to counter this
finding and the evidence supporting it. As discussed, the minors have been with their respective
foster parents since shortly after birth and are safe and bonded to their foster parents, who wish
to adopt them. The case had been ongoing for more than four years and the children have not
been in respondent’s care since that time with only supervised visitation. After reviewing the
evidence presented along with the factors under the Juvenile Court Act, we conclude that the trial
court’s finding that it was in the best interest of the children to terminate respondent’s parental
rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 69 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook
County.
¶ 70 Affirmed.
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