People v. Edwards ( 2022 )

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2022 IL App (3d) 210103-UOrder filed May 11, 2022
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IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2022
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
) Tazewell County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-21-0103
v. ) Circuit No. 19-CF-384
)
CHASE S. EDWARDS, ) Honorable
) Katherine S. Gorman,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
____________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Daugherity and Lytton concurred in the judgment.
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ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court erred in sentencing defendant to 48 months of probation. The
conditions of defendant’s probation are reasonable and related to the offense or his
rehabilitation.
¶2 Defendant, Chase S. Edwards, appeals his sentence. Defendant argues that the Tazewell
County circuit court erred in sentencing him to 48 months of probation when the maximum term
provided for by statute is 30 months. He further argues that some conditions of his probation are
unreasonable and not related to the offense or his rehabilitation. We affirm as modified.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The State charged defendant with two counts of domestic battery (subsequent offense) (720
ILCS 5/12-3.2(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2018)), and one count each of unlawful interference with the
reporting of domestic violence (id. § 12-3.5(a)) and criminal damage to property (id. § 21-1(a)(1)).
A jury found defendant guilty of one count of domestic battery (subsequent offense), a Class 4
felony, and not guilty of the remaining counts.
¶5 At the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that defendant was probation eligible for up
to 48 months and that he could be jailed for up to 180 days.
¶6 In arguing for a term of imprisonment, the State noted that defendant’s conduct caused
bodily harm to the victim and defendant’s criminal history, including a 2008 conviction on
multiple counts of aggravated battery and a 2001 misdemeanor domestic battery. The State also
argued that the presentence investigation report (PSI) indicated that defendant failed to appear in
court multiple times in prior cases and that his probation or court supervision had been revoked or
terminated unsuccessfully at least five times. It further commented that according to the PSI,
defendant was not forthcoming in his interview, and he would not be a good candidate for
supervision.
¶7 The PSI indicated that defendant refused to sign a release of information form for purposes
related to the presentence investigation. Additionally, it noted a specific instance of defendant
being untruthful wherein defendant stated that he had not consumed alcohol for nearly six months,
but the chief probation officer had reported seeing defendant drinking alcohol only a few months
prior. Defendant admitted to drinking when confronted. The PSI further stated that the probation
officer did not feel defendant was forthcoming with information in response to “questions,
especially in response to his family and criminal histories, which would limit both probation and
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treatment providers in their ability to make proper assessments in order to better help the needs of
the client, if placed on probation.” Further, the probation officer believed that defendant’s refusal
to sign the release requested of him “puts into question his desire to comply.” The officer
specifically recommended that the court not consider defendant for probation but that if it did, he
recommended at a minimum that the court impose “High Risk probation with all conditions to
apply, along with these special conditions: Domestic Violence treatment and an Integrated
assessment for both mental health and substance abuse treatment be ordered.”
¶8 Defense counsel argued for probation. He asserted that defendant was acquitted of three of
the four charges in this case. Also, he argued that defendant acted under a strong provocation as
the victim testified that she slapped defendant first. Counsel asked, “the Court to place [defendant]
on probation under any form the Court believes is appropriate with any terms and conditions the
Court believes is appropriate.” Defendant gave a statement in allocation.
¶9 The court noted that it considered the evidence, the PSI, the arguments, defendant’s
statement, the factors in mitigation and aggravation, and the history and character of defendant.
The court found in aggravation that defendant took “no accountability at all for putting [his] hands
on someone.” The court stated that defendant acted like the victim and that there was always
someone else to blame. It noted that it could not remember anyone ever refusing to sign a release
presented by the probation department. The court sentenced defendant to “48 months high risk
probation with domestic violence and whatever probation suggests.” It also sentenced him to 180
days in jail.
¶ 10 All the conditions included on the certificate of conditions of high risk probation applied
to defendant. The special conditions included therein, set forth, among other things, that defendant:
(1) “shall work only at employment that has been pre-approved by Probation”; (2) “will not change
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[his] approved place of residence, move outside the jurisdiction of the Court (Tazewell County)
without prior approval from the Probation Department and/or the Court”; and (3) “shall make
overnight visits only at places pre-approved by Probation.” The conditions also provided that
defendant have no contact with the victim.
¶ 11 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence arguing “both the High Risk Probation and
term of incarceration are excessive” and the court did not properly consider the factors in
aggravation and mitigation. The court denied the motion. Defendant appeals.
¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 13 A. Length of Probation
¶ 14 Defendant argues that his 48-month probation term exceeded the maximum allowed by
statute for his conviction, which he asserts is 30 months. He acknowledges he forfeited this issue
but argues it is reversible under the second prong of the plain error doctrine. See People v. Fort,
2017 IL 118966, ¶ 19 (“ ‘The imposition of an unauthorized sentence affects substantial rights’
and, thus, may be considered by a reviewing court even if not properly preserved in the trial
court.”) (quoting People v. Hicks, 181 Ill. 2d 541, 545 (1998)). The State concedes error. Both
parties request that this court modify the sentence to reduce the term of probation to 30 months.
¶ 15 As charged, defendant’s domestic battery conviction is a Class 4 felony. See 720 ILCS
5/12-3.2(b) (West 2018). The statutory maximum probation term for a Class 4 felony is 30 months.
See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-45(d) (West 2018). Accordingly, we accept the State’s concession, and per
the parties’ request, we reduce defendant’s probation term to 30 months. See Ill. S. Ct. R.
615(b)(4).
¶ 16 B. Probation Conditions
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¶ 17 Defendant argues that three of his probation conditions are unreasonable and unrelated to
his offense or rehabilitation. The three conditions are that he obtain preapproval for where he
works, where he resides, and any place he stays overnight. Defendant acknowledges that he
forfeited this issue but requests review under the second prong of the plain error doctrine.
¶ 18 Defendant failed to raise an objection to his probation conditions in the circuit court and
thus, forfeited this issue. People v. Hammons, 2018 IL App (4th) 160385, ¶ 14 (“Raising no
objection in the trial court to court-created conditions of probation results in a forfeiture of the
issue on appeal, under supreme court precedent.”). Under the plain error doctrine, a clear or
obvious error may excuse the procedural default. Id. ¶ 17. However,
“under the plain error doctrine, the existence of an error is not enough to avert a
forfeiture, even if the error is genuinely an error. Not even reversible error is
enough. *** The plain error doctrine is not a backdrop to catch merely arguable
issues that could have been raised in the trial court. The error had to be manifest or
patent.” Id.Under the second prong of the plain error doctrine, if a clear or obvious error occurred, the court
must then determine if the “ ‘error is so serious that its consideration is necessary to preserve the
integrity and reputation of the judicial process.’ ” Id. ¶ 42 (quoting People v. Hampton, 149 Ill. 2d
71, 102 (1992)). The concern is whether defendant has suffered a serious injustice. Id.¶ 19 “Generally, the trial court is afforded wide discretion in fashioning the conditions of
probation for a particular defendant.” People v. Meyer, 176 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1997). The circuit
court is allowed to impose conditions of probation that are not specifically enumerated in section
5-6-3(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections “as long as it is (1) reasonable and (2) relates to (a)
the nature of the offense or (b) the rehabilitation of the defendant as determined by the trial court.”
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(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Goossens, 2015 IL 118347, ¶ 15 (quoting Meyer,
176 Ill. 2d at 378).
¶ 20 Here, while the conditions defendant complains of may seem onerous, they are neither
unreasonable nor unrelated to his rehabilitation and/or the offense given his lack of cooperation
and prior history of having his probation or supervision revoked or terminated unsuccessfully.
Because of defendant’s dismal record of compliance, the probation officer’s concern with
defendant’s desire to comply with probation conditions, and defendant’s conduct in being less than
forthcoming with the probation officer during the presentence investigation, preapproval as to the
environment in which defendant would spend significant time (work, residence, overnight visits),
is a warranted limitation. See Hammons, 2018 IL App (4th) 160385, ¶ 28 (“ ‘[T]he environment
in which a probationer serves probation is an important factor on the likelihood that probation will
be successfully completed.’ ” (quoting People v. Robinson, 245 Cal. Rptr. 50, 51 (1988)).
Additionally, due to defendant’s history of noncompliance, these conditions serve as another
measure to ensure that defendant complies with another condition of his probation, that he have
no contact with the victim. Although defendant complains that the condition he obtain preapproval
for overnight stays could effectively strand him in an emergency situation, the condition does not
require preapproval every time he wishes to stay overnight, rather it requires preapproval of each
place he wishes to stay overnight. As such, nothing prevents defendant from providing the
probation department or his probation officer a list of all potential places he would stay overnight
for approval at the outset such that he would know which places he would be able to stay overnight
should a need or want arise. Based on the foregoing, we cannot say that defendant has shown the
court committed a clear or obvious error in imposing the conditions.
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¶ 21 Even if we assume the court committed a clear or obvious error in imposing the conditions,
it does not necessarily follow “that they inflict a serious injustice upon him and throw the judicial
system into disrepute.” Id. ¶ 42. This is especially so considering defendant has the right to request
a modification of his conditions. See 730 ILCS 5/5-6-4(f) (West 2018). Therefore, even if
defendant could establish the imposition of the conditions amounted to a clear and obvious error,
it is not reversible under the second prong of the plain error doctrine.
¶ 22 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 23 The judgment of the circuit court of Tazewell County is affirmed as modified.
¶ 24 Affirmed as modified.
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