People v. Townsend , 2022 IL App (1st) 191110-U ( 2022 )

2022 IL App (1st) 191110-UNo. 1-19-1110
May 16, 2022
FIRST DIVISION
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in
the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Cook County, Illinois.
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) No. 17 CR 9901
v. )
) Honorable
ROMELLO TOWNSEND ) James B. Linn,
) Judge Presiding.
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
JUSTICE WALKER delivered the judgment of the court.
Justice Coghlan concurred in the judgment. Justice Pucinski specially
concurred.
Order
Held: The in-court identification of the defendant as the offender, together with an expert’s
identification of the defendant’s fingerprint on an object taken from the victim,
sufficed to prove the defendant guilty of aggravated battery and attempted armed
robbery. Testimony that another expert verified the testifying expert’s fingerprint
identification did not amount to plain error where the record did not show that the
judge relied on the hearsay.
¶1 Following a bench trial, the trial court found Romello Townsend guilty of aggravated
battery and attempted armed robbery. Townsend contends that the evidence did not support
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the convictions, and the trial court committed plain error by allowing hearsay into evidence.
We find the corroboration of eyewitness and fingerprint identifications sufficed to prove
Townsend guilty. Because Townsend has not shown the trial court relied on the hearsay, we
find no plain error. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 Around 1:30 a.m., on October 13, 2016, two men robbed Trace Hamilton and Rachel
Ehrenberg on a street in Wrigleyville, taking Hamilton’s wallet and cellphone. Police found
the cellphone shortly thereafter near Lake Shore Drive. Hamilton and Ehrenberg went to the
police station to view a lineup in March 2017, about five months after the robbery. Hamilton
identified Townsend as one of the robbers, while Ehrenberg identified one of the fillers.
Prosecutors charged Townsend with armed robbery.
¶4 At the bench trial, Hamilton testified that he got a good look at the robbers when they
stepped into the light from a nearby store. Townsend grabbed Hamilton and held him from
behind and placed a gun-like object against Hamilton’s neck. The other robber struck
Ehrenberg with a gun-like object when she refused to hand over her purse. A car pulled up
and the two robbers jumped in. The entire incident took less than two minutes. Hamilton gave
police only a generic description of the offenders: two Black men, about 6 feet tall. At trial,
Hamilton added that one wore dreadlocks, and one wore a hat.
¶5 An officer testified that he lifted a fingerprint from Hamilton’s cellphone. Officer Cynthia
Seavers testified that she worked as a fingerprint examiner for 12 years after receiving more
than 200 hours of classroom instruction on the science of fingerprints. In her opinion, the
fingerprint lifted from Hamilton’s cellphone matched Townsend’s fingerprints.
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¶6 On cross-examination, Seavers admitted she did not mark features of the fingerprints lifted
from the cellphone before comparing them with the fingerprints obtained directly from
Townsend. Seavers acknowledged that the Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge
Analysis, Study, and Technology (SWGFRAST) recommended such marking prior to
comparison. Seavers knew that some examiners mark features in different colors based on
their confidence that a person’s fingerprints would show that feature, but she did not use that
method. She acknowledged that verifiers working for the Chicago Police Department knew
whether the first examiner found a match before the verifier reviewed the fingerprints. Seavers
testified that Townsend’s fingerprint card included her handwriting and the handwriting of “the
verifier, Officer Alan Metke.” Seavers explained that after comparing Townsend’s fingerprint
with the original lift, identification was once again verified by Metke.
¶7 The court found Hamilton and Seavers credible. Hamilton’s in-court identification of
Townsend, corroborated by Seavers’s testimony regarding the fingerprints found on
Hamilton’s cellphone, constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Townsend committed
the offense. The court found that the State failed to prove the robbers had firearms, but by
striking Ehrenberg with a bludgeon to try to get her purse, the robbers attempted armed
robbery. The court sentenced Townsend to 12 years for attempted armed robbery and 5 years
for aggravated battery, with the sentences to run concurrently. Townsend now appeals.
¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 On appeal, Townsend argues the evidence does not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
he committed aggravated battery and attempted armed robbery, the court erred by permitting
Seavers to testify Metke verified her fingerprint identification, and the matter should be
remanded to correct a clerical error in mittimus.
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¶ 10 When considering challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, a reviewing court must
determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, "any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt." People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985). The reviewing court
shall decide whether the evidence supports a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People
v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280, 818 N.E.2d 304 (2004). We will not reverse a conviction
based on insufficient evidence “unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that a
reasonable doubt remains as to the defendant's guilt.” People v. Harris, 2018 IL 121932, ¶ 26.
¶ 11 In assessing identification testimony, we consider the five factors set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972): (1) the witness's
opportunity to view the offender during the offense, (2) the witness's degree of attention at the
time of the offense, (3) the accuracy of the witness's prior description of the offender, (4) the
witness's level of certainty at the identification, and (5) the length of time between the offense
and the identification. People v. Thompson, 2020 IL App (1st) 171265, ¶ 42.
¶ 12 Here, the Biggers factors do not favor identification. Hamilton testified that the light from
a nearby store permitted him to see Townsend’s face at close range for more than a minute.
Hamilton stated that during the offense, he paid attention to the robbers, their weapons, and
Ehrenberg, but because the robber grabbed him from behind, Hamilton could only see the side
of the robber’s face. Hamilton gave only a vague description of the offenders, and his
description of the robber who held him at nearly 6 feet tall did not fit Townsend, who stood
only 5 feet 6 inches tall. Finally, the 5-month delay before the identification counts against its
reliability. See People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 570 (2007).
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¶ 13 Though the Biggers factors do not favor identification, Seavers’s testimony corroborated
Hamilton’s identification of Townsend. Townsend contends the trial court should not have
relied on Seavers’s testimony because she admitted that she did not follow some
recommendations of SWGFRAST. The evidence of Seavers’s training and experience sufficed
to create an issue for the trier of fact concerning the reliability of her opinion. See Snelson v.
Kamm, 204 Ill. 2d 1, 24-27 (2003). In People v. Cline, 2022 IL 126383, a fingerprint examiner
similarly identified a fingerprint on a stolen item as the defendant’s fingerprint. Although the
examiner in Cline did not testify that he completed all steps required for the identification, our
supreme court held that a rational trier of fact could rely on the expert’s opinion to find beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant took the stolen item. Cline, 2022 IL 126383, ¶ 36. A
rational trier of fact could rely on Seavers’s opinion, despite her decision not to adopt some
practices recommended by SWGFRAST. We find the evidence sufficient to sustain the
convictions.
¶ 14 Next Townsend argues that the court erred by permitting Seavers to testify Metke verified
her fingerprint identification. Townsend admits that his attorney did not object at trial, to
Seavers’s testimony indicating: “the verifier, Officer Alan Metke” signed Townsend’s
fingerprint card. Townsend’s attorney also did not object when Seavers testified, “[a]fter doing
the comparison of the in-custody print card to the original lift, it was noted identification was
once again effected.”
¶ 15 Townsend asks this court to find plain error in the introduction of hearsay evidence that
Metke verified Seavers’s finding that the fingerprint on the cellphone matched Townsend’s
fingerprint. This court applies the plain-error doctrine when:
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“(1) a clear or obvious error occurred, and the evidence is so closely balanced that
the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant,
regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred,
and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and
challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the
evidence." Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565.
¶ 16 Our supreme court held that the second prong of plain error review concerns only structural
errors which “erode the integrity of the judicial process and undermine the fairness of the
defendant's trial.” People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 608 (2010). Errors in the admission
of hearsay into evidence do not constitute structural errors. People v. Lewis, 2019 IL App (1st)
160864, ¶ 53. Here, Townsend argues the testimony unfairly bolstered the State’s case where
the evidence at trial was closely balanced.
¶ 17 We find this case is similar to People v. Yancy, 368 Ill. App. 3d 381, 385-87 (2005). In
Yancy, a fingerprint examiner testified that fingerprints found at the crime scene matched the
defendant’s fingerprints. Without objection, the examiner also testified that her lab’s quality
assurance department agreed with her conclusion. The appellate court found the hearsay
evidence harmless in part because defendant failed to identify evidence in the record to
overcome the appellate court’s presumption that the trial judge followed the law and
disregarded hearsay testimony. The court found the latent prints' identification provided
evidence of defendant's guilt, but it did not mention or indicate that its finding was influenced
by the quality assurance department's identification. Yancy, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 386-87.
¶ 18 Here, as in Yancy, there is no evidence in the record to overcome the presumption that the
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trial judge ignored the hearsay evidence of verification. The admission of hearsay identification
testimony is harmless error when the testimony is cumulative or supported by a positive
identification and other corroborative circumstances. People v. Mitchell, 200 Ill. App. 3d 969,
975 (1990). In addition, admission of hearsay evidence is harmless and does not warrant reversal
where there is no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different without the
hearsay evidence. People v. Soto, 342 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1014 (2003). The admission of hearsay
evidence does not require reversal where it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v.
Thompson, 349 Ill. App. 3d 587, 594 (2004). Hence, the admission of Seavers’s testimony
regarding a fingerprint verifier does not amount to plain error.
¶ 19 The parties agree that the mittimus does not correctly reflect the sentence the trial court
imposed. We remand for correction of the mittimus.
¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 21 The record does not show the judge relied on hearsay verification evidence when finding
that Townsend left his fingerprint on Hamilton’s cellphone. We find no plain error in the trial
court’s failure to exclude the evidence of verification. Seavers’s testimony corroborated
Hamilton’s identification of Townsend, making the evidence sufficient to support the
convictions. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We remand for the court to
correct the mittimus.
¶ 22 Affirmed and remanded.
¶ 23 JUSTICE PUCINSKI, specially concurring:
¶ 24 While I agree with my colleagues in this case on these facts, I will never understand why
the Chicago Police Department has yet to modernize its fingerprint analysis protocols to reach
a higher level of believability. Nor do I understand why side-by-side photographs of the
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fingerprint lifted and the fingerprint sample are not put into evidence. I recognize that we are
not in some television “CSI” environment but in real-life court with real-life evidence, not
science fiction. Yet side-by-side comparison is well within the capability of the police and the
state. The more clear evidence is presented the more we serve the liberty interests of
defendants, which must always be our highest priority.
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