People v. Goodwin , 430 Ill. Dec. 741 ( 2018 )

2018 IL App (1st) 152045
No. 1-15-2045
Opinion filed September 21, 2018
SIXTH DIVISION
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) 14 CR 8078
)
JOSEPH GOODWIN, )
) Honorable Joseph G. Kazmierski,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
)
JUSTICE CONNORS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Hoffman and Cunningham concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Joseph Goodwin, was charged with threatening a public official, intimidation,
and unlawful restraint after he yelled obscenities at an assistant state’s attorney and followed her
down the hall of the courthouse to her office. After a jury trial, defendant was convicted of
threatening a public official and unlawful restraint. He was ultimately sentenced to two and a
half years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the State failed to prove him guilty
of threatening a public official beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no evidence that he
threatened the victim, (2) in the alternative, he was deprived of a fair trial due to ineffective
assistance of counsel, (3) the threatening a public official statute is unconstitutional, and (4) the
State failed to prove him guilty of unlawful restraint beyond a reasonable doubt. For the reasons
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that follow, we find that the State failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
threatening a public official and reverse his conviction. We also remand this matter to the circuit
court to impose a sentence for defendant’s unlawful restraint conviction.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 A grand jury charged defendant with the following respectively-numbered counts: (I)
threatening a public official (720 ILCS 5/12-9(a)(1) (West 2014)), (II) intimidation (id. § 12-
6(a)(2)), and (III) unlawful restraint (id. § 10-3(a)). The indictment named Assistant State’s
Attorney Nora Gill as the public official at issue. The charges arose from an incident that
occurred on the fourth floor of the Richard J. Daley Center (Daley Center) on March 19, 2014.
Defendant’s jury trial began on February 17, 2015, and ended on February 19, 2015, with the
jury finding defendant guilty on counts I and III, and not guilty on count II.
¶4 After opening statements, the State called Gill to testify. Gill stated that she had been an
assistant state’s attorney for eight years and that, on March 19, 2014, she was assigned to traffic
court in courtroom 402 of the Daley Center. On that date, Gill was four and a half months’
pregnant. Gill testified that typically there are two assistant state’s attorneys assigned to a
courtroom, but on that date, her partner was on vacation and law clerk Allison Kudzy was
assisting her. Gill described the court call on March 19, 2014, as “very, very heavy,” and said the
courtroom was “packed.” Gill stated that the court call was supposed to start at 9 a.m., but that
Judge Dan Gallagher did not get to courtroom 402 until about 9:40 or 9:45 a.m. Gill stated that
while she was waiting for the judge to take the bench, she spoke to some of the present defense
attorneys. Specifically, she spoke with attorney Patrick Boyle, who represented Alfredo Montes.
Gill testified that around 9:30 a.m., Boyle told her that he needed to get to federal court. Boyle
asked Gill to let the judge know that he had been there and that Montes was represented and to
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No. 1-15-2045
request another date. Gill stated that the judge took the bench and Montes’s case was called first.
Montes then approached the bench from the gallery and Gill informed the judge that Montes had
an attorney who had to be in federal court at 10 a.m., and had asked that Gill put his name in the
record and ask for a short date. In response, the judge “yelled” at Gill “ ‘[H]ow dare you let
attorneys leave, I wanted this case called.’ ” Gill stated that the judge gave the case a very short
date and “threw some papers and stormed off the bench and yelled at me to get my shit
together.”
¶5 Gill testified that Montes was standing next to her at that point and looked confused. She
thought Montes might think the judge was yelling at him, so she told Montes to come to her
office down the hall to call his attorney and let him know what happened. Gill stated that she and
Montes then turned towards the back of the courtroom and walked down the aisle towards the
double doors, only one of which opened. Gill further stated that a man, whom she identified as
defendant, was standing by the door that did not open and “approached me and he was like
laughing and kind of pointing his finger, oh, you made the judge mad; ha, ha, you made the
judge mad.” Gill testified that she responded, “between the two of us you are here on bond, so
why don’t you find a seat.” As a result, defendant “got really loud and really angry, and he
started putting his finger in my face and said, come back here and say that to my face, get back
here and say that to my face.” Gill further stated that she then went to walk out the door with
Montes still to her right, and that defendant “sort of edged *** Montes out and squeezed through
the door with me at the exact same time, so he was like right in my face.” Gill testified that the
small satellite office to which she took Montes was 40 feet from courtroom 402. Gill stated that
the satellite office had a phone, a desk, a computer, and a couple of chairs.
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¶6 Gill testified that on the way to the office, “[defendant] followed me. He stayed right
here. I tried to move to the left closer to the wall, and he came right with me, just right in my
face. The whole time he was just screaming louder and louder; fuck you bitch, come back here
and say that to my face, you can’t talk to me, fuck you bitch. Just screaming just right in my
face.” Gill indicated that defendant was about six to eight inches from her face. Gill stated that
she felt scared and had not had a defendant do that to her in the previous four and a half years
she had been assigned to traffic court. Gill testified that she did not say anything in response to
defendant’s yelling. Gill testified that when she attempted to enter her office, she reached for the
door handle and defendant “turned like right in front of the door, like right in front of me so I
[could not] get into the door.” Gill stated that she could not get into her office at this point
because defendant’s body was blocking the door. When asked what happened next, Gill
responded:
“Montes was right behind us. He had been next to me, and the defendant
squeezed him out. He reached through. The defendant reached with his hand like he was
going to go for the handle, but [Montes] put his arm in and he pushed on the handle and
he pushed open the door and I was able to get through between the wall and [Montes].
[Montes] moved in between us.”
¶7 Gill testified that she and Montes then went into the office. Inside the office was Gill’s
coworker, Assistant State’s Attorney Debra Chessick. Gill stated that once in the office, she sat
down in a chair that was not visible from the door because she did not want defendant to be able
to see her. Gill testified that Chessick was on the phone and she asked her to hang up so that she
could call Montes’s attorney. While Gill made the phone call, defendant was “[r]ight outside the
glass door.” Gill could see defendant’s hair and could hear him talking, but could not hear what
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No. 1-15-2045
he was saying. After Gill spoke to Montes’s attorney, Montes asked if he should stay or leave.
Gill told him it was okay for him to go. Montes then opened the door to leave and shut the door
behind him. Gill stated that when the door opened, she could hear defendant say “come out here
and talk to me, come out here and talk to me you bitch.” Gill stated that a law clerk named
Bobby then came into the office, and a couple minutes later, law clerk Kudzy came in. Gill
testified that defendant was standing outside the door to the office for three or four minutes and
“[i]t felt like a really long time.” Gill stated that at that point, she felt “really scared that
[defendant] was going to do something.” Gill further stated that she did not feel free to leave the
office. Specifically, she stated, “There was no way I could have gotten out of the office door. He
was right there, and the whole time he was still yelling.” Gill explained that she did not try to
leave the office because “[defendant] was right in the door and he was screaming; come out here,
come out here you bitch, fuck you bitch.” Additionally, Gill stated that she tried to call her
supervisor to tell her what had happened but she was “choked up” so Chessick took the phone
and explained what happened. Gill stated that when law clerk Bobby came into the office, he
stayed. Law clerk Kudzy, however, asked Gill if she was okay, and when Gill replied that she
was not, Kudzy stated that she was going to get the sheriff who was assigned to courtroom 402.
Shortly thereafter, the sheriff came to the office, and defendant left.
¶8 On cross examination, Gill stated that after the incident was over she had a “brief”
conversation with Leann Goshen, an investigator from the sheriff’s department, within one or
two hours of the incident. When asked if she ever told Goshen that defendant had said “fuck you,
bitch” to her, Gill stated that she told Goshen that defendant was screaming in her face, but that
she did not recall if Goshen asked for the specific words defendant used. Gill admitted that
defendant never verbally threatened her with bodily harm. Gill also stated that while defendant
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was standing outside her office, he was on the phone. She clarified that she did not see him on
the phone, but that she “heard conversation where it seemed like he was talking on the phone.”
Gill denied that defendant was continuously asking for her name and denied that she ever
threatened to have defendant locked up. On recross examination, Gill testified that she called
Montes’s attorney when she was in the office, and did not call anyone in the sheriff’s
department.
¶9 The State next called Montes, who testified that on March 19, 2014, he went to
courtroom 402 of the Daley Center because he had a case pending in that courtroom. Montes
stated that on that date he arrived at 9 a.m. and saw his attorney, Patrick Boyle, in courtroom
402. Montes stated that he and Boyle had a conversation and then Boyle left to go to federal
court. Montes testified that Judge Gallagher did not take the bench in courtroom 402 until 9:40
or 9:45 a.m. When asked what happened when he stepped up in front of the judge, Montes stated
that “[the] State’s attorney told the judge that my lawyer had to go to federal court. [The judge]
got really upset and started yelling at the state’s attorney and gave me a continuation date. Then
she was going to do me a favor and call my attorney to let him know when was my continuation
date.” Gill told Montes to follow her to one of the offices in the hallway so that she could call his
attorney. Montes stated that when he stepped out into the hallway there was no one else in the
hall, except Gill and a man who was about five feet, eight inches or five feet, nine inches tall,
weighed about 140 or 150 pounds, and had dark skin and dreadlocks. Montes testified that he
saw this man approach Gill, and heard her saying, “ ‘[Y]ou shouldn’t have said that,’ in a polite
way.” Montes stated that the man then started yelling and following Gill towards the office, but
that he did not know what the man was yelling about. Montes further stated, “Then we got to that
office, he was standing right with his side part of his body blocking for her to get in. So when I
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No. 1-15-2045
walked to the door, I got in between them and I opened the door to allow [Gill] to get in.”
Montes also explained this encounter at the office door by stating, “[W]hen I approached them, I
got in between them two and opened the door handle and allowed—I had to push the guy to give
me space to open the door and allow [Gill] to get in, and then I followed her.” After Montes
opened the door, Gill walked in, and Montes followed her and closed the door. Montes testified
that, at this point, Gill was “very upset” and had “watery eyes.” Montes stated that while in the
office, he could see the man with dreadlocks standing outside the office door for “[a]t least a
good five minutes.” Montes testified that Gill called his attorney once inside the office. After the
phone call, Montes asked if it was okay to leave, and Gill said it was, so he left and went home.
Montes stated that when he and Gill first walked into the office, there was a man and a woman
already in the office. Montes also stated that he could tell Gill was pregnant at that time because
“[h]er belly was pretty big.”
¶ 10 On cross examination, Montes stated that he did not see anyone put his finger in Gill’s
face, and did not hear or see anyone say anything to Gill inside the courtroom. Montes also
stated that he never heard the man with dreadlocks call Gill a bitch, did not hear him say “fuck
you, bitch,” and did not hear that man threaten any physical harm to Gill. Montes also testified
that he never saw the man with dreadlocks put his hands in Gill’s face or use any hand gestures
in her face. Montes explained that he was “facing down,” was “wondering about [his] own case,”
and did not hear what the man with dreadlocks was saying as he followed Gill to the office.
Montes testified that he spoke with an investigator from the sheriff’s department and gave a
written statement in connection with his interview. Montes stated that his written statement
included that he pushed the man with the dreadlocks in the chest, but when pressed, the State
volunteered to stipulate that it was not in Montes’s statement.
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No. 1-15-2045
¶ 11 Assistant State’s Attorney Debra Chessick testified next. She stated that, in March 2014,
she worked in the traffic courtrooms on the fourth floor of the Daley Center. Around 10 a.m. on
March 19, 2014, Chessick was on the phone in the small satellite office when she heard some
commotion, including “loud noises, maybe some yelling.” Chessick explained that when the
door to the office is closed, a person could not hear exactly what is going on outside the door.
Chessick testified that she saw Gill and two men entering the office. She stated that Gill was on
the right, Montes in the middle, and defendant on the left. Chessick explained that “[a]s ***
Montes was in the middle, he kind of had his arm stretched out to be a barrier in between the
defendant and [Gill]. His hand was either on the glass or on the handle of the door to allow [Gill]
access to the room.” Chessick stated that defendant did not come into the office, but stayed
outside of the door, pacing back and forth and yelling. Chessick described Gill as “very upset”
because her face was flushed and she looked like she was about to start crying. Chessick stated
that Gill asked her to use the phone, so Chessick put the phone down, and Gill made a short
phone call. Chessick testified that a law clerk, Bobby Cannatello, came into the office, and
shortly thereafter law clerk Kudzy also came into the office.
¶ 12 Chessick further testified that she stepped one or two feet out of the office and told
defendant to get away and that he had to get out of there. Chessick stated that defendant stepped
back about seven feet, but was still visible from the office and was just across the hallway.
Chessick testified that defendant was still loud at this point and demanded that Chessick give
him Gill’s name and her information. Chessick also testified that defendant had his cell phone in
his hand and said he was talking to his lawyer. Chessick described defendant’s voice as
“demanding like he needed to get that information right that very second.” When asked how she
felt at that moment, Chessick responded that she felt “scared” and stated “I [did not] feel safe. I
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No. 1-15-2045
[did not] know what he was going to do next, and I wished that there had been a sheriff that was
close by to make him step away to get further away from our office.” When Chessick stepped
back into the office, Gill tried to call their supervisor but was too upset, so Chessick took the
phone and told the supervisor what had happened. Then, a sheriff’s deputy came over to speak
with defendant.
¶ 13 On cross examination, Chessick testified that she never heard defendant say “fuck you
bitch.” Chessick also testified that she was sure she briefly spoke to investigator Goshen, but did
not remember the conversation very well. She recalled that she told the investigator that she saw
defendant on his cell phone. Chessick stated that she “[did not] hear [defendant] threaten [Gill]
with words,” but “the way his body was when she was coming into the room was threatening.”
Chessick also testified that she never saw defendant physically grab or put his hands on Gill. She
also never heard defendant threaten to grab Gill.
¶ 14 On redirect examination, Chessick testified that she saw defendant trying to get into the
office. On recross examination, Chessick stated that defendant was trying to get into the office
“[i]nitially when they were in the doorway.” When asked if she told the investigator that
defendant tried to get into the office, Chessick responded that she did not remember.
¶ 15 The State’s final witness in its case-in-chief was Deputy Joe Glover of the Cook County
Sheriff’s Department, who testified that on March 19, 2014, he was assigned to courtrooms 402
and 404 of the Daley Center, which meant that he was to go back and forth between those two
courtrooms throughout the day. Deputy Glover testified that Judge Gallagher was “pulling
double duty” and also going between the two courtrooms that day. Deputy Glover testified that
Judge Gallagher ran through the call in courtroom 404 and then they went to courtroom 402,
where Gill was working. Deputy Glover stated that when the first case was called in courtroom
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No. 1-15-2045
402, Gill and a defendant were at the bench, and “Judge Gallagher got up visibly upset.” Deputy
Glover stated that he could hear the “displeasure” in the judge’s voice, and the judge then left the
bench and took a recess. Deputy Glover stated that Gill then left the courtroom through the doors
leading out to the hallway, and that defendant, who was standing at the back of the room,
“mentioned something to her, turned towards her and exited the courtroom with her.” Deputy
Glover could not hear what defendant had said to Gill and could not hear whether Gill said
anything back to defendant. After Gill left the room, Deputy Glover went to courtroom 404 with
Judge Gallagher through the private hallway behind the courtrooms. Deputy Glover further
testified that while in the private hallway, he was approached by law clerk Kudzy, who was
frantic, and told him that “there was some guy yelling and screaming at [Gill].” Deputy Glover
called the security supervisor to report the disturbance and then went into the public hallway
with Kudzy, where she pointed to defendant, who was down the hall approximately six feet from
the state’s attorney’s satellite office door. Deputy Glover testified that he observed defendant on
his phone at this time, though defendant did not appear to be doing anything while on the phone.
Deputy Glover then instructed defendant “to step back into [r]oom 402 where he started his day
to wait for his case to be called” and defendant complied. Deputy Glover stated that after
defendant’s case was called, he and other security officers took defendant into custody.
¶ 16 On cross examination, Deputy Glover testified that he never heard defendant yell or curse
at anyone.
¶ 17 The State then rested its case-in-chief, and the trial court denied defendant’s motion for a
directed verdict.
¶ 18 The defense first called defendant to testify. Defendant testified that at approximately 9
a.m. on March 19, 2014, he was in courtroom 402 on the fourth floor of the Daley Center to pay
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off a fine for a traffic matter. Defendant testified that the courtroom was standing room only, so
he stood in the back of the courtroom with a few other people. Defendant stated that court started
“a little late,” and that Montes’s case was about the third case called. Defendant further stated
that the judge became upset with Gill, raised his voice, and threw some papers down before
calling a recess and going to the courtroom next door. Defendant testified that Gill “seemed to be
physically a little bit upset at how the judge handled her at that point.” Defendant stated that at
this point, he was “in conversation with a young lady at the back of the courtroom in regards to
what was going on.” Specifically, he said that he and this unknown woman were “conversing
back and forth” and the unknown woman commented that it seemed as though the deputy was
trying to lock up Montes. Defendant testified that, in response, he said “yeah, wow, that
[assistant state’s attorney] really pissed the judge off.” Defendant stated that he did not know that
Gill was coming out of the courtroom at the same time as he and the unknown woman, and that
Gill interrupted their conversation by stating “well, don’t you worry about who is getting locked
up today, you worry about yourself getting locked [up].” In response to Gill, defendant testified,
“Simultaneously, as I asked her, are you threatening me ma’am, I put my right hand in my
pocket and grabbed my cell phone, instantly called my attorney, William Laws, at that point.”
Defendant testified that he took Gill’s words as a threat because he had not appeared before the
judge yet and he felt threatened by Gill because “she say[s] she is not a person that can have [me
locked up], but look at what [I am] going through now. Off her word I was arrested that day.”
Defendant stated that he then headed down the hallway to retreat to the bathroom to have a
private conversation with his attorney to find out why the assistant state’s attorney “was saying
she is going to lock me up or I could be locked up.” Defendant explained that his attorney had
told him that it was okay to attend court by himself on that date. He also explained that he
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wanted to go to the bathroom to have a private conversation because there were people in the
hallway coming in and out of the courtrooms. Defendant testified that when he was walking to
the bathroom, Gill was about three steps behind him. Defendant saw Gill go into the state’s
attorney’s satellite office, which he described as being “pretty much adjacent to the men’s
bathroom.” Defendant then asked his attorney where he could file a complaint, and looked
through the door of the office Gill entered “to see if there was a name on the front of the desk to
go and make my complaint.” Defendant stated he was about seven or eight feet from the door
when he was looking in. Defendant denied ever trying to touch the door of the office. Defendant
also denied that Montes ever touched him and stated that Montes “never even came near me.”
¶ 19 Defendant further testified that, eventually, someone came out of the office and got
“Deputy Joe,” who approached defendant and said, “[H]ey, when you get done with your call,
just step back into the courtroom for me.” Defendant testified that when he went back into
courtroom 402, he asked the clerk what the name of the female state’s attorney that was
previously before the judge in that courtroom. The clerk did not know her name and told
defendant to ask a male assistant state’s attorney who was present, but he turned his back and
walked away from defendant. Defendant testified that when his case was finally called, he was
told to sit in the front because one of the assistant state’s attorneys stated that defendant was to
be “locked up today.” Thereafter, defendant was arrested. Defendant denied ever saying “fuck
you” to Gill, denied ever calling her a bitch, and denied ever trying to touch her. Defendant also
testified that he never put his hands in Gill’s face and never threatened her.
¶ 20 On cross examination, defendant testified that the men’s bathroom is “down the hall”
from the state’s attorney’s satellite office. He also testified that he had his attorney’s phone
number on speed dial. Defendant stated that on the date in question he did not know that Gill was
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pregnant and explained that Gill “is shorter than I am, so when she made the comment to me
when I was leaving out the courtroom, when I turned around, the only thing I actually saw was
her face.” Defendant also stated that he did not know the name of the woman he spoke with at
the back of the courtroom. Additionally, defendant testified that Montes’s testimony that he went
in between Gill and defendant was untrue. Defendant further stated that he never raised his voice
at Gill, but that she, in fact, yelled at him. Defendant stated that Gill raised her voice similar to
how the prosecutor was currently raising his voice at defendant during cross examination. When
asked if he felt threatened by the prosecutor, defendant responded that he did not feel threatened
but felt intimidated. The prosecutor then asked, “Though I am intimidating you, nothing is
stopping you from saying a lot of things to me, is it?” Defendant responded:
“You have to look at it like this, sir. Once again, there is a time and place for
everything. Any time as a black man you are in a courthouse, you have to be conscious
of what [sic] and what you do. So me responding to you negatively will not do anything
positive for me, nor would it have done anything for me responding negative[ly] to [Gill]
down at the Daley Center.”
¶ 21 Subsequently, defendant was asked what his race had to do with this case, and defendant
responded that “we can say it has nothing to do with it, we can say it has everything to do with it,
but I mention my race just as much as you mention her pregnancy.” Defendant further testified
that he was about 5 feet, 9 inches tall, but did not know how much he weighed. When asked by
the prosecutor if, as a 5-foot, nine-inch man, he was threatened by “this pregnant woman,”
defendant responded, “Yes, sir. You can get pulled over by [an] officer [that is] 4’10”. We are
not talking about [stature] that makes a person a threat.” Defendant confirmed that Gill was not
wearing a gun or badge on the date in question and explained, “Without the gun and badge, she
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still has me here today, so I was very much threatened at that point in time in my life.”
Defendant also confirmed that he never filed a complaint against Gill.
¶ 22 The defense next called investigator Leann Goshen from the Cook County Sheriff’s
Department. Goshen testified that on March 19, 2014, she was called to the Daley Center to
investigate an incident involving a threat to a public official. Goshen said that she and her partner
conducted interviews with Gill and defendant and stated, “There might have been a couple other
interviews.” Goshen testified that during the interviews she took notes and ultimately prepared a
report. When asked if during the interview Gill ever told her that defendant said, “[C]ome out
here and talk to me bitch,” Goshen responded, “In my notes I didn’t write that because things are
in summary. It is not verbatim.” Goshen further testified that she did not write that defendant
said, “[F]uck you bitch” in her report. The report also did not state that defendant tried to grab
the handle of the satellite office door, but did state defendant had blocked the doorway. Goshen
also testified that her report only stated that defendant was making gestures, but did not state that
he pointed a finger in Gill’s face. Goshen testified that she also interviewed Montes, but stated
her report did not mention of Montes ever pushing defendant in the chest. Goshen also
interviewed Chessick and testified that Chessick never told her that defendant attempted to enter
the satellite office.
¶ 23 On cross examination, Goshen read the following excerpt from her report:
“[Defendant] approached *** Gill making rude comments. [Defendant] followed
*** Gill to her office yelling, pointing her finger in his—excuse me—pointing his finger
in her face. [Defendant] blocked the doorway of *** Gill’s office, not letting *** Gill
enter her office.”
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Goshen then clarified that, in fact, defendant’s finger pointing was included in her report.
Goshen also stated that she never asked Gill what exact words defendant yelled at her. Goshen
further testified that for each interview she conducted, she was just looking for a summary or a
“general sense” of what occurred.
¶ 24 In rebuttal, the State called law clerk Bobby Cannatello, who testified that on the date at
issue, he was working as a law clerk for the State’s Attorney’s Office and was assigned to
courtroom 408. Cannatello testified that at approximately 9:45 a.m., he left courtroom 408 to go
to the satellite office down the hall. He estimated that the walk between the courtroom and the
office took 45 seconds. Cannatello testified that while he was walking down the hallway to the
office, he “heard a man’s voice, a deep voice fairly loud.” He identified defendant as the man
whose voice he heard. Cannatello testified that defendant was approximately one foot from the
satellite office door and was yelling, “This is fucking bullshit, come out of the office. I want your
fucking name, bitch.” Cannatello then entered the office, where he observed Gill, Chessick, and
“a Latino gentleman.” Cannatello testified that when he entered the office, the door was closed,
and is always closed because “[i]t automatically closes.” Cannatello further testified that he
noticed that Gill was “red, teary-eyed” and was crying “kind of hysterical.” Cannatello asked if
there was anything he could do, such as get the sheriff’s bailiff, but he remained in the office
because he “felt uncomfortable leaving [Gill] and [Chessick] alone.” Cannatello testified that
while in the office, he could hear defendant in the hallway screaming, “[C]ome out of the office
you fucking bitch, give me your fucking name, this is bullshit.” Shortly after Cannatello arrived
in the office, law clerk Kudzy came in, but she left immediately to get the sheriff’s bailiff, who
arrived about 30-45 seconds later. Cannatello testified that he then saw the sheriff and defendant
walking down the hallway.
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¶ 25 On cross examination, Cannatello testified that defendant never spoke to him, and he
could not recall whether defendant was on the phone during the occurrence. Cannatello also
testified that he spoke with investigator Goshen approximately two or three hours after the
occurrence. Cannatello stated that he told Goshen that defendant had said, “[T]his is fucking
bullshit.” Goshen was taking notes during their interview, but Cannatello could not see what she
was writing down. Cannatello stated that his conversation with Goshen was “less than a minute
long” but that he told her that defendant said, “I want your name, bitch” and “come out of the
fucking office.” Cannatello testified that while he was in the office with Gill and Chessick, he
did not make any attempt to contact any sheriffs or police officers.
¶ 26 The defense then re-called Goshen in rebuttal, who testified that she spoke with
Cannatello after the incident in question and took notes during their conversation. Goshen also
testified that she recalled Cannatello saying that an individual was yelling, but could not recall
what his exact words were. When presented with her report from her interview with Cannatello,
Goshen testified that neither her notes nor her report included that defendant said, “[T]his is
fucking bullshit,” “I want your name, bitch,” or “come out of the fucking office, bitch.” Goshen
explained that her notes are not verbatim.
¶ 27 On cross examination, Goshen testified that her interview with Cannatello lasted less than
a minute. She also stated that he could have told her all of the expletives that defendant was
yelling, but that she just did not include them in her report. Goshen stated that her notes are
merely “summaries.”
¶ 28 After closing arguments, the jury was instructed about the offense of threatening a public
official by Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 11.49 and 11.50 (4th ed. 2000)
(hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th). The court also instructed the jury that “[a] person holding the
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position of assistant state’s attorney is a public official” pursuant to IPI Criminal 4th No. 11.49A.
Further, the jury was given an instruction regarding the definition of a threat based on IPI
Criminal 4th No. 13.33F (1)-(2), (5). Specifically, the court stated, “The word threat means a
menace, however communicated, to inflict physical harm on the person threatened or any other
person or on property or subject any person to physical confinement or restraint or expose any
person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule.” The defense did not object to the giving of this
instruction, and did not request that an instruction be given regarding the definition of a “true
threat.”
¶ 29 The jury found defendant guilty of threatening a public official and unlawful restraint, but
acquitted him of intimidation. Defendant filed a motion for new trial, arguing, inter alia, that the
jury’s verdicts were legally and factually inconsistent and against the manifest weight of the
evidence. The motion was denied on April 14, 2015. Also on that date, the court merged the
unlawful restraint count into the threatening a public official count and sentenced defendant to
two-and-a-half years’ imprisonment. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to reconsider his
sentence, which was denied on June 3, 2015. Defendant filed his timely notice of appeal on June
16, 2015. Oral argument was held in this case on August 30, 2018.
¶ 30 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 31 Defendant raises four arguments on appeal: (1) defendant’s conviction for threatening a
public official should be reversed because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he intended to convey any threat, much less a true threat; (2) in the alternative, defense
counsel deprived defendant of a fair trial when counsel argued that the jury should acquit him of
threatening a public official because his speech was protected by the first amendment, but failed
to request a true threat jury instruction; (3) the threatening a public official statute violates the
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No. 1-15-2045
constitutional guarantees of free speech and due process because the statute does not require
proof that a defendant had the subjective intent to make a true threat; and (4) defendant’s
unlawful restraint conviction should be reversed because his speech, directed to a public official,
cannot be categorized as “fighting words” that conveyed a true threat, and thus his speech was
protected from criminal sanction by the first amendment. We address each below.
¶ 32 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Threatening a Public Official
¶ 33 We first address defendant’s contention that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the offense of threatening a public official.
¶ 34 Section 12-9 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-9 (West 2014))
provides, in relevant part:
“(a) A person commits threatening a public official or human service provider when:
(1) that person knowingly delivers or conveys, directly or indirectly, to a public
official or human service provider by any means a communication:
(i) containing a threat that would place the public official or human service
provider or a member of his or her immediate family in reasonable apprehension
of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint; or
*** and
(2) the threat was conveyed because of the performance or nonperformance of
some public duty or duty as a human service provider, because of hostility of the person
making the threat toward the status or position of the public official or the human
service provider, or because of any other factor related to the official’s public
existence.”
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No. 1-15-2045
¶ 35 Generally, the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
criminal conviction “is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319
(1979). Citing Duncan v. Peterson, 408 Ill. App. 3d 911 (2010), defendant asserts that the
Jackson standard does not apply to this matter. In Duncan, the court recognized that “[w]e
review de novo whether a statement qualifies as constitutionally protected speech under the first
amendment.” Id. at 918. In response, the State points out that the court in People v. Dye, 2015 IL
App (4th) 130799, ¶ 11, a case upon which defendant heavily relies for its substance, applied the
Jackson standard, and contends that defendant’s argument regarding Duncan is misplaced
because that case examined whether a statement was constitutionally protected as religious
opinion and this case is not about whether a specific statement was protected. The State further
contends that the Jackson standard is proper because the facts of this case involve the totality of
defendant’s conduct toward Gill, which cannot be distilled into a “statement.” We agree with the
State’s characterization of the issues before this court, and thus must determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of threatening
a public official.
¶ 36 Defendant does not contest that Gill was a public official at the time he confronted her, or
that he knew this to be the case. Instead, defendant argues that he did not convey a threat, let
alone a “true threat” as was necessary in order to convict. Defendant advances two arguments on
this point. First, defendant contends that the State’s evidence failed to prove that he threatened a
public official because the evidence shows that he did not convey any threat to Gill and Gill
herself testified that defendant did not verbally threaten her with bodily harm. In the alternative,
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No. 1-15-2045
defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he intended to convey a “true threat,” and thus
his conviction violates the first amendment of the United States Constitution.
¶ 37 Various Illinois statutes, including section 12-9 of the Code, criminalize the making of
threats. The first amendment, applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
prohibits the enactment of laws “abridging the freedom of speech.” U.S. Const., amends. I, XIV.
The first amendment signifies that the government does not have the power to prohibit
expression based on its subject matter, message, ideas, or content. Ashcroft v. American Civil
Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002). However, the Supreme Court has recognized that
there are categories of expressions that are not protected by the first amendment, such as “true
threats.” United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (plurality opinion). We have
consistently held that if the State charges a defendant with making a threat of violence, the threat
must be a “true threat,” or else the prosecution would violate the first amendment. People v.
Wood, 2017 IL App (1st) 143135, ¶ 13, appeal denied, No. 123250 (Ill. May 30, 2018); Dye,
2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 8; People v. Sucic, 401 Ill. App. 3d 492, 502-03 (2010).
¶ 38 Further, when interpreting section 12-9 of the Code, “we have held that intentionality on
the defendant’s part is required.” Wood, 2017 IL App (1st) 143135, ¶ 13 (citing Dye, 2015 IL
App (4th) 130799, ¶ 10). In Dye, this court observed that “a ‘true threat’ requires intentionality
[citation], in contrast to section 12-9(a)(1) [citation], which, by its terms, requires merely
knowledge (‘knowingly’).” Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 10. This means that in order for a
defendant’s conviction for threatening a public official to stand, the threat must have been a “true
threat.” See id. In Virginia v. Black, the Supreme Court explained a “true threat” as follows:
“ ‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
20
No. 1-15-2045
particular individual or group of individuals. [Citations.] The speaker need not actually
intend to carry out the threat. Rather, a prohibition on true threats protect[s] individuals
from the fear of violence and from the disruption that fear engenders, in addition to
protecting people from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003).
¶ 39 Pursuant to Black, the question we must address is whether the State proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant communicated a serious expression of intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence against Gill that placed Gill in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future
bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint. The parties disagree over the perspective
from which we analyze this question. Defendant argues that after Black was decided, courts have
used a subjective speaker-based test—whether a reasonable person would understand that the
person making a threatening statement intended to make a true threat under the circumstances—
when determining whether a statement is entitled to first amendment protection. The State
responds that the traditional, objective test that was used prior to Black—whether an ordinary,
reasonable recipient would interpret the defendant’s statement as a threat—still applies.
¶ 40 Our supreme court recently acknowledged that “it is unclear whether the true threat
exemption from the first amendment would apply to a statement made with innocent intent but
which negligently coveys a message that a reasonable person would perceive to be threatening”
(People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 38), but did not resolve the issue. The State relies on
People v. Diomedes, 2014 IL App (2d) 121080, to support its position. There, the Second District
looked to the federal courts and examined this issue as follows:
“In United States v. Parr [citation], the Seventh Circuit discussed that there also exists a
split of authority on whether (based on Black’s language that true threats encompass
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No. 1-15-2045
statements wherein the speaker means to communicate a serious threat to harm) a
subjective element was introduced into the analysis or whether the traditional, objective
reasonable-person test should continue to be applied. In doing so, however, it described
the traditional objective test as asking whether a reasonable speaker would understand
that his or her statement would be interpreted as a threat (the ‘objective “reasonable
speaker” ’ test) or, alternatively, whether a reasonable recipient would interpret the
statement as a threat (the objective ‘ “reasonable recipient” ’ test). [Citation.] The Parr
court stated that ‘[t]his circuit has not yet addressed the issue,’ and it described its former
decision in Fuller as merely ‘a post-Black true threats case applying, without reference to
Black, the traditional objective “reasonable person” test.’ [Citation.]
Accordingly, it appears that the Seventh Circuit’s approach has been, and
remains, an objective one, which allows evaluation of the speaker’s communication
under either the reasonable-speaker or the reasonable-recipient test. Further, although
courts in this state have not explicitly decided the issue, the approach also appears to be
objective. For example in Sucic, the defendant relied on Black to argue that a subjective
approach should be applied to determine whether his statements amounted to true threats.
[Citation.] In addressing that claim, the court noted that, while there has been a federal
split of authority interpreting Black, Illinois courts have found that the term ‘threat’
implies generally that the expression has a ‘reasonable tendency to create apprehension
that its originator will act according to its tenor.’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
[Citation.] This definition suggests that an objective, not a subjective, approach continues
to apply. [Citation.]
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No. 1-15-2045
Therefore, it appears that neither the objective reasonable-speaker nor the
objective reasonable-recipient approach is foreclosed from our consideration. Indeed, in
our view, the reasonable-speaker test, by requiring consideration of how others might
interpret the communication, essentially subsumes or encompasses the reasonable-
recipient test. In any event, even applying, per defendant’s request, the reasonable-
speaker approach, we conclude that the evidence here is such that a speaker would
reasonably foresee that a listener would reasonably interpret the communication as a
serious expression of intent to harm.” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶¶ 33-35.
¶ 41 Conversely, defendant relies on Dye and Wood as support for a test with a subjective
component. In Dye, the Fourth District applied a subjective test in reaching its conclusion that
the evidence did not prove that when the defendant told an assistant public defender, “ ‘ “I’m
gonna get you,” ’ ” the defendant intended to convey the idea of violent retribution, as opposed
to nonviolent retribution. Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 12. Similarly, in Wood, this court
determined that the Supreme Court’s decision in Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, ___, 135
S. Ct. 2001, 2011 (2015), required that “statutes criminalizing speech for being threatening
require proof that the speaker intends the communication to be a threat and that a reasonable
listener would understand the communication to be threatening.” Wood, 2017 IL App (1st)
143135, ¶ 13.
¶ 42 The State has failed to present, and we have not found, a compelling reason why we
should depart from the test applied by this court in Wood. The decision in Wood resulted from
this court’s analysis of the same issue with which we are now faced. As such, we apply the same
test as in Wood, and thus decide whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant intended his communication to Gill to be a threat that a reasonable listener would
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No. 1-15-2045
understand to be threatening. See id. Had we opted to apply the State’s version of the test, then
our question would be whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable
person in defendant’s position would have foreseen that a listener would reasonably interpret his
communication as a serious expression of intent to harm. See Diomedes, 2014 IL App (2d)
121080, ¶ 35. We find it difficult to reconcile the State’s proposed test with Black’s declaration
that “ ‘[t]rue threats’ encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or
group of individuals.” (Emphases added.) Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60. We also fail to see how the
State could prove the requisite elements of threatening a public official without a subjective
component because section 12-9 of the Code requires that a person “knowingly” convey a
communication containing a threat. 720 ILCS 5/12-9 (West 2014). A person acts knowingly if he
is consciously aware that his conduct is practically certain to cause the prohibited result. People
v. Lengyel, 2015 IL App (1st) 131022, ¶ 45. Thus, the language of the statute makes clear that
defendant’s subjective intent is relevant to determine whether the State satisfied the requisite
elements.
¶ 43 Defendant asserts that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
threatening a public official because the evidence did not establish that defendant intended to
communicate a “true threat.” Specifically, defendant asserts that the State presented no evidence
that defendant issued a distinct verbal threat to Gill, and instead only presented evidence of him
yelling obscenities at her. Further, defendant asserts that the State did not prove that defendant
meant to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence as
is required in order to establish a “true threat.” Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60. The State responds
that it satisfied its burden by proving that defendant’s “true threat” was communicated by the
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No. 1-15-2045
totality of his unambiguously menacing conduct. We find that, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of threatening a public official beyond a reasonable doubt where the State presented no
evidence that defendant meant to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an
unlawful act of violence. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
¶ 44 Defendant relies on Wood and Dye as support for his contentions, and we find those cases
instructive. In Wood, this court was recently faced with a question similar to the one before us
now. There, the defendant was charged with threatening a public official after he left a voicemail
for his public defender wherein the defendant stated, inter alia, that he hated the judge who
presided over his case and “pray[ed] for the death and destruction upon the judge and upon every
single person who sentenced [him].” Wood, 2017 IL App (1st) 143135, ¶ 4. On appeal, the
defendant argued that his conviction should be reversed because he did not convey any
communication to the judge, and because the content of his speech was not a “true threat.” Id.
¶ 12. The court began by determining whether the defendant even made a threat to the judge, and
defined a threat as “ ‘[a] communicated intent to inflict harm or loss on another or on another’s
property.’ ” Id. ¶ 13 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1618 (9th ed. 2009)). The court added that
intentionality by the defendant is required when interpreting section 12-9 of the Code and that
intentionality means that for a conviction for threatening a public official to stand, the threat
must be a “true threat.” Id. The court further explained, “Under recent Supreme Court precedent,
statutes criminalizing speech for being threatening require proof that the speaker intends the
communication to be a threat and that a reasonable listener would understand the communication
to be threatening.” Id. (citing Elonis, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2011).
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No. 1-15-2045
¶ 45 The Wood court focused on the part of defendant’s statements that “ ‘there is not a day
that goes by since I was sentenced at that courthouse that I have not dreamed about revenge and
the utter hate I feel for the judge’ and ‘there’s not a day that goes by that I don’t pray for the
death and destruction upon the judge.’ ” Id. ¶ 14. The court determined that neither of these
statements, individually or in their entirety, threatened immediate or future bodily harm, sexual
assault, confinement, or restraint as required by section 12-9 of the Code. Id. Additionally, the
court stated that the defendant’s statements were not “ ‘serious expression[s] of an intent to
commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual.’ ” Id. ¶ 15 (quoting Black, 538
U.S. at 359). In fact, the court opined that the defendant never said he was going to do anything,
but instead merely hoped and prayed that bad things would happen to those he felt had wronged
him. Id. The State contended that the circumstances surrounding the phone call showed that the
defendant intended to make a threat and that a reasonable person could construe the
communication as a threat. Id. ¶ 16. The State also pointed out that the defendant was upset at
the time he called, called from a blocked number, and did not leave his name on the voicemail.
Id. Additionally, the judge, who was the subject of the defendant’s phone call, testified at trial
“about his subjective apprehension after the message was played for him by the assistant public
defender” and that he “became suspicious of others and was scared for the safety of himself and
his family.” Id. The court acknowledged that the “circumstances surrounding the threat are
obviously important.” Id. (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam)).
However, the court ultimately held that although “unsettling,” the context provided by the State
did not transform the defendant’s remarks into a true threat because there was no evidence
establishing that the defendant intended to convey the idea of violent retribution. Id. ¶ 17. The
court explained that the statements at issue did not warn of any future harm, were vague and
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No. 1-15-2045
ambiguous, and did not indicate any actual intent to carry out a threat or any intent to
affirmatively do anything. Id. ¶ 22. The court also characterized the defendant’s statements as
“distasteful, inept, and crude,” but nonetheless “not criminal.” Id. The court concluded, “The
State cannot criminalize a defendant’s dream for revenge unless, along with that expressed
dream, the defendant seriously expresses an intention to commit an act of unlawful violence to
fulfill his dream.” Id.
¶ 46 We also find Dye applicable to the case at bar. In Dye, the defendant and his public
defender had a meeting where the public defender informed the defendant that she had
subpoenaed some documents and inadvertently uncovered evidence that would be harmful to the
defendant’s case, and that the State would receive a copy of this harmful evidence. Dye, 2015 IL
App (4th) 130799, ¶ 3. The defendant became irate and pointed at the public defender and told
her, “ ‘ “I’m gonna get you,” ’ ” two or three times. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. The public defender responded,
“ ‘ “Are you fucking threatening me?” ’ ” and the defendant stated, “ ‘ “No, no. I ain’t
threatening you” ’ ” Id. ¶ 5. During this confrontation, a paralegal stepped between the defendant
and the public defender because of the defendant’s mannerisms, aggressive speech, and posture.
Id. The public defender was “scared, trembling, and on the verge of tears.” Id. ¶ 6. On appeal, the
court reversed defendant’s conviction for threatening a public official because it found that it
would have been impossible for any rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant made a “true threat” within the meaning of Black. Id. ¶ 1. Specifically, the court
held that the defendant’s threat, “ ‘ “I’m gonna get you,” ’ ” was ambiguous as to whether the
intended meaning was violent retribution or nonviolent retribution, and the context of the threat
could not reasonably resolve the ambiguity. Id.
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No. 1-15-2045
¶ 47 At the outset of its analysis, the Dye court stated, “we interpret section 12-9 as requiring
intentionality.” Id. ¶ 10. The court then acknowledged that “no witness had direct sensory access
to defendant’s mind and intent,” and thus “the trier of fact could determine what he intended
only by drawing inferences from his conduct, including what he said.” Id. ¶ 11. The court framed
the question before it as, “Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,
would it be possible for any rational trier of fact to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
defendant intended to physically threaten [his public defender]?” Id. The court concluded that
there was no evidence that would justify a reasonable inference that the defendant intended to
convey the idea of violence. Id. ¶ 12. Specifically, the court noted that during the encounter at
issue, the defendant and his public defender were both shouting and a witness had described the
defendant’s speech and posture as “ ‘aggressive.’ ” Id. Nonetheless, the court explained, “When
people are angry, however, they tend to become loud and tense and to make vigorous gestures—
even when threatening to do something nonviolent.” Id.
¶ 48 In this case, like in Wood and Dye, the evidence presented by the State was not sufficient
to prove that defendant meant for his communications and expressions to Gill to convey a
serious intent to carry out an unlawful act of violence. Simply put, the State did not meet its
burden to prove that defendant meant to threaten Gill with unlawful violence. It is undisputed
that defendant did not make any verbal threats to Gill. Gill testified that defendant never verbally
threatened her with bodily harm. Gill testified that defendant initially approached her after the
judge stormed off the bench on the date at issue by laughing, pointing at her, and stating that “oh,
you made the judge mad; ha ha, you made the judge mad.” Gill stated that she responded,
“[B]etween the two of us you are here on bond, so why don’t you find a seat.” Defendant, on the
other hand, testified that Gill stated, “[W]ell, don’t you worry about who is getting locked up
28
No. 1-15-2045
today, you worry about yourself getting locked [up].” Gill testified that subsequently defendant
followed her to the satellite office, and told her to “come back here and say that to my face, get
back here and say that to my face.” Gill also testified that defendant screamed, “[F]uck you,
bitch, come back here and say that to my face, you can’t talk to me, fuck you bitch.” Montes,
who was near Gill during the encounter, did not know what defendant was yelling about, but
testified that he never heard defendant say “fuck you, bitch” or threaten her with physical harm.
Chessick testified that defendant demanded that she give him Gill’s name and her information,
but that she never heard defendant say “fuck you, bitch.” Likewise, Deputy Glover testified that
he did not hear defendant yell at Gill. The only witness besides Gill to testify that defendant used
expletives was Cannatello, who testified that he heard defendant yell, “This is fucking bullshit,
come out of the office. I want your fucking name, bitch.” Defendant denied ever calling Gill a
bitch or saying “fuck you” to her.
¶ 49 This foregoing testimony establishes that there was no evidence that defendant verbally
threatened Gill. This is significant because, as a result, whether the State met its burden depends
on whether any rational trier of fact could reasonably infer from defendant’s expressions and
demeanor that he intended to commit an unlawful act of violence against Gill. As stated in Dye,
“the trier of fact could determine what [defendant] intended only by drawing inferences from his
conduct, including what he said.” 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 11. After reviewing the evidence,
we find that no rational trier of fact could have found that the State proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that defendant intended to convey an unlawful threat of violence to Gill. Merely because
defendant used offensive language in a loud voice does not create a reasonable inference that he
intended to use violence. As stated in Dye, “When people are angry, however, they tend to
become loud and tense and to make vigorous gestures—even when threatening to do something
29
No. 1-15-2045
nonviolent.” Id. ¶ 12. Additionally, the evidence did not show beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant made any overtly threatening gestures. Gill testified that defendant put his finger in
her face. However, this is not an overtly threatening gesture, such as shaking a fist at someone,
dragging a finger across one’s throat, or pounding a fist into an open hand. In the context of the
factual scenario here, defendant’s pointing at Gill while yelling his desire to learn her name in an
expletive-laden tirade does not rationally indicate his desire to inflict violent harm on Gill.
Defendant argues, and we agree, that there is no case wherein conduct similar to his was deemed
sufficient to convict someone of threatening a public official.
¶ 50 The State argues that defendant communicated his threat to Gill through the totality of his
“unambiguously menacing and threatening conduct.” We agree with the State that we must look
to the totality of defendant’s conduct because “[t]he circumstances surrounding the threat are
obviously important.” Wood, 2017 IL App (1st) 143135, ¶ 16 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 708).
However, we disagree that the totality of defendant’s conduct evidenced his intent, or allowed
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom that would evidence his intent, to convey a serious
threat of unlawful violence against Gill. Rather, the evidence creates a reasonable inference that
defendant was attempting to obtain Gill’s name so that he could file a complaint against her. Gill
denied that defendant ever asked for her name, but Chessick and Cannatello both testified that
defendant asked for Gill’s name. We find this similar to the factual scenario in Dye. There, the
court found that the defendant did not intend to convey the idea of violent retribution when he
told his public defender, “ ‘I’m gonna get you.” ’ ” Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 12. The
court reasoned that “ ‘[g]et’ ” was “just as apt a word for nonviolent punishment as violent
punishment and some additional facts, beyond the mere utterance, would be necessary to infer,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that ‘I’m going to get you’ was intended as a threat of violence.” Id.
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No. 1-15-2045
Here, the evidence established that defendant asked for Gill’s name on numerous occasions and
was observed talking on the phone by multiple witnesses. Defendant testified that he was on his
phone because he was calling his attorney to seek advice as to how to file a complaint against
Gill. The evidence also established that defendant demanded Gill give him her name, that
defendant demanded Chessick give him Gill’s name, and that defendant yelled obscenities
outside the office in order to obtain this information. Chessick specifically testified that
defendant’s speech was “demanding like he needed to get that information right that very
second.” This indicates that defendant’s intent was focused on obtaining Gill’s name, not
inflicting violent harm upon her.
¶ 51 In Dye, the defendant’s speech and posture were described as “ ‘aggressive.’ ” Id. Here,
Chessick testified that, although she did not hear defendant threaten Gill with words, “the way
his body was when she was coming into the room was threatening.” Chessick also testified that
she “[did not] feel safe.” However, Chessick’s testimony regarding “the way [defendant’s] body
was” does not create a reasonable inference of defendant’s intent to threaten Gill with violence
because defendant’s conduct was not overtly threatening and Chessick did not provide an
explanation that would lead a rational trier of fact to infer defendant’s intent to threaten violence.
“We should draw only reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution; we should not make
random speculations in favor of the prosecution.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. Additionally, like
the public defender in Dye who was “scared, trembling, and on the verge of tears,” Gill was also
described as tearful and hysterical. However, as was done by the court in Dye, we consider the
victim’s reaction and impression of the defendant in context of the totality of the circumstances
and do not find that Gill’s reaction to defendant is an appropriate source from which to infer
defendant’s intent.
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No. 1-15-2045
¶ 52 We further find it significant that defendant complied when Chessick asked him to step
back from the office door and complied when Deputy Glover asked him to return to the
courtroom after he finished his phone call. This indicates that defendant was not seriously
expressing an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence against Gill. See Black, 538 U.S. at
359-60. Further, although Gill testified that she did not feel she could leave the office, she also
testified she never tried, even though two law clerks had come into and gone out of the office
while she was in there. The totality of the evidence here did not satisfy the State’s burden. It
would be purely speculative to infer that defendant intended to convey a threat of unlawful
violence against Gill based on the evidence presented at trial. Rather, we agree with defendant
that a reasonable inference could be drawn from defendant’s statements and conduct that he was
angry about what Gill had said to him in the courtroom, wanted to find out her name so that he
could file a complaint, and wanted her to come out of the office to provide him with her
information. While we would characterize defendant’s conduct as “distasteful, inept, and crude,”
as in Dye, we also view such conduct as “not criminal.” See Wood, 2017 IL App (1st) 143135,
¶ 22.
¶ 53 Although the State’s closing argument is not raised as an issue on appeal, we find that a
comment made by the State indicates that it believed that it could meet its burden merely by
proving that Gill felt threatened because of how defendant appeared to her or how she felt. In
closing, the prosecutor stated that in order to convict defendant of threatening a public official,
the jury had to find that “defendant knowingly delivered or conveyed directly or indirectly to a
public official by any means a communication containing a threat that would place the public
official in a reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm, confinement, or
restraint.” The State went on to explain as follows:
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No. 1-15-2045
“Directly or indirectly; it doesn’t have to be direct. It doesn’t have to be specific.
[Defendant] didn’t have to tell [Gill] I’m going to hurt you. I am going to confine you.
I’m going to restrain you. He doesn’t have to use those words at all. He doesn’t have to
use words, period. A menacing look, a gesture is enough.”
The defense then made an objection, which was overruled. The State continued with the
following example:
“The boogie man is walking down the street on the same side you are on and you
see him and just his mere presence scares you, just his mere presence, the way he
positioned his body, any gestures he may make, the look in his eyes towards you which
causes you to cross the street, that is an indirect threat.”
¶ 54 While we agree that there are no magic words that indicate a defendant’s intent to convey
a threat, we believe this example by the State exemplifies why no rational trier of fact could have
properly found defendant guilty based on the facts of this case. Neither the case that the State
presented, nor the example given in its closing argument, represents a threat outside the
protection of the first amendment because neither contains an indication that defendant (or the
boogie man, in the example) meant to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit
an act of unlawful violence. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60. Simply put, the State’s evidence and
closing argument improperly focused on defendant’s conduct solely from the perspective of the
victim. Here, there was no evidence of defendant’s intent to threaten Gill with violence, and as
such, the State cannot meet its burden. Although there was testimony that defendant stood
outside the state’s attorney’s satellite office for a number of minutes, continued to yell, and
paced back and forth, without more, it is not rational to infer defendant’s intent to commit
violence. For example, there is no evidence that defendant actually attempted to enter the
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satellite office or that he tried to pull the door open while Gill was inside. There was no evidence
that defendant made overtly threatening gestures while Gill was in the office or that he intended
to do anything but obtain Gill’s name. Additionally, some of the witnesses felt safe enough to go
into the office and come out during the time that defendant was standing outside the door.
During this time, defendant continued to ask for Gill’s name and asked that she come out of the
office and provide it to him. Based on this conduct, no rational trier of fact could have inferred
defendant intended to commit an act of violence against Gill. Because “we interpret section 12-9
as requiring intentionality” (Dye, 2015 IL App (4th) 130799, ¶ 10), the State was required to
prove defendant’s intent to convey a threat of unlawful violence beyond a reasonable doubt, but
failed to do so. As such, we reverse defendant’s conviction for threatening a public official.
Because we reverse defendant’s conviction for threatening a public official due to insufficiency
of the evidence, we need not address his alternative argument for reversal—that his counsel
provided ineffective assistance.
¶ 55 B. Constitutionality of Threatening a Public Official Statute
¶ 56 Defendant argues that the threatening a public official statute is unconstitutional because
it violates guarantees of due process and free speech. Although not raised in the court below, “a
constitutional challenge to a statute can be raised at any time.” People v. Bryant, 128 Ill. 2d 448,
454 (1989). However, our supreme court has long recognized that “ ‘cases should be decided on
nonconstitutional grounds whenever possible, reaching constitutional issues only as a last
resort.’ ” The Carle Foundation v. Cunningham Township, 2017 IL 120427, ¶ 34 (quoting In re
E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172, 178 (2006)). As a result, “ ‘courts *** must avoid reaching constitutional
issues when a case can be decided on other, nonconstitutional grounds’, and such issues ‘should
be addressed only if necessary to decide a case.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Hampton, 225 Ill. 2d
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238, 244 (2007)). Because we have already determined that the State failed to prove defendant
guilty of threatening a public official beyond a reasonable doubt, we need not address his
constitutional challenges.
¶ 57 C. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Unlawful Restraint
¶ 58 Defendant also asserts that his unlawful restraint conviction, which the trial court merged
into his conviction for threatening a public official and did not impose sentence upon, should be
reversed because his speech, which was directed to a public official, cannot be categorized as
“fighting words” that conveyed a “true threat,” and thus his speech was protected by the first
amendment. “In a criminal case, there is no final judgment until the sentence has been imposed,
and in the absence of a final judgment, an appeal cannot be entertained except as specified in
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604 (210 Ill. 2d R. 604).” People v. Thomas, 402 Ill. App. 3d 1129,
1131 (2010). Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604 (eff. Dec. 3, 2015) provides exceptions for appeals
from certain judgments and orders, including appeals by the State; appeals when a defendant is
placed under supervision or sentenced to probation, conditional discharge, or periodic
imprisonment; appeals from bail orders by a defendant before conviction; appeals by a defendant
from a judgment entered upon a guilty plea; appeals from an order finding a defendant unfit to
stand trial or be sentenced; appeals by a defendant on grounds of former jeopardy; and appeals
from an order granting a motion to disqualify defense counsel. None of these exceptions apply
here.
¶ 59 However, our supreme court has recognized other scenarios in which an appellate court
has jurisdiction to address unsentenced convictions. In People v. Dixon, 91 Ill. 2d 346, 349
(1982), the defendant was convicted of armed violence, aggravated battery, mob action, and
disorderly conduct. The circuit court sentenced the defendant to two concurrent four-year terms
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on the armed violence and aggravated battery convictions and did not impose sentence on the
mob violence and disorderly conduct convictions, holding that they merged into the sentenced
convictions. Id. The appellate court affirmed the aggravated battery conviction, reversed the
armed violence conviction, and refused to remand for sentencing on the two unsentenced
convictions. Id. On appeal to the supreme court, the State argued that the appellate court should
have remanded the cause to impose a sentence on the defendant’s conviction for mob action or
disorderly conduct, as the State conceded that the defendant could not be sentenced on both. Id.
at 351. The defendant responded that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to entertain an
appeal from the State from a nonfinal order where the defendant did not raise any issues
concerning its propriety. Id.
¶ 60 In reaching its decision, our supreme court noted that “the final step in a criminal
judgment is the sentence [citations], and that in its absence an appeal ordinarily cannot be
entertained because the judgment is not final [citations].” Id. at 352. The court explained that
there were cases similar to the one at bar where action by the reviewing court was not precluded.
Id. (citing People v. Lilly, 56 Ill. 2d 493 (1974), and People v. Scott, 69 Ill. 2d 85 (1977)). The
court further stated that the issue before it differed from those cases because the defendant had
not appealed from the mob action and disorderly conduct convictions. Id. at 353. The defendant,
therefore, argued that if the court allowed the case to be remanded to impose a sentence on those
counts, it would effectively broaden the right of the State to appeal. Id. The supreme court
rejected the defendant’s argument and held that the matter should be remanded to the circuit
court to impose a sentence on the defendant’s mob action conviction, determining that “[t]he
situation before us is an anomalous one in that the trial judge’s failure to impose sentence on
defendant’s convictions for mob violence and disorderly conduct stemmed from his belief that
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they merged into the other offenses upon which he did not impose sentence.” Id. The court
ultimately held that although the unsentenced convictions were nonfinal orders, the appellate
court had jurisdiction to order remand to impose a sentence because the defendant had appealed
the final judgments entered on the sentenced convictions and because the unsentenced
convictions were “intimately related to and ‘dependent upon’ the appealed convictions within the
meaning of Rule 615(b)(2).” Id. at 353-54.
¶ 61 In People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, our supreme court recently reexamined the
application of Dixon. In Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 14, the defendant was convicted of four
counts—two counts of stalking and two counts of cyberstalking—but was only sentenced on one
stalking count. The circuit court did not impose a sentence on the three remaining convictions,
and the record on appeal did not disclose why. Id. The appellate court vacated all four of the
defendant’s convictions based on its determination that the stalking and cyberstalking statutes
violated due process. Id. ¶ 15. The supreme court disagreed with the appellate court’s reasoning
(id. ¶ 22), but ultimately affirmed its decision to vacate defendant’s convictions on other grounds
(id. ¶ 78). As a final matter, the supreme court addressed the appellate court’s decision to address
the validity of the defendant’s three unsentenced convictions. Id. ¶ 71. The court noted that the
appellate court determined that it had jurisdiction to address those convictions based on Dixon,
and found “the appellate court’s conclusion to be unwarranted under the circumstances of this
case.” Id. The court stated that the appellate court’s reliance on Dixon was misplaced for two
reasons. First, the court found Dixon distinguishable on its facts because Dixon was
“ ‘anomalous’ ” in that “the circuit court determined, albeit incorrectly, that sentences could not
be imposed on the lesser offenses because they merged into the other offenses.” Id. ¶ 74. Our
supreme court then made clear its view that “the decision in Dixon must be understood to be
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limited to the type of factual situation presented in that case,” which it stated did not exist in the
case before it. Id. Second, the court stated that Dixon must be given a narrower interpretation
than the one given by the appellate court because “[a] close reading of Dixon makes clear that, to
the extent the appellate court had any jurisdiction to address the nonfinal convictions, that
jurisdiction was limited to ordering a remand for imposition of sentences on the lesser
convictions.” Id. ¶ 75. As a result, the court held that the appellate court had interpreted Dixon
too broadly and had improperly considered the merits of the defendant’s unsentenced
convictions. Id. Ultimately, however, the supreme court exercised its general administrative and
supervisory authority to obtain jurisdiction over the unsentenced counts. Id. ¶ 76.
¶ 62 Although defendant was not sentenced on the unlawful restraint count, he nonetheless
argues that this court should reverse that conviction. In this case, it is clear that the trial court did
not impose a sentence on the unlawful restraint count because it merged that conviction into
defendant’s conviction for threatening a public official and imposed a two-and-a-half year prison
sentence on the threatening a public official count. It is unclear why the court merged those two
convictions. Defendant states in his reply brief that “the record shows the trial court erroneously
merged the unlawful restraint conviction into the threatening a public official conviction,” but
provides no explanation or legal authority to explain why the merger was erroneous. Instead,
defendant argues that our substantive review is permitted because an erroneous merger occurred
here as it did in Dixon.
¶ 63 Defendant acknowledges Relerford, but suggests that the court there “held the appellate
court should not have addressed the validity of the defendant’s unsentenced convictions because
the record did not disclose the reason for the trial court’s failure to impose sentences on those
counts.” We agree with defendant that the factual scenario in this case is similar to that of Dixon
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and thus may satisfy the first part of the Relerford holding that requires an appellate court’s
jurisdiction to review unsentenced convictions be limited to cases factually similar to Dixon.
However, we disagree with defendant’s interpretation of Relerford because defendant ignores the
second portion of the Relerford holding, wherein the court stated that even when a factual
scenario similar to Dixon existed and thus an appellate court had jurisdiction, “that jurisdiction
was limited to ordering a remand for imposition of sentences on the lesser conviction.” Id. ¶ 75.
Here, it is possible that the circuit court improperly merged counts as in Dixon, but even
assuming that the merger was improper, we would still not have jurisdiction to review the merits
of defendant’s unlawful restraint conviction based on the court’s holding in Relerford. As a
result, because defendant has included his unlawful restraint count in his notice of appeal, we
exercise our limited jurisdiction to remand this matter to the circuit court to impose a sentence on
defendant’s unlawful restraint count. See People v. Olaska, 2017 IL App (2d) 150567, ¶ 115
(“[R]egardless of what authority this court has with respect to unsentenced convictions, we have
no jurisdiction to review convictions that defendant has not in fact appealed.”).
¶ 64 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 65 Based on the foregoing, we reverse defendant’s conviction for threatening a public
official because the State failed to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We also
remand this matter to the circuit court to impose a sentence on defendant’s unlawful restraint
conviction because we lack jurisdiction to address the merits of defendant’s appeal of that issue.
¶ 66 Reversed and remanded with directions.
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