Lee County, Illinois v. Lee County Landfill, Inc. ( 2022 )

NOTICE 2022 IL App (4th) 220362-UFILED
This Order was filed under
NO. 4-22-0362 December 9, 2022
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender
not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate
limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT
Court, IL
under Rule 23(e)(1).
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
LEE COUNTY, ILLINOIS, a Public Corporation and ) Appeal from the
Body Politic, ) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Lee County
v. ) No. 21MR98
LEE COUNTY LANDFILL, INC., an Illinois )
Corporation and REPUBLIC SERVICES, INC., a ) Honorable
Delaware Corporation, ) Clayton L. Lindsey,
Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice Doherty concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, finding the circuit court properly entered summary
judgment because there existed no genuine issue of material fact and defendants
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
¶2 In November 2021, plaintiff, Lee County, filed a complaint for declaratory
judgment, seeking the circuit court’s declaration plaintiff has the right to consider an application
for the siting of a second landfill within its geographic boundaries, and the solid waste
management agreement between plaintiff and defendants, Lee County Landfill, Inc., and
Republic Services, Inc., did not restrict any such right. Pursuant to section 2-1005(c) of the Code
of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2020)), defendants moved for summary
judgment, contending there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the
contractual agreement between the parties prevented plaintiff from enacting a solid waste
management plan intended to establish alternative landfills within Lee County. After substantial
briefing and argument, the court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion.
¶3 Plaintiff appeals, arguing the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of defendants. Plaintiff contends the court erred by enforcing the contract in a way which
misinterpreted its terms and ignored the “statutory primacy” of plaintiff’s solid waste
management plan over the contract. We affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 The following facts are taken from plaintiff’s complaint as well as various
documents submitted by the parties. In August 1993, plaintiff adopted a solid waste management
plan (Plan) pursuant to section 4(a) of the Solid Waste Planning and Recycling Act (SWPRA)
(415 ILCS 15/4(a) (West 1992)), which provided, in part, “each county with a population of less
than 100,000, shall submit to the [Environmental Protection] Agency [(Agency)] an officially
adopted plan for the management of municipal waste generated within its boundaries.” Relevant
to this appeal, section 5(e) of SWPRA (415 ILCS 15/5(e) (West 1992)) requires each county
waste management plan to be updated and reviewed every five years.
¶6 In June 1994, plaintiff entered into a solid waste management agreement
(Agreement) with defendants, wherein defendants agreed to operate a landfill located within Lee
County in exchange for, inter alia, plaintiff’s agreement “to amend its *** Plan by designating
the Lee County Landfill as its regional waste disposal facility.” Thereafter, plaintiff amended the
Plan to provide that plaintiff would utilize existing sited landfill capacity within Lee County as
its long-term disposal option and recognized its agreement with defendants “to continue
operation of the Lee County Landfill into the foreseeable future.”
-2-
¶7 In October 1998, plaintiff adopted its first five-year update to the Plan (five-year
update) which provided plaintiff would “rely on the Lee County Landfill for its long-term
disposal capacity pursuant to its *** Agreement with [defendants].” The five-year update further
recommended there be no new landfills sited or expanded in Lee County for the next five years.
¶8 In October 2002, the parties adopted an amendment to the Agreement after
finding it necessary to do so before defendants filed their intended siting application for the
expansion of the Lee County Landfill. In exchange for defendants’ willingness to (1) provide
“long-term, environmentally sound landfill disposal capacity for [plaintiff’s] residents and
commercial, institutional, and industrial establishments” and (2) pay plaintiff a fee for each ton
of waste disposed of in the landfill, plaintiff agreed to amend the Plan “to designate the Lee
County Landfill as the sole landfill to be permitted in Lee County, so long as [Lee County
Landfill, Inc.] is open and operating the Lee County Landfill *** and is in compliance with the
Agreement (as amended) and the *** Plan.”
¶9 In November 2003, plaintiff adopted its 10-year update to the Plan, wherein
plaintiff acknowledged its obligations under the October 2002 amendment to the Agreement.
The 10-year update also provided “a list of the recommendations approved by the Lee County
Board which represent[ed] [plaintiff’s] solid waste policy for the next five years,” which
included the following provision:
“The Lee County Landfill as it is currently permitted and as it is anticipated to be
expanded, shall be designated as the sole landfill to be permitted anywhere within
the borders of Lee County. This sole designation is contingent upon the Lee
County Landfill and its expansion remaining open and operating, and remaining
in compliance with the *** Agreement, as amended.”
-3-
¶ 10 In November 2008, the parties adopted a second amendment to the Agreement
after plaintiff sought assurances and investments in the Lee County Landfill from defendants to
ensure Lee County’s solid waste disposal needs were met in the future. In exchange for
defendants’ willingness to provide plaintiff’s desired assurances and investments, plaintiff
agreed “to reaffirm its agreement, commitment, and determination that the [Lee County] Landfill
will be the only landfill to be permitted in Lee County.” That same month, plaintiff adopted its
15-year update to the Plan, which reaffirmed the Lee County Landfill’s designation as the “sole
landfill” to be permitted within Lee County, so long as it remained open and operating and in
compliance with the Agreement.
¶ 11 In March 2012, the parties adopted the third, and final, amendment to the
Agreement, wherein plaintiff “recognize[d] the historical and future capability of the [Lee
County] Landfill and [defendants] to provide for the solid waste disposal needs of [Lee]
County.” Similar to the provisions set forth in the second amendment to the Agreement,
defendants again agreed “to ensure the solid waste disposal needs of [Lee] County are met in the
future” if plaintiff agreed “to reaffirm its agreement, commitment, and determination that the
[Lee County] Landfill will be the only landfill to be permitted in Lee County.” Further, the third
amendment provided, “All provisions of the Agreement, the First Amendment, and the Second
Amendment not amended by this Third Amendment shall remain in full force and effect.”
¶ 12 In November 2013, plaintiff adopted its 20-year update to the Plan. The 20-year
update made no mention of its obligations pursuant to the parties’ March 2012 amendment to the
Agreement and no longer included any provision designating the Lee County Landfill as the
“sole landfill” to be permitted in Lee County. However, the 20-year update provided plaintiff
-4-
would “continue to rely on the *** Lee County Landfill for disposal capacity for at least the next
five years.”
¶ 13 In June 2019, plaintiff adopted its 25-year update to the Plan, which
recommended plaintiff “position itself as a regional depository for waste generated in northern
Illinois.” To that end, the 25-year update provided, “[t]he Lee County Landfill shall no longer be
designated as the sole landfill to be permitted within [Lee] County,” and the Lee County Board
“retain[ed] the right to site a second landfill in Lee County,” despite the Lee County Landfill’s
“projected *** 49 years of remaining capacity.”
¶ 14 In November 2021, plaintiff filed the instant complaint for declaratory judgment.
In its complaint, plaintiff argued defendants’ “position concerning the terms of the Agreement is
wrong” because the Agreement “always deferred to the plan *** concerning the designation of
the [Lee County] Landfill as the sole landfill in Lee County.” As a result, plaintiff sought the
circuit court’s declaration plaintiff had the right to consider an application for the siting of a
second landfill within its geographic boundaries, and the Agreement, as amended, did not restrict
any such right.
¶ 15 Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment in December 2021, asserting no
genuine issue of material fact existed on whether plaintiff had the right to consider an application
for the siting of a second landfill. Specifically, defendants asserted the Agreement, as well as its
amendments, limited “[p]laintiff’s right to permit the operation of any landfill at and within its
geographic boundaries *** to allowing [defendants] to commence and continue to operate the
subject landfill as the ‘sole’ landfill within *** [p]laintiff’s geographic boundaries.” Thus,
defendants argued, they were entitled to judgment in their favor.
-5-
¶ 16 In February 2022, plaintiff filed a response to defendants’ summary judgment
motion, asserting “any promise to designate the [Lee County] Landfill as the ‘sole landfill’ was
*** only for a limited amount of time.” In support of its argument, plaintiff claimed the updates
to the Plan “making the sole landfill designation ***, by their express terms, were each for a
limited time period of 5 years,” and “under the Illinois Environmental Protection Act [(Act) (415
ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2020))], the Plan controls over the *** Agreement.” Therefore, according
to plaintiff, defendants were not entitled to judgment in their favor because the Plan (1) had not
designated the Lee County Landfill as the “sole landfill” to be permitted in Lee County since
2013 and (2) had called for a second landfill since 2019.
¶ 17 In April 2022, the circuit court entered a written order granting defendants’
summary judgment motion. In doing so, the court noted there “ha[d] been no allegation that
[d]efendants are in breach of the Agreement or that the contract ha[d] been terminated.” The
court also considered the relevant provisions of the Act, the SWPRA, as well as the Local Solid
Waste Disposal Act (LSWDA) (415 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West 2020)), and determined plaintiff
possessed “the right to make the Lee County Landfill an exclusive landfill within [Lee] County
***, even if such exclusive methods *** have an anti-competitive effect.” However, despite
plaintiff’s “absolute authority” in deciding how it disposes of solid waste, the court found
plaintiff “must also comply with the contracts entered into for such purpose.” The court stated
further:
“While [plaintiff] can certainly make a policy determination that a second landfill
is necessary, this policy[-]making authority does not give [it] the unfettered right
to breach or terminate an existing contract. The contract [plaintiff] has entered
with [defendants] *** requires such landfill to be operated by [defendants]. The
-6-
contract has not expired and there is no contention that Lee County Landfill is not
continuing to be open and operating *** in Lee County. ***
*** [Plaintiff] is certainly free to set its policy and determine that it should
place itself in a position to accept waste from northern Illinois and Wisconsin. It
can also reach the policy decision to site another landfill. However, it must do so
within the contractual obligations it has entered into with the Defendants.”
¶ 18 This appeal followed.
¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 20 On appeal, plaintiff argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment
in defendants’ favor because it “wrongly assumed” an additional landfill would breach the
Agreement between plaintiff and defendants. Specifically, plaintiff contends the Plan governs the
Agreement and, therefore, the only promise made to defendants was a time-limited promise to
amend the Plan to grant exclusive landfill status, pursuant to section 5(e) of the SWPRA (415
ILCS 15/5(e) (West 2020)), effective only until the next update to the Plan.
¶ 21 Section 2-1005(c) of the Code governs summary judgments, providing the circuit
court must enter judgment where the “pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2020). A
circuit court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment presents a question of law, and thus we
apply the de novo standard of review. Brotze v. City of Carlinville, 2021 IL App (4th) 200369,
¶ 27, 183 N.E.3d 251.
¶ 22 The primary purpose of the Act is “to establish a unified, state-wide program
supplemented by private remedies, to restore, protect and enhance the quality of the
-7-
environment, and to assure that adverse effects upon the environment are fully considered and
borne by those who cause them.” 415 ILCS 5/2(b) (West 2020). Section 39(a) of the Act tasks
the Agency with responsibility to issue permits to applicants upon proof the “facility *** will not
cause a violation of this Act or of regulations hereunder.” 415 ILCS 5/39(a) (West 2020). The
Act further authorizes the Agency to impose conditions necessary to accomplish the purposes of
the Act. 415 ILCS 5/39(a) (West 2020).
¶ 23 Prior to November 1981, the Agency was generally entrusted with approving
permits for the development of landfill facilities. M.I.G. Investments, Inc. v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 122 Ill. 2d 392, 398, 523 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1988). However, as of November
1981, the Act was amended to provide “county and municipal governments a limited degree of
control over new solid waste disposal sites within their boundaries.” M.I.G. Investments, Inc.,
122 at 398 (citing Pub. Act 82-682 (eff. Nov. 12, 1981)). By March 1995, any county with a
population less than 100,000 was required to “submit to the Agency an officially adopted plan
for the management of municipal waste generated within its boundaries.” 415 ILCS 15/4(a)
(West 2020). A county’s solid waste management plan must be updated and reviewed every five
years, “and any necessary or appropriate revisions shall be submitted to the Agency for review
and comment.” 415 ILCS 15/5(e) (West 2020). As part of the permitting process, “units of local
government may provide by *** contract or other means that the methods of disposal of solid
waste shall be the exclusive methods of disposal to be allowed within their respective
jurisdictions.” 415 ILCS 10/6 (West 2020).
¶ 24 Pursuant to section 39.2(a) of the Act, local county boards “shall approve or
disapprove the request for local siting approval” upon consideration of statutory criteria. 415
ILCS 5/39.2(a) (West 2020). If the proposed facility establishes the statutory criteria, “local
-8-
siting approval shall be granted.” 415 ILCS 5/39.2(a) (West 2020). In relevant part, the
enumerated criteria require that if the facility will be located “in a county where the county board
has adopted a solid waste management plan ***, the facility is consistent with that plan.” 415
ILCS 5/39.2(a)(viii) (West 2020). “At least one public hearing *** is to be held by the county
board or governing body of the municipality no sooner than 90 days but no later than 120 days
after the date on which it received the request for site approval.” 415 ILCS 5/39.2(d) (West
2020). “If, prior to making a final local siting decision, a county board or governing body of a
municipality has negotiated and entered into a host agreement with the local siting applicant, the
terms and conditions of the host agreement *** shall be disclosed and made a part of the hearing
record for that local siting proceeding.” 415 ILCS 5/39.2(e) (West 2020).
¶ 25 As stated, plaintiff contends the Agreement is governed by the Plan. In support of
its argument, plaintiff directs our attention to Will County v. Village of Rockdale, 2018 IL App
(3d) 160463, 121 N.E.3d 468, and Fox Moraine, LLC v. United City of Yorkville, 2011 IL App
(2d) 100017, 960 N.E.2d 1144. However, we find plaintiff’s reliance on these cases to be
misplaced, as neither supports plaintiff’s position on appeal. For example, in Will County, the
respondent, a refuse hauling business operating in Rockdale, Illinois, filed a request for siting
approval to develop a pollution control transfer station. Will County, 2018 IL App (3d) 160463,
¶ 3. Following a public hearing on the matter, the Rockdale Board of Trustees (Rockdale Board)
conditionally approved the respondent’s application and found it satisfied the enumerated criteria
set forth in section 39.2(a) of the Act. Will County, 2018 IL App (3d) 160463, ¶ 26. Thereafter,
the petitioners, Will County and Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., filed separate petitions
requesting the Illinois Pollution Control Board (Pollution Board) review the Rockdale Board’s
decision. Will County, 2018 IL App (3d) 160463, ¶ 30. The Pollution Board upheld the Rockdale
-9-
Board’s approval of the respondent’s application, finding the Rockdale Board’s decision
regarding subsections (i), (ii), (v), and (viii) of section 39.2(a) of the Act was not against the
manifest weight of the evidence. Will County, 2018 IL App (3d) 160463, ¶ 30.
¶ 26 On appeal, the petitioners argued, in relevant part, the respondent’s siting
application was inconsistent with certain provisions of Will County’s solid waste management
plan and, therefore, not in compliance with section 39.2(a)(viii) of the Act. Will County, 2018 IL
App (3d) 160463, ¶ 78. However, the Third District found “nothing in the record that shows that
the application was not in compliance with the Will County [solid waste management plan].”
Will County, 2018 IL App (3d) 160463, ¶ 81.
¶ 27 In Fox Moraine, LLC, the petitioner, Fox Moraine, LLC, appealed from the
Pollution Board’s order affirming the decision of the Yorkville City Council to deny the
petitioner’s siting application to construct a landfill in Kendall County for failing to satisfy the
criteria set forth in subsections (i), (ii), (iii), (v), (vi), and (viii) of section 39.2(a) of the Act. Fox
Moraine, LLC, 2011 IL App (2d) 100017, ¶ 1. On appeal, Kendall County and the Pollution
Board argued “the county’s May 2006 amendment to its ‘Kendall County Solid Waste
Management Plan’ *** provided that landfills could be sited only within unincorporated areas of
the county,” and thus, the petitioner “failed to meet criterion (viii) because siting the facility
within the city limits of Yorkville would violate the county’s solid waste plan.” Fox Moraine,
LLC, 2011 IL App (2d) 100017, ¶ 105. In response, the petitioner asserted it satisfied the county
plan’s siting requirement because “it ‘located’ the landfill while the land was in unincorporated
Kendall County” and “negotiated the host agreement with Yorkville before it annexed the
property.” Fox Moraine, LLC, 2011 IL App (2d) 100017, ¶ 108. Ultimately, the Second District
“agree[d] with the [Pollution] Board and Yorkville that [the petitioner’s] interpretation of the
- 10 -
amendment’s use of the word ‘located’ [was] a strained one” and found, “[w]ithout any evidence
to the contrary *** we are left with Kendall County’s solid waste management plan amendment,
which usurped the right of any municipality in Kendall County to site a solid waste management
facility.” Fox Moraine, LLC, 2011 IL App (2d) 100017, ¶¶ 107-08. Therefore, “the [Pollution]
Board’s decision that [the petitioner] failed to meet criterion (viii) was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.” Fox Moraine, LLC, 2011 IL App (2d) 100017, ¶ 108.
¶ 28 Unlike the present case, the questions presented in Will County and Fox Moraine,
LLC, turned on whether a prospective landfill’s siting application complied with the enumerated
criteria set forth in section 39.2(a) of the Act, which included compliance with each respective
county’s solid waste management plan. See 415 ILCS 5/39.2(a)(viii) (West 2020). Neither
addresses the status of a county’s plan in relation to existing contracts to which the county is a
party. There also is no dispute over the Lee County Landfill’s siting application. Although the
court in Fox Moraine, LLC, provided some clarity with respect to the interplay between a
county’s solid waste management plan and the siting rights of a municipality within its
boundaries, plaintiff fails to cite any authority—statutory or otherwise—supporting the type of
primacy plaintiff seeks here.
¶ 29 However, in Village of South Elgin v. Waste Management of Illinois, Inc., 348 Ill.
App. 3d 929, 930, 810 N.E.2d 658, 661 (2004), the Second District analyzed a contract dispute
within the statutory framework of section 39.2 of the Act. In that case, the defendant began
operating a landfill near the village-plaintiff’s eastern border in 1976. Village of South Elgin, 348
Ill. App. 3d at 931. By 1982, “it was determined that the facility could sustain operations for only
36 more months.” Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 931. However, the defendant
continued operating the landfill after receiving the requisite permit from the county and, in 1988,
- 11 -
the defendant sought to apply for another permit allowing the landfill to operate for another 15
years. Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 931.
¶ 30 Although the plaintiff initially opposed the landfill’s 15-year extension, the
parties eventually reached an agreement in which the plaintiff agreed not to oppose the extension
at the Kane County Board hearing if, among other things, the defendant agreed to not expand the
landfill further. Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 931. In 1998, the Kane County Board
enacted a resolution granting the 15-year extension. Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at
932. The resolution expressly incorporated the parties’ agreement, which provided the landfill
“ ‘shall not be expanded further.’ ” Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 932. In 2002, the
defendant filed an application with the county board to operate a transfer facility, which “would
occupy about 9 acres of the 120-acre area that the landfill occupie[d]” and service over twice the
number of trucks using the landfill each day. Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 932.
Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging the defendant’s proposed installation breached
(1) the conditions imposed by the county and (2) the covenants the defendant agreed to with the
plaintiff. Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 932.
¶ 31 On appeal, the Second District examined whether the doctrine of exhaustion of
remedies barred the plaintiff from proceeding and noted the doctrine only applied “when an
agency has exclusive jurisdiction over an action.” Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 935.
“If the legislature does intend to divest the circuit courts of jurisdiction over some matter, it must
do so explicitly.” Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 935. With those principles in mind,
the Second District interpreted section 39.2(a) of the Act, which “vests county boards and other
local governmental bodies with the authority to grant requests for local siting approval.” Village
of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 935. The court also considered section 39.2(g) of the Act,
- 12 -
which provides, in relevant part, “ ‘The siting approval procedures, criteria and appeal
procedures provided for in this Act for new pollution control facilities shall be the exclusive
siting procedures and rules and appeal procedures for facilities subject to such procedures.’ ”
Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 935 (quoting 415 ILCS 5/39.2(g) (West 2002)). Thus,
when read together, “sections 39.2(a) and 39.2(g) make plain the legislature’s intent that county
boards and like entities shall be the exclusive forum for passing on questions regarding the
application of the Act to the siting of pollution control facilities.” Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill.
App. 3d at 935-36.
¶ 32 Ultimately, because the legislature exercised its ability to remove such matters
from the circuit court’s jurisdiction, the Second District determined, “to the extent [the]
plaintiff’s complaint is based upon [the] defendant’s alleged violation of the Kane County
resolution, it is subject to the requirement [the] plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies.
However, [the] plaintiff’s contract theory is not.” Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 934.
The court reasoned this was so because the plaintiff’s “claim does not involve a right arising
under the Act or from an action of the Kane County Board.” Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App.
3d at 936. Rather, the plaintiff’s claim stemmed from an alleged contract, which is “a traditional
common-law cause of action,” existing independently of the Act, and not part of the process of
siting approval. Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 936-37. Because “section 39.2(g)’s
plain language indicates that the legislature intended to vest the county board with jurisdiction to
hear only matters specified in the Act,” the court determined the legislature “did not intend that
matters such as actions based on contracts, even if they actually could affect siting, be heard
exclusively before the county board.” Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 937. Therefore,
despite the possible effect on the defendant’s ability to utilize a portion of the landfill site for a
- 13 -
transfer station, the Second District found the defendant’s “obligations under the alleged contract
with [the] plaintiff *** collateral to the issue before the Kane County Board regarding whether it
would be appropriate to permit a transfer facility at the *** site in accordance with the
requirements of the Act.” Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 937.
¶ 33 Here, there is little question “units of local government may provide by ***
contract or other means that the methods of disposal of solid waste shall be the exclusive
methods of disposal to be allowed within their respective jurisdictions.” 415 ILCS 10/6 (West
2020). This is the action plaintiff took when it agreed to designate the Lee County Landfill as the
“sole landfill” to be permitted within Lee County, so long as it remained open and operating and
in compliance with the Agreement. However, aside from granting units of local government
considerable discretion in how they manage solid waste and providing the relevant criteria for
local siting approval, none of the above-cited statutes contain a provision granting a county the
right to unilaterally terminate an existing contract. Rather, a contract claim is a traditional
common-law cause of action, existing independently of the Act, and peripheral to the issue
before the Lee County Board regarding whether it would be appropriate to site another landfill in
Lee County. See Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 936-37. Plaintiff’s contractual
obligations regarding the Lee County Landfill’s “sole landfill” designation stem from the
Agreement. Therefore it follows, because a contract dispute does not involve a right arising
under the Act (see Village of South Elgin, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 936), the Agreement, at least as of
the present time, has not expired and remains enforceable. “A contract is to be construed as a
whole, giving meaning and effect to every portion thereof, if possible, and not resorting to
detached portions thereof standing alone.” Coles-Moultrie Electric Cooperative v. City of
Sullivan, 304 Ill. App. 3d 153, 159, 709 N.E.2d 249, 253 (1999). Plaintiff has not alleged a
- 14 -
breach of the Agreement or that the Lee County Landfill is not continuing to be open and
operating in Lee County. While plaintiff is certainly free to determine its policies and place itself
in a position to accept waste from other jurisdictions, “it must do so within the contractual
obligations it has entered into with *** [d]efendants.”
¶ 34 Accordingly, we find the circuit court did not err by concluding no colorable
argument exists plaintiff has the statutory right to unilaterally terminate the Agreement with
defendants and consider an application for the siting of a second landfill. Therefore, the circuit
court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment as there exists no genuine
issue of material fact, and defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Illinois
Environmental Protection Agency v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 2018 IL App (4th)
170144, ¶ 20, 142 N.E.3d 737.
¶ 35 In closing, we commend the circuit court for providing a thoughtful and
comprehensive written order summarizing the evidence and detailing the court’s reasoning. The
order provided valuable insight into the court’s thought process, which this court found most
helpful.
¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 37 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.
¶ 38 Affirmed.
- 15 -